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Abstract 
In recent years researchers from a variety of cognitive science disciplines have begun to 
challenge some of the core assumptions of the dominant theoretical framework of 
cognitivism including the representation-computational view of cognition, the sense-
model-plan-act understanding of cognitive architecture, and the use of a formal task 
description strategy for investigating the organisation of internal mental processes. 
Challenges to these assumptions are illustrated using empirical findings and theoretical 
arguments from the fields such as situated robotics, dynamical systems approaches to 
cognition, situated action and distributed cognition research, and sociohistorical studies of 
cognitive development. Several shared themes are extracted from the findings in these 
research programmes including: a focus on agent-environment systems as the primary unit 
of analysis; an attention to agent-environment interaction dynamics; a vision of the 
cognizer's internal mechanisms as essentially reactive and decentralised in nature; and a 
tendency for mutual definitions of agent, environment, and activity. It is argued that, taken 
together, these themes signal the emergence of a new approach to . cognition called 
embodied, situated, and distributed interactionism. This interactionist alternative has many 
resonances with the dynamical systems approach to cognition. However, this approach 
does not provide a theory of the implementing substrate sufficient for an interactionist 
theoretical framework. It is suggested that such a theory can be found in a view of animals 
as autonomous systems coupled with a portrayal of the nervous system as a regulatory, 
coordinative, and integrative bodily subsystem. Although a number of recent simulations 
show connectionism's promise as a computational technique in simulating the role of the 
nervous system from an interactionist perspective, this embodied connectionist framework 
does not lend itself to understanding the advanced 'representation hungry' cognition we 
witness in much human behaviour. It is argued that this problem can be solved by 
understanding advanced cognition as the re-use of basic perception-action skills and 
structures that this feat is enabled by a general education within a social symbol-using 
environment. 
1. Cognition: A Concept in Transition 
Cognition may not be what we think it is. 
Ed Hutchins (according to Elman, 1995, p. 195) 
Introduction 
The majority of psychologists and other cognitive scientists have traditionally assumed that 
cognition is what the mind does, and that the term mind is just an old-fashioned way of 
talking about the functioning of the brain. So the major focus for cognitive explanation has 
been on what goes on inside agents' heads. Ask a traditionalist where we might find 
cognition and you will receive a response something like this: 
The fact that cognition is something the brain does is so obvious it seems barely worth stating. (Kosslyn, 
1986, p. 231). 
I will refer to this dominant theoretical framework as cognitivism. Cognitivism underpins 
much of the theoretical work done in cognitive psychology and the other cognitive science 
disciplines such as artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy of mind, and 
neurobiology. And insofar as cognitive psychology has become the default foundation of 
nearly all modem psychology, cognitivism can be viewed as forming the foundation of 
most contemporary psychological theory. The cognitivist framework, as I shall characterise 
it, consists of three interlocking assumptions. First, the cognizer is assumed to be an 
information-processor who extracts, stores, and manipulates information about things in 
the environment. Second, information is considered to be realised by representations 
which are transformed and manipulated by computations. Finally, from a methodological 
perspective these representational-computational information-processing sequences and 
operations are arrived at via a process of formal task description. Roughly speaking, this 
involves working out what algorithms are logically necessary for carrying out various 
kinds of cognitive tasks and attempting to map these procedures on to neurocognitive 
structures and processes. I will have more to say about cognitivism in the next chapter. For 
now it is important to note that these three assumptions underpin cognitivism's 
commitment to the idea that cognition goes on in one's head. 
Recently attitudes have begun to change. A growing number of researchers from various 
cognitive science-related disciplines have argued that many cognitive activities and 
behaviours are not best understood primarily in terms of the processes going on inside 
agents' heads (i.e., in their central nervous systems or brains). Instead, they argue that we 
must understand behaviour as arising from the continuous interplay of the internal 
resources (brains, bodily systems) and external resources (objects in the environment, other 
agents, and so on). Claims like the following are beginning to appear in the literature: 
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Minds are not purely internal things; they are, in part, worldly in character. That is, minds are hybrid entities, 
made up in part of what is going on inside the skin of creatures who have them, but also made up in part of 
what is going on in the environment of those creatures. (Rowlands, 1999, p. 29) 
Enter the new wave in cognitive science l . It does not currently have a commonly agreed 
upon name, probably because it is really still a loose amalgamation of ideas, techniques, 
and disciplines. I will call this new approach embodied, situated, and distributed 
interaction ism (ESD interactionism for short. Others call it (or something like it), situated 
cognition (Clancey, 1997), embodied cognition (Clark, 1997), embedded cognition 
(Haugeland, 1995), enactivism (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), environmentalism 
(Rowlands, 1999), interactivist-constructionism (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press) 
and behavioural systems theory (Keijzer, 1997). There is a feeling amongst some that ESD 
interactionism may revolutionise cognitive science. 
We contend ... that a breakthrough is occurring within cognitive science that will prove to be a more 
dramatic turning-point in the history of western ideas than the 'cognitive revolution' ever was. We are 
witnessing a shift from a linguistic and fonnalistic conception of mind and intelligence, to an approach in 
which mind is conceived as sensitivity and adaptivity to the environment. Cognitive science is presently 
breaking with the fundamental and exclusive deflnition of the human being as the 'animal rationale' (the 
thinking or intellectual animal). Mind is no longer regarded as a disembodied rational entity, immersed in its 
own thoughts, but is seen as being active in the world. Mind is seen no longer as the manipulator of static, 
pre-encoded representations in and for itself, but as taking part in dynamic and adaptive relations with the 
outside world. Mind is not a network of self-propelling propositions, but a way of constructing meanings in 
the world. (Bern & Keijzer, 1996, pp. 449-450) 
More specifically interactionism departs from cognitivism in the following ways: 
1. Interactionists are generally sceptical about the usefulness of the notion of 
representation. Some interactionists are anti-representationalists (they actively argue 
against representation), others are non-representationalists (they simply use other 
theoretical concepts), while others are agnostic or endorse some highly-modified sense 
of representation. The key point of agreement amongst ESD-oriented researchers is the 
rejection of the notion of representations as models of the world and plans for action. I 
will refer to anti- and non-representationalists as ESD interactionists and those who 
continue to endorse the use of some form of representation as ESD representationalists. 
2. Interactionists generally reject the sense-model-plan-act schema as a template for 
describing the way cognizers work. Many ESD researchers argue that the kind of 
analysis used to produce these information-processing stories is inherently flawed. 
Instead the functional architecture of agents is often understood as being made up of a 
wired together collection of parallel-operating behaviour layers (Brooks, 1991a, 
1 Albeit one with old roots in Dewey and others (see chapter 3). 
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1991b). Each layer carries out the internal operations necessary for generating a basic 
kind of behavioural activity. The structure and function of such layers cannot be 
discovered by employing formal task description. Instead interactionists suggest that 
we must engage in systematic behavioural analysis and real-world modelling 
(Hendriks-J ansen, 1996). 
3. The primary focus of much interactionist research is on basic cognitive and behavioural 
phenomena. Higher-cognition is understood as deeply grounded in basic, skilful, 
sensorimotor ability. This effectively reverses traditional cognitivist thinking which 
models 'knowing how' as a low-level, unconscious version of inference and reasoning 
(see Bechtel & Abrahamsen [1991]). By contrast, cognitivism focuses upon high level 
human cognitive phenomena such as speech, complex problem-solving, and deductive 
reasoning. The archetypal subject of cognitivism is the normal, educated, and typically 
literate, human adult (Von Eckardt, 1993). Although these phenomena constitute 
legitimate areas of study for cognitive science the methodological and explanatory 
frameworks in which these phenomena are embedded have been carried over to studies 
of lower level cognitive phenomena such as automatic and unconscious processes, 
practical skills, and the activities of 'non-language users' such as infants, non-humans, 
and our hypothesised hominid ancestors. Whether or not this importation of concepts 
deriving from high-level human cognitive capacities is a legitimate explanatory move 
is the focus of much current controversy. 
4. Interactionists reject the equation of 'the mind' with the brain. The brain is viewed 
primarily as a coordinative and regulative system that is coupled with the rest of the 
body and, via that, with the environment. Brain, body, and world interact in interesting 
ways and cognitive activity emerges as result. Cognition, if it is anywhere, is to be 
found embedded in the 'organism-in-the-environment'. 
These ideas form the core of this thesis. The main aim of this work is to unravel the 
complex issues at the heart of psychology's present approach to the study of cognition in 
the hope of making better sense of the relevant phenomena. It appears that the current 
cognitivist framework is coming to the end of its useful life and is already in the process of 
evolving into something quite different. The implications for research, and scientific and 
social policy based on that research, are profound and far-reaching. However this work is 
neither an attempt at building a comprehensive theoretical alternative to present orthodoxy 
in psychology and cognitive science, nor a procedural scheme suggesting better ways for 
doing research, although it touches on both of these points. Rather, it is an attempt to 
encourage psychologists to think differently about the concept of cognition and how and 
why we study and use it. 
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An Outline o/the Structure of this Work 
The bulk of this thesis is an attempt to sketch out the commitments of an interactionist 
framework for understanding cognition and to contrast these with those of cognitivism. In 
particular, the aim here is to investigate the empirical and theoretical research implications 
that are posed when the concept of cognition is understood in an interactionist manner. My 
goals are relatively modest. In the final part of this chapter I begin by arguing that 
cognition can be usefully understood in terms of the 'time-space distancing skills and 
capacities' animals have for taking account of and responding to aspects of local and 
distant (including hypothetical and imaginary) environments. In chapter 2 I examine the 
cognitivist framework and describe several problems that it faces. In particular I focus on 
the ways in which the representational metaphor may lead us methodologically astray by 
guiding us toward individualistic, in-the-head explanations and explorations of cognitive 
activity. It is possible to think about the relationship between the embodied agent and the 
world in a non-representational manner by recasting the representational notion of 
'constructing internal content' as the possession of an ability to 'be sensitive to'. This 
rather vague idea seems to be operative in many interactionist accounts of cognition. 
Chapter 3 outlines several fields of recent cognitive scientific research that challenge many 
of the basic assumptions of cognitivism. These research areas include situated robotics, 
active vision research, dynamical approaches to cognition, distributed cognition, and 
sociohistorical approaches to development. In chapter 4 I distil several key themes from 
the insights of these fields including the concepts of the agent-environment system, 
perception-action cycles, reactive-de centralised architectures, and interactive emergence. I 
go on in chapter 5 to argue that dynamical systems theory provides a promising framework 
for making sense of cognition from an ESD perspective but that, in addition, an 
interactionist cognitive psychology requires a 'theory of the implementing substrate'. 
Chapter 6 suggests that such a theory can be found in an 'autonomy view' of animals that 
portrays the nervous system as a regulatory, coordinative, and integrative bodily 
subsystem. Chapter 7 describes how several recent simulations show connectionism's 
promise as a computational technique in simulating the role of the nervous system from an 
interactionist perspective. Unfortunately, as it stands, such a framework does not seem to 
lend itself to understanding the advanced 'representation hungry' cognition we witness in 
much human behaviour. So in chapter 8 I speculate that much of what we call advanced 
cognition involves a Ore-use' of basic perception-action skills and structures. Furthermore, 
this reuse is the outcome of a general education within a symbol-using environment. One 
potentially fruitful way of unpacking this hypothesis is to suggest that all advanced 
cognizing is a form of 'mental imagery use' and that mental imagery is a 'socially guided' 
use of perception-action skills and structures. 
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In sum this work attempts to tie down some basic themes that will facilitate understanding 
cognitive phenomena from an interactionist perspective in the hope that new ways of 
theorising and researching may be encouraged. This is no easy task, as the modem view of 
cognition held by many psychologists and cognitive scientists is deeply intertwined with 
the cognitivist perspective. In order to alleviate this problem, the rest of this chapter is 
dedicated to unpacking what we mean when we talk of cognitive phenomena. 
Characterisations of Cognition 
The term cognition is used in a wide variety of ways by psychologists and other cognitive 
scientists. It seems to be most commonly understood by psychologists as a high-brow 
synonym for thought or thin/ang2 . Thoughts then become cognitions. From this perspective 
cognition is just 'psychology-speak' for an aspect of the everyday (Western) understanding 
of mind. More specifically, cognition is frequently considered to feature in the age-old 
mental triad of cognition, emotion, and volition (conation). This distinction between 
rational thought, affect, and motivation to act is quite popular within other branches of 
psychology. In social psychology, for instance, attitudes are sometimes understood in 
terms of an ABC (affect, behaviour, cognition) model (Myers, 1993). However, it is clear 
that the introduction of the term cognition by cognitive revolutionaries such as Jerome 
Bruner and George Miller was not intended to be understood so narrowly. In an interview 
with Bernard Baars (1986), Miller notes that: 
I think they [the early cognitive psychologists] were just reaching back for common sense. In using the word 
'cognition' we were setting ourselves off from behaviorism. We wanted something mental - but "mental 
psychology" seemed terribly redundant. "Commonsense psychology" would have suggested some sort of 
anthropological investigation, and "folk psychology" would have suggested Wundt's social psychology. 
What word do you use to label this set of views? We chose 'cognitive'. 
But "cognition" was meant in a very broad sense. When Jerry Bruner and I started the Center for Cognitive 
Studies at Harvard, did we mean to exclude anything that a computer can't do? Emotion, will, motivation? 
No, of course not. (p. 210). 
So, for Miller at least, it is clear that the use of the term cognition served as more of a 
signpost of the break with behaviourism than the careful formulation of a new 
psychological phenomenon. Such a reading is implicit in the critical comments of a 
number of psychologists working in the transition period between behaviourism and 
cognitivism. Commenting on psychologists' early enthusiasm for the notion of cognition 
William Battig noted: 
2 This is admittedly only a personal observation garnered from going to many seminars, lectures, and 
presentations in academic environments and from reading academic texts and papers. Psychologists seem to 
use cognition in this manner more often than philosophers do, but I think that the term is generally adopted 
by many within the cognitive sciences. 
- ~ - ~ I 
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What makes the current high popularity of cognition especially astounding is that even its most dedicated 
advocates seem unable to provide us with a clear or consistent defmition of exactly what is meant by or 
encompassed under the cognitive label, or how it is to be distinguished from the allegedly noncognitive 
character of whatever is (or was) not described as cognitive psychology. (Battig, 1975, p. 195 quoted in 
Knapp, 1986, p. 29) 
The popularity of the term cognition at the expense of a clear understanding of the concept 
itself led Ernest Hilgard to the only slightly cynical observation that cognition might be 
understood as "something you put in front of a book title that wouldn't have been there a 
couple of years ago" (in Fisher, 1983, p. 18 quoted in Knapp, 1986, p. 30). However, 
despite these critical observations cognition has become a popular word and has infiltrated 
most areas of modem psychology. Kessen (1981) goes so far as to say that psychology 
"has been redefined as the study of cognition." (p. 181): 
Friendship has become social cognition, affect is seen as a form of problem-solving, newborn perception is 
subsumed under a set of transforming rules, and psychoanalysis is reread as a variant of information 
processing. Cognition, the feeble infant of the late Fifties and early Sixties, has become an insatiable giant. 
(p. 181). 
Cognition has become such a ubiquitous term that many psychologists write as if its 
meaning is so obvious that the audience does not need to be told. More deviously, some 
researchers actually claim that the lack of a thorough characterisation of the central 
concepts of a discipline, such as cognition, should be expected because they "often prove 
to be the most difficult to analyze explicitly." (Palmer & Kimchi, 1986, p. 43) 
In contrast to the rather loose ways in which psychologists use the term cognition, the 
philosophers of mind of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Fodor, Putnam, Armstrong, Sellars, 
and Chisholm, intended the adjective cognitive to be restricted to those kinds of mental 
states, such as beliefs and desires (propositional attitudes), that could be truth-evaluated, 
and not mental states such as consciousness and qualia (subjective experiences) (Green, 
1996). For the philosophical psychologists (and the philosophically sophisticated 
Chomsky) cognition was not a synonym for mental but rather for that part of the mental 
that exhibits evaluable consequences in the external world. However, like Miller and 
Bruner, they wanted to construct a scientifically respectable alternative to behaviourism 
and wanted to use the concept of cognition as a central feature. Green (1996) argues that 
"the strict use of 'cognitive' [by the philosophers] was intended to keep the behaviourist 
criticisms of early-century mentalism at bay, [but that] its broad use in psychology returned 
us to precisely these criticisms." (p. 37-38). He goes on to argue that: 
cognitivism was an answer to the problem: how can we introduce (at least part) of the mental back into 
scientific psychology while not falling prey to the criticisms that brought down the mentalism of old and led 
us to behaviourism? ... The answer that cognitivism has provided ... is that as long as the aspects of the 
mental that are revived are restricted to those that are susceptible to truth-evaluation ... then the 
behaviourists' criticism will be stayed (pp. 37-38). 
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These days the philosophers' understanding of cognition has now largely disappeared, 
even within philosophy of mind, where we witness many theorists grappling with issues 
that were initially considered to be non-cognitive. 
Today many psychologists use the term cognitive in, what Shanon (1992) calls, a 
phenomenological sense, to simply refer to all those mental abilities and processes that 
make up the subject matter of cognitive psychology. Thus, cognitive psychology texts 
provide a reasonable window on this sense of cognition. The structure of modern texts has 
changed very little since the publication of Neisser's (1967) Cognitive Psychology beyond 
a steady trend in placing more attention on higher-processes such as problem-solving and 
reasoning3• Anderson (2000) provides a typical list of things cognitive in his widely used 
text Cognitive Psychology and its Implications: perception, attention and performance, 
lmowledge representations, encoding and storage of memory, retention and retrieval in 
memory, problem solving, expertise, reasoning and decision making, and language. So this 
use of cognition serves as a kind of disciplinary shorthand, but unfortunately contains no 
explicit understanding of what it is for something to be cognitive. 
Typically, when quizzed about the actual meaning of the term cognitive psychologists 
advert to describing the information-processing approach to understanding cognition 
(Shanon [1992] calls this the theoretical sense of cognition)4. On this reading cognitive 
phenomena are phenomena that are explained in terms of symbols (and, in connectionism, 
sub symbols) and their processing. That is, something is cognitive if it involves mental 
representations and their computation, however those concepts are understood. It is 
interesting to note that even modern psychological dictionaries shy away from explicitly 
saying what cognition is and encourage a 'theoretical sense characterisation'. For instance, 
the cognition entry in The encyclopedic dictionary of psychology (Harre & Lamb, .1983) 
tells the reader to "see language and cognition." (p. 90). Although the entry under language 
and cognition is mostly concerned with the relation between thought and language, it does 
mention that the modern use of cognition "is wider in scope than the study of thinking: a 
reasonable definition would refer more generally to the mental processing of information 
3 Sternberg (1998) provides a single exception to this rule. The structure of The nature of cognition is 
divided up into major conceptual themes, such as domain-generality versus domain-specificity, rather than 
the usual substantive topics. 
4 Some may argue that all theories of cognition, traditional and non-traditional, are information-processing 
theories broadly understood. I think that this really stretches the sense of information-processing well beyond 
that typically characterised within cognitive psychology. For instance, I would not consider ecological 
approaches (McCabe & Balzano, 1986) and dynamical approaches to cognition (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994) 
to be information-processing accounts. Chapter 2 of this thesis involves a critical analysis of, what I take to 
be, the mainstream information-processing model of cognition. 
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... " (p. 332). Bizarrely, The Blackwell dictionmy of cognitive psychology (Eysenck, 1990) 
has no entry for cognition at all! It does however characterise cognitive psychology as 
"concerned with infonnation-processing, and includes a variety of processes such as 
attention, perception, learning, and memory; it is also concerned with the structures and 
representations involved in cognition." (p. 61). 
Another popular rendering of cognition is an intermediate sense (Shanon, 1992) where 
cognitive phenomena are understood as phenomena described at the explanatory level 
between the behavioural and biological levels. This level is usually thought of as an 
abstract, functional description of the operation of the brain. Such a view is most strongly 
associated with functionalist theories of mind (see Bechtel, 1988 and chapter 2 of this 
thesis). 
None of these senses of cognition seem to get at the idea that cognition is to do with 
knowing. An etymological diversion may help us to sharpen our focus here. According to 
the Oxford English Dictionmy the word cognition did not appear in the English lexicon 
until 1447, and it was not until 1651 that it was used in the philosophical sense as the 
action or faculty of knowing distinct from emotion and volition (Simpson & Weiner, 1989, 
Vol. 3, pp. 445-446). Prior to this cognition seems to have been a synonym for 
understanding or insight as the following selections from early texts indicate: 
Illumynyd she is wyth c1ere cognycyoun In hyr soule (1447, Bokenham, Seyntys). 
With conscience and perfit cognition of innocencie (1604, Wright, Passions). 
I will not be my selfe, nor haue cognition Of what I feele (1606, Shakespeare, Troilus & Cressida). 
(Source, Simpson & Weiner, 1989, Vol. 3, pp. 445-446). 
This sense of cognition is etymologically related to the older English (Gennanic) words 
can (to be able to), ken, and know and has much in common with the pre-Cartesian use of 
the word mind. Thus cognition's roots lie in the older 'commonsense' notions of know (I 
lmow how to milk cows), can (I can build a house), and ken (Writing a book is beyond my 
ken). Like the word mind, the early usage of cognition was connected with talk about a 
person's abilities and capacities rather than a type of reflective, internal mental activity. 
I want to suggest that we should understand cognition in the old-fashioned sense as being 
about the abilities of humans and other animals to act. This may seem an odd move to 
make, because it ties cognition very strongly to the notion of behaviour, or at least the 
capacity to behave. Indeed, I will use the tenn cognitive activity interchangeably with that 
of behaviour where I understand behaviour in the non-behaviourist sense of "the self-
initiated, purposeful movement of animals and humans." (Keijzer, 1997, pp. 11-12). 
Behaviour, in this interactionist sense, is not about mere movements, surface phenomena, a 
response to a stimulus, or an operant. Many modern psychologists are reluctant to use the 
tenn behaviour for fear of being branded as behaviourists, but as Hendriks-Jansen (1996) 
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notes, only a better theory of behaviour will put the ghost of behaviourism to rest. 
Behaviour, especially adaptive behaviour, is a complex phenomenon that encapsulates 
issues of knowledge, feeling, motivation, goal-orientedness, and, importantly, doing. I 
believe these concerns lie at the heart of what Shanon (1992) calls the genuinely 
psychological sense of the term cognitive. In this sense cognition refers to a phenomenon 
"only inasmuch as it pertains to meaningful behavior." (Shanon, 1992, p. 245). Keijzer's 
interactionist take on behaviour provides us with the kernel of an idea for appreciating 
cognition in this sense. 
Behavior does not only consist of movements, these movements are made 'in order to' bring about a specific 
consequence. On a longer time scale, these consequences are fed back to the behaving system (for example 
by selection in evolution or by reinforcement in learning). The net, long term result is the existence of 
systems that maintain themselves over time. (Keijzer, 1997, p. 12, emphasis added) 
Keijzer's final sentence is an important one because it links behaviour with the activities 
that living things must engage in to stay alive. In chapter 6 I will examine a couple of 
frameworks that bring these concerns to the fore. For now it is enough to appreciate that I 
take cognition to be strongly bound up with an organism's capacity to coordinate its 
activities with the environment such that it can stay alive. One can see that meaningfulness 
is deeply grounded in such a relation because things (objects, events, actions) in the world 
will relate, to some greater or lesser degree, to the task of staying alive. Thus the ability to 
perceive in an adaptive manner is an ability to appreciate meaning as a kind of 'value 
perspective'. Therefore cognition, as it is understood here, relates primarily to the 
capacities living things possess for adaptively negotiating the world. The theoretical 
challenge of explaining how such behaviour is possible constitutes the central problem for 
cognitive science. 
The Problem of Cognitive Order 
Psychologists and their forbears have long been puzzled by the behaviour of people and 
other animals. This puzzlement comes from the fact that the behaviour of animals is 
qualitatively different from the behaviour of non-living systems. The Classical Greeks 
were aware of these differences and proposed that the psyche was responsible for them 
(Everson, 1991). The theories of Early Modem science developed by Newton and his 
contemporaries have had astounding success explaining the behaviour of the non-biotic 
world. However, their failure to do the same for the behaviour of animals, especially the 
higher animals like ourselves, has led a number of scientists in disciplines as diverse as 
physics (Schr6dinger, 1945), biology (Ho, 1993), and psychology (Kugler & Turvey, 1987; 
Swenson & Turvey, 1991) to claim that the puzzles of human behaviour will require a 
more complex understanding of nature than that provided by orthodox Classical physics. 
Of all psychologists, Gibson (1979/1986, p. 135) was perhaps the most intensely aware of 
this problem: 
',. '. 
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The richest and most elaborate affordances of the environment are provided by other animals and, for us, 
other people. These are, of course, detached objects with topologically closed surfaces, but they change the 
shape of their surfaces while yet retaining the same fundamental shape. They move from place to place, 
changing the postures of their bodies, ingesting and emitting certain substances, and doing all this 
spontaneously, initiating their own movements, which is to say that their movements are animate. These 
bodies are subject to the laws of mechanics and yet not subject to the laws of mechanics, for they are not 
governed by these laws. They are so different from ordinary objects that infants learn almost immediately to 
distinguish them from plants and nonliving things. 
Living systems like people exhibit a startling and complex fonn of ordered and meaningful 
(that is to say, adaptive) behaviour that is very rarely seen amongst non-living macroscopic 
objects and events. The problem of explaining how it is that living agents do this is what I 
call the problem of cognitive order. 
The problem of cognitive order is an adaptation of social theorist Anthony Giddens' (1984) 
notion of the problem of orderS - "the problem of how it comes about that social systems 
'bind' time and space, incorporating presence and absence." (p. 181). Held and Thompson 
(1989b) provide a nice gloss on these complex sounding ideas. 
Rather than thinking of time and space as abstract categories or as frameworks within which action takes 
place, they can be more illuminatingly thought of, Giddens suggests, in terms of 'presence' and 'absence' -
terms which he borrows from Heidegger. Every interaction involves different forms of presence and absence. 
A face-to-face interaction typically takes place in a defmite setting and endures for a defmite period; the 
other person is 'present' both spatially and temporally. But social systems can become 'extended' in space 
and time, in such a way that the other is no longer immediately present. This time-space distancing (or 
'distanciation', as Giddens generally calls it) has been facilitated by the development of new forms of 
transport and communication. The significance of the invention of the telegraph, to take one example, was 
that it separated the process of communication from the physical transportation of messages, thereby 
enabling individuals to communicate quickly at a distance, without sharing a common physical locale (pp. 7-
8). 
Although Giddens' focus is social theory we can understand 'problems of order' more 
generally as having to do with explaining puzzling phenomena in the light of an 
explanatory framework that does not 'allow' the existence of the phenomena in question. 
These puzzling phenomena often incorporate an action-at-a-distance principle where the 
system under examination is both affected by, and able to affect, things distant in time and 
space. In the absence of knowledge of the structures or mechanisms that make these 
phenomena possible, researchers are faced with a problem of how the system 'binds' space 
and time. This problem occurs because it seems that there exists no obvious mechanism for 
effecting the behaviour observed. Put another way, there appears to be an absence of a 
causal mechanism. For instance, to someone not familiar with a magnet, its power to 
influence a metal object without touching it may appear miraculous. The magnet's capacity 
S Giddens has in tum borrowed this idea from Talcott Parsons. 
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to act at a distance contravenes the commonsense notion that a tool cannot be responsible 
for moving another object unless the tool is touching the object6. 
When applied to people and other living things the problem of order relates to the ways in 
which these agents can know, influence, and be influenced by things in the world distant in 
time and space. In other words, many animals do not seem to be stuck in the immediate 
here and now. They possess abilities to 'take account of things that they are not currently 
in physical contact with. These abilities are central to the phenomena studied by cognitive 
psychologists and they seem to have one important feature in common: they are all about 
adaptively modulating behaviour through being sensitive to the dynamics of the 
environment. Reed (1996) nicely summarises this view when he writes "[ fJrom an 
ecological point of view, in which knowing is not separated from living, cognition might 
best be defined as an animal's capacity to keep in touch with its surroundings." (p. 169, 
emphasis added). Some phenomena, such as attention and perception, are essentially 
concerned with how people and other animals manage to know about, and thereby 
coordinate their behaviour with respect to objects, events, and properties in the local 
environment; that is, things with which the agent is in causal, but often not direct, physical 
contact. Other cognitive phenomena concern the ways in which animals modulate their 
behaviour with respect to things that exist in, what I will call, distant environments -
environments with which the agent is not in direct causal contact. For instance, memory 
research involves understanding how past events and experiences shape current 
functioning. Problem-solving and reasoning often involve being influenced by anticipated, 
future circumstances. Language use also often involves mediating behaviour by using 
information about distant environments or by providing a way of redescribing what exists 
in the local environment. Unlike non-living things, people and other animals possess the 
power to sense the world about them, learn from previous experiences, make use of these 
'memories', and, perhaps most importantly, anticipate the future. In a sense living systems 
are characterised by the fact that, to greater or lesser degrees, they 'stretch' themselves 
over spans of space and time incorporating and integrating the influences of distant things 
into their present activities. Unlike the particles of Newtonian physics, there is more to the 
behaviour of living things than the effects of collisions in the here and now7• These ideas 
6 The ancient Greek philosopher Tha1es assumed that magnets possess a psyche for this very reason 
(Everson, 1991). 
7 Things are, of course, not this simple. Some non-living systems, especially non-linear, far-from-
equilibrium systems, exhibit very complex 'action-at-a-distance' behaviours that appear to be rather life-like. 
(The above magnet example is a simple non-linear, equilibrium system). Throughout history complex non-
living objects and events have been understood as animate and agentive, possessed by spirits, gods, or other 
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seem to provide a promising avenue for making explicit the unifying concepts that 
underpin research into cognition. Our primary interest in basic cognitive research is in 
understanding how and why the behaviour of animals, and possibly other organisms, is so 
complexly modulated by environmental states and events. One useful way of 
characterising the problem of cognitive order is to produce an abstract map of the kinds of 
interrelationships that seem to exist between environment and agent. 
Cognition as Time-Space Distancing 
In this section I sketch out the variety of phenomena that exercise the minds of cognitive 
psychologists and attempt to show how they are all varieties of time-space distancing. At 
this stage I make no attempt to explain these abilities, although I occasionally use the ideas 
of various cognition researchers, cognitivist and non-cognitivist, to illustrate my claims. 
Figure 1.1 provides a rough diagrammatic representation of the ways a literate, adult 
human (the typical participant in cognitive psychology experiments) 'cognitively stretches' 
over spans of space and time. To a first approximation it may help to think of the diagram 
as a map of the knowledge an agent has of objects and events that can influence its 
behaviour. The agent in question sits in the middle of this time-space distancing map (or 
TSD map): here the agent is temporally in the present and spatially in 'the here'. For the 
moment I will ignore the significant problems associated with the question of the duration 
of the present and rely on the intuitive notion that it consists of recent and soon-to-happen 
events rather than an infinitesimal point8. 
There are two primary areas of influence for the agent: the first consists of the objects and 
events that are 'copresent' with the agent; the second consists of the objects and events that 
are absent but often potentially knowable and thus influential. The size of the 'here and 
now' is demarcated by the perceptual abilities of the agent and its/their current 
effectiveness. Anything 'beyond perception' exists in the realm of the' absent' and must be 
known by other means. 
supernatural, but life-like, beings. Conversely, some living things, most plants for instance, seem more like 
non-living systems. In chapter 6 I address some of these complexities in greater detail. 
8 Both Gibson (1966) and Giddens (1984) have made the point that the present is not experienced as a point-
like 'now'. Giddens (1984) notes that " ... one might suppose that memory refers simply to the past-to-past 
experiences, traces of which somehow remain in the organism. Action then occurs in the spatiality of the 
present, drawing upon memories of the past whenever such are needed or desired. A moment's reflection 
will demonstrate the inadequacy of such a view. 'Present' cannot be said or written without its fading into 
the past. If time is not a succession of 'presents' but 'presencing' in the sense attributed to this by Heidegger, 
then memory is an aspect of presencing." (p. 45). The Heideggerian notion of presencing is similar to 
William James' notion of primary memory. 
Perceivable present 
Experienced past 
time 
Figure 1.1 An Example of a Time-Space Distancing Map 
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retrodiction 
Both the 'domain of the co-present' and the 'domain of the absent' feature in the problem 
of cognitive order. The former relates to what Clark and Toribio (1994) call the 
compression and dilation of the "unruly ambient manifestations" of objects and events - a 
distinction alluded to in the earlier work of Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). The latter relates to 
Clark and Toribio's description of action in the absence of informative environmental 
signals. I will discuss these two ideas in tum. 
Co-presence: Problems of Compression and Dilation 
An agent is connected to its surroundings by its perceptual systems. Perceptual systems are 
used to 'pick up' information from the surroundings. Both range (how far they reach) and 
acuity (how finely they distinguish things) are important system factors relating to the 
utility (quality, usefulness) of the information that can be picked up. An agent possesses a 
,- -.-
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great advantage in being able to detect helpful or dangerous environmental states before it 
contacts them. Distal perception €ffectively enables the animal to 'see into the future' by 
being able to act early to avoid dangers or capitalise on opportunities (Christensen & 
Hooker, in press; Dennett, 1996; Smithers, 1995). 
Thus, the basic cognitive order problem faced by an agent is how information can be 
detected without direct physical contact between the object or event in question and the 
perceiver's body. Turvey, Shaw, Reed, and Mace (1981) suggest that, at least with regard 
to visual perception, this basic order problem is central to the theories of J. J. Gibson: 
The intentionality of visual perception can work only by explaining how organisms can "come into 
psychological contact" with objects which they are not in physical, or more aptly, mechanical contact. 
Solving this problem of perceptual "action at a distance" is the function of Gibson's theory of ecological 
information for perception. (p. 242) 
Typically this problem is understood by suggesting that the sensory systems of an agent 
make contact with the local medium as it is perturbed by the distal object or event (see 
Gibson, 197911986). Hearing involves a sensitivity to sound waves travelling through the 
air (and sometimes other media), vision consists of intercepting reflected light (photons), 
olfaction is the uptake of various volatile chemicals and so on. The action-at-a-distance 
powers of perceptual systems are thus explained by reference to the mediating effects of 
proximal causal consequences of distal objects and events. 
But finding a pathway for the transmission of information from a distant object or event 
cannot explain how an agent responds selectively to types of proximal stimulation (see 
Keijzer, 1997, chap. 2). The major puzzle here is how to explain the ways an agent 
compresses and dilates 'input'. This problem encompasses two related sorts of phenomena. 
The first relates to the perceptual notion of object constancy (Humphreys & Riddoch, 
1984), while the second involves an attempt to explain conceptual equivalence. 
Object Constancy and Inconstancy 
The problem of object constancy comes from the observation that a particular object or 
event presents the perceiver with variable proximal or peripheral stimulation (e.g., 
stimulation of the array of retinal cells in the eyes) when the object is viewed from 
different positions or in different situations. Simply put, this fact raises the question of how 
agents know that they are looking at (or act in the same way toward) the same thing when 
they see it at different angles, in different configurations (e.g., when partly obscured), and 
in different conditions (e.g., in a variety of lighting conditions). Object constancy is a 
compression problem simply because it involves understanding how an agent 'works out' 
how different types of stimulation arise from, and thus relate to, a single object (see 
Brunswick, 1952; Keijzer, 1997). 
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The computational vision literature does not explicitly address the possibility of an 
opposite sort of problem (what we might call a problem of object diversity), but Clark and 
Torbio's (1994) work suggests it is a possible phenomenon of interest. They note that 
compression problems (where agents treat different stimuli as equivalent) are mirrored by 
dilation problems (where agents treat similar stimuli as different). This sort of problem is 
not as easy to formulate as that of object constancy, and I suspect this has to do with the 
fact that it is a somewhat incoherent one. Presumably the actual difference between the 
two objects of identical (proximal) appearance has important consequences for the 
perceiver. For example, perhaps we dilate proximal input when we can tell a real apple 
from a wax replica9. 
Most cognitive scientists, including psychologists, adopt a sort of Kantian attitude to 
solving these problems, arguing that the perceiver'S mindlbrain contains mechanisms for 
ordering (squashing together for compression, prizing apart for dilation) the input 
stimulation in such a way as to either construct an internal canonical representation (e.g., 
Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Marr, 1982) or a manipulable, viewer-centred exemplar of the 
objects (e.g., Tarr & Pinker, 1990). These representations then provide the 'internal 
stimulus' for consequent action. 
Ecological psychologists on the other hand claim that every object or event structures the 
appropriate informational array (the light for vision, sound waves for audition, etc.) in an 
invariant way no matter how or under what conditions it is observed thereby providing an 
unmistakable 'proximal stimulus' for object and event recognition (e.g., Gibson, 
1979/1986; McCabe & Balzano, 1986). When an agent fails to perceive an object or event 
accurately this is not viewed as a consequence of faulty internal ordering mechanisms or 
the inappropriate use of stored knowledge, but rather as a consequence of the agent not 
being able to pick up sufficient information. Objects and events are dilated because they 
really do appear to be different, not because internal mechanisms separate them 'in the 
mind'. 
Conceptual Equivalence and Nonequivalence 
Clark and Toribio (1994) make a significant concession to 'direct perception' at this basic 
level, one that earlier researchers and theorists such as Ullman (1980) and Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1981) were unwilling to make. These earlier researchers took the topic of 
perception to be the fixation of perceptual beliefs (beliefs about the things that people can 
9 Although surely if we could not notice a difference between a real apple and a fake one no amount of 
'mental processing' would be able to reliably lead to an accurate distinction. I suspect the sort of dilation that 
must occur in such a situation is a 'higher-level', conceptual type of inference of the sort I discuss in chapter 
8. 
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see, hear, etc., such as the belief that 'that woman standing quietly over there is a political 
reactionary'). Even basic perception of, say 'a person standing still' or 'a cliff with a long 
drop' were regarded as types of perceptual belief - situations where there is not enough 
infonnation reaching the perceiver to specify these appreciations of the surroundings. 
Research in situated robotics1o (e.g., Brooks, 1991a, 1991b) has convinced a number of 
recent theorists, such as Clark and Toribio (1994), that it is possible that there is enough 
infonnation in the world for agents to make basic perceptual compressions and dilations 
without requiring recourse to a mental representational explanation. However, they go on 
to argue that there exist higher-level compression and dilation problems ('real' perceptual 
belief problems) where the ambient physical manifestations of objects and events are far 
too different (compression) or similar (dilation) to provide the appropriate infonnation for 
making functional distinctions 11. They give two 'compression examples': the set of 'all 
valuable things', and the set of 'things that belong to the Pope'. Valuable things would 
consist of objects and events with such unruly ambient physical manifestations as BMWs, 
$100 bills, and friendships, whereas the Pope's belongings might include a Bible, a 
cassock and responsibility for the Roman Catholic church. Within cognitive psychology 
some concept researchers suggest that people often rely upon theories to understand class 
membership rather than mere perceptual similarity (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 
1985). They argue that only the use of a theoretically-based strategy can explain the fact 
that children, money, photo albums, and pets all belong to a single category (i.e., 'things to 
take out of one's house in case of fire') (Medin, 1989). Clark and Toribio (1994) do not 
give a high-level version of dilation, but a possible example may revolve around a 
difference of functional perspective (or as Gibsonian's would say, a difference in 
affordance) of a $10 note lying abandoned at the side of the road and a $10 note sitting in a 
friend's wallet. Obviously both $10 notes provide similar ambient physical manifestations 
but the behavioural consequences of picking them up and putting them in one's pocket 
differ, because ofthe different contexts in which they are embedded. 
Absence: Lack of Environmental Signals 
So much for a person being able to have an 'ordered view' of their perceivable 
surroundings. As has been pointed out by many cognitive scientists, a person is never 
10 I discuss situated robotics research in more detail in chapters 3 to 7. 
11 Fodor (1986) makes essentially the same point when he argues that humans and other cognitively complex 
animals can respond to the nonnomic properties of objects as well as nomic properties. Roughly speaking, a 
nonnomic property is something that is not given by the so-called projectable properties of the object. For 
instance, I can respond to the fact that this computer is my computer although there is nothing about its 
projectable properties that indicates such a thing. 
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purely at the mercy of their current situation. To give just a couple of examples, Gibson's 
(1979/1986) distinction between direct and indirect (or mediated) perception and Corballis' 
(1991) distinction between praxic and non-praxic skills both relate to the idea that people 
can often act based upon knowledge they get from objects and events distant in space and 
time; that is, from objects and events that are unperceivable or absent (see also Kirsh, 
1991). For Gibson, indirect perception comes about through using pictures, photographs, 
and other types of representation that 'carry some of the meaning' of the world elsewhere 
(and typically 'elsewhen'). Corballis (1991) suggests that praxic skills involve actions that 
are not "stimulus-bound - that is, actions that occur directly in response to environmental 
events." (p. 206). For him, praxis is characterised as "the organisation of purposeful, 
sequential actions in which spatial constraints imposed by the environment are minimal." 
(Corb allis , 1991, p. 213). The ideas of both Gibson and Corballis fit nicely with Clark and 
Toribio's (1994) notion of types of behaviour that require information for which there 
exists no (direct) environmental signal or constant causal contact between the agent and the 
'stimulus for action' (see also Chemero, 1998b). A simple example of such a situation is 
the change in behaviour evidenced by a person who has heard that a certain street comer is 
a haunt for muggers. There may thus exist no perceivable difference between a safe and 
dangerous street comer. Something else must be required in order to effect the behavioural 
change. What follows is a brief examination of the absent 'places' where this 'extra' 
knowledge may come from. 
The Hidden Present 
Real objects and events that are either hidden from the perceiver or out of range of their 
sensory systems can still be known in a number of ways. That is, there exist stretching or 
time-space distancing mechanisms that enable the knowledge of things in the 'hidden 
present'. One of the most obvious stretching mechanisms is prediction. Knowing what 
time of the day it is in a distant country prior to making a long-distance phone call is a 
simple example. The accuracy of this kind of stretching is of course limited by the 
predictability of the relevant events. Another way of obtaining information about things 
'out of sight' is to be told about them by another person or warned by some sort or 
interpretable sign such as surveillance or communication equipment. Of these 
'interpretable signs' Gibson (1979/1986) notes: 
Some optical instruments merely enhance the information that vision is ready to pick up; others ... require 
some inference; still others ... demand a complex chain of inferences. Some measuring instruments are closer 
to perception than others. (p. 260). 
In these cases the reliability of the 'original direct perception' (e.g., the perception of the 
person telling you about the event, or the product of the resolving capacity of the 
instrument) of the event or object provides a bound upon the utility of this mediated 
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infonnation. Hutchins' (1995a) study of U.S. Navy navigation crews provides a relevant 
example: 
The Officer of the Deck [OOD] tends to trust the navigation plot maintained on the bridge better than he 
trusts the plot generated in the Combat Information Centre [CIC]. This is because the OOD can come to the 
chart table, look at what the navigation team are doing, and talk to the quartermasters. In this relatively rich 
face-to-face interaction, an understanding can be negotiated. The work that went into the recommendation 
can be displayed and discussed. Such negotiation of meaning is difficult when one is dealing with CIC via 
the phone talkers. (p. 232). 
Similarly, Vicente and Bums' (1996) investigation of how nuclear power plant operators 
monitor the state of their plants shows that the operators prefer direct knowledge of the 
state of components to 'second hand' knowledge from the reports of other workers, and the 
vast array of infonnation displayed in the plant control rooms because "there are crucial 
differences between direct perception and indirect perception mediated by instruments. 
These differences arise from the fact that direct perception is based on infonnation, 
whereas indirect infonnation is based on external symbolic representations." (pp. 276-277). 
They note Gibson's (1979/1986) observation that for the bearers of 'second hand' 
infonnation "the reality testing that accompanies the pickup of natural infonnation is 
missing. ... The invariants have already been extracted. You have to trust the original 
perceiver." (p. 261). Trust (or lack thereof) thus constitutes an important constraint on 
'indirect knowing'. 
The Experienced Past 
Past events and objects can also have an effect upon a person. Indeed knowledge gained 
from past experiences plays a vital role in all fonns of time-space distancing. Things 
experienced by a person are often eligible for deliberate and conscious recollection and 
often involve the 'recovery' of facts and images. This is usually what people mean when 
they refer to memory and remembering. But the past also has a deeper effect in that 
experiences implicitly 'shape' or 'sculpt' the bodily skills of people regardless of whether a 
conscious recollection ofthe relevant learning events is possible. For instance, maintaining 
the ability to swim - a type of know-how or procedural knowledge - may stay with a 
person long after they have any explicit recollection of the places, events, and even 
learning procedures that were involved in gaining the skill. In a sense, memory is better 
thought of as the 'processes' where people's and other animals' conduct is regulated by 
their history of interactions with events and objects (Skinner, 1989; Maturana & Varela, 
1988). Many cognitive psychologists have argued that there exist a number of different 
kinds of memory system and consequently that there are a number of different ways in 
which the past may modulate current action. One common distinction is that between 
explicit memory and implicit memory (Graf & Schachter, 1985; Schachter, 1987) where 
"[i]mplicit memory is revealed when perfonnance on a task is facilitated in the absence of 
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conscious recollection; explicit memory is revealed when performance on a task requires 
conscious recollection of previous experiences." (Graf & Schachter, 1985, p. 501). Cohen 
and Squire (1980) have made a similar claim that learning can modulate our behaviour 
both procedurally and declaratively. Procedural learning is essentially motoric and skill-
based whereas declarative learning involves the learning of 'facts' (and includes both 
semantic memory, memory for general knowledge, and episodic memory, memory for 
particular events [Tulving, 1972]). Although debate continues over whether either the 
implicit-explicit distinction or the declarative-procedural distinction better accounts for 
memory phenomena in normal and amnesic people, it is clear that there are two broad ways 
in which past events can modulate behaviour (see Glenberg, 1997). The first is a basic kind 
of skilful and unconscious shaping of perceptual and motor ability that is environmentally 
based and data driven. This notion of memory is roughly equivalent to what Heidegger 
called presencing (see Giddens, 1984). The second is an effortful and deliberate attempt to 
consciously 'retrieve' information and is person-initiated and conceptually-driven (see also 
Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). In the terminology of ecological psychology, 
implicit/procedural memory seems to be a sort of direct memory, and explicit/declarative 
memory seems to be a type of indirect or mediated memory. I will leave examination of 
these promising parallels for later. Suffice to note at this point that notions of memory are 
somehow related to the ways in which people and other living things can 'reach back' 
through time to events that mediate action in the present. 
The Unexperienced Past 
A person can also have knowledge of past events that they did not experience. This 
knowledge can be gained in two ways: through mediated memories that are memories of 
indirect perceptual activity (e.g., remembering that you had been told that the Treaty of 
Waitangi was signed in 1840), or through retrodiction. Retrodiction is simply prediction of 
things past but, unlike prediction, retrodiction is usually reliant on the existence of some 
sort of set of 'archives' to act as a basic contact with the past. Often these archives may 
have actually been present in some form at the time of the event being retrodicted (e.g., 
geological strata, fossils, archaeological findings, original texts and so on). These archives 
act as a sign or representation of things past and their utility and accuracy is both limited 
by the resolution and quantity of the information that they can carry and the ability of the 
person to 'pull out', or interpret, that information. Archives may also have been 
constructed after the relevant past event from the author's direct perception or upon their 
readings of other archives. In many forms of retrodictive activity there exist long chains of 
interpretation and 'reconstruction' of the past that incorporate numerous interpreters and 
archival sources. An undergraduate's textbook and lecture notes are prime examples of 
such processes. Through the use of authored archives a student of, say, astrophysics, can 
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reach far back in time and light years through space, in order to make authoritative 
statements about such untouchable phenomena as black body radiation and black holes. 
The Future 
Daniel Dennett (1996) reminds us that the "task of the mind is to produce future" (p. 57). 
And more specifically: 
The mind is fundamentally an anticipator, an expectation-generator. It mines the present for clues, which it 
refmes with the help of materials it has saved from the past, turning them into anticipations of the future. It 
then acts, rationally, on the basis of those hard-won anticipations. (pp. 57-58). 
The future is a domain that places interesting bounds upon action in the present. Our 
expectations, anticipations, and predictions of future events and objects are in large part 
responsible for our actions and activities in the present. Notably, there is no notion of 
'direct prediction' - the ability to actually 'see' the future is reserved for those who claim 
they possess paranormal or time-travelling powers. Because all prediction is an indirect 
cognitive activity it is vulnerable to inaccuracy, unreliability, and confabulation. But not all 
prediction is equally untrustworthy. Prediction effects can range from the scientifically 
respectable (e.g., there will be a high tide at 6 a.m., so put the fishing gear in the car for an 
early start tomorrow) to the speculative and fantastic (e.g., my horoscope said to be careful 
about dealing with large amounts of cash today, so I'll put off buying the car until 
tomorrow). 
Modem human life is typically a future-oriented activity. The consequences of actions are 
foremost in our thought and are 'built-in' to the discourses, institutions and organisations 
that we inhabit. Saving money in a bank, taking out a loan, having a job, and having a 
family all involve actions in the present which commit us to future actions, responsibilities, 
and consequences. Often we are chastised when we ignore or overlook the consequences of 
our actions by people as diverse as teachers, parents, governments, social commentators, 
and environmentalists. The future thus affects our present behaviour in interesting ways 
although, as Skinner (1989) correctly notes, the future only 'works on us' insofar as we 
expect things about it, and we only expect things because of a past history of particular 
types of interactions with our surroundings. However, this does not mean, as Skinner 
supposes, that "[w]e do what we do because of what has happened, not what will happen." 
(p. 14), unless, by such a remark, Skinner simply means that we do not directly perceive 
the future. The future is by no means fully determined, but our lives are fundamentally 
organised to exploit those parts of it that are likely to occur. Within cognitive psychology 
several research domains deal directly with the modulating behaviour with regard to the 
future. Judgment and decision-making research studies the ways in which people plan to 
act and problem-solving research examines the ways in which people move from a current 
state to a desired future state of affairs. 
, '! ~ - . 
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The Hypothetical 
There exists one last 'space' from which a person can gain information for their current 
action. I call this the domain of the hypothetical (it is not represented in figure 1.1 above). 
By hypothetical objects and events I simply mean invented, imaginary, or (currently) 
fictional representations of states of affairs that are acknowledged as such. This 
distinguishes a 'hypothetical' from a prediction or retrodiction of a state of affairs. The 
latter are intended to capture information about things going on in the perceptually 
inaccessible world. I do not wish to draw too hard and fast a distinction here as many 
predictions are intended only as inaccurate possibilities that approximate truthfulness. This 
is, of course, an acknowledgment of the potential unreliability and inaccuracy of the 
procedures for making the predictions in the first place. In sum, the key point here is that 
our attitudes toward representations (i.e., whether they are real or unreal, possible or 
impossible) determines how they are likely to affect our current actions. 
It may seem that acknowledging that a hypothetical representation has no real referent 
(whether in the present, past, or future) would be grounds for arguing that it should have no 
bearing on our actions. All adaptive activity should be based upon real or likely states of 
affairs, not things that we know are not the case. To act based upon a fictional reading of 
something would constitute a potentially dangerous strategy. But hypotheticals do have 
important and adaptive effects on the things that we do in the present. For instance, 
philosophers and scientists use hypotheticals when they engage in counter/actual 
reasoning12 to work out what might have happened had some, say experimental, conditions 
been different. And what might have happened may provide us with knowledge about the 
world that is as useful as knowledge derived from what has actually happened. This sort of 
reasoning is not just central to the design and conduct of scientific research (if A really 
does cause B all by itself, an experiment that screens off A should not result in B), but also 
to a lot of everyday problem-solving where we plan to do things differently in future given 
the outcomes of particular experiences. For instance, on experiencing traffic problems 
taking one route to work you may reason that next time (a future action) you will take an, 
as yet, untravelled alternative route. This is a prediction of a future state of affairs, but it is 
a prediction based upon what may have happened had you done things differently earlier. It 
is not simple inductive reasoning from past experiences to future experiences, but a more 
complex version of reasoning that involves forays into hypothetical space where 
representations of experiences past are decomposed and then recomposed in accordance 
with a deeper understanding of underlying generative mechanisms. This sort of existential 
12 Crane (1995, p. 56) describes counterfactual reasoning when he notes that " ... if we believe that A caused 
B, we commit ourselves to the truth of the counterfactual, 'If A had not occurred, B would not have 
occurred' ." 
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abductive reasoning (see Haig, 2000) relies on what Annette Kanniloff-Smith (Kanniloff-
Smith, 1992, 1994; Clark, 1993; Clark & Kanniloff-Smith, 1993) calls representational 
redescription. Broadly speaking, representational redescription refers to an ability to 
disembed implicit knowledge from its grounding in real-world, procedural activities and 
use it to facilitate manipulation and interaction with other lmowledge. This enables a 
person to creatively combine different ideas, images, and concepts in a compositional 
manner. Much more will be said about the details of these mechanisms in future chapters. 
For now the important point is that the 'inhabitants' of hypothetical sp~ce feature centrally 
in the detennination of actions in the present via the time-space distancing mechanism of 
representational redescription. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set up a framework for the chapters to come. I believe that, just as the 
Ancients suspected, a genuine 'psyche-ology' is not so much a study of human mental 
processes but rather the study of life; of how it is that living things manage to use and 
negotiate the environment so that they stay alive. For too long the question 'what is 
cognition?' has been answered with the reprise 'see infonnation processing'. Time-space 
distancing, on the other hand, gives us a relatively theory-neutral description of the issues 
underlying our use of cognition-related tenns. The problem of cognitive order and the 
notion of time-space distancing will thus serve as a framework for investigating current 
cognitive science research in Chapter 2 and an alternative embodied and situated approach 
in the rest of this work. 
23 
2. Cognitivism and its Problems 
We have all seen one social or human science after another - psychology, sociology, economics - come under 
the sway of some fad. In the United States such fads were more often than not the product of a reductionist 
idea of what it means to be "scientific." The idea that nothing counts as a contribution to "cognitive 
science" unless it is presented in terms of "mental representations" (and these are described 
"computationally") is just another case of this unfortunate tendency. 
Hilary Putnam (1988, pp. 55-56). 
Introduction 
In this chapter I critically examine the primary assumptions that constitute the cognitivist 
approach to understanding cognitive activity. At the core of cognitivism is the basic belief 
that the mind is an in-the-head, physical, rational device (Bern & Keijzer, 1996). This 
starting point enforces the following constraints on the cognitivist enterprise: naturalism, 
rationality, and localised control. Naturalism refers to the belief that a materialist 
understanding of mind cannot make reference to semantic br intentional terms, for these 
are the very concepts that cognitive theorists attempt to explain (see, e.g., Crane, 1995)13. 
Thus naturalism demands an explanation of mental notions in physical or causal terms. 
Rationality is the belief that the mind is somehow endowed with the ability to execute 
bodily movements reliably and validly14. In other words, most of the time the mind 
accurately assesses an agent's surroundings and uses these assessments to co-ordinate the 
agent's body with the environment in an adaptive manner. Localised control derives from 
the assumption that the mind, being a device, has to be somewhere. For the materialist this 
location is nearly always taken to be the brain or, more broadly, the central nervous 
system. The mind thus forms a subsystem within the body and its function is to control its 
movements in the world in an adaptive manner. 
Given these constraints, the basic task of cognitive science becomes the search for a likely 
explanation of how a brain can realise the rational device of the mind. Cognitivism 
provides a solution in terms of a framework of three interlocking assumptions: a 
commitment to an information-processing or sense-model-plan-act (SMP A) architecture; a 
commitment to a representational-computational explanatory approach; and the use of 
formal task description as the primary method for deducing the kinds of processes and 
operations that underpin cognitive activity. 
13 This is a more restricted sense of naturalism than that generally used in the philosophy of science. 
14 This is a broader sense of rationality than is used within philosophy and cognitive science. There 
rationality is used in the more restrictive sense of the use of reason or logic to solve a problem. 
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Cognitivism holds that people and other animals are information-processors in the sense 
that they make their way about the world by receiving stimulus information from their 
local environment and then transduce it into an internal informational code. The 
information in this internal code is manipulated and transformed in order to produce a 
useful model of the environment - a model that lets the agent know what is in the world, 
and where the agent is relative to those things. It is often argued that this model cannot be 
built entirely from stimulus information and thus must be supplemented with information 
from memory (considered to be a kind of database of extra supporting information, e.g., 
the basic concept of schema used in cognitive psychology). The agent knows where they 
are situated in the environment once the model has been constructed. The subsequent stage 
of processing then involves deciding what to do next. This is often thought to involve a 
process of internally simulating different courses of action (using the model as an internal 
off-line surrogate of the real-world) to see what the most effective actions will be. 
Ultimately a plan for action is constructed. Finally this plan needs to be translated into a 
'motor program' - a series of instructions telling the body how to produce the desired 
behaviour. In sum, cognitivism is committed to, what a number of researchers call, the 
sense-model-plan-act (SMPA) framework (Brooks, 1991b; Smithers, 1995). 
The SMPA idea is complemented by a theory of how these different 'stages of processing' 
are carried out in an agent's mindlbrain. We can call this the representational-
computational theory of cognition. In very general terms this is the claim that the brain is a 
kind of computer and that mental information is realised in the neural substrate in a manner 
similar to the way that information in a computer is realised by the computer's hardware. 
Thus, internal information ( or knowledge) is thought to be representational (internal states 
of the brain represent various concepts, features, and properties). These representations are 
manipulated and transformed computationally; that is, according to certain kinds of rules. 
This view of the relation between the brain and mental activity may seem to be relatively 
straightforward, but fact numerous books and papers have been written trying to make 
sense of it. Philosophers have co:p.structed many candidate theories of mental 
representation and theories of content (Von Eckardt, 1993). Theories of mental 
representation aim to describe how some physical objects (e.g., a neural ensemble or a state 
of a transistor) can represent other things. Theories of content are attempts at explaining 
how these representations get their particular representational content. Often these two 
projects are tightly interconnected in the literature that discusses the plausibility of the 
representational-computational theory of mind (These issues are discussed in more detail in 
the following section Theories of representation). Without going into the gory details at 
this stage, the upshot of this research is that nobody has constructed a widely endorsed, 
adequate theory of representation thus far (Grush, 1997). Indeed a number of philosophers : .. -' 
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seem to be losing interest in the problem altogether. In sum, the notion of representation is 
currently vague at best. 
The third key assumption of cognitivism is a methodological one aimed at providing a way 
of working out just what kinds of representations and computations are necessary for 
carrying out a particular cognitive task. The answers to this kind of question have always 
been at least partly empirically based. Many cognitive psychology experiments have 
attempted to use chronometric analyses to demonstrate how many information-processing 
operations are necessary to complete certain tasks (the usual reasoning is that if a task takes 
longer than another related task then it involves 'more processing'). However, 
underpinning this kind of research is a guiding belief in the usefulness of analysis using 
formal task descriptions (a.k.a. functional task analysis, decomposition by function) 
(Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). Basically speaking this is the strategy of hypothesising that 
cognizers, or cognitive subsystems, can be understood as having to accomplish particular 
tasks, and that the mechanisms underlying cognitive activity can be discovered using a 
logical or algorithmic breakdown of these tasks (the behavioural functions of particular 
activities) into a series of subtasks. Each subtask is thought to be implemented by a 
particular component ofthe agent's inner machineryl5. 
In the rest of this chapter I will examine each of these assumptions, particularly the 
representational-computational theory, in more detail and show how they constitute a 
mutually-reinforcing set of arguments and ideas. That is, I want to suggest that in utilising 
the concepts of representation and computation there is an implied commitment to viewing 
cognizers as information-processors and a similar commitment to viewing the task of the 
cognitive theorist as the production of formal task descriptions that can be mapped on to 
the neurocognitive architecture16• I will also describe some of the difficulties associated 
with these different assumptions. In particular I focus on the idea that cognitivism's set of 
interlocking assumptions force on us a guiding methodological picture that is antithetical to 
an ESD interactionist view of cognition. Interactionism and representationalism cannot be 
easily reconciled without fundamentally reworking both the standard and intuitively 
attractive notion of representation and the useful elements of the interactionist approach. 
15 This component need not be a neurobiologically independent entity. Neural resources can be shared 
amongst different functional systems. That said, however, the equation of, at least some functional systems 
with specific neural systems is widely assumed. 
16 A number of authors have recently argued that the three cognitivist assumptions do not have to be 
understood as naturally implying each other. In particular it is argued that we may endorse many of the 
challenges of ESD interactionism, but preserve some kind of role for representation and computation (e.g., 
Clark, 1997; Markman & Dietrich, 1998). I will have more to say about these hybrid positions in coming 
chapters. 
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This kind of argument stands in contrast to many of the debates over mental representation 
in that it does not seek an ontological argument that aims to knock down a particular view 
of representation (although I do not presume that such a task is impossible). Instead I want 
to claim that, as cognitive research increasingly pays attention to issues of embodiment, 
situatedness, and distribution, the prominence of representational and computational issues 
will fade. 
Using Representation and Computation to Explain Time-Space 
Distancing 
At the heart of cognitivism is the idea that the agent is separated from their environment 
and that, in order to act adaptively in that environment, they must have access to 
knowledge about the environment. This assumption seems to demand a representational 
answer to the problem of cognitive order. The problem of cognitive order, it will be 
recalled, refers to the need to explain how an agent 'hooks up with' elements of the world 
beyond its skin in an adaptive manner. Cognitivism holds that this time-space distancing 
occurs because many animals are, or contain, mental representational systems. The notion 
of mental representation derives from an understanding of external and public 
representations such as pictures, signs, flags, texts, manual gestures, and spoken utterances, 
as well as natural signs such as clouds that signify impending rain, spots that signify 
measles, and smoke that signifies fire. Not surprisingly then, a number of modem cognitive 
theorists have used C. S. Peirce's (1931-1958) comprehensive treatment of the notion of 
representation to unpack the notion of mental representation (e.g., Deacon, 1996, 1997; 
Von Eckardt, 1993). Given this relatively widespread endorsement I will use Peirce's 
framework to provide us with an idea of the kinds of relations and structures that must hold 
for something to be a representation. 
Peirce's View of Representation 
Peirce distinguishes three different types of representation: icons, indices, and symbols. 
Icons are things that share certain qualities with the things they represent (their object). The 
small paint squares on paint charts are icons of paint (Peirce called these types of icons 
images). A road map is an icon of some terrain as there exists a mapping between aspects 
of the world and the map (a diagram in Peirce's terminology). Indices are things that have 
some sort of real causal or spatial-temporal connection with the thing they represent. A rap 
on the door is an index of the presence of someone at the door. A weathervane in a certain 
position is an index of wind direction. A pointed finger or an utterance such as 'now' or 
'there' are also indices of the thing or things 'pointed at'. Symbols include all arbitrary 
human creations that are 'about' things and that have their meaning established by means 
of convention. They include words spoken and written, flags, road signs, gestures and so 
on (for a more recent, but similar, view see Noble & Davidson, 1996, p. 5). 
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Although, in some respects problematic, Peirce's distinctions are useful for picking out the 
sort of things that may be called external representations. In all three cases Peirce is clear 
that a representation has three integral relations. Any 'thing' that does not possess all three 
is not a representation. A representation is a representation when there exists a bearer (or 
sign), an object (or referent), and an interpreter. A bearer is simply the physical form that 
a representation takes. Crane (1995) distinguishes between the medium of the 
representation (the stuff that realises the representation such as sound waves, ink on paper, 
a magnetic disk, fabric or wood) and the vehicle of the representation (the form of the 
instantiation, such as natural language or a picture or flag symbol). 
An object, or referent, is simply the thing or things that the representation is about. Many 
theorists argue that it is important to distinguish a representation's object and content17 
(e.g., Smythe, 1989). Objects are typically understood to be the 'things in the world' that 
are represented. The content refers to the way in which the object is construed in the 
representation. The object of a photograph of a tree is the actual tree (whether it still exists 
or not) whereas the content of the photo is the aspect of the tree captured by the 
configuration of the bearer. This distinction hints at the many complex problems associated 
with the notion of a representational object (does a picture of a unicorn have an object or 
merely content?). 
An interpreter is someone for whom the representation has meaning. Peirce called the 
'mental effect' of a representation an interpretant. Some writers have taken this claim to be 
equivalent to the idea that external representations are understood when they cause a 
thought or mental representation. It is clear that without someone interpreting a bearer 
nothing is represented (if no one ever saw a particular set of deer hoof prints in the mud in 
a forest then they will never have actually represented anything). Yet it is always possible 
that someone could have interpreted the hoof prints as a representation of the presence of 
some deer. Von Eckardt (1993) notes that "[v]irtually anything is a possible representation 
for Peirce, but only certain things are actual representations." (p. 153). 
Since Peirce's analysis of representation deals exclusively with external representations it 
does not explicitly provide a foundation for discussing the nature of mental representations. 
More recently theorists such as Dretske (1988, 1995) have attempted to recast the ideas of 
previous philosophers such as Peirce in order to make sense of the notion of mental or 
internal representation. Roughly speaking, Dretske accepts Peirce's analysis of the major 
aspects of a representation (the bearer, object, and interpreter) and takes account of them in 
his taxonomy of representational entities. He distinguishes three kinds of representation: 
conventional public representations, natural signs, and, what he calls type III 
17 Other tenns used in making this distinction include sense versus reference and intension versus extension. 
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representations. The third sort of representation, Dretske contends, describes physical 
entities that can do the work of mental representations. Dretske's type I representations are 
equivalent to Peirce's symbols in that they are representations that gain their 
representational power via convention. According to Dretske type I representations do not 
have intrinsic representational power. Many, perhaps most, cognitivist theorists take type I 
representations to be grounded in mental representations. They are viewed as external 
expressions of internal thoughts and concepts that have found a high degree of stability 
across cultural groups due to various processes of social learning and transmission. For 
instance, Davies (1995) argues that linguistic aboutness derives from the intrinsic 
intentionality of 'attitude aboutness'. Attitude aboutness refers to the aboutness of human 
mental states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, wishes and intentions (the so-called 
propositional attitudes). Davies suggests that the aboutness of our propositional attitudes is 
more semantically fine-grained than that available in public language. 
Type II representations are what Dretske calls natural signs (after Grice, 1957, see Bem & 
Keijzer, 1996; Davies, 1995, refers to the 'intentionality' of natural signs as indicator 
aboutness). These roughly correspond to Peirce's indices in that they gain their 
representational power from objective rather than conventional relations with the world. 
Well known examples of natural signs include smoke indicating fire, annual rings 
indicating the age of a tree, and small red spots indicating measles. Hendriks-Jansen (1996) 
notes that the notion of natural representation is not really representational in a strict sense. 
It is certainly not the function of tree rings to indicate the age of a tree, nor, presumably, did they indicate 
such a thing until human beings learned to interpret them. Tree rings are the result of variations in growth 
rate over the seasons. They have no natural function and no natural "users" of their representational 
potential. (p. 40). 
In an important sense type II representations are not 'natural' representations at all, their 
capacity to be used as representations notwithstanding. 
Dretske's type III representations are similar to natural signs but they do have natural 
users. That is, they are natural states of the world that are objectively related to other states 
of the world and they are used by the system of which they are a part because of this 
natural relation. These representations with natural users possess what Dretske refers to as 
functional meaning rather than the natural meaning of type II representations. Dretske 
introduces the term functional meaning to describe the idea that a type III representation 
serves a function or purpose within the system that it is embedded. If a component has a 
function, argues Dretske, then it can malfunction, and if the function of a representation is 
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to represent then it can misrepresentl8 . For instance, a petrol gauge (type III) represents the 
amount of petrol in the tank: because that is its function (it has been designed to convey that 
information), whereas the annual rings on a tree do not exist in order to convey the age of 
tree to any natural user. Of course the petrol gauge example suffers from the fact that a 
gauge is a human artifact and is thus really a sort of type I representation because its 
interpretation and use requires appropriately enculturated humans. The car itself does not 
use the covariance to do anything. Dretske tries to provide a better example by appealing to 
the workings of a species of sea-going bacteria that possess internal magnetic structures 
called magnetosomes. The bacteria 'use' their magneto somes to avoid toxic, oxygen-rich 
waters near the surface of the sea (i.e., they have an important biological function within 
the bacteria and thus have functional meaning) and Dretske wants to suggest that the 
magneto somes thus represent oxygen-rich or toxic waters. We will examine some of the 
difficulties associated Dretske's analysis later on in the section Representations as 
Indicators: Causal Theories of Content. At this stage it I merely want to indicate the ways 
in which, at least some, cognitive scientists try to conceive of representations as natural 
intentional entities. Not all philosophers of mind consider Dretske's notion of type III 
representations to be sufficient for making sense of the broad range of intentional mental 
state terms used within psychology and the other cognitive sciences. Davies (1995), for 
instance, seems to suggest that Dretske's type III representations merely possess 'indicator 
aboutness' but that the aboutness of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, and so on), 
experiential aboutness (the intentionality of our perceptual experiences), and subdoxastic 
aboutness l9 (the aboutness of unconscious, subpersonal psychological states) possess 
different, possibly additional, qualities to those that make up type III representations. 
Representations are thus widely thought to consist of bearers that carry informational 
content and that are used by an interpreting system. Such entities can enable a 
representation-using system to engage in a number of important activities. 
What Representations Can Do 
Mental representations are supposed to accomplish time-space distancing in the same way 
that external representations do. In this section I will examine the things that external 
18 Later on in this chapter I argue that a malfunctioning type III representation does not constitute a case of 
misrepresentation sufficient for cognitivist needs. 
19 Davies (1995) argues that subdoxastic aboutness differs from indicator aboutness because the former 
"allows for the possibility of misrepresentation." (p. 372). It is possible, then, that Davies may accept that 
Dretske's type III representations, which Dretske considers capable of misrepresentation (see the following 
section about Representations as Indicators), could be candidate entities for enabling subdoxastic aboutness. 
This is important because Davies' subdoxastic states seem to be equivalent to the subpersonal mental 
representations central to most modem cognitive scientific theory. 
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(public) representations make possible: time space distancing, making the abstract 
concrete, and making mistakes possible. 
Representations can make the distal proximal. Things at a distance in time and/or space can 
have effects on people (interpreters) who are not co-present with them via the mediation of 
representations. High-tech satellite transmissions and the internet, for instance, can produce 
real-time representations of states-of-affairs occurring thousands of kilometres away. 
Books and letters do a similar sort of thing but delay contact. The fact that the bearers of 
representations can remain interpretable for great lengths of time introduces the possibility 
of contact with the past although, of course, this relies on the capacity of the interpreter to 
interpret the bearer (think of archaeologists faced with an artifact inscribed with an 
unknown ancient symbol system). And bearers are not restricted to things created by 
people or other animals. Geologists for instance can 'read the Earth' to recover something 
of the events of the past before humans, and indeed before life, existed on the planet. 
Representations also provide us with the tools for making concrete imaginary or 
hypothetical states of affairs. We can draw a picture of a unicorn or tell a story about pixies 
that can affect an audience (even when that audience knows that the things represented are 
not real). Representations can also stand for non-imaginary things for which there is no 
concrete referent such as the 'number 3' or the 'species of cats' or 'justice'. 
This brings us to a third important effect of representations. If we can represent things that 
are hypothetical or imaginary (even in the cases of prediction or retrodiction when we hope 
that our representational constructions will be, or were, real) then there exists the 
possibility that objects may be misrepresented. When an interpreter takes a representation 
as referring to something that does not exist (e.g., telling someone that there is a burglar in 
their house when there isn't) there exists the possibility that the interpreter will act upon 
the misinterpretation producing maladaptive (dangerous, embarrassing or 
incomprehensible) behaviour. 
How Representations Do It 
Representations make possible time-spacing distancing, 'concretisation' and mistake-
making because they possess the properties of localness, surrogacy, and persistence. 
Representations are local in the simple sense that they have their effects on people by 
being in the same place as the reader or user of the representation. A 'Beware of the Dog' 
sign provides me with information about Sam even when Sam is hidden quietly behind the 
fence (i.e., unperceivable). Thus, we do not need to appeal to 'occult' or action-at-distance 
causation (e.g., my detecting Sam's presence by ESP) to understand how a person can have 
information about things in the world that are distant from the perceiver - that is, not 
obviously causally connected to the agent in some sense (see the section below on versions 
of representation hungriness). Newell (1990) makes this clear when he writes that: 
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It is a law of nature that processing in the physical world is always local, that is, always takes place in a 
limited region of physical space. This is equivalent to there being no action at a distance, or somewhat more 
specifically, that causal effects propagate with an upper velocity of c, the speed of light in vacuo. 
Consequently, any computational system ultimately does its work by localized processing within localized 
regions in space. What guides or determines this processing task must then also be local. (p. 74) 
Newell considers symbols, or more accurately symbol tokens, to be things that cause us to 
access and retrieve distant knowledge rather than being informative in their own right. 
Newell's notion of a symbol is somewhat like that of a variable in a computer program. A 
variable is assigned a value at some point in the operation of the program. When the 
program executes a procedure that involves the variable the variable's current value is 
accessed and retrieved from elsewhere in the computer's memory. 
Representations thus can serve as surrogates or proxies for environmental information. I 
can be scared of Sam and behave appropriately without ever having laid eyes on him. 
Recent views of representation in cognitive science have focused on the idea that we can 
tell that something is a representation when an entity 'stands in for' aspects of the 
environment that are not always reliably present (Bechtel, 1998; Clark & Toribio, 1994; 
Grush, 1997; Haugeland, 1991). 
Finally, many representations possess the property of persistence. They stay the same, or, 
more generally, they remain potentially informative, over time. Their persistence is largely 
determined by the physical nature of the representation bearer. Representational 
persistence is important because it provides an avenue for storing information of the past. 
In other words, persistence constitutes a sense of memory. This allows the user of the 
representation to let the representation 'carry the memory-load' thereby freeing the user to 
devote their cognitive resources to other activities. If a representation is transportable (e.g., 
a list of appointments in a diary) then it can be used as a mobile information carrier and it 
can be consulted in a whole variety of environments, as long as the environments support 
the use of the representation bearer. Thus, mobile representations permit the use of 
information in multiple contexts, and this capacity permits a certain level of 
decontextualisation that would not be possible without them. Consider the following 
situation: a friend tells me a list of important phone numbers which I could not possibly 
remember unaided. If I go home without recording them, and my friend is elsewhere, I can 
not make use of the phone number information; the 'environmental stimulus' is not 
available as a resource for action. If I write the numbers down in my diary and take it home 
with me, a surrogate of the environmental stimulus comes with me. The diary entry permits 
me to use the information in the absence of the environmental stimulus provided by my 
friend; I can perform actions 'out of context'. Moreover, I could not do this unless I had the 
representation and the ability to use it. 
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How Representations Solve the Problem of Cognitive Order 
If there exists an internal and mental equivalent of external representations, cognitive 
scientists can explain a huge variety of human and animal activities that would otherwise 
appear puzzling or at least recalcitrant to explanation under the environmental detenninism 
assumed in behaviourism. If we can make sense of the notion of a mental representation we 
can avoid the 'right here, right now' implication of the behaviourist's situational 
detenninism. In other words, mental representations, like their source external 
representations, can account for the ability to behave adaptively when faced with 
representation hungry problems (Clark & Toribio, 1994). These are situations where there 
is no reliable environmental signal of important behavioural detenninants (see Chemero, 
1998b for a critical discussion of this idea). The mental representations stand in for the 
perceptually absent things by serving as an internal surrogate for what is missing 
externally. Mental representations can thus account for behaviour that is based upon belief 
rather than what is perceived, and thus (mis-) behaviour that occurs because of the 
misrepresentation of a situation. And because mental representations are viewed as neural 
states in animals, and similar underlying internal, physical states in other potentially 
intelligent agents (robots, Martians), they are always close at hand. In a sense the notion of 
mental representations as being inside a cognitive agent explains behaviour in the absence 
of external stimuli by suggesting that the 'stimulating' world is to a large degree carried 
about inside them. 
Versions of Representation Hungriness 
In chapter 1 I described several subproblems that together constitute the problem of 
cognitive order. These subproblems include what I called the basic problem, object 
constancy, conceptual equivalence, the hidden present, the experienced past (temporal 
stability), the unexperienced past, the future, and the hypothetical. There exist important 
differences of opinion within modem cognitive science over the degree to which solutions 
to the various subproblems mentioned previously require appeal to the notion of mental 
representation. These differences of opinion largely revolve around the sort of thing the 
various theorists take a mental representation to be. 
Orthodox cognitivists believe that all of the subproblems are solved by mental 
representations. I will call this view the close range version of representation hungriness 
because its advocates argue that even things that are only slightly distant from the 
mindlbrain have their cognitive effects on the agent via some fonn of mental 
representation, at least in higher animals like ourselves. Representations in this sense are 
any sort of internal (neural) state configured by infonnational stimuli (either environmental 
or internal knowledge) that are used to mediate behaviour. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) and 
Lloyd (1989) might be close range advocates. 
33 
An increasing number of researchers believe that we do not need to appeal to the notion of 
mental representation in order to explain an agent's (often complex) behaviour in response 
to information available in the local (i.e., perceivable) environment. Instead they argue that 
an internal state is only truly representational if it provides, or could provide, information 
in the absence of environmental stimuli2o• Thus, a 'neural mapping' of something in the 
local environment would not be considered to be a representation but perhaps only a 
presentation (Grush, 1997). Representations are thus a form of internal model of what may 
or could be. This view I call the medium range version of representation hungriness. Clark 
and Toribio (1994) and Grush (1997) fit nicely into this category. 
Advocates of the long range version of representation hungriness suggest that many 
cognitively complex activities are possible without recourse to the notion of representation 
and that only humans who have acquired representation-using skills can aspire to truly 
long-range forms oftime-space distancing. These kinds of representation are not internal or 
mental representations in the traditional cognitivist sense, but rather are private versions of 
'external representations'. Gibson (1979/1986), Noble and Davidson (1989, 1996), and 
possibly Vygotsky (1930-1935/1978, 1934/1986), can be seen as endorsing this sort of 
version of representation hungriness in different ways. Bechtel (1993a) and Hutchins 
(1995a) may be other advocates. It is also the view that I will develop in what follows 
(especially in chapter 8). The long range view is not what I would consider a cognitivist 
view of cognition because it rejects the notion of mental representations as 'things in the 
head'. This is not to say that there are not interesting facts of biology (especially 
neurobiology) associated with this view. 
Aspects of the Problem of Cognitive Order 
In the earlier discussion of the subproblems of cognitive order (in chapter 1) I hinted at the 
ways cognitivist researchers use the notion of mental representation to provide solutions to 
these problems. I will now take time to briefly tie these ideas into the current examination 
of the notion of mental representation. 
According to some the basic problem of how the distant world affects an organism is 
solved by the fact that the environment is represented by the activation of arrays of cells on 
an organism's sensory surfaces. In M8:rr's (1982) theory of vision the basic resource for 
20 Clark (1997; Clark & Grush, 1997) argues for a weakened fonn of the 'stand in' version of representation 
(see 'Representations as simulations' below). In the 'stand in' view an entity is only a representation if it can 
and does stand in for an absent object. In Clark's (1997) view there exists a weaker kind of representation 
that cannot be decoupled and used off-line but which has the evolutionary function of standing in for its 
object. This makes Clark, at least partly, a close-range advocate. See Chemero (1998b) for a critique of all 
'standing in' theories of representation. 
34 
seeing the environment is the continually changing pattern of stimulated retinal cells in 
both eyes (what is often called the peripheral stimulus and what Marr refers to as an 
image). Many researchers, especially those in the neurosciences, are happy to refer to these 
patterns as representations. 
The problem of object constancy is solved by the computational generation of a mental 
representation common to a variety of activated stimulus arrays. That is, an object is 
known as such because there is a many-to-one mapping between peripheral stimulation and 
an exemplar or canonical representation. 
Conceptual equivalence is handled in a similar manner to object constancy, the difference 
being that conceptual equivalence occurs at a much higher level of abstraction. Many 
complicated inferential procedures must go into categorising, for instance, bananas and 
termites as examples of chimp food. No amount of clever transforming of the retinal array 
is going to map bananas onto termites to create a single common representation. More 
abstract features such as edibility must come into play. 
Memory of the experienced past is understood in terms of the persistence of stored mental 
representations in the appropriate neural circuits in the brain (particularly the neocortex and 
the hippocampal system). The hidden present is understood in terms of stored mental 
representations becoming part of the interpretation of the perception of a certain place or 
event. The bottom-up resources from perception fuse with the top-down resources of 
memory and inference to form an overall interpretation of a situation. Loftus and Palmer's 
(1974) research on the interaction between language and memory provides a nice example 
of this sort of phenomenon. 
The unexperienced past, the future, and the hypothetical are all examples of inferential and 
recombinative processes based upon the internal transformation of stored mental 
representations into new representations of states of affairs. These are not always explicit 
cogitative processes limited to adult human beings. For instance, it is argued (Cheney & 
Seyfarth, 1990; Clark & Toribio, 1994) that monkey deception and social maneuverings 
imply the necessity for a sort of anticipation (future representation) and counterfactual 
reasoning (hypothetical representation). 
The Computer as Representation Engine 
Mental representations are obviously a potentially powerful explanatory mechanism for 
researchers interested in the time-space distancing processes associated with cognitive 
phenomena. The challenge for psychologists and other cognitive scientists is to come up 
with some way of showing how mental representations can be a respectable part of the 
natural order, especially that part of the natural order concerned with neurobiology. In 
other words researchers have to come up with some way of fitting the notion of mental 
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representation into an explanatory model that respects the constraints of localised control 
and naturalism mentioned at the beginning ofthe chapter. Fodor (1987) puts it this way: 
I suppose sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate 
and irreducible properties of things. When they do, ... spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear on their 
list. But aboutness surely won't: intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. (p. 97) 
Cognitivist cognitive science has seized upon the computer as a promising source model 
for understanding the brain as a mental representation engine (e.g., Fodor, 1975). 
Computers are physical, automatic, formal systems and formal systems are understood as 
systems in which symbols are manipulated 'mechanically' (i.e., without regard to the 
interpretations of a person). Hutchins (1995a) describes the operation of a formal system in 
the following way: 
[T]here is some world of phenomena, and some way to encode the phenomena as symbols. The symbols are 
manipulated by reference to their form only. We do not interpret the meanings of the symbols while they are 
being manipulated. The manipulation of the symbols results in some other symbolic expression. Finally, we 
may interpret a newly created string of symbols as meaning something about the world of phenomena. (pp. 
359-360) 
The computer, as an automatic, physically-realised, symbol manipulator, respects the 
constraints of naturalism and localised control: It is explainable purely in physical terms 
and it is an object with finite displacement. A mind, understood as a rational device, could 
thus be some neural version of a computer. Thus the cognitivist approach: 
takes cognition to be the operation of a special mental computer, located in the brain. Sensory organs deliver 
up to the mental computer representations of the state of the environment. The system computes a 
specification of an appropriate action. The body carries this action out. (Van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 1) 
Promising Properties of Computers 
Cognitivist theories suggest that a computer is just the right sort of physical device for 
realising a mental representation system because it is a purely physical system that 
supposedly manipulates representations (symbols) of things automatically and 
mechanically. These 'representation engines' are also attractive explanatory models of 
cognition because their structure supports compositionality - the generation of molecular 
thoughts from cognitive atoms arranged according to a particular syntax. Compositionality 
is often taken to be a central aspect of human cognition (e.g., Corballis, 1991; Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1988). Computers can also be potentially programmed to be partially 
autonomous entities; systems that can implement ongoing input-processing-output cycles 
without the guidance of an external agency. 
Automaticity and Partial Autonomy 
The vast majority of computers in existence today require the constant attention of a 
human operator to provide them with input, instructions for manipulating that input 
36 
(usually in the form of pre-written software loaded onto the system) and to make sense of 
the output. The computer is a machine for automatically manufacturing and storing 
information (in the everyday sense of information), albeit a hugely flexible and versatile 
machine. Thus the typical personal computer is not a lot different from a television, car, or 
washing machine. One 'instructs' it to do something, lets it 'manipulate' or 'interpret' 
one's instructions, and then makes use of the 'output'. For example, an automatic washing 
machine takes an internal state given by its control settings and, via the mechanical 
configuration of its insides, 'transforms' this 'information' into various other types of 
internal states relating to water flow, temperature, spin cycle, and so on. 
Computers only really begin to excite the psychological imagination when (1) this input-
processing-output process is turned in on itself to become a closed loop and (2) the 
procedures carried out by the central processing unit are made flexible enough for the 
computer to, in effect, program itself. High-level artificial intelligence languages such as 
LISP provide this sort of potential. A computer that can sample its environment, 
manipulate that sampling in a meaningful way, and then output it in order to res ample the· 
environment begins to look much more like an autonomous21 entity. That is, in principle a 
computer could exhibit adaptive behaviour in a 'real-world environment' for a reasonable 
period without the outside assistance of a beneficent engineer. 
Compositionality 
The computer is practically defined by the fact that its basic structure can be configured, by 
programming it or loading a program into it, to create a potentially infinite variety of 
specialised virtual machines22• That is, the basic 'hardwired' operations of a computer can 
be compiled in various combinations into an unlimited number of 'high-level' operations. 
Thus a computer can be, as we all lmow, a spreadsheet machine, a word-processing 
machine, a drawing machine, and so on. This fact is especially attractive for cognitive 
theorists for it suggests that a purely physical machine can exhibit the sort of 
compositionality that is often attributed to cognizers like ourselves (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988). Compositionality is usually thought to be reflected in the productivity, 
21 Boden (1996a) suggests that we judge a system to be autonomous: 1) to the extent to which responses to 
the environment are direct rather than indirect (mediated by internal structures shaped by the system's 
history); 2) the extent to which control mechanisms are self-generated rather than imposed; and 3) the extent 
to which internal mechanisms can be reflected upon and modified. The first two aspects are within the grasp 
of a closed-loop computer. It is unlikely that many cognitivist researchers would concede that existing AI 
systems could accomplish the third feat. In chapter 6 I discuss a much stronger notion of autonomy that 
requires the system in question to have a special kind of physical cohesion (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in 
press). No existing computational or robotic system is autonomous in this strong sense. 
22 Actually this characterisation applies only to the ubiquitous general purpose machine. 
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systematicity, and inferential coherence of human thought and language. Productivity (or 
generativity) is the ability to create an infinite number of thoughts or utterances by the 
syntactic recursion of simple elements. Systematicity is the ability to recombine elements 
of cognitive expressions in meaningful ways so that, for instance, a system that can think 
that 'the. cat is under the car' can also use those conceptual elements to think that 'the car is 
under the cat'23. Inferential coherence is the ability to make cogent inferences such as 
inferring "from the proposition 'It is raining in Spain' to the proposition 'It is raining 
somewhere. '" (Rowlands, 1999, p. 175). In order for these cognitive capacities to exist, 
classical cognitivist theorists (e.g., Fodor, 1975) argue that mental representations must be 
symbolic, canonical, structured, static, and abstract entities (Shanon, 1991, pp. 361-362; 
see also Hamad, 1990, p. 336). These are just the kinds of properties that conventional 
computer symbols seem to exhibit. 
Symbolic representations are symbolic in the sense that they have two aspects: a bearer (or 
vehicle) and a content (or message). The bearer is of no significance except as the 'carrier' 
of information. The same information can be instantiated in different media (the, so-called, 
multiple-realisability thesis). 
Symbolic representations are canonical in the sense that they are phrased in a single code. 
This code is complete (all knowledge possessed by an agent is represented by the code), 
exhaustive (there exists no subtleties of interpretation or connotation that are not explicitly 
encoded), and determinate (each distinct piece of knowledge is represented by a distinct 
representation that has a single interpretation). 
Symbolic representations, at least as they are understood in classical computationalism, are 
structured in that they are, or are composed of, well-defined primitives (a finite, small set 
of building blocks rather like an alphabet) and well-formed composites (each 'word' that is 
created by combining groups of the primitives is done so by a system of rules - a syntax or 
grammar). Many connectionist theorists part company with classical computationalists on 
these points. Connectionists tend to view the relationship between input and output (say a 
question and an answer) as a complicated process that deals with 'microfeatures' or 
'subsymbols' that themselves are derived from training with particular kinds of paired 
inputs and outputs. In connectionist networks there are no well-defined primitives. Well-
fonned composites (e.g., grammatically correct utterances) emerge from the connectivity 
23 Systematicity is very similar to Evans' (1982) notion of the generality constraint. Evans' idea is that we 
do not feel that a person, or other system, exhibits genuine thought unless they (or it) can show that they 
have (or it has) the capacity to juxtapose arguments and predicates. Russell (1996) expresses this idea simply 
when he writes "it makes no sense to attribute to somebody a thought such as Fa [where F is a predicate such 
as 'white', and where a is an argument, such as 'car'] unless she also has the capacity to think Fb or Fc or Fd, 
and so forth, as well as Ga or Ha or Ka, and so forth." (p. 165) (see also Clark, 1993). 
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and weightings of the network rather than by following explicit transformational rules. 
Arguments rage over whether connectionist networks can provide us with adequate models 
of cognition for these very reasons. 
The 'natural state' of symbolic representations is a static one. Unless they are 'damaged', 
altered, or 'overwritten' representations are thought to be permanent. Such a view stands in 
opposition to dynamic models of mind which include biologically-realistic neural nets 
(Globus, 1992), artificial life neural networks (Parisi, 1997), and dynamical systems 
models of cognition (Van Gelder & Port, 1995). 
Symbolic representations are abstract in two senses: (1) they are amodal or cross-modal 
(they have no special affinity with any particular sensory modality or way of learning; for 
instance, it matters not whether a representation is created after witnessing an event, 
hearing someone talk about it, or reading about it), and (2) they can be instantiated in many 
physical forms (the physical composition of the representational system is unimportant). 
Simply put, mental representations conceived in these terms are thought to possess the 
flexibility and interchangeability necessary to create and transform cognitive expressions 
in characteristic human ways. It is argued, for instance, that in order for us to understand 
what changes when we reverse the roles ofthe 'cat' and the 'mat' in the sentence 'the cat is 
on the mat', we must possess discrete mental structures with the semantic content 'cat' and 
'mat' as well as a complex group of syntactic rules for recombining them into meaningful 
expressions. Ifthe 'cat on the mat' structure was not decomposable (say, it was constituted 
by a holistic structure) then we would not be able to perform such feats of thought. 
Not all cognitive scientists are convinced that productivity, systematicity, and inferential 
coherence are definitive qualities of human cognition, and still fewer are convinced that a 
classical symbol system architecture, such as that instantiated in a typical computer, is 
necessary for their implementation (Rume1hart & McClelland, 1986)24. In addition, the 
concept of systematicity puzzles some (e.g., Copeland, 1993). These worries aside, there 
can be little doubt that the highly flexible and modifiable structure of the computer makes 
it a much more attractive metaphor of the human mind than one based on other artifacts. 
Potential Rationality 
Once the wordly event has been encoded as some sort of internal state of the machine, it 
can be transformed through the execution of various internal processes (often called rules 
or effective procedures) into a new internal state. This state can be further transformed or it 
can be used to create some sort of output event such as a display on a VDU, a printout, the 
24 For further discussion of whether connectionist networks can, or need to be able to, exhibit 
compositionality see Bechtel (1993a), Smolensky (1988, 1990), and chapters 7 and 8 of this work. 
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movement of a robotic limb, and so on. This output event may, or may not, appear to be 
meaningful, useful, or expected by the computer user. Such things depend on the ways in 
which the programmer has organised the particular virtual machine in operation. Typically 
the operation of a particular virtual machine is intended to 'make sense'. That is, the 
machine's output events are 'sensible' transformations of its input events. 
Symbolic/Representational 
Perhaps the most significant attraction of computers is that they seem to provide us with a 
purely physical way of understanding how a system can represent things in the world. 
Specifically we can instruct (program) a computer to recognise some sort of input (a 
particular key press, sound in a microphone, pattern of activation on a photovoltaic array) 
as relating to a certain state of the world. When an input device is activated it configures 
part of the internal structure of the machine in a certain way. This internal configuration is 
often called a symbol or representation because it correlates with a particular worldly 
event. Indeed, the whole point of programming a computer is so we can 'encode' wordly 
events as internal, storable, configurations of the machine. Not only can we interpret 
various internal states as being about things in the world, we can also begin to understand 
how the internal states might be representations of things in the world for the machine. 
That is, the internal states of a machine can not only be external, personal-level, public 
representations but also internal, subpersonal-level, mental representations. The former 
represent by virtue of their derived intentionality, while the latter represent by virtue of 
their intrinsic intentionality (Searle, 1992). It is this latter notion of internal states as 
representations for the machine (or mental representations) that excites the cognitivist 
imagination. 
Of course, the trick is to argue just how an internal state is 'meaningful' for a machine 
rather than just being interpretable (by a clever human) as such. I imagine that few 
cognitivists would be game enough to argue that the internal states of a regular home 
computer running a word processing program were 'meaningful' for the computer 
(although Newell [1990] and Vera and Simon [1993] may). Cognitivist philosophers of 
mind tend to think that it requires a special sort of virtual machine for symbols to have 
intrinsic meaning. In order for a computer to be a cognitive system, some special kinds of 
relation must be set up between the system and the world in order for its internal 
configurations to be understood as mental representations. Unfortunately for cognitivism 
there is little in the way of consensus among modem cognitive theorists about the nature of 
this special set of relations. So cognitivism's first challenge is to face up to what has been 
called the symbol grounding problem. 
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Problem 1: The Symbol Grounding Problem 
The symbol grounding problem is the problem of how subpersonal mental representations 
can be intrinsically meaningful (Hamad, 1990). We know that external, public 
representations can be meaningful because people, as interpreters, can understand and use 
them. But we also refer to entities within computer programs as symbols and 
representations. Many cognitive scientists believe that mental representations are just 
computer symbols realised in neural wetware instead of silicon hardware (e.g., Newell, 
1990). The question is, are these computer symbols meaningful to the computer or is their 
meaning parasitic on a human interpreter? Hamad (1990) puts it this way: 
How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than 
just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, 
manipulated solely on the basis or their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless 
symbols? (p. 335) 
Most cognitive scientists agree that the symbols that feature in modem computer software 
are external, public symbols in the same way that written text is or spoken utterances are 
(e.g., Heil, 1981). That is, these symbols mean nothing to the computer itself. To be sure, 
computer symbols are automatically manipulated and transformed, but their use and 
interpretation is entirely up to"the human user. So the challenge for the cognitivist is to 
formulate an account of how computer-like symbols might become meaningful. Ifthis can 
be done then the cognitivist representational-computational project can be carried through. 
Cognitivist theorists either believe that the symbol grounding problem can be solved or 
that it can be avoided. Critics of cognitivism have often raised the objection that the notion 
of mental representation falls foul of the homunculus fallacy and consequently that the 
symbol grounding problem cannot be solved (see Heil, 1981; Searle, 1992; Crane, 1995, 
pp. 149-151). Dennett (1978) describes the homunculus fallacy in terms ofa paradox. 
First, the only psychology that could possibly succeed in explaining the complexities of human activity must 
posit internal representations ... second, nothing is intrinsically a representation of anything; something is a 
representation only for or to someone; any representation or system of representations thus requires at least 
one user or intelpreter of the representation who is external to it. Any such interpreter must have a variety of 
psychological or intentional traits ... : it must be capable of a variety of comprehension, and must have beliefs 
and goals (so it can use the representation to inform itself and thus assist it in achieving its goals). Such an 
interpreter is then a sort of homunculus. 
Therefore, psychology without homunculi is impossible. But psychology with homunculi is doomed to 
circularity or infinite regress, so psychology is impossible. (Dennett, 1978, pp. 121-122) 
In essence the homunculus fallacy objection claims that the explanatory terms used by 
cognitivism in elucidating the notion of cognition, terms such as representation, 
computation, iriformation, signal, and symbol, are personal-level not subpersonal-Ievel 
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tenus and consequently that these tenus are illicitly used to make explanatory mileage in 
cognitivist theories. 
Keijzer (1997) refers to the cognitivist strategy of co-opting the personal-level conceptual 
framework for making sense of subpersonal processes and structures as Agent Theory 
(AT). "In AT, the subpersonal mechanism is molded after a conceptual framework that is 
traditionally used to describe and explain the actions of whole, behaving agents: folk 
psychology, or belief-desire psychology." (pp. 58-59). He makes the important point that 
such a strategy is not necessarily a problematic one. A number of philosophers and 
historians of science have observed that the use of a well understood process or mechanism 
(a source domain) to model a hidden generative mechanism thought to lie behind a 
puzzling phenomenon (a target domain) is an integral part of scientific explanation and 
theory construction (Harre, 1976; Haig, 1987). So there is no a priori reason why scientific 
explanations should not make use of models or metaphors from our everyday 
understandings of the world in order to illuminate our understandings of puzzling 
phenomena in more esoteric scientific domains. Cognitive scientists are completely within 
their rights to call neural states that often reliably covary with particular states of affairs in 
the environment mental representations or cognitive states or green cheese for that matter. 
Problems only arise when researchers claim that some sort of explanatory ground can be 
made by utilising the non-analogous aspects of the model or metaphor. Keijzer (1997) 
refers to this phenomenon as theoretical hitchhiking25 • He characterises it in the following 
way: 
Theoretical hitchhiking occurs when the cognition-dependency of a hypothesized subpersonal property is 
consistently obscured by the observer's own personal-level perspective. A hitchhiking property is not really 
present at the subpersonallevel. (Keijzer, 1997, p. 133). 
Keijzer (1997) argues that we can spot a hitchhiking property when we actually try to build 
an artificial system using the inadequate model. 
A 'real' subpersonal property will be actually present at the subpersonal level. Its characteristics can 
subsequently be replicated in an artificial context and used to build an artificial, behaving system, a model. A 
hitchhiking property, on the other hand, provides only the illusion of being present at the subpersonallevel. 
Models based on hitchhiking properties will reflect this incorrect analysis of the subpersonal situation that 
they are supposed to approximate. Crucial characteristics will be left out and the resulting model will remain 
flawed and not live up to expectations. (p. 134). 
Sound waves, for instance, will never make someone wet. The explanatorily useful part of 
the wave model of sound does not carry over that part of the metaphor. If there did exist a 
situation where a sound of some sort was associated with someone getting wet (perhaps a 
particular sound is associated with sweat-inducing exercise) it would be obviously wrong 
25 I think that theoretical piggybacking might be a more apt term. 
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to explain the wetness 'because sound comes in waves and waves are wet'. This wave 
example is of course overly simple but the history of science provides us with many 
examples where the use of analogy in scientific explanation has foundered due to an 
increasing awareness of the lack of fit between source models and their targets (Laudan, 
1984). In the 19th century physicists believed that light was a wave-like phenomenon. 
Since a wave involves the motion of some medium these physicists hypothesised that there 
must exist an interplanetary medium (the electromagnetic ether) through which light-waves 
propagated. When a number of striking observations and experiments brought the 
existence of ether into question the scientific view of light underwent a radical change (see 
Giere, 1988; Hacking, 1983). The wave model of sound illustrates th~ point that model and 
metaphor use are central aspects of theory development. The mind, no less than any other 
puzzling scientific phenomenon has been the target domain of many ambitious modellers. 
It is important to note that the explanatory utility of any model rests upon the degree to 
which it is clear which parts of the model are actually doing the explaining (the positive 
analogies) and which bits are irrelevant and disanalogous. If it turns out that there is no 
useful carry over between the source and target domains then the model must be rejected. 
A potential explanation of a puzzling phenomenon can only proceed by using the 
acknowledged analogies as explanatory constructs. A theorist cannot legitimately let the 
often unacknowledged disanalogies do the explanatory work. 
The successful use of a model from a source domain in modelling the underlying 
mechanisms in a target domain rests on the degree to which the model is analogous to the 
actual generative mechanisms at work in the target domain. In essence the homunculus 
fallacy objection argues that cognitivist explanations of cognitive activity rely upon a 
model (the computational model) that is not analogous with the mechanisms at work in 
cognitive activity. This can be shown by making explicit the cognitivist's tacit explanatory 
reliance on disanalogies in the computational model. 
The Analogies and Disanalogies in Agent TheOl)? 
In terms of Peirce's understanding of representation, cognitivism latches on to the fact that 
representations have content about objects which need not be present for the representation 
to have an effect on the person, animal, or other cognitive agent. This provides an 
explanatory mechanism for behaviour in representation-hungry situations. Cognitivism 
also involves a clear statement that the physical bearer of representations in people and 
other animals is the brain. Although there is much argument over the appropriate vehicle of 
representations, whether they are best understood in terms of a language of thought, 
connectionist network, analogical, or dynamical system, most cognitivists agree that the 
medium of mental representation is the brain. So the cognitivist representational model of 
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the mind describes how mental representations are analogous to external representations in 
terms of the bearer and the object aspects of Peirce's theory of representations. 
It is generally agreed however that the notion of the inte7preter cannot be easily carried 
over to the subpersonal realm of the mind as the notions of bearer and object have been. 
This is so for the simple reason that the notion of an interpreter requires us to posit just 
those cognitive abilities that we are trying to explain. Thus, if we invoke an internal 
interpreter (a homunculus) to interpret our mental representations we will have to 
somehow explain how the homunculus can interpret. The only obvious way we can do this 
is to posit a representational system inside the homunculus which, of course, can only be 
made sense of in terms of another interpreter (the homunculus' homunculus). 
Cognitivist Solutions to the Symbol Grounding Problem 
Crane (1995) nicely sums up the theorist's dilemma at this point: 
The problem is this. Either [mental representations] get their meaning in the same way that public [external 
representations] do, or they get their meaning in some other way. If they get their meaning in the same way, 
then we seem to be stuck with a regress of homunculi. But if they get their meaning in a different way, then 
we need to say what that way is. Either way, we have no explanation of how [mental representations] mean 
anything. (p. 150) 
There are basically two kinds of cognitivist response to this problem: the first is to try and 
argue that there is no problem, that we can possess an adequate notion of mental 
representation without having to introduce some system for interpreting representation 
bearers. The second type of solution admits that bearers must be used or interpreted in 
some way and that there must exist some kinde s) of natural, physical subpersonal 
interpreter that can perform this task. The second reply is by far the most widely endorsed 
by cognitive scientists. 
There is No Symbol Grounding Problem 
One widespread reaction to the homunculus fallacy is that it presents no problem for the 
cognitivist theorist because it is simply not the case that the use of representations require 
an interpreter with all of the powers of an interpreting agent. Dennett (1978) is probably 
the most well-known defender of representation via a strategy of 'stupifying homunculi'. 
His argument goes like this: 
Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung in to explain. . .. If one can 
get a team or committee of relatively ignorant, narrow-minded, blind homunculi to produce the intelligent 
behavior of the whole, this is progress. A flow chart is typically the organizational chart of a committee of 
homunculi (investigators, librarians, accountants, executives); each box specifies a homunculus by 
prescribing a function without saying how it is accomplished (one says, in effect: put a little man in there to 
do the job). If we then look closer at the individual boxes we see that the function of each is accomplished by 
subdividing it via another flow chart into still smaller, more stupid homunculi. Eventually this nesting of 
boxes within boxes lands you with homunculi so stupid (all they have to do is remember whether to say yes 
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or no when asked) that they can be, as one says, "replaced by a machine.". One discharges fancy homunculi 
from one's scheme by organizing armies of idiots to do the work. (Dennett, 1978, pp. 123-124) 
Ultimately, what Dennett is saying here is that homunculi are merely explanatory 
promissory notes of potential, future explanations at a purely mechanical and structural 
level. We leave a limited 'mentality' in our proposed explanatory mechanisms and 
gradually attempt to whittle it away as we increase our knowledge. In other words 
homunculi are not interpreters but rather methodological artifacts. They help us do our 
research but we never think of them as ontologically real. The problem here, as Dennett 
acknowledges, is that cognitivist theorists become the unlucky possessors of an unpaid 
explanatory loan. That is, the concept of mental representation is used without an agreed 
upon understanding of what a mental representation is. We await the day when we 
understand behaviour and cognition in terms of a purely physical theory. In fact that is 
precisely what other philosophers are trying to do when they propose their theories of 
content. Only then will we see how to reduce mental representation without resorting to the 
use of homunculi. Thus the homuncular functionalist approach roughly says "Just wait and 
see, we're sure that we'll ultimately pull this off'. 
Theories of Representation 
Philosophers, and to a much lesser extent other cognitive scientists, have long theorised 
about how representations might be meaningful. By and large the general attempt has been 
to formulate theories of content; that is, theories about how mental representations get their 
content. Call this the problem of content assignment26• This task generally assumes that 
mental representations exist somehow in mindlbrains. Chemero (1998a) argues that recent 
arguments in favour of anti-representationalism have shifted philosophical interest to the 
question of what makes something a mental representation in the first place. We might call 
this the representation constitution problem27 • Clearly the latter problem is more central to 
questions about the theoretical status of cognitivism. However it is important to realise that 
this distinction is not always made and that many theories of content tell us something 
about what it is for something to be a representation (see, e.g., Von Eckardt, 1993). With 
this in mind the approach I will take here is to use insights from content theories in 
combination with claims about what constitutes a representation. I will discuss three basic 
kinds of theory of representation: indicator or causal theories, simulation or functional role 
theories, and teleological theories. 
26 Cummins (1989, 1996) calls this, or something very like it, the problem ofmeaning assignment. 
27 Cummins (1989,1996) uses the term the problem ofmeaningfulness. 
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Representations as Indicators: Causal Theories of Content 
Causal theories, also known as indicator theories and covariance theories, are currently the 
most popular kind of theory of content (summaries of these positions can be found in 
Crane, 1995; Cummins, 1989, 1996; Rey, 1997; Von Eckardt, 1993). The basic idea of 
causal theories is that internal representations are about what causes them. Unfortunately 
such a crude idea is obviously far from adequate. The first problem is that we know that 
not all :thoughts' about something are caused by being exposed to their object. Some 
thoughts about sheep, for instance, are caused by thinking about farm animals in general, 
others by mistaking a goat for a sheep. Indeed this fact seems to be central to the 
cognitivist idea that representations enable complex behaviour by standing in for things 
that are not currently perceivable. The second problem is that not all encounters with an 
object cause us to produce a 'thought' about that object. Sometimes sheep are mistaken for 
goats and thus a goat-thought is also caused by sheep. 
So causal theorists require a more subtle criterion of content determination than that given 
by a crude causal theory. Instead they appeal to the notion of reliable indication. This is 
, 
just to say that a mental representation represents an object only when the object is actually 
present, or is really being thought about, or conditions are such that it would be reasonable 
to believe that object is present. The problem then becomes one of explaining how, and 
under what circumstances, a bearer reliably indicates its object. Some, like Dretske (1981, 
1988, 1995) argue that historical factors (evolution, learning) are responsible for the 
emergence of reliable indication. Others, such as Fodor (1987, 1990), claim that there exist 
logical factors which determine whether something is a representation. However, even if 
such a definition of reliable indication is possible, causal theories face a third significant 
problem; that it is by no means clear how a causal theory can account for the possession of 
representations of things that cannot be perceived - things such as Santa Claus, 
mathematical functions, and future events. Generally causal theorists have had their hands 
full trying to make sense of representations of things that do physically exist, so this 
problem has not been broached. Perhaps, argue the causalists, these more complex mental 
representations are the result of some further process that derives them from basic 
perceptually-based representations. If we can make sense of these basic representations 
then we can move on to the more complicated examples. Until then we should try and 
make sense of simpler causal representations. However, these cases seem to raise problems 
of their own that few philosophers believe have been satisfactorily solved. 
The key problems facing indicator-type causal theories revolve around the much discussed 
Problem of Error. Simply put the problem is that indicator explanations do not explain 
how it is possible to misrepresent things. Most philosophers argue that, if anything is 
characteristic of a representation, it is the fact that a representation-user can misrepresent 
events and objects. Misrepresentation is important for cognitivism because it relates to the 
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central assumption that representations can stand in for objects in their absence. A system 
that misrepresents can obviously do this. The problem of error can be understood by 
thinking of it in terms of two related subproblems: the problem of misrepresentation and 
the disjunction problem. 
The misrepresentation problem states that since representations, understood as reliable 
indicators, will always indicate something it is hard to see how they can ever misrepresent 
an object by triggering the wrong mental representation. If, for instance, we take a certain 
type of spot to be a reliable indicator of measles (i.e., the spots naturally represent measles) 
it does not make sense to suggest that the spots could misrepresent something else. People 
may take the spots to indicate, say small pox, but there is no way that the spots could 
naturally misrepresent the disease. A natural sign of something always reliably indicates 
its object. We know, however, that our mental representations (thoughts, plans, memories) 
can often be in error. So indicator theories do not provide an adequate account of this 
aspect of mental representation. 
Dretske (1988) tries to solve this problem by suggesting that misrepresentation occurs 
when an organism uses a natural representation bearer and the bearer is incorrectly 
configured or activated due to a system malfunction or less than ideal conditions. As we 
have seen, he refers to these representations as type III representations. For instance, as 
noted above, Dretske (1986) argues that water-born bacteria containing magnetosomes 
(subcellular components that point to magnetic north and are 'used' by the bacterium to 
orient itself) constitute a natural representation system of 'safe water' (because their 
pointing north directs them away from toxic, oxygenated surface water) and that this 
system can misrepresent when a magnet is placed near the bacterium. 
Dretske's solution has been criticised in two of ways. Cummins (1989) argues that this 
malfunction view of misrepresentation does not account for the fact that not all 
misrepresentation occurs because of problems in the representation-constructing and 
representation-using processes. Sometimes we intentionally misrepresent things (e.g., 
when a child pretends that a big box is a house). More recently he has argued that we 
should distinguish between error and falsehood (Cummins, 1996). Error occurs when the 
representational content is inappropriate to the situation, whereas falsehood occurs when an 
object is represented as something that it is not. We may have a false representation of an 
object that is none-the-Iess a correct use in a particular situation. Thus Cummins' analysis 
demands an understanding of mental representation that can deal with both error and 
falsehood. Because Dretske's theory treats all errors as falsehoods (and vice versa) it 
cannot answer this criticism. It may be possible to modify Dretske's theory to handle this 
problem, but the problem itself indicates that an adequate notion of misrepresentation, and 
thus representation, is more complicated than is generally supposed. 
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A possibly more serious problem for Dretske's theory becomes evident when we try to 
specify the content of the natural representation in question. Take the magnetotactic 
bacteria example mentioned earlier. Hendriks-Jansen (1996) argues that this is not a simple 
or obvious example of misrepresentation because there exists no simple way of 
determining just what it is that the magneto some system actually represents (if it represents 
anything). It may represent toxic water, danger, north, magnetic north, geomagnetic north, 
or even the presence of a relatively strong magnetic field. The simplest 'object' of this 
system would be the last mentioned. But if that is the case, then a nearby magnet does not 
cause any misrepresentation. 
Dretske is not unaware of this sort of problem. He suggests that we can better identify the 
content of a representation when information from multiple sensory channels is causally 
connected to a single bearer (see also Lloyd [1989] for a similar point of view). In such 
cases where, for example, multiple proximal stimuli such as the sound, sight, and smell of 
an approaching car, can all independently trigger a single internal structure (a 
representation bearer), we are in a much better position to argue that the structure 
represents an approaching car (a distal stimulus). In situations, such as the magnetotactic 
bacteria, where there exists only a single information channel, it is impossible to 
conclusively argue that an internal structure (bearer) 'represents' a distant environmental 
object, event, or condition (e.g., toxic water), rather than a simple local stimulus (e.g., the 
presence of a magnetic field). The existence of multiple triggering conditions is consistent 
with, but not sufficient for, concluding that the bearer is 'causally connected to' the 
environmentally significant object. If this sort of analysis is plausible, then indicator 
theorists are in a better position to argue for a natural, causal account of misrepresentation 
because it seems much easier to appreciate cases of misrepresentation when dealing with 
distal stimuli (e.g., toxic water, approaching cars) than proximal stimuli (e.g., the presence 
of a magnetic field, a rapidly increasing roaring sound). 
Unfortunately the lack of sufficiency here plagues this sort explanation. The mere fact that 
information from multiple sources triggers a single bearer is not enough to conclude that it 
is connected to a single distal stimulus rather than a collection of proximal stimuli. And if 
this is the case, then it becomes problematic knowing how to interpret the triggering of a 
bearer by multiple stimuli. How do we decide on the content of a bearer that is (apparently) 
mistakenly triggered by a stimulus unrelated to the distal object? Is the situation one of 
misrepresentation (e.g., car is triggered by the sound of the wind) or one of accurate 
representation where the content of representation is either car or wind that sounds like a 
car? This difficulty is known as the disjunction problem and forms the second important 
part of the problem of error. The disjunction problem can be described schematically in the 
following way: 
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If a mental representation (MR1) reliably indicates an object (01) but MR1 is triggered by 
02 on a particular occasion, then it is not legitimate to argue that 02 has been 
misrepresented by MR1. What prevents us from arguing that MR1 is a representation of 
01 or 02-in-certain-circumstances? 
Fodor (1990) attempts to avoid this problem by appealing to something called asymmetric 
dependence. This is basically the idea that misrepresentations are asymmetrically 
dependent on accurate representations. In schematic form Fodor argues that: 
If it were not true that 01s cause MR1 then 02s would not cause MR1 (02s cause MR1 
only if01s cause MR1). 
and 
If it were not true that 02s caused MR1 then 01s would still cause MR1 (it is not the case 
that 01s cause MR1 only if02s cause MR1). 
The main problem with Fodor's answer is, as Cummins (1989) and others have argued, that 
Fodor seems to be merely redescribing what is the case in a disjunctive situation rather 
than saying how a representational system may deal with it. Thus, Crane (1995) writes that 
he is 
unable to see how asymmetric dependence goes any way towards explaining mental representation. I think 
that the conditions Fodor describes probably are true of mental representations. But I do not see how this 
helps us to understand how mental representation actually works. In effect, Fodor is saying: error is parasitic 
on true belief. But it's hard not to object that this is just what we knew already. The question rather is: what 
is error? Until we can give some account of error, then it does not really help us to say that it is parasitic on 
true belief. (pp. 180-181) 
Dretske (1986) approaches the disjunction problem in a different way. He argues that 
genuine misrepresentation, and thus, presumably genuine mental natural representation, 
can only occur in organisms or systems of a particular level of complexity (see also Lloyd, 
1989). In particular an organism must be capable of simple associative (respondent) 
learning. 
A representation-using organism must possess internal structures (representation bearers, 
RB) that covary with particular stimuli (S) (for simplicities sake we can gloss stimuli as 
signs of some object or referent 0). An RB then leads to the appropriate sort of behavioural 
response (R). Furthermore each RB must be connected to each 0 by more than one S by, 
for example, detecting an object using different sensory modalities or by responding to 
different aspects of the object accessible via a single modality (e.g., its colour and style of 
movement). This condition goes some way toward avoiding the idea that the RB is just an 
indicator of a particular proximal stimulus. Of course this setup remains vulnerable to the 
disjunction problem. That is, it cannot tell the difference between 'sensitivity to 0' versus 
'sensitivity to S 1 in some conditions and S2 in some other conditions'. So, in order to 
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avoid this problem Dretske argues that a representation-containing organism must be also 
capable of associative learning; of learning how to take a new S as a sign, or conditioned 
stimulus, of 0, and thus use that new S as information for initiating B. 
How can such a set up unambiguously account for misrepresentation? Dretske argues that 
if an animal with all of these capacities acts with behaviour B in response to CSi (a 
conditioned stimulus which is normally connected to 01) but on this occasion CSi is 
produced by 02 then we can legitimately suppose that the organism is misrepresenting CSi 
as 01. Why? Because the animal has a history where CSi was learned to be paired with Si 
which produced B. We know that CSi was learnt as a substitute for Si. Dretske applies the 
same kind of logic where the historical factors are evolutionary rather than ontogenetic. 
Does Dretske's approach adequately deal with the notion of misrepresentation? In a sense 
Dretske uses an historical explanation to prop up an indicator explanation where the 
historical explanation seems to require an a priori indicator explanation! This raises the 
question of how we work out what the original unconditioned stimulus is and thus what the 
'true' content of the representation is28 . Without this information Dretske's solution to the 
disjunction problem cannot get off the ground. In a sense Dretske assumes that we already 
know the content/object of the representation before he introduces the complexities of 
multi-modality and associative learning. Obviously such a strategy cannot be used to work 
out whether a system is representational or not, let alone what the content of the 
representation is. 
Current causal theories seem to struggle with the basic problem of providing a naturalistic 
explanation of how an internal and subpersonal component of a cognizer can possess 
representational content. I think it is possible that a future causal theory of representation 
may eventually emerge that can explain how a system can exhibit some form of 
appropriate object constancy - that is, be able to distinguish various objects and events in 
its environment in a reliable manner. This will mean that there may exist a component of 
the system's innards that can act as a reliable indicator of a particular referent. Also it is no 
doubt possible that this reliable indicator theory will be able show how this indicator can 
be inappropriately triggered and thus show that the system has 'misperceived' something 
in its local environment. But such a theory is a long way from providing anything like the 
kind of understanding of representation that cognitivism requires. Indeed a reliable 
indicator theory does not really seem to be a theory of representation at all. After 
28 One implication of this is that Dretske's theory violates the intuition that it should be the present structure 
of the system, not its history, that determines whether something is a representation (see the following 
section on teleological theories for more on this criticism). 
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examining Lloyd's (1989) indicator theory of representation, and the robotic example he 
uses to illustrate it, Keijzer (1997) remarks that the robot: 
on the other hand, is a device which, many [e.g., J. A. Anderson, 1991; Fodor, 1986] would hold, does not 
depend on representation at all. Its behavior can be fully described in terms of reactions to configurations of 
external stimuli. From a theoretical perspective there is no need to invoke the concept of representation in 
this case. (Keijzer, 1997, p. 102) 
Reliable indicators are really just a kind of subsystem that can be activated in response to 
some kind of, typically high-level, invariant (to use Gibson's [1979/1986] terminology). 
They are not internal simulators of the outside world but rather just sophisticated kinds of 
detectors that may be able to fix onto distal targets. I suspect that this is why causal 
theories have so much difficulty in dealing with misrepresentation because 
misrepresentation is bound up, in some sense, with the ability to think about or interpret a 
situation in a decoupled and off-line manner. Yet reliable indicators are subpersonal on-
line instruments. They are not, it seems, the kinds of entities that can serve as cognitivism's 
representations. Bem and Keijzer (1996) suggest that reliable indicators may form some 
part of a theory of cognition but it will not be one concerned with representation. 
What we can do is to construct a theory about the indicating functions of neural elements (networks) and 
then, remaining loyal to this level of explanation, avoid semantics and intentionality. But we cannot have a 
theory of meaning while staying within the mere indicating system (p. 462, emphasis added). 
So it seems that cognitivism requires a theory of representation where representations can 
modulate behaviour in the absence of environmental information - this is the core notion 
of functional role theories of content. 
Representations as Simulations: Functional Role Theories of Content 
Keijzer (1997) argues, as I have above, that representation is postulated as an explanatory 
concept within cognitivism in order to explain how a cognitive system can coordinate its 
behaviour with respect to things that the system is not able to sense. A representation, in 
this sense, is a model of the world that can be used in the absence of the things that it 
represents. One commonly discussed idea, that derives from Haugeland (1991), is that 
something is a representation if it can 'stand in for' for its object (see also Bechtel, 1998; 
Clark, 1997, chap. 8; Chemero, 1998a; Grush, 1997). Clark (1997) provides a concise 
summary of Haugeland's position. For Haugeland, a system is a mental representational 
system just in case: 
(1) It must coordinate its behaviors with environmental features that are not always "reliably present to the 
system." 
(2) It copes with such cases by having something else (in place of signal directly received from the 
environment) "stand in" and guide behavior in its stead. 
(3) That "something else" is part of a more general representational scheme that allows standing in to occur 
systematically and allows for a variety of related representational states. (Clark, 1997, p. 144). 
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The first point distinguishes representational systems from ones that only use information 
from the local environment to modulate their behaviour, such as plants tracking the sun 
with their leaves. In other words, Haugeland (1991) is arguing here that the reliable 
indicators of causal theories of content are not representations. Grush (1997) makes a 
similar claim. The second point identifies how we might begin to locate the representation 
bearer. The third point qualifies the second by pointing out that not all physical 
components that seem to stand between an event and an activity are representational. 
Rather, representations exist only in systems that must deal with a reasonable variety of 
event-activity mappings. Haugeland (1991) illustrates why this third condition is necessary 
by suggesting that "triggered gastric juices might keep a primitive predator on the prowl, 
even when it momentarily loses a scent - thus standing in for the scent." (p. 62). 
Hauge1and (1991) seems to view such a 'stand in' as insufficiently representational 
because of its lack of flexibility and specificity. It does not seem to be tied to a particular 
environmental event in a strong enough manner to constitute a representation. Haugeland's 
framework is not meant to be at all rigorous, but it serves to illustrate the idea that a 
representation is a kind of internal surrogate for distant environmental objects and therefore 
useful as an internal controller of behaviour29 . Haugeland's framework thus relies on the 
idea that representations are essentially internal simulations or isomorphisms of (possible) 
external events. This is the core idea of functional role theories of representation (a.k.a. 
inferential role theories, conceptual role theories; see, e.g., Von Eckardt, 1993)30. One of 
29 Chemero (1998a, 1998b) critiques Haugeland's notion of representations as decouplable, enviromnental 
stand-ins at length. He argues that the notion of 'reliable presence' is too vague to do any real explanatory 
work and that it is revisionist in nature. 
30 According to Von Eckardt (1993) functional role theories include conceptual role semantics (e.g., Loar, 
1981), Cummin's (1989, 1996) interpretational semantics, and Newell's (1990) approach to representation. 
In the conceptual role semantics view a representational system is a computational system whose relations 
(transformations, associations, implications, entailments and so on; these are sometimes referred to as 
epistemic liaisons) between bearers mirror the relations that hold between entities in the world or entities in 
logical space (see also Lloyd, 1989, pp. 24-37). So representations get their meaning primarily in terms of 
the ways in which they relate to other bearers. This makes intuitive sense in that, for instance, we can 
imagine learning the meaning of a new word without having its referent pointed out because we come to 
understand how it relates to other words (representations) that we already know. Criticisms of conceptual 
role semantics usually focus on the fact that they do not appear to say anything about the external referential 
relationship concepts have with things in the world. Dual aspect theories (e.g., Block, 1986) attempt to solve 
these problems by thinking of meaning as a combination of internal relations between other concepts and 
external relations between concepts and objects in the world. For the purposes of this thesis I will consider 
simulation representations to be of the dual aspect variety rather than purely internalist in nature. This, I 
believe, seems to be what theorists such as Cummins and Newell have in mind in their formulations of 
representational content. 
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the clearest expositions of the functional role approach is the interpretational semantics 
approach of Robert Cummins (1989, 1996). 
In his approach Cummins (1989, 1996) attempts to reformulate the notion of mental 
representation in order avoid the problems implied by theories of representation that 
require recourse to an interpreter. He argues that all 'use theories' of representation are 
doomed to failure because they do not adequately characterise what it is about 
representations that makes them represent. In essence he argues that notions of 'use' and 
'interpretation' are red herrings for a theory of natural representation. Natural 
representations represent, so he argues, because they are isomorphic to the intended 
referent. For Cummins a natural representation represents its object regardless of whether 
or not it is used and regardless of whether or not it is used correctly. The essence of the 
representational relationship is the preservation of isomorphic relations between the bearer 
and its object. To capture this idea he refers to such entities as simulation representations 
or s-representations. Thus, Cummins distinguishes the question of the determination of 
representational content from that of representational use or interpretation. 
He further argues that symbols form only an unusual subset of representations and make 
poor explanatory entities for theories of cognition. A symbol, says Cummins, is the sort of 
representation that does require 'use' or 'interpretation' to have content assigned to it. The 
bearer of a symbol has an arbitrary shape or structure. That is, it is not in any way 
isomorphic with its object. It gets its content by being grounded in natural representations 
that are isomorphic with their objects. For instance, a stop sign (a symbol) gains its 
meaning by being parasitic on social conventions realised by human minds that possess 
mental representations (natural representations of the isomorphic variety). Cummins closes 
his argument by noting that isomorphic natural representations do not need to be grounded 
(have elaborate causal or conceptual connections with their objects) because the 
isomorphism relationship is sufficient for characterising the representational relationship. 
This implies that there is no symbol grounding problem. He argues that: 
for symbols, being meaningful just reduces to being understood, and ... understanding a symbol (or any kind 
of representation) requires relating to something else. Symbols don't mean, in other words, except to the 
extent that they meanfor. But for nonsymbolic representations like maps, being meaningful does not reduce 
to, or even require, being understood or having a meaningfor [i.e., being used]. Maps represent whether or 
not anyone does or can understand them .... [T]he content of a map is independent of its "grounding." ... 
Grounding is therefore not an issue for representation, but for understanding, and relates to meaningfulness 
only because symbolic meaningfulness requires understanding, that is, because symbolic meaning is based in 
meaningfor, and is therefore not really a semantic matter at all, but a cognitive one. (Cummins, 1996, p. 130) 
Cummins raises the important point that there is a sense in which the structure of a bearer 
(of a nonsymbolic representation) does 'contain' information. There has been a tendency 
among many cognitive theorists, who are used to thinking of representations as symbol-
like, to think: that a bearer has a completely arbitrary connection with its object and thus 
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that the burden of making use of the representation is mainly the province of the 
interpreting system31 . But Cummins' useful corrective shows us that the structure of a 
bearer limits the possible informational interpretations that can be derived from the use of 
the bearer. However, despite his insights there seem to be two crucial difficulties with the 
idea that representations are simulations. 
The first is that Cummins seems to ignore the fact that the structure of a representation 
bearer is highly likely to be consistent with multiple, perhaps infinite, different 
interpretations of what the bearer may represent. It has long been argued that the entities 
and relations that hold in a model are isomorphic with a large number of worldly event 
referents or natural functions32. If this is the case then cognitive scientists face a massive 
problem trying to determine the content of a representation. Since simulation 
representations can be used in the absence of their referent, unlike reliable indicators, there 
is no way we can even get a clue as to whether a particular representational transformation 
is, to use Pinker's (1997, pp. 80-81) example, a case of chess playing or a re-enactment of 
the Six Day War. 
But things get worse. Searle (1992) and others have argued that any physical system could 
be interpreted as computing some kind of natural function. He argues that the atoms in his 
office wall may be actually computing the same functions as his computer's word-
processing software. Interestingly defenders of the computational view seem to agree with 
Searle, but constrain things by arguing that cognition is the only natural phenomenon in 
which computations are constitutive of that phenomenon (Chalmers, 2000). The problem 
then becomes one of knowing when 'computation for cognition' is occurring and when the 
computations are merely a side show to some other natural phenomenon such as digestion 
or being an office wall. So, not only does the isomorphism view of representation seem to 
31 Indeed Newell's (1990) notion that the defming property of a physical symbol is its ability to encourage 
distal access is entirely in keeping with this symbol-based view. The idea here is that a symbol serves as a 
'pointer' to meaning or knowledge stored elsewhere. In this case the symbol does not so much represent, as 
serve, an information-fetching role. In this case the symbol only needs to be recognisable by the system that 
uses it and can take pretty much any form at all. It becomes a single-valued entity that points to a particular 
location rather than an information bearer. In sum a physical symbol contains little information itself. 
32 Winograd and Flores (1986) provide a nice illustration of the multiple isomorphism problem when they 
discuss how 'display hack' programs use the complex internal 'representational' structures in computer 
programs to produce geometrical designs on a video display: "Many of these grew out of programs that were 
originally created to perform operations on symbols that had nothing to do with visual figures. When the 
contents of some of their internal storage cells were interpreted as numbers representing points on a video 
display screen, strikingly regular patterns emerged, which the programmer had not anticipated. ... In these 
cases, the description of the program as representing something is a description by some observer after the 
fact, rather than by its designer." (p. 92) 
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preclude finding out the content of a representation, it also seems to make spotting a 
representation well nigh impossible. 
One could argue that such examples do not make simulation theories problematic because 
a representation represents what it was originally designed to represent not what it 
accidentally causes when it is plugged into a different sort of interpretational system. But 
such a response just reinforces the point that Cummins goes to some lengths to avoid, that 
the structure of the bearer alone does not specify a unique representational content. In order 
to do this we need to take into account the ways in which the bearer is used and perhaps 
even the purposes for which it was designed (see below for the problems these extra 
content-specifying criteria raise). 
It seems then that everything is a simulation representation of something or multiple 
somethings. The fact that a bearer cannot represent just anything (i.e., be completely 
arbitrary) does not mean that its content is unique. Cummins seems to shift all of the 
difficulties associated with explaining natural representations to the 'cognitive' or 
understanding processes that must be part of the cognitivist story. For instance, it now 
becomes a burden of 'cognitive' processes to work out which isomorphism is the right one 
for a particular representational relation - that is of learning to apply the appropriate 
interpretation/unction (Cummins, 1989, 1996). 
However, these criticisms can be stayed to a certain extent by the fact that robotics research 
has shown that systems can be constructed that use simulation representations (or at least 
internal physical structures that are isomorphic to structures in their environments) to 
control their behaviour. Thus, Keijzer (1997) argues that "[t]he empirical context imposes 
constraints that limit the open-endedness of s-representations ... ", because within robotic 
simulations these "representations are used as a causal factor that helps to explain how a 
behaving organism coordinates its activity with respect to distant and future events in the 
environment. The behavioral context restricts the number of systems to which a 
representational interpretation can be applied, and it also limits the number of possible 
interpretations." (p. 95). However, it is far from clear that such systems can actually engage 
in something akin to natural cognitive activity (I will discuss some of the problems with 
model-based robotic architectures in the next chapter). So it is still by no means clear that 
s-representations are plausible candidate internal mechanisms for natural cognition. It is 
also unclear how we could tell whether a natural cognizer possessed s-representations. 
However, there is another avenue open to the representational theorist. They can argue that 
natural selection would see to it that the appropriate relations exist between the world, a 
representational system, and behaviour and bypass the question of the kinds of causal 
structures that realise these relationships. These kinds of arguments are central to 
teleological theories of representation. 
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Representations as Teleological Entities 
A number of theorists have argued that we can only understand representations relative to 
an animal's history of natural selection (e.g., Chemero, 1998a; Dretske, 1988; Millikan, 
1984, 1993; for summaries see Crane, 1995; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Lyons, 1992; Von 
Eckardt. 1993). The basic idea here is that a representation is a correlation between an 
inner physical structure (a bearer) and a state of the environment (an object) that has the 
function of adapting the organism, by taking part in the production of appropriate 
behaviour, to that state of the environment. The reason that the representation has this 
function is that it has been selected to do that job in the evolution of the organism. Under 
this scheme representation systems are viewed in the same way as other phenotypic traits -
as things that have been selected because of their functional advantages to the animal. Thus 
representation systems have evolved because at one time or another they contributed to the 
fitness of the animal. This basic picture is complicated somewhat when one pays close 
attention to the logic of natural selection. 
Typically phenotypic traits are selected because they enable a large enough members of 
that species to survive and reproduce for the lineage to continue. This does not mean that 
the trait will bring success in all or even a majority of cases. For instance, the function of 
acorns is to become oak trees even though most acorns will rot. But the reason that acorns 
exist now, with the properties they have, and occurring in the numbers that they do, is that 
they have enabled the continuity of the oak tree lineage. Millikan (1984, 1993) refers to the 
conditions under which a trait was selected as normal conditions, even though normal 
conditions may only obtain infrequently. Phenotypic traits thus have what she calls a 
proper function, a term that refers to the job that they were selected to do even if they 
rarely or never actually manage to achieve that job (more on this term below). 
Millikan uses this basic framework to develop an explanation of what she calls intentional 
icons. Mental representations are one kind of intentional icon. Chemero (1998a) provides 
us with a stripped down version of Millikan's theory that preserves all of its essentials. The 
basic idea is that a representation is part of a naturally selected biological representation 
system. This system stands between a biological representation producer and a biological 
representation consumer. A producer produces a representation (e.g., a perceptual system, a 
speaker) and a consumer uses the representation (e.g., a motor system, a person 
comprehending speech). The proper function of the representation is to adapt the consumer 
to some aspect of the environment by enabling the animal to behave appropriately with 
respect to that aspect of the environment. The key term in this sentence is proper function. 
A proper function is the function something was 'designed' (in this case by evolution) to 
perform. So a faulty heart, for instance, may still have the proper function of pumping 
enough blood about the body for survival even if it currently cannot achieve this task. The 
content of a representation in this view is the way the world would need to be (the normal 
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conditions) for the representation to achieve its proper function. Thus, a representation can 
be said to misrepresent when it functions under non-normal conditions. Chemero (1998a) 
describes it in the following way: 
Since the content of a representation is determined by its function, along with those of the representation 
producer and consumer, its content will remain constant even in cases in which one or more of the producer, 
consumer and representation itself fails to work properly. That is, just as the function of a sperm is to fertilize 
an egg, despite the fact that the number that do so is vanishingly small, so the function of an icon that 
represents "chicken-here-now" does not change, even in cases in which the icon is produced or used 
improperly. (p. 27) 
Roughly speaking, Millikan's use of natural selection seems to provide her with a 
scientifically sound way to argue that misrepresentation occurs when a representation does 
not represent what it is supposed to. 
Millikan's teleological theory has some fairly radical implications that she is fully prepared 
to accept. One important implication is that it is not possible to tell whether a particular 
structure is a representation (i.e., solve the problem of representation constitution) or what 
its content is (i.e., solve the problem of content determination) just by examining its 
physical properties. This is because a teleological approach argues that the status of 
representation is historically determined, not causally determined. Indeed Millikan argues 
that of two 'internally identical' physical structures that possess the same relations to other 
things in the world ('externally' identical) only one may really be a representation with 
representational content. Lyons (1992) provides an apt analogy. He suggests that a 
representation might be akin to a key. An object is a key only if it was designed to be a 
key, and only a key of a certain lock if it was designed for that purpose. The fact that 
another (undesigned) object may function as a key, or the key functions to unlock other 
doors, is just good luck - a fitting of a structure to part of the world for which it was never 
designed. The piece of metal that fortuitously opens a lock is not a key for that lock, and a 
key designed to open a lock that nevertheless opens it only on rare occasions is (always) a 
key for that lock. 
Such radical thinking has met with a host of criticisms33 • The first involves a suspicion of 
the teleological implication that only evolved creatures can have representational systems. 
Millikan does not see this as a problem, but the intuition among many theorists is that a 
spontaneously emergent molecule-for-molecule duplicate of an evolved agent (the 
infamous 'swamp man') would possess all of the powers (cognitive and otherwise) of the 
33 I think that even if Millikan's theory turns out to be plausible, its portrayal of mental representation is so 
radically unlike the loose conception that many psychologists have of the concept, that it would not really 
solve their problems of representation and cognitive order (see Hendriks-Jansen, 1996 for an argument in 
favour of much of what Millikan says except for her attempt to naturalise mental representation). 
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evolved version of the agent34• It is hard to see how an historical explanation can make 
sense of the traditional notion of mental representation as some sort of bodily structure. 
Cummins (1996) argues that the problem lies in the fact that teleological theorists try to 
explain why a structure is a natural representation by reference to natural selection rather 
than explaining why a structure is selected by reference to its representational qualities: 
Adaptational stories get the explanatOlY order wrong. Representations, when they are adaptive, are adaptive 
because they represent what they do. Think of cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948): They are adaptive because 
they are isomorphic to the spaces they map; they are not isomorphic to the spaces they map because they are 
adaptive. Explaining correctness in terms of adaptation gets matters backward. The adaptational theory is 
motivated by the fact that it is plausible ... to suppose that correct uses of representation are adaptive. 
(Cummins, 1996, p. 46) 
The second common criticism is that teleological theories only provide us with an 
explanation of the system's general adaptational workings, not the adaptive particular 
instances of representation use. That is, these theories seem to explain the existence and 
usefulness of systems or mechanisms for constructing representations rather than the 
individual representations themselves (see Fodor's Donellan Lectures cited in Lyons, 1992; 
Sterelny, 1990). Lyons (1992) expresses this criticism in the following way: 
[T]o appeal to evolution as a way of individuating mental content is a very crude instrument. Evolution is the 
'selection' of types of organism by the environment on the basis of behaviour. So, at most, what can be said 
to have survival value is types of behaviour not particular refined or precise instances of mental content. (p. 
320) 
Lyons (1992, p. 319) suggests a possible retort for the teleological theorists: they can note 
that one just needs to find out about the situation that the agent finds themself in and 
'apply' the evolved structures and processes to it to derive the actual content of the 
representation in question. 
A third problem for teleological theories relates to the explanation of modem human 
mental states and representations. There obviously cannot be a simple evolutionary 
explanation of non-survival relevant representational states such as the desire to go bungy 
jumping. This complaint is really an implication of the previous criticism, but it involves a 
further twist - the idea that many of our knowledge structures seem to be products of 
34 For those who may baulk at the swamp man thought experiment because it asks us to imagine an 
impossible event, Snowdon (1988) raises a related but more realistic problem: "Due to a random mutation, a 
creature is produced with a new sense organ and connected neural system which provides it with information 
about aspects of the environment. The system performs a highly advantageous function and persists and 
spreads. It therefore gets selected to perform that function. However, how do we characterize in cognitive, 
representational terms the very first creature to possess it? In it, the system had not been selected for 
anything, because the processes of selection had not [a] chance to operate." (p. 630). Eliasmith (2000) 
provides a similarly plausible explanation in terms of connectionist networks. 
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cultural, social, and individual processes rather than being evolutionarily determined. This 
suggests that teleological theories are hugely inadequate as a means of 'reading' most of 
what is going on in human minds. 
Teleological theories have also been criticised for their seeming reliance on an optimality 
view of evolution where every trait (in this case every representational system) is selected 
for its fitness-enhancing (in this case accuracy of the representations generated) qualities, 
when in fact we know that not all traits are fitness relevant (some are neutral and some may 
even be unfavourable but piggy-back upon the genes associated with other important traits, 
Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). In a review of Millikan's theory Godfrey-Smith (1988) remarks 
that 
Her model explanations are biological, yet it is well known that within biology there has lately been a 
reaction against the 'Panglossian' or 'optimising' view of natural selection. Stephen Jay Gould and Richard 
Lewontin spearhead the reaction, claiming that the products of evolution are not collections of independently 
selected, perfectly functioning parts, but a tangle of engineering compromises, including many features with 
no-function. (p. 559) 
The introduction of concepts such as exaptation and spandrel into the adaptational 
argument (Gould, 1991) suggests that it is possible that mental representations and 
representational systems may, in some way, have no proper function and thus have no 
content. A number of evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; 
Dennett, 1995; Pinker, 1997) have argued that spandrels and exaptations pose no major 
threat to an optimality view of evolution. Spandrels are accidental bypro ducts of evolved 
phenotypic structures used by intelligent creatures for a certain non-evolutionary purpose 
(e.g., the bridge of the nose being useful for holding up one's glasses). Such features do not 
evolve because of their teleological functions. Evolutionary psychologists argue that 
representational systems are obviously not spandrels and therefore the force of the spandrel 
argument is discharged. 
Exaptations are phenotypic traits that have acquired a new function that 'either co-exists 
with an old function or replaces it. Natural selection cannot account for the origin of the 
new function but it can account for the preservation of that function in subsequent 
generations of a lineage. In other words, as soon an exaptation is maintained because of its 
evolutionary benefits it becomes an adaptation. Thus, exaptations seem to be relatively 
minor, short-lived aspects of the evolutionary process and thus not do not pose a major 
problem for a broadly teleological analysis of mental representation. Millikan (1993, pp. 
41-50), however, does seem to consider the exaptation argument to be an important one 
and has modified her basic theory to take account of them. After all, arguing that 
exaptations are exceptions to the general rule of adaptation does not discharge the 
argument that there may well exist some adaptive 'representational' structures that have no 
adaptational history. Thus Millikan (1993) argues 
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Being 'built' by natural selection is sufficient for proper function, being maintained by natural selection is 
independently sufficient, and having been utilized by other structures built or maintained by natural selection 
is also independently sufficient for proper function. It is hard to see how modem human cognition could fail 
to be caught in one or more of these nets. (p. 49). 
These difficulties with making sense of the teleological functions of particular body 
systems may reflect a deeper difficulty with the use of the modem Darwinian-Mendelian 
synthesis in our explanations of mental representation. Representations and representation-
systems are widely held to be discrete structural traits of an organism, whereas 
evolutionary analyses often focus upon the evolution of whole living phenotypes - after all, 
it is organisms that evolve not specific parts of them35 (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Oyama, 
1985). Although it is not totally incorrect to say that organs evolve under selection 
pressures, it needs to be clearly understood that they evolve only indirectly in terms of the 
behaviour that they enable. The fitness enhancing benefits of any bodily structure can thus 
only be understood in relation to the rest of the organism's body and the ways in which 
that body enables behaviours within a particular ecological niche. In this sense function 
(and content) of a body structure is highly reliant upon other body structures as well as the 
characteristics of the niche in which that body structure evolved. 
Teleological theories attempt to bring the developed theoretical apparatus of evolutionary 
biology to bear upon the issue of mental representation in the explanation of behaviour. 
Like Hendriks-Jansen (1996), I think that this is an important development but one that, 
taken to its logical conclusion, would reject the notion of mental representation altogether. 
Teleological theories have difficulty reconciling the cognitivist drive to assign 
informational content to discrete internal structures with the idea that organisms are 
selected . for what they can do given their entire phenotypical constitution and its 
relationship to the ecological niche that the animal inhabits. Information, or meaning, is 
best understood in these circumstances as a relationship between the behaving animal and 
its surroundings not as structure 'frozen' within the body. 
Is the Concept a/Representation Dead in the Water? 
There is, to put it mildly, a lot of healthy debate within the philosophy of mind over how 
we might go about solving the problems of symbol grounding, representation constitution, 
35 This problem is also reflected in the variety of means that can be attributed to the term 'trait'. Trait can be 
used both in the structural sense to refer to a particular body part or organ (e.g., wings, eyes, ears), and the 
behavioural sense to refer to something that an organism with such and such a constitution can do (e.g., 
flying, night vision, echolocation). The two senses are obviously related in that, for instance, having eyes 
obviously has something to do with being able to see, but seeing (especially seeing in a particular way, e.g., 
seeing a particular sort of predator) relies on the existence of many other body structures that enable that 
activity (for a related discussion of sensory systems see Gibson, 1979/1986). 
- .;- . ~ :-.' 
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and content assignment. It is tempting for the critic of cognitivism to suggest that this 
deeate is an indication of disarray and the fundamental incoherence of the concepts of 
mental representation and natural computation. But, as I will make clear in the coming 
chapters, the notion of mental representation has remained alive and well in the face of the 
emerging interactionist ideas. More than a few theorists have argued that modified 
understandings of representation are called for to help us make sense of the embodied, 
situated, and distributed nature of cognition. Representation continues to constitute a 
theoretical and methodological rallying point for many researchers. It provides a scaffold 
for organising empirical research design, computer and robotic modelling, and theoretical 
explanations in the cognitive sciences. I hope to have made it clear however that mental 
representation cannot simply be assumed; that it must be argued for if it is to serve as a key 
explanatory concept. Currently there exists no widely agreed upon understanding of what a 
subpersonal mental representation might be and of how we might spot one if we came 
across one. However, there is a widespread intuition that what cognitive scientists need 
from the concept of mental representation is something that can act as an internal 
isomorphism of the world (a model) and of potential actions (a plan). Thus the popular 
notion of representation seems to come with much more theoretical baggage than just the 
fact that it should be a physical content holder. The concept of s-representation seems to 
demand a modular or stage-based understanding of the operation of the mindlbrain. 
The Sense-Model-Plan-Act Schema and Formal Task Description 
If cognitivism's representations are simulation representations then cognitivism seems 
committed to the view that cognizers build models of their worlds and use those models to 
build other s-representations that serve as plans for action. In other words people and other 
cognizers are not just computers implemented by wetware but specialldnds of computers. 
Indeed they are not even characterisable as computers that can operate independently of an 
operator. Cognizers are viewed as computers that adaptively control bodies in, often 
dangerous, environments by transforming peripheral stimuli into useful forms of internal 
information that can be used to decide what to do and ultimately execute behaviour. 
Brooks (1991b) has referred to this view as the sense-model-plan-act (SMPA) approach to 
modelling cognition. Cognitive psychologists will recognise this as the central schema that 
underpins the usual formulation of the notion of information processing in cognitive 
psychology texts. Van Gelder and Port (1995) provide a nice example of this SMPA 
picture: 
According to this approach, when I return a serve in tennis, what happens is roughly as follows. Light from 
the approaching ball strikes my retina and my brain's visual mechanisms quicldy compute what is being seen 
(a 'ball) and its direction and rate of approach. This information is fed to a planning system which holds 
representations of my current goals (win the game, return the serve, etc.) and other background knowledge 
(court conditions, weaknesses of the other player, etc.). The planning system then infers what I must do: hit 
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the ball deep into my opponent's backhand. This command is issued to the motor system. My arms and legs 
move as required. (Van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 1) 
Figure 2.1 presents a simplified example of information flow and processing in a cognitive 
system from the SMP A perspective. This framework is largely a simplification of Holland, 
Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard's (1986) framework for understanding inductive reasoning in 
all sorts of cognitive systems. 
Sensing involves the transformation of peripheral stimuli, such as the intensity values of 
the cells in the retinal array, into an internal description of the local environment. Often 
researchers speak of the early cognitive processes recovering the environment from 
degraded sense data. Cognitive psychology texts usually depict this stage of processing as 
involving sequential substages of sensation, perception, and recognition and identification. 
The product of this series of computations is a 'meaningful picture' of the local 
environment. This picture is passed on to the modelling stage. 
Modelling, as noted earlier in the chapter, involves embellishing the product of perception 
with one's stored knowledge structures. In a sense modelling is an interpretation and 
evaluation stage and involves discovering what the percept 'means' from the agent's 
perspective by providing knowledge of where things are, their utility, and so on. A 
complex cognitive system wi11likely contain a number of candidate stored representations, 
such as schemas and scripts, that can potentially explain the deep (i.e., non-obvious) 
structure of the present surroundings. These alternative possible stored representations are 
often thought to compete with each other based upon the degree to which they best explain 
the present surroundings. That is, each stored representation has an associated 'strength'. 
The strength of a stored representation is modified in the light of the system's experiences 
of the accuracy of the predictions and expectations derived from the 'view of the world' 
given by that stored representation. When a stored representation usefully or accurately 
predicts how the environment will change, its strength is increased and the strengths of 
other competing interpretations are decreased. If a stored representation fails to 
successfully predict, its strength is decreased. 
Planning involves moving from simply knowing what exists in the world to deciding what 
to do. This involves the interplay of knowledge of what is, or may be, in the world and the 
system's goals. Goals are also represented, typically as desired states ofthe world, and are 
also subject to modification in the light of experience. Planning is usually thought to 
involve a kind of problem-solving procedure where a sequence of actions are formulated 
for reducing the distance between the current world state and the desired goal state. This 
process is sometimes thought of as involving the utilisation of an off-line emulator that 
conducts simulation runs on various possible plans. Ultimately one plan is selected to be 
passed on to the final processing stage. 
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The acting stage consists of a translation of the plan into a motor program that instructs the 
various relevant body parts how to move in order to produce the appropriate behaviour. 
In sum, the cognitivist vision decomposes the cognitive process into a series of 'cognitive 
functions'. In Haugeland's (1995) terminology each function is a component ofthe system. 
Within a component there exist high-bandwidth connections and interactions. Information 
flows thickly back and forth between the subprocesses within the component. By 
comparison, the interfaces between components exhibit low-bandwidth connections. They 
amount to information bottlenecks where the product of one stage is passed on to the next 
stage to be processed. Since most modem scientific endeavours require some sort of 
decomposition of the target phenomenon (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993) it makes sense to 
decompose along its natural fracture lines where the interactional bandwidths are the 
lowest. This, hopefully, will do the least amount of violence to the system being studied 
and provide the best understanding of how it works. It is hardly surprising then, that since 
cognitivism considers sensing, modelling, planning, and acting to be the major components 
of cognitive systems, the divisions of modem research follow this functional 
decomposition. 
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Deducing the Computational Blueprints using Formal Task Description 
How has cognitivism arrived at the idea that the primary components of cognitive creatures 
are their cognitive functions? The answer seems to be that the SMP A schema seems to fall 
out naturally when one embraces what Hendriks-Jansen (1996) calls a formal task 
description approach to the understanding of cognitive phenomena. The formal task 
description approach forms a central plank of the functionalist theOlY of mind which holds 
that the best way to study cognitive phenomena is to understand the causal roles of 
cognitive entities. Here are two representative characterisations of functionalism: 
Functionalism maintains that mental events are classified in terms of their causal roles. Thus, a mental event 
would be described in terms of its role in the mental system just as a cam shaft is characterized in terms of its 
causal role of controlling the opening and closing of valves in a car engine. (Bechtel, 1988, p. 112) 
[T]he essence of conscious intelligence lies in the "software," in the abstract computer program, in the set of 
algorithmic procedures, that each normal human implements in his or her biological "hardware." ... 
Functionalism care[s] relatively little about exactly what processes take place inside us, so long as they 
implement the right input-output function. (Churchland, 1995, pp. 250-251) 
Functionalists have latched onto the computer metaphor of mind in order to understand 
how mental states are individuated. Fundamental to functionalism is the view that 
psychology cannot proceed merely by examining the neurobiological structures that 
underpin mental activity (see e.g., Fodor, 1975). Functionalists distinguish themselves 
from both type-type identity theorists and eliminativist materialists (see Bechtel, 1988). 
Type-type identity theorists (e.g., Armstrong, 1968; Lewis 1972, Place, 1956, Smart, 1962) 
propose that each type of mental state (e.g., all instances of seeing the colour red, all 
instances of the pain felt in one's leg) is identical to a particular type of neural state (e.g., a 
type-type identity theorist might argue that pain is identical to the activity in one's C-
fibres). In other words, these theorists believe that there exist two equally legitimate ways 
of describing 'mental life': a physical neurobiological description and a higher-level 
psychological description in just the same way that there are two equally legitimate ways 
of describing the temperature of a gas: a high-level 'thermometer-based' description and a 
low-level description of the mean kinetic energy of the gas molecules. Such a relationship 
between levels is technically called a supervenience relation36. 
Type-type identity theory is often contrasted with token-token identity theOlY - a version of 
identity theory that is widely held to be more compatible with functionalism than type-type 
36 Sterelny (1990) notes that "[i]nformally, one level of nature supervenes on another if the supervening 
level somehow depends on the more fundamental level. ... A little more formally, one domain supervenes on 
another, if there can be no change in the first, supervening, domain without change in the second, base, 
domain." (pp. 43-44). The supervenience literature is large and complex and a variety of kinds of 
supervenience have been identified. I aim only to give a broad, informal characterisation here. 
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theory37. In philosophy the term type refers to a class of entity and the term token refers to 
a particular instance of a class. Token-token identity theorists hold that each particular 
instance of a mental state is identical with a particular instance of a brain state but that it is 
not possible to make the stronger type-type identity claim because our mental state 
concepts do not supervene on particular types of neural states. The idea that many different 
types of structure can serve as the substrate of a psychological state or process has come to 
be called the multiple realisability thesis. The following sort of analogy, originating in the 
work of Dennett, is typical of the sort of argument advanced to make this point: 
[A] clock is the type of thing that tells the time. OK, but notice "type of thing that tells time" is not a very 
materialistic way of putting things; it describes clocks in functional terms. So, let's try and defme "clock" in 
terms of a type - mode of classification - available in physics. You will soon notice that there is no clear-cut 
set of physical features that defmes the class of clocks. There is, in effect, no one type of physical thing by 
virtue of which all token clocks belong to the type clock. Some clocks run on springs and motors, some are 
digital, some have batteries, some are big, some are small, some contain sand, and so on. All clocks, of 
course, are physical. So token-token identity theory is true of clocks; each and every clock is a physical 
thing. But type-type identity theory is false of clocks; there is no physical vocabulary that can do the job our 
functional way of talking about clocks does. (Flanagan, 1991, p. 59) 
In sum then, the majority of functionalists (those that endorse token-token identity theory) 
believe that the strict neural reductionist vision of mentality implied by type-type identity 
theory cannot serve as an adequate foundation for psychology and cognitive science. 
Neurobiological eliminativists38 argue that advanced neurobiological descriptions will 
make a scientific mentalistic vocabulary, at least one based upon our everyday mentalistic 
talk, redundant (e.g., Churchland, 1989). That is, our psychological talk of mental states 
such as beliefs, desires, and thoughts, even when conceptually tidied up in symbolic or 
information-processing terminology, will not map onto any of the real biological cognitive 
processes that occur in nature. Folk psychology is a theory and an incorrect theory at that39, 
37 Actually the 'Australian functionalists' (see, e.g., Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 1996) argue that 
functionalism is more attuned to type identity theory but acknowledge that this is a minority viewpoint. 
38 Another brand of eliminativism advances the claim that a new sort of cognitive vocabulary, that is in 
keeping with neurobiological description and is radically different from everyday mentalistic talk, will be 
necessary for a scientific study of mind (e.g., Stich, 1983). 
39 One could argue that an interactionist view of cognition, like the one developed in this thesis, is also a 
form of eliminativism (e.g., Smithers, 1992, 1995). Keijzer (1997) sidesteps this possibility by arguing that 
his behavioural systems theory focuses on subpersonal issues and not the personal, mentalistic issues typical 
of folk psychology. Keijzer believes that we should eliminate a folk psychologically-based agent talk from 
our subpersonal theories but that this may be consistent with the legitimacy of a folk psychological 
framework at a personal level (although he provides no argument showing how this might be the case). I take 
a different view again and suspect, like Coulter (1979, 1983, 1989), that the 'mentalistic' view of folk 
psychology expounded by many philosophers of mind misreads what people are actually doing when they 
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By contrast with the type-type identity theorists and the eliminativists functionalists 
believe that some kind of informational-level of description will provide us with our best 
understanding of cognitive processes (see Bechtel, 1988; Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 
1996 for reviews). They eschew neurobiological reductionism for a number of reasons 
including the fact that higher-level abstract description provides us with a simpler and 
clearer avenue for research. This approach, as Dennett (1996) notes, "promises to make life 
easier for the theorist by abstracting away from some of the messy particularities of 
performance and focusing on the work that is actually getting done." (p. 69). Perhaps the 
primary impetus for the functionalist perspective is the conviction that mental states and 
processes are defined by computational transitions and that such transitions can be 
implemented by a variety of physical mechanisms (the multiple realisability hypothesis). 
Putnam (1975), for instance, points out that it seems eminently sensible to attribute a type 
of mental state to agents whom we know have different underlying brain states: no two 
people have identical neurobiological structures, and no single person has the same 
neurobiological structure throughout their life, yet it makes sense to say that, in both cases, 
they could entertain the same mental state. For instance, it would be strange to suggest that 
Believing that World War 2 ended in 1945 was only possible in a certain sort of brain, or 
that two different neurobiological structures attempting to entertain such a belief would, at 
some fine grain of analysis, actually tum out to instantiate different beliefs. And 
neurobiological research confirms Putnam's claim of the existence of important individual 
and developmental differences in the brain structures of humans. It has been shown that 
there are marked individual differences in the ways in which people's brains are wired up 
beyond a gross neuroanatomical level of description (Edelman, 1992), that slightly 
different regions are activated in different individuals in response to identical sensory 
stimuiationltasks40 (see Elman et aI., 1996, p. 298), and that people's brains undergo many 
changes through the lifespan. Presumably, however, all of these different neural 
configurations can be said to 'realise' most mental states. 
use terms such as belief, desire, thought, memory and so on. Unfortunately there is not the space to develop 
this argument here; suffice to say that the alternative 'ethnopsychological approach' views 'mental state talk' 
as an instrument for social coordination and positioning and not an insight in to the fact that people have 
mental states in their heads. Note that whether the idea that people have in-the-head mental states is a 
sensible scientific hypothesis is another question entirely. 
40 For instance, Elman et al. (1996) discuss several pieces of research that show how human brain structure 
varies between individuals. MRI research shows significant individual variations in the size and shape of 
cortical areas even in genetically identical individuals. For instance in two genetically identical subjects the 
amount of cortical area occupied by the occipital cortex differed by somewhere between 3% and 7%. 
Another fMRI study has shown that there is a sizeable variation in the cortical regions activated by an upper 
and lower visual field stimulation task. There is also a long tradition of research showing individual 
differences in terms of handedness and hemispheric organisation for language. 
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Furthennore, if we were to attribute particular human-like mental states (e.g., recognising a 
particular researcher) to animals of different species such as chimps, dogs, aliens,41 or 
artificially intelligent machines, then it becomes even more obvious that a strict structural 
method of individuating mental states cannot possibly provide an adequate basis for the 
categorisation of psychologically interesting phenomena. At the same time however it is 
important to realise that human brains are very much alike and indeed are very similar to 
the brains of other primates and mammals (Elman et aI., 1996). Thus, there exists little 
empirical evidence to support the strong functionalist claim that the similar mental states 
can be realised by radically different physical states such as computer hardware, pieces of 
string, old Coke cans, and so on. That said, there is evidence for the weaker claim that we 
do attribute the ability to, for instance, believe that John Lennon was a BeatIe to people 
with differently structured brains. And perhaps more interestingly, it seems to make sense 
to say that non-humans and humans (who have even less similar brain structures than two 
different people) can share mental states such as 'recognising a particular person' . 
Refining Functionalism 
An important implication of the dominance of the functionalist and token-token identity 
views of the mind-brain relationship is that many cognitive scientists, especially those in 
traditional experimental cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of 
mind, have just assumed that the brain is some sort of computational-representational 
device in which the mind is realised without paying much attention to the neurobiological 
plausibility of such a view. For instance, cognitive psychologists have, until recently, used 
data gathered from reaction-time, discrimination, and accuracy studies to model cognition 
almost purely in tenns of particular types of infonnation flow and processing (e.g., Palmer 
& Kimchi, 1986). Several factors have led to a number of criticisms of this sort of 
approach and the basic computational functionalism on which it is based. 
One classic objection to functionalism was made by Block (1978). He argues that different 
kinds of functionalism are either too liberal or too chauvinist in their assignment of 
mentality to systems. In commonsense (or folk psychological) functionalism any system 
that can be understood to mirror the causal relationships between commonsense 
psychological inputs, internal states and outputs is considered to be a cognitive system42. 
41 Philosophers of mind seem to be inordinately worried about the repercussions of Martian mindlbrain 
physiology on cognitive science. Philosophers tend to assume that Martians will have a radically different 
physical basis to their mindlbrains. 
42 Commonsense inputs, outputs, and internal states are simply perceived entities (e.g., a person sitting 
down), mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires etc.), and behaviours (e.g., catching a ball) as we conceive of them 
in the everyday, folk psychological sense. 
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Block (1978) argues that systems such as the Chinese nation, or a collection of trained 
fleas, might mirror these relationships (i.e., duplicate the causal roles and relationships of 
mental systems) but that we would be unlikely to want to think of them as cognitive 
systems. In particular, he claims that the experiential aspects of mentality (i.e., qualia) 
cannot, on the face of it, be captured by such systems. By contrast to commonsense 
functionalism, psychofunctionalism describes the inputs, outputs, and internal states of a 
cogniser in neurobiological, physical, or technical psychological terminology. Block 
argued that such explanations must be couched in tenns of our understanding of the 
workings of particular examples of cognisers (e.g., humans) and may thus be overly 
chauvinistic in their assignment of mentality to different systems. For instance, a 
psycho functionalism based upon the kinds of internal transitions found in the human brain 
would withhold mentality from intelligent robots or Martians whose mental hardware 
worked in an unhuman manner. 
Block's (1978) arguments have had a significant impact upon the ways in which 
philosophers have thought about the sufficiency of functionalist interpretations of mental 
states and their relationship to the physical substrate (see Bechtel, 1988 for a summary of 
some of the attempts at saving functionalism from the problems Block identifies). 
However, functionalist thinking has also been challenged by a number of empirical 
developments within cognitive science. 
First, the development of a strong connectionist alternative to the traditional classical 
symbolic model of cognition has led a number of researchers to suggest that we do need to 
pay close attention to peculiarities ofthe physical substrate of cognition. Rumelhart (1989) 
has pointed out that arguments for the functionalist claim of the primacy of an 
informational/functionallevel of analysis that derive from an examination of computers are 
misleading. 
It is ... often pointed out that we can learn very little about what kind of program a particular computer may 
be running by looking at the electronics ... It doesn't matter whether we use an IBM or an Apple, the 
essential characteristics are the same. This is a very misleading analogy. It is true for computers because they 
are all essentially the same ... When we look at essentially different architecture, we see the architecture 
makes a good deal of difference. It is the architecture that determines which kinds of algorithms are most 
easily carried out on the machine in question ... It is thus reasonable that we should begin by asking what we 
know about the architecture of the brain and how it might shape the algorithms underlying biological 
intelligence and human mental life. (Rumelhart, 1989, p. 134) 
Other connectionist-friendly theorists have claimed that connectionism has blurred the 
traditional boundary between implementational substrate (neurobiology) and functional 
description (psychology) (e.g., Churchland, 1989; 1995; Clark, 1993; 1997). Clark (1997) 
notes that 
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With the advent (or rebirth) of connectionist models, [the beliefs associated with the multiple realizability 
thesis] began to change. These models were deliberately specified in a way that reduced the distance 
between the computational story and the broad nature of neuronal implementation .... [A]s connectionism 
matured ... a real synthesis of the computational and neuroscientific perspectives looked to be on the cards 
(p. 129). 
The second important factor in the changing view of the mind-brain relationship has been 
the rapidly increasing interest in neurobiology and the consequent genesis of fields such as 
cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuropsychology (e.g., Sarter et aI., 1996). A number 
of researchers have argued that we need to pay much more attention to the structure of the 
brain before we can have an adequate understanding of the mind (see, e.g., Churchland & 
Sejnowski, 1992; Edelman, 1989, 1992; Koch & Davis, 1994; Reeke & Sporns, 1990). 
This has had the effect of reintroducing a moderate form of eliminativism into current 
cognitive neuroscience. 
Thirdly, there has been an important introduction of an evolutionary perspective into basic 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology by those who claim that the basic functional 
analysis of psychological processes cannot be undertaken without an understanding of the 
selection pressures that a species has faced in its evolutionary past (Buss, 1995; Barkow, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). 
Lastly there has been a recent move toward appreciating the role played by non-neural 
body systems in cognitive activity (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Dennett, 1996). Dennett (1996) 
notes that " ... it's almost standard for functionalists to over-simplify their conception of 
[the] task [of individuating by function rather than structure], making life too easy for the 
theorist ... " (p. 69) because they do not take into account " ... [t]he fact that your nervous 
system ... is not an insulated, media-neutral control system - the fact that it "effects" and 
"transduces" at almost every juncture - forces us to think about the functions of their parts 
in a more complicated (and realistic) way." (p. 77) 
With each of these criticisms computational functionalism has been modified (when it has 
not been rejected outright) in order to account for the particular concerns raised. With each 
modification functionalism has been come less and less intertwined with the multiple 
realizability thesis and more concerned with describing, in abstract terms, the actual 
relations that hold between neural structures, other body structures, and the environment. 
Formal Task Description 
The functionalist orthodoxy, even in its more refined forms, encourages the cognitive 
scientists to conceive of cognitive activities as neural processes that should be described at 
an abstract informational level of analysis. So when a cognitive scientist attempts to 
understand how an agent might carry out a particular cognitive activity, or a roboticist 
designs a machine to accomplish a certain task, he or she resorts to, what Hendriks-Jansen 
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(1996) calls formal task description43 • Basically speaking this is the strategy of 
hypothesising that the mechanisms underlying cognitive activity can be discovered using a 
logical or algorithmic breakdown of tasks (the behavioural functions of particular 
activities) into a series of subtasks. Each subtask is thought to be implemented by a 
particular component of the agent's . inner machinery. Indeed this is exactly how 
programmers usually write programs. So functionalism seems to encourage the cognitive 
theorist to think 'how could I program a computer so that it could carry out this cognitive 
task?'. 
Van Gelder (1995) gives a nice example of this kind of thinking as it might have been 
applied to the problem of building a governor - a device for modulating the amount of 
steam needed to smoothly run an engine. Van Gelder suggests that the computationally-
oriented engineer would adopt the classic cognitive science approach of breaking the 
overall problem task into smaller components and thereby produce an algorithm that 
abstracts out the 'information processing tasks' that the computational governor must do. 
1. Measure the speed of the flywheel. 
2. Compare the actual speed against the desired speed. 
3. If there is no discrepancy, return to step 1. Otherwise, 
a. measure the current steam pressure; 
b. calculate the desired alteration in steam pressure; 
c. calculate the necessary throttle valve adjustment. 
4. Make the throttle valve adjustment. 
5. Return to step 1 
(Van Gelder, 1995, p. 348). 
Van Gelder goes on, in typical cognitivist fashion, to suggest that the computational 
governor that implements these steps probably possesses "a tachometer (for measuring the 
speed of the wheel); a device for calculating speed discrepancy; a steam pressure meter; a 
device for calculating the throttle valve adjustment; a throttle valve adjuster; and some kind 
of central executive to handle sequencing operations." (p. 348). It is interesting to note that 
the actual mechanical design of the governor is nothing at all like this. In chapter 5 I 
examine this example in much more detail. Although van Gelder's example is perhaps a 
little simplistic,44 it does underline the important point that the formal task analysis 
43 Van Gelder (1995) refers to a similar strategy as homuncular explanation and Clark (1996, 1997) calls it 
componential explanation. 
44 For instance, a formal task analysis will typically be constrained by some kind of empirical observations 
or experiments. In cognitive science behavioural performance, as measured by, say, chronometric 
experiments, and neural activity pattern analysis, via brain imaging, might provide extra constraints on the 
hypothesized computational description. It is important to realise, however, that formal task descriptions are 
often constructed prior to such empirical work and that the empirical results often get squeezed into an 
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approach of functionalism seems to encourage a particular way of thinking about 
explaining cognition that does not provide a fail-safe strategy for constructing an adequate 
model of the processes involved in a particular cognitive activity. 
More specifically, there are two problems that arise from adopting the formal task 
description method when deducing the inner workings of the cognitive computer. The first 
problem is that the formal task description approach does not work in cases where an 
activity is an emergent feature of a behavioural system. Thus exclusive reliance on formal 
task description effectively renders emergent functionality invisible. The second problem is 
that formal task description lends itself to two incompatible readings. One reading portrays 
the formal description as an abstraction of lower level in-the-head processes. The second 
reading implies that the description is a description of the tasks that the system as a whole 
carries out in the world. Although incompatible, these two readings are unfortunately 
conflated in the literature. Let's look at each ofthese problems in tum. 
Problem 2: The Emergent Functionality Problem 
The first problem with the formal task description approach is that situated roboticists and 
other ESD thinkers have shown that the decomposition by function approach is not the 
only possible way of building an agent that performs a particular kind of task. And this 
implies that the functional decomposition that derives from a formal task analysis is not the 
only way natural born cognizers (people, other animals, even Martians) might be put 
together. I will discuss these interactionist insights in the rest of this thesis. For the moment 
all we need to appreciate is that functionality can be emergent - indeed it can be 
interactively emergent. All this means is that the components of the agent may not 
correspond to sub-machines that carry out logically deduced sub-tasks. Rather, activity 
may arise from the operation of a collection of behavioural layers that interact with the 
local environmental structure (see chapters 3 and 4 for how this may occur). The variables 
that seem to be explicitly used by the agent (in the light of our formal task analysis) in fact 
only exist in the folk psychological interpretation of the observer (Smithers, 1992). More 
importantly, emergent functionality is not only a possibility in natural cognitive systems 
but, according to Hendriks-Jansen (1996), it would be a miracle if natural selection ever 
produced a system made up of subsystems equivalent to the subtasks in a formal task 
decomposition. Natural selection operates on evolutionarily successful behaviour-in-the-
existing computational interpretation. One could argue that this is standard scientific hypothetico-deductive 
practice where hypotheses are empirically tested and modified in light of the results of research. In addition 
to being sceptical about the adequacy of the hypothetico-deductive view of scientific method (see, e.g., Haig, 
2000) I believe that much, but not all, work within mainstream cognitive science does not so much test the 
empirical adequacy of formal task descriptions as use them as unanalysed explanatory scaffolds for empirical 
findings. 
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world not on the components of an environmentally-isolated machine; and the latter would 
have to be the case for evolution to select a creature's innards that contained physical 
correlates of a task or its logically decomposed subtasks. The implications of this 
interactive emergence are profound for engineering (designing and building robots) and 
reverse engineering (attempting to understand the generation of behaviour by natural 
agents) in cognitive science. If a formal-task analysis cannot reliably establish how to best 
put together an autonomous agent, then we are left with a serious methodological problem. 
Problem 3: The Incompatible Readings Problem 
The emergent functionality problem suggests that formal task analysis is merely a bad 
explanatory heuristic for cognitive science and psychology. I want to suggest, however, 
that the reason this is so is because formal task analysis and, more generally, functionalism 
involves the conflation of two distinct understandings of cognitive activity. This is perhaps 
best illustrated by an analysis of Marr's (1982) popular approach to understanding 
cognitive systems. 
Marr's Three Levels for Understanding Information-Processing 
David Marr (1982) describes three different levels of analysis required when trying to 
understand how any information-processing machine works. Such machines include 
animals, animals' computational subsystems, such as their visual systems, and, if Marr is 
to be believed, cash registers. 
Marr draws a distinction between three levels of description: a computational theory level, 
a representation and algorithm level, and a hardware implementation level. He suggests 
that each level provides a particular perspective on an infonnation-processing problem and 
thus comes complete with its own set of questions. Marr (1982) summarises these in the 
following way: 
Computational theory: What is the goal of the computation, why is it appropriate, and what is the logic of the 
strategy by which it can be carried out? 
Representation and algorithm: How can this computational theory be implemented? In particular, what is the 
representation for the input and output, and what is the algorithm for the transformation? 
Hardware implementation: How can the representation and algorithm be realized physically? (based on 
figure 1-4, p. 25). 
One common interpretation of Marr's view is to simply equate the representation and 
algorithm level with an abstract description of the physical hardware that constitutes the 
cognitive agent's mindlbrain, and the computational level with an even more abstract view 
of the representation and algorithm level. By analogy, the representation/algorithm level 
would be akin to describing the running of a computer at the level of a particular piece of 
programming and the computational level would be akin to a higher level, logical 
'flowchart' description of what the program (and ultimately the computer) does. Marr 
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(1982) implies this sort reading when he writes that the abstract computational theory 
should be understood as characterising the performance of the device as "a mapping from 
one kind of information to another, the abstract properties of this mapping are defined 
precisely, and its appropriateness and adequacy for the task at hand are demonstrated." (p. 
24). We can call this the process interpretation of Marr because here he seems to be 
suggesting that each level provides a different window on the physical processes that go on 
within an information-processing device. 
However, if we are mindful of the fact that high-level descriptions are oftenJunctionally-
inspired there is a risk that high-level terms will not map onto low-level physical ones, 
especially localised (i.e., in-the-head), low-level tenns. A 'high-level description' of a 
horse as a means of transport will not reduce to a physiological description of the horse 
because the property of 'being a means of transport' has as much to do with how a horse is 
used and what it does as it does with its physical structure. The same sort of problem may 
exist with high-level descriptions of 'mental modules' that are described as 'face 
recognisers' or 'explicit memory stores'. 
This 'irreducibility' of levels seems implicit in another interpretation of Marr's (1982) 
levels of description. In this alternative task interpretation the computational level refers 
not to an abstract level of description that can potentially map onto 'lower' levels but rather 
to a description of the problems or tasks that an agent (or device) faces and that are 
'solved' by particular subsystems within the cognitive agent. This view of the 
computational level is postulated in order to provide top-down constraints on our 
investigations of the workings of cognitive subsystems. This seems to be what Marr is 
getting at when he describes the computational level in terms of the kind of functions the 
device is built to perform. For instance, he believes that in the computational theory of 
vision "the underlying task is to reliably derive properties of the world from images of it." 
(Marr, 1982, p. 23). We need a computational theory in order to help us understand what 
the device being investigated does. He uses the following analogy to illustrate this point. 
[T]rying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to understand bird flight by 
studying only feathers: it just cannot be done. In order to understand bird flight, we have to understand 
aerodynamics; only then do the structure of feathers and the different shapes of birds' wings make sense. 
(Marr, 1982, p. 27) 
Evolutionary psychologists are attracted to this interpretation of the computational level 
because it accords with their beliefs that evolutionary analyses (theories of adaptive 
function) provide vital constraints on our theories of the nature and functioning of the 
cognitive subsystems . 
.. , theories of adaptive function '" are an indispensable methodological tool, crucial to the future 
development of cognitive psychology .... To isolate a functionally organized mechanism with a complex 
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system, you need a theory of what function that mechanism was designed to perfonn. (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1994,p.43) 
In sum there are two interpretations of Marr's computational level: a process view in 
which it is viewed as a high-level description of the workings of parts of the brain, and a 
task view in which the computational level is understood as a description of the problems 
or tasks that face the cognitive agent. Simply put, task refers to the things an animal needs 
to do, and processes refer to the ways that it does them. It is important to note that the 
process aspect of describing cognitive activity is usually understood in terms of internal 
(usually neural) structures and operations. Vision, for instance, is described in tenns of the 
ways the visual system transduces electromagnetic energy and uses it to create a 
representation of the world. Tasks on the other hand refer to things that the whole animal 
does, needs to do, or is designed to do in the world. At the task level vision is understood 
in terms of the sorts of environmental information that the animal requires in order to see 
in an adaptive manner. Processes happen inside the animal, whereas tasks describe the 
relations between the inside and outside. Roughly speaking this distinction maps onto the 
subpersonal-personal distinction. 
The key point to understand here is that task and process are not different levels of 
abstraction of a single system, as, for instance, the representation/algorithm and hardware 
implementation levels seem to be. There exists no mapping between task and process. 
Rather, they portray different concerns, one to do with what needs to be done, and the other 
with how that will be accomplished. This is not always, or even often, appreciated, even by 
Marr himselfl5. The use of level to label the different concerns probably does not help for 
this term implies a stratified view of reality. But perhaps more importantly it is likely that 
the use of formal task analysis in the writing of computer programs that contributes to 
Marr's apparent conflation of the two incompatible views. If, for example, a programmer is 
asked to write a program to calculate prices after tax the first step is to break down the task 
for calculating correct answers into smaller subtasks (perhaps the steps that a person would 
follow if calculating by hand) to create an appropriate algorithm. The overall task may be 
to calculate prices after tax. Say the subtasks are (1) FIND ITEM PRICE, (2) FIND 
ITEM TAX RATE, and (3) CALCULATE TAXED PRICE. Each of these subtasks may 
be further broken down into smaller, simpler subtasks, but they are tasks nonetheless. The 
potential for believing that tasks are just high-level descriptions of processes occurs when 
the algorithmic redescription of the task is then used to produce the routines in a program 
that are ultimately instantiated in the physical structure of a computer. Here it appears that 
45 For instance, see Marr's (1982, pp. 22-24) discussion of how his three level approach can be applied to the 
infonnation-processing operations of a cash register. Importantly a cash register is rather like a computer in 
tenns of the ways tasks can be mapped onto processes. 
74 
the task description is converted into a configuration of physical structures (the process). 
Heil (1981) was aware ofthis point twenty years ago. 
[W]e must take care to avoid the error of supposing that descriptions of things done are really indirect 
descriptions of the mechanisms which get them done. This is where the use of computer models of the 
activities of persons seems especially pernicious. To coax a computing machine to perform a certain task, we 
must fIrst say what it is we want done. This requires that we describe in a precise way the performance we 
have in mind. Thus, the complexity of the programmes we write may well be a function of the complexity of 
the descriptions with which we are obliged to supply the computing machine. If we are successful, the 
machine will use our description (appropriately 'coded') to carry out the task we have set for it. In this way 
our description of what is done does provide a characterization of sorts of the mechanism (the computing 
machine) which performs the task described. This, however, is simply a boring fact about the way in which 
we have programmed the machine. It scarcely licenses the conclusion that any device which performs the 
task in question necessarily does so in anything like the way the computing machine does it. (p. 327) 
The concept of a subtask actually resides in an 'ontological no-man's land'. Sometimes a 
computer program may decompose a task in a way consonant with the series of actions a 
person may carry out (e.g., an algorithmic breakdown of tying shoelaces may go PUT ON 
SHOE, GRASP BOTH ENDS OF LACE, CROSS OVER, etc.). We can call this a 
practical activity decomposition. However within cognitive science the task decomposition 
is usually of an entirely different sort that we might call a logical or formal decomposition. 
With this form of decomposition theorists hypothesise about the logically necessary 
elements of a task rather than the actual temporal series of actions that a person would 
follow. Take the example of visual recognition; it is commonly claimed that in order to 
recognise an object, a representation of the object needs to be created (subtask 1), followed 
by some process of matching the constructed representation with those stored in long term 
memory (subtask 2). This is so because the logical implication of believing that 
'recognition is matching' is that a system requires two entities to be compared and 
contrasted. This situation is unlike (most of) our experiences of visual recognition where 
the act of recognising an object (i.e., knowing what it is) requires little or no effort at all. 
That is, we do not consciously work our way through a series of steps to arrive at a solution 
(unlike, for instance, when we do complex multiplication using pen and paper)46. 
Hendriks-Jansen (1996) argues that formal task descriptive readings of cognitive activities 
arise from a basic assumption (clearly articulated by Marr, 1982) that cognitive processes 
are solutions to problems. In particular Marr argued that cognitive phenomena such a~ 
46 SQme might argue that the reason that we feel as if there is no series of computational stages (processes) 
equivalent to the subtasks is because they are unconscious processes. But this need not be the case as 
connectionist research shows. Connectionist networks can 'recognise' an object (i.e., correctly identify a 
stimulus and provide an appropriate output) without the need for separate 'memory look up' and matching 
processes. This is a simple example of how even in-the-head emergent phenomena remain invisible to the 
formal task description method. 
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vision involve a movement from a basic kind of peripheral representation (e.g., an image) 
to a complex and useful deep representation (e.g., a 3D model) and that cognitive processes 
are the computations that transform one into the other. Hendriks-Jansen (1996) argues that: 
When Marr laid down that a computational theory should specify what needs to be computed and why before 
going on to specify how [in the representation/algorithm level], he did not appear to realise that, by adopting 
a problem-solving approach, he had already constrained his possibilities concerning what and why by 
making the most fundamental assumption of all concerning how. (p. 105) 
The fundamental lesson we should take from this analysis is that subtasks within a formal 
task decomposition remain tasks: things that need to be done by the whole 'cognitive 
system' in the world. At no point do they miraculously become descriptions of the 
sequential internal workings of the agent: the process whereby the task is accomplished. 
In sum it seems that the notion of explanation via formal task description raises a number 
of difficulties for cognitivism. There exists a disturbing lack of clarity as to what the term 
function is meant to do in psychological explanation. It is common for theorists to appeal 
to the notion that a neurocomputational circuit of a cognitive system has a function in the 
same sense that a component of an engine has a function; what might be called the function 
within the system. At first blush this seems to be what theorists like Sterelny (1990) and 
Bechtel (1988) have in mind when they discuss the functionalist approach to mind in the 
following way: 
When I talk of mental functions, the notion of function is biological; it is the same sense in which the 
function of the kidney is excretion and water regulation. (Sterelny, 1990, p. 11) 
[A] mental event would be described in terms of its role in the mental system just as a cam shaft is 
characterized in terms of its causal role of controlling the opening and closing of valves in a car engine. 
(Bechtel, 1988, p. 112) 
Unfortunately cognitivist researchers seem to mix up this sense of function with the notion 
offunction for the system. This sense of function is apparent when psychologists and their 
kin talk of computational subsystems having the function of solving particular problems or 
tasks that face the cognitive agent. Talk of neurocognitive modules that recognise faces or 
detect cheats confuses two distinct and complexly related senses of function, and this in 
tum gives the misleading impression that the cognitivist enterprise has made explanatory 
progress. 
Conclusion: Cognitivism as a Methodological Framework 
Despite the fact that I have examined some conceptual arguments regarding the plausibility 
and coherence of the notions of mental representation, natural computation, the SMP A 
schema, and the use of formal task descriptions, my main objective in this chapter has been 
to present cognitivism in terms of the methodological implications it has for making sense 
of cognitive phenomena empirically and theoretically. Cognitivism is a research 
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programme, or global theory, and is thus not vulnerable to direct empirical testing. What it 
provides us with is, not only an ontological framework for organising our observations of 
cognitive phenomena, but also a set of methodological constraints which specify, amongst 
other things, what is and is not observable, how to describe those observations, the 
conditions under which things are or are not observable, the instrumental means by what is 
measurable is measured, and the reliability of those measures (Hooker, 1987). The 
following is an admittedly idealised summary of some of cognitivism's key 
methodological constraints. I do not mean to argue that every cognitivist psychologist 
explicitly accepts these constraints, only that the theoretical tools and concepts of 
cognitivism encourage and guide the researcher toward constructing theories and designing 
empirical studies consistent with these constraints. The first of these guiding constraints is 
that researchers should think of cognition as something in the head rather than something 
in the world or distributed across world and agent. The notions of mental representation 
and the SMP A schema both derive from, and reinforce, this assumption. Christensen and 
Hooker (2000) make it clear how the concept of representation implicitly encourages the 
view that cognition is an in-the-head phenomenon: 
Of course, cognitive processes must have some important relation to the "outside", but this is [messed as 
representation, where the relations to the "outside" are collapsed into some kind of referring relation and the 
focus is on the internally characterized representational contents. The referring relation "skims over" all the 
detail of process organization and interactive dynamics to magically connect internal mental entities to the 
"outside" world. Once the general character of this reflection is specified the details are suppressed and 
attention focused on the "inner workings." (p. 29) 
Bern and Keijzer (1996) show how the SMPA assumption reduces the role of the 
environment in cognition to a matter of input and output: 
What the system does in its own domain, the internal processing of the system, is what makes it cognitive, 
not its relations with the environment, because these relations are conceptualized merely as input and output 
to the system - where they come from, and what they represent, is taken for granted. (pp. 450-451) 
The idea that the most important relations and mechanisms of cognition are located in the 
head lends itself to a downplaying of the importance of environmental structure. Therefore, 
the second constraining assumption of cognitivism is that the environment consists of 
degraded and relatively unstructured raw sense data. Given this assumption that the 
environment provides low grade information to the agent, theorists are naturally led to the 
view that purely environmentally-determined behaviour is simple and inflexible. 
Since the environment is information-poor and the mindlbrain is a complex device the 
problem of cognitive order is brought into sharp relief. In order for the mindlbrain to 
produce adaptive behaviour the following three constraints are observed: solve the problem 
of cognitive order by postulating the existence of self-organising internal stimuli (mental 
representations); think of subpersonal components of the mindlbrain as having meaningful 
'':. :-
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content; and think of the agent as a problem-solving machine that must construct deep 
useful representations from simple peripheral stimuli. 
Finally, given this view ofthe relationship between the agent and the world, and of the way 
the mindlbrain deals with this relationship, the following constraint emerges: cognition 
should be explained by discovering the problem an agent, or a subsystem of an agent, 
faces. This involves working out what information an agent starts with and what kind of 
information they require to produce the appropriate behaviour. One then constructs an 
algorithm that will get from the former to the latter. Empirical research is subsequently 
directed toward assessing which one of several hypothesised algorithms best accounts for 
the performance of participants in different kinds of experiment. 
An Interactionist Alternative? 
There is at least one other basic orienting picture that we can use to understand the 
production of adaptive and intelligent behaviour and that, I believe, underpins the 
frameworks of non-cognitivist frameworks such as ecological psychology and ESD 
interactionism. It goes something like this: Adaptive behaviour is fundamentally about 
possessing sensitivity to the nuances of the environment regardless of how distant those 
environmental features are from the agent. If there is a predator bounding toward you it 
pays to flee. And if there is possibly a predator nearby (because 'ecological laws' link 
particular environments with the presence of particular creatures) it also pays to keep clear 
(e.g., dense foresTed areas are 'cues' to the existence of potential danger. In an animal's 
Umwelt a place may look dangerous even though they see no predator). In other words, the 
alternative framework suggests that, contrary to the representational approach, it makes 
sense to build situationally-determined systems and not systems that use internal stimuli 
for initiating action. If this is the case then we need to view the bodily and neural resources 
of agents as enabling a complex kind of environmental coordination system; a system that 
produces appropriate behaviour in response to the environmental furniture that is about 
them even if that furniture is out of immediate perceptual/causal contact (recall that it is 
this lack of perceptual/causal contact which lies at the heart of the problem of cognitive 
order and the cognitivist claim that representations must be postulated as mechanisms that 
bridge superficial appearances and adaptive interpretations of the environment). The world 
is full of regularities that hold between perceivable things and things that are hidden or are 
potentially there. In order to produce adaptive behaviour agents need to be sensitive to the 
implications of these regularities. It is not uncommon for these regularities to change or be 
changed. Thus many, but by no means all, animals must have the capacity to update their 
sensitivity to changing regularities in order to survive (see Keijzer, 1997, 1998a; 
Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press, for a similar approach). 
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No doubt one could argue that some notion of representation can be rescued from such an 
analysis. Indeed there have been any number of attempts in recent years to formulate more 
interactionist-friendly versions of mental representation and I will discuss some of them in 
coming chapters. I think however that there are two good reasons why we should be 
sceptical of claims that some modified form of mental representation is in order. First, such 
attempts really weaken the view of representation as an environmentally impervious 
content container and tum it into something that it is not - a structure that simply enables 
cognitive activity (see also Keijzer, 1997). The second reason is a pragmatic one. If 
representation-talk can be dispensed with in theoretical and empirical research then why 
bother preserving it? Indeed if representational thinking can lead us methodologically 
astray, as I have argued, letting it go may well free us up to pursue more fertile lines of 
inquiry. Both cognitivist and interactionist frameworks are consistent with the idea that 
animals have knowledge of things in their surroundings and the relations that hold between 
those things (that is, both are cognitive frameworks) but only cognitivism requires that the 
knowledge be encoded in the structures of the organism rather than simply being apparent 
in the animal's behavioural abilities. 
For now we need to set aside the peculiar kind of behavioural coordination that 'grown 
humans' (i.e., linguistically and cognitively sophisticated people of, perhaps, ages five and 
higher) exhibit by thinking about things 'in their heads', consciously formulating plans, 
and imagining _alt~matives, hypotheticals, and counterfactuals. This may seem to be asking 
rather a lot, given the fact that these are precisely the sorts of activities that form the core 
phenomena studied by cognitive psychologists, but I hope to convince the reader by the 
end of this work that such abilities rest upon a basic cognitive bedrock that needs to be 
understood in a non-representationalist manner first. 
Does the Concept of Representation Lead us Astray? 
In this chapter I have suggested that the concept of representation represents the tip of a 
theoretical iceberg that encourages us to think of an agent's adaptive behaviour as enabled 
by a system that extracts information from the environment and encodes it so that it can be 
used within an inner analytic arena. It is a picture reminiscent of a general and his aides 
being secreted in a bunker receiving reports about activity in the field, examining them and 
formulating plans of action, and then sending out instructions for those on the front line to 
follow. 
The three assumptions, the representational-computational theory, the sense-model-plan-
act schema, and formal task description, constitute a mutually reinforcing set of principles 
for cognitivism. Cognitivists want to explain complex organisms' time-space distancing 
powers in terms of physically instantiated knowledge structures that reside inside those 
organisms. Because these organisms do not have contact with the appropriate 
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environmental stimuli they must possess internal contentful structures that can stand in for 
those 'absent' stimuli. These are subpersonal mental representations. Because complex 
organisms must behave adaptively most of the time, they need to be able to sense their 
changing environments and then supplement what they sense with their internal 
knowledge. This involves the building of inner models. In order to act adaptive1y internal 
plans for action also need to be constructed. 
For many within psychology and cognitive science this seems like the only way that 
cognition can be adequately explained. Indeed, for some time it has been argued that 
cognitivism is 'the only game in town'. Newell and Simon (1981) sum up this attitude 
nicely when they write that "[t]he principal body of evidence for the symbol system 
hypothesis ... is negative evidence: the absence of specific competing hypotheses as to how 
intelligent activity might be accomplished whether by man or machine." (p.50). There have 
existed a number of alternative explanatory frameworks within psychology and the other 
social sciences throughout the current cognitivist period. But recently there seems to have 
been a concerted effort to construct genuine, robust, alternative explanations to those 
espoused by cognitivism. To be sure, cognitivism is still in its ascendancy within the 
cognitive sciences, and especially in psychology, but the claim that the cognitivist 
framework must be true because there is no plausible alternative is now, more than ever, 
untrue. Indeed, as I intend to show in the coming chapters, it may tum out that the 
interactionist app~oach provides a better explanation of cognitive activity than cognitivism 
does. 
3. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed 
Interactionist Influences 
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The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of organism, and with the conception of environment 
comes the impossibility of considering psychical life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum. 
John Dewey (188411969,p. 56). 
Introduction: The Emergence of ESO interactionism 
In the past few years there has been an explosion of research that seeks to study cognitive 
activity by examining the ways in which embodied agents relate to and interact with their 
environments. This change of emphasis has moved the 'search for cognition' from the 
inside of the skull to an exploration of the relations that hold between animals (made up of 
bodies and brains) and their surroundings. More recently still, several theorists have tried 
to provide frameworks for situating the many claims and findings that derive from the 
work of researchers in over a dozen disciplines as well as teasing out the implications these 
new ways of looking at things have for established notions of cognition. These people 
include Clark (1997), Keijzer (1997), Hendriks-Jansen (1996), McClamrock (1995), 
Rowlands (1999), and Clancey (1997). By and large this revolution has yet to impact on 
mainstream psychology, although the gradual uptake of dynamical systems ideas 
throughout pSY911Qlogy presents a significant counterexample. 
The primary focus of this Interactionist perspective is in the theoretical and empirical 
investigation of cognition as an embodied, situated, and distributed (ESD) phenomenon. 
Sutton (1998) summarises the aim and promise of this approach with an aquatic example: 
Dolphins and bluefm tuna ... are just not strong enough to swim as fast as they do. Their abilities derive not 
from great evolved strength but from a capacity to treat their medium as enabling, rather than constraining, 
their motions. As well as exploiting aquatic swirls and eddies to aid their manoeuvres, they actively create 
new and useful vortices and pressure gradients in their environment. The world is not a jumble of obstacles 
against which organisms must struggle, rail, and bump, but a pool of resources with which they interact in a 
looping, "intricate and iterated dance". When considering the natural, technological, linguistic, and 
institutional environments in which humans are embedded ... we would do well to remember that uncanny 
fusions of internal and external processes, analogous to the dolphins} use of fluid dynamics, can have a 
startling productivity which remains invisible to investigation which stops at the boundaries of the skin. 
(Sutton, 1998, p. 90, emphasis added) 
Such a multi-perspective understanding of cognition takes into account behavioural, 
developmental, evolutionary, social/cultural, neurobiological, and ecological factors and 
thus draws on a number of disciplines within psychology and the cognitive sciences as well 
as several fields outside of the traditional 'big five or six disciplines' of cognitive science. 
To get a sense of the nature of this enterprise it will help to have a sense of how I use the 
terms embodiment, situatedness, distribution, and interactionism. 
"'<- ' 
81 
Embodiment, Situatedness, Distribution, and Interactionism 
Embodiment 
Unlike most cognitivist theory, the ESD approach views the living body as central to the 
study of cognition. This means a number of things. First, that cognition is all about moving 
bodies around to get things done (e.g., Keijzer, 1997). Second, this means that the role of 
the nervous system is, first and foremost, to 'control' and modulate bodily activity. Bodies 
are complex 'intelligent' systems that are coupled to nervous systems, not commanded by 
them (e.g., Beer, 1995a, 1995b). Third, living things, being the 'possessors' of bodies, are 
primarily interested in surviving - in preserving their own organisational integrity (through 
a process known as autopoiesis) and in maintaining adaptive contact with their 
surroundings (a process known as structural coupling) (e.g., Maturana & Varela, 1980, 
1988; Varela et al., 1991). Fourth, since the primary purpose of cognition is 'making one's 
way in the real world', more advanced, reflective, and abstract forms of cognition are 
derived from, constrained by, and grounded in more basic forms of 'embodied cognition' 
(e.g., Glenberg, 1997; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987). 
Situatedness and Distribution 
These two concepts are often used interchangeably in the literature to refer to the idea that 
all, or nearly all, cognitive activity is made possible by resources that occur beyond the 
cognitivist mi~d&rain. There are subtle differences of emphasis in the use of these terms 
that derive from the different intellectual environments from which they have emerged (see 
the following section on Cognition in the Wild). Here I will use situatedness to refer to the 
nature of the cognitive agent and their activity. A situated approach to the study of 
cognition and action claims that activity is primarily the product of the moment-by-
moment interactions of the agent with the furniture and inhabitants of their surroundings. 
The agent's primary skills and abilities include recognising patterns arid using and 
manipulating their surroundings. Higher cognitive abilities, such as 'off-line' reflection and 
effortful planning are grounded in these basic perception-action abilities. This stands in 
contrast to the cognitivist view of the individual as primarily a symbol-manipulator that 
models its surrounds and plans what to do before 'executing' behaviour. By contrast, when 
I say that cognition and action are distributed, it is in the sense that a full explanation of 
many activities requires us to trace 'flows of information processing' beyond the skull and 
into environments of tools, practices, and other agents. Distributed cognition analyses 
focus on the ways in which external resources are used to taclde different tasks and the 
ways in which environments are constructed so as to support certain kinds of cognition and 
action. Indeed, it is often claimed that the environment contains entities that play important 
roles as vehicles for thought. To focus only on what lies under the skin or the skull is to do 
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violence to a natural and integrated functional system. Thus distributed cognitive analyses 
focus on the agent-environment system as the primary level of analysis. 
Interactionism 
Since the primary unit of analysis for the ESD theorist is the agent-environment system, 
there exists a great deal of interest in understanding the ways in which bodies, brains, 
. artifacts, and environments interact with each other. Cognitive activity emerges from the 
interplay of (often) simple reflexes and the layout of the local environment and, 
importantly, does not exist preformed in either the agent or the world (Hendriks-Jansen, 
1996). The interactionism advocated here is not the naive interactionism of much 
developmental science critiqued by the likes of Pinker (1997, pp. 33-34) and Oyama 
(1989) but what Oyama calls a constructive interactionism. The contrast is between a view 
of traits or behaviours being an outcome of the 'mixing' of environment and innate 
structure and a position that recognises the 'informational' and constructive roles of 
multiple resources. 
With these terms roughly characterised we can now tum to the basic structure of the 
chapter. In this chapter I aim to discuss and summarise the ideas and findings from several 
broadly cognitive scientific fields of research. The intention is to provide the flavour of the 
common aims and claims of this rather disparate collection of research endeavours. The 
next chapter is an attempt at distilling out the major shared themes of the research 
programmes int11is loose coalition. The aim is to make explicit the basic explanatory 
commitments of an Interactionist perspective. This will lay the foundation for the 
explanatory framework I begin to develop in chapter 5. 
Influential Fields 
Progenitors of the ESD approach include, in one way or another, John Dewey (see 
Clancey, 1997), William James (see Good & Still, 1998), Lev Vygotsky, Jerome Bruner, 
Eleanor and James Gibson, Wilhelm Wundt (Cole & Engestrom, 1993), a number of 
'Continental theorists' including MerIeau-Ponty (Varela et a1., 1991), Heidegger and 
HusserI (Wheeler, 1996; Kadar & Eftken, 1994; Good & Still, 1998), the Gestalt 
psychologists (e.g., Lewin and Koftka see Val siner, 1997; Good & Still, 1998), and the 
ethologists Von Uexkiill, Lorenz, and Tinbergen (Hendriks-Jansen, 199411996, 1996). 
Modem inspiration for ESD interactionism derives from a number of quarters, including 
the work of ecologically-oriented researchers (e.g., Costall & Leudar, 1996; Gibson, 
197911986; Goldfield, 1995; Ingold, 1993), situated action and situated cognition 
researchers (e.g., Clancey, 1997; Suchman, 1987), distributed cognition researchers (e.g., 
Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b; Salomon, 1993), the growing situated and embedded movement 
in artificial life and 'the new artificial intelligence' (e.g., Brooks, 1991; Steels, 1995), 
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externalist philosophy of mind (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1995; McClamrock, 1995), 
developmental systems theory (e.g., Oyama, 1985), Vygotskian-inspired developmental 
psychology (e.g., Berk & Diaz, 1992; Lock, 1980; Nelson, 1996; Valsiner, 1997; 
Vygotsky, 1930-1935/1978, 193411986), radical approaches to connectionism (e.g., 
Bechtel, 1997; Clark, 1993; Elman et aI., 1996; Globus, 1992; Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 
1992b), autopoietic and autonomy analyses (e.g., Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press; 
Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1988), dynamical theories of cognition and development (e.g., 
Port & Van Gelder, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994), as well as psychological, 
anthropological, and archaeological studies of the evolution of language and modern 
human behaviour (e.g., Deacon, 1997; Lock, 1999; Noble & Davidson, 1996). Although all 
of these fields have made a mark on the nascent interactionist approach, several fields have 
been of particular importance and form the basis of my treatment in this section. The 
domains that perhaps best illustrate the fresh perspectives and theoretical innovations of 
the interactionist approach are: situated robotics; interactive vision; dynamical systems 
approaches to development and cognition; studies of socially distributed and situated 
cognition; and socio-historical studies of child development. 
Situated Robotics 
Situated robotics (a.k.a. autonomous agents research, the animat approach) forms a central 
component of, what has been called, the new AI as well as one of the main divisions of the 
rapidly growing-field of artificial life (Alife) (see Boden, 1996; Langton, 1995, 
1992/1996). At first blush it may seem odd that robotics, being a field deeply anchored in 
computer technology, could supply us with what Hendriks-Jansen (1996) calls 'existence 
proofs' that bring into question some of the fundamental assumptions of the 
representational-computational framework. However researchers such as Rodney Brooks 
and his MIT colleagues and students (Brooks, 1991a, 1991b, 1997; Brooks, et aI., 1998; 
Brooks & Stein, 1994; Mataric, 1991), Steels (1995, 1998), Beer (1995a, 1995b), Pfeifer, 
Verschure, and Scheier (Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b, Pfeifer & Scheier 1999), 
Smithers (1992, 1995), and Husbands, Harvey, and Cliff (Harvey, Husbands, & Cliff, 
1994; Husbands, Harvey, & Cliff, 1995) have revolutionised the way in which robot 
engineers have gone about designing and building 'artificial agents'. This revolution has 
been inspired primarily by the many sticky problems that robotics researchers have 
confronted when they have tried to construct robots in keeping with the cognitivist 
framework. It is significant that the solutions and new ideas brought to bear on such 
practical problems have provided a basis for many non-roboticists investigating the 
implementational and architectural foundation for a noncognitivist psychology (see, e.g., 
Clancey, 1997; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Keijzer, 1997). 
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Problems with Traditional AI 
Traditionally robotics design has taken the fonn of a kind of attempted implementation of 
cognitivist theorising. Following the lead of theorists such as Marr (1982) and Newell and 
Simon (Newell, 1990; Vera & Simon, 1993) roboticists have concentrated on trying to 
recover the world inside the robot in a rich representational fonnat that contains explicit 
and meaningful (to the robot) decomposition of its surroundings into objects and places 
and (occasionally) events. This re-presented internal model of the surroundings is then 
analysed, plans for action (movement) are fonnulated and finally executed. The similarities 
ofthis design procedure and the cognitivist model of mind (see chap. 2) should be obvious. 
Roboticists have adopted the decomposition by function approach for building their robots 
that derives from the sense-model-plan-act schema (Brooks, 1991b). Right from the start 
engineers have struck problems attempting to implement this kind of design strategy. 
These problems have included: 
The Frame Problem(s) 
There are numerous fonnulations of the frame problem (see the various papers III 
Pylyshyn, 1987) but the basic idea has been nicely summarised by Janlert (1987) as the 
problem of "finding a representational fonn pennitting a changing and complex world to 
be efficiently and adequately represented." (pp. 7-8). The trouble with a classical AI 
representational system is that everything it does must be based upon something that is 
explicitly represented in its cognitive innards. Thus, if it is to accurately and usefully act, it 
must have some method of maintaining a continuous and meaningful mapping of the world 
so that it can work out what to do (i.e., plan) to achieve whatever goals it has. A 
representational system will need both a large number of representations (a huge stock of 
'common sense') in order to know what to do in many types of circumstances and a 
method of deciding which of its many knowledge representations are relevant to the 
current situation. More specifically, a representational robot will need to assess the 
consequences of its actions in order to plan how to act. The central difficulty is in 
constructing some sort of procedure for working out which of the many consequences are 
actually relevant to that planning. A robot that systematically decides that, if it moves 
behind a wall to avoid some danger, then the sun will keep shining, gravity will not 
change, the wall will not tum into a gas, and so on and so forth, will be preoccupied with 
all sorts of irrelevancies and likely yield to the danger before anything useful can be 
concluded. One could argue that having a fast processor and a large memory may 
overcome the problem but this does not make the procedure any more biologically 
plausible. In fact it may tum out that there is just no way a classical AI system can meet 
this problem, fast processors and clever algorithms notwithstanding. 
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The Problem of Brittleness 
Robots designed following the decomposition-by-function approach have also tended to be 
extremely brittle. That is, they have tended to be thrown off by small malfunctions or 
slightly noisy environments. This is especially the case as the internal complexity of the 
robot increases (see Keijzer, 1997, p. 117). Representational automata usually require very 
accurate signals to work. Encounters with novel and complex situations seem to often play 
havoc with their modelling and planning functions. Connectionist networks have been 
proclaimed as solutions to problems of brittleness but they have their own problems (see 
Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a). Not the least of these is the common charge of their lack of 
compositionality (or ability to manipulate representational atoms by wayan explicit 
syntax) (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; see chapters 7 and 8). It is not at all clear that a complex 
representational robot, of the sort built by classical AI engineers, can be built without a 
compositional representational architecture. 
The Instruction Problem 
Keijzer (1997, pp. 117-122) points out an unacknowledged problem that engineers must 
contend with when figuring out how to tum internally modelled plans into actions. The 
instruction problem, he argues, is the efferent analogue of the frame problem. It involves 
the question of how to build a system that can execute plans in a way that is sensitive to the 
unique peculiarities of any particular environment. Keijzer calls the actual subtle, 
environmentally-specific, fine-grained activity of agents their proximal behaviour and the 
high-level description of similar examples of this distal behaviour. He claims that 
cognitivism has avoided the instruction problem by focusing attention on distal behaviour 
which is less complex looking than the actual behavioural activity of agents. Of course the 
proof is in the building of robots and here it does not look good for cognitivist inspired 
designs. A robot, for instance, may have the plan 'walk slowly forward ten paces' (its 
distal behaviour) but have no way of modulating such an instruction that takes into account 
the numerous environmental features that may affect it - things such as the unevenness or 
mushiness of the ground, wind speed, restraining effects of things caught on the robot's 
legs and so on (its proximal behaviour). In sum, Keijzer argues that it is highly unlikely 
that any representationally-based instruction system can ever specify the exact motor 
outputs that are adequate for producing the kind of behaviour required to achieve a task in 
varying conditions. 
Attempted Solutions 
In order to make progress in the face of these problems traditional AI workers have 
pursued a number of simplifying strategies in order to deal with the messy complexity of 
real-world cognitive activity. These include focusing efforts on the 'model' and, to a lesser 
extent, 'plan' functions of cognitive activity, leaving perception (recognition, sensing) and 
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action (movement, motor programs) for later (or preferably someone else). The assumption 
here, of course, is that a 'sensing function' will deliver something like a symbolic picture 
of the current environment to the 'modelling function' and that the 'planning function' can 
easily transduce its symbolic states into an adaptive movement pattern. Neither of these 
assumptions have stood the test of time. The transduction of energetic signals into 'internal 
symbols' and the subsequent transduction of symbols into action constitute extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, problems for traditional AI (see, e.g., Keijzer, 1997, chap. 3). 
Another widely used simplifying strategy is that of modelling single domains of cognitive 
activity (as, for example, expert systems do) instead of "the full gamut of human 
intelligence." (Brooks, 1991a, p. 140). This strategy assumes that one day all of these 
independent inquiries will somehow meld together into a coherent whole47 and that, by 
implication, there is no principled problem with the idea that different cognitive abilities 
can be studied and simulated in relative independence from each other. 
A third technique is to simplify the environment that artificial agents must live in by 
creating toy worlds full of a relatively small subset of simplified and easily distinguishable 
objects and places. For instance, the world of Shakey (see, Dennett, 1991), the first mobile 
robot, consisted of a collection of carefully lit, uniformly coloured, linked rooms. 
containing a few large, coloured blocks and wedges. The boundaries of floors and walls 
were marked with dark rubber baseboards. All of these feature were designed to make it 
possible for Shakey's SMPA-based modelling and planning control system to operate (see 
Brooks, 1991b). (Despite such assistance, Shakey could still only move at about two 
metres per hour). Ironically, as I will discuss in the next chapter, there is actually good 
reason to believe that the redundancy and complexity of the real world may actually be of 
benefit to AI engineers. 
Of course the use of these simplifying strategies does not, in itself, challenge the 
fundamental assumptions of cognitivism. Defenders of the dominant approach can argue 
that a 'human-size physical symbol system' will need to be implemented in a very large, 
complicated, and powerful computer such as the brain (whereas the resources that AI 
workers have to work with pale in comparison). They can also suggest that the brain may 
utilise some kind of as yet undreamed of set of algorithms that can deal with the problems 
oftraditional AI. No one can offer a knockdown rejoinder to these arguments. At the same 
time, however, such responses give no good reason for following a cognitivist approach to 
47 Actually, the standard attitude seems to be that AI should focus on these more tractable expert system 
issues than on building a fully rounded artificial intelligence. In a sense this is a retreat from the heady goal 
of building intelligent agents to one of supplementing human abilities with those of machines (see, e.g., 
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). 
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the exclusion of all others. As a growing number of robotics and New AI researchers are 
discovering, this is not the only way to think about the workings of agents. Indeed it seems 
that is not the best way either. 
A New Way of Doing Things 
Rodney Brooks is perhaps the most well known advocate of the situated robotics 
alternative to the traditional AI approach. He was one of the first researchers to outline how 
it may be possible to avoid many of the problems noted above. Brooks' goal has been to 
design and build robots that can survive unaided in a real world environment. All of the 
simplifications tried by traditional AI workers are rejected. His requirements for the 
creation of one of his 'Creatures' include the ability to "cope appropriately and in a timely 
fashion with changes in its environment"; that it "should be robust with respect to its 
environment; minor changes in the properties of the world should not lead to total collapse 
of the Creature's behavior; rather one should expect only a gradual change in capabilities 
of the Creature as the environment changes more and more ... "; it "should be able to 
maintain multiple goals and, depending on the circumstances it finds itself in, change 
which particular goals it is actively pursuing; thus it can both adapt to surroundings and 
capitalize on fortuitous circumstances ... "; and it "should do something in the world; it 
should have some purpose in being." (Brooks, 1991a, p. 145). 
The 'Fast, Cheap, and Out of Control , Design Philosophy 
In order to achieve these goals Brooks and his colleagues have effectively thrown out the 
traditional symbol system approach to designing AI machines. Gone is the emphasis on 
high-level cognitive skills such as reasoning and logic. Brooks (1991a, pp. 140-141) argues 
that organic agents have been billions of years in the making and that for most of that time 
the focus has been on the evolution of basic, survival-oriented, perception-action abilities, 
and that AI engineers should take this leaf out of Mother nature's book. His first message 
is to start by building simple creatures that can survive in the hurly burly of real world 
environments. Brooks (1991a) sees a number of dangers in trying out early prototypes in 
simplified environments (including simulated computer environments that simulated 
robots live in) consisting of features such as "matte painted walls, rectangular vertices 
everywhere, colored blocks as the only obstacles" (p. 150). In particular in "a simplified 
world ... it is very easy to accidentally build a submodule of the system which happens to 
rely on some of those simplified properties .... When it comes to move to the unsimplified 
world, we gradually and painfully realize that every piece of the system must be rebuilt." 
(p. 150). It is only when a simple kind of ongoing, adaptive 'intelligence' is engineered in a 
real world environmemnt that greater behavioural complexity can be tackled. This is 
achieved by adding additional behavioural layers atop a previously successful and totally 
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autonomous first layer. Within this set of demands important design features have arisen 
within Brooks' research programme. 
The Brooksian approach rejects classical AI's strategy of decomposition by function which 
depends on formal task descriptions of cognitive activities. Instead he advocates a strategy 
of decomposition by activity and the construction of, what he calls, subsumption 
architectures. 
Robot design begins by building a basic behaviour layer. This layer will make the robot 
autonomous in a real-world environment, enabling it to respond in an appropriate and 
timely fashion to environmental events and contingencies. Typically the behaviour of this 
basic layer is something simple like object avoidance. The layer is made up of a collection 
of simple 'reflexes' realised by augmented finite state machines (AFSMs). These are tiny 
computers that receive small packets of 'information' from a variety of crude sensors (e.g., 
the position of a leg motor or a the readings of several noisy sonar returns) and manipulate 
it a bit before sending signals to other AFSMs48. 
Construction then proceeds in a vaguely evolutionary fashion. A new layer is attached to 
the basic layer, to enable the robot to engage in a new kind of activity. The components of 
the new layer are side-tapped into existing wires in he basic layer. These low bandwidth 
connections can either inhibit the output or suppress the input signals leading to AFSMs in 
the other layer. The layers thus cooperate and compete with each other so that adaptive 
behaviour is achieved. Usually making such a system work involves a lot of real-world 
debugging, sometimes by modifying sensors, actuators, and body parts, rather than the 
control system itselfl9. (Smithers [1992] argues that it is often the case that altering the 
bodily morphology is easier than trying to rectify a problem by altering the internal control 
system). Others layers are gradually added in a similar incremental fashion leading to a 
rather odd-looking layered architecture of semi-independent competing/cooperating 
behaviour producers. Each layer works independently, receiving its own input and making 
its own 'decisions' about what to do. Because earlier layers are not in any way dependent 
on later layers for their basic operation, Brooks-style mobots are much more robust (than 
their classical cousins) when confronted with physical malfunctions or difficult 
environments that may 'confuse' higher layers. No centralised or explicit model of the 
48 An AFSM is made up of a [mite state machine (FSM) and a collection of other components such as a 
timer and registers (simple 'message storers'). A FSM is essentially a tiny computer with a limited number of 
possible internal states. 
49 Other roboticists have attempted to automate this debugging system by artificially evolving the robotic 
architectures using genetic algorithms (e.g., Harvey, Husbands, & Cliff, 1994; Husbands, Harvey, & Cliff, 
1995). 
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world exists inside the robot, just a collection of coordinated testers, detectors, and 
measurers coupled to an equally large collection of motor control systems. 
Brooks (1991a, pp. 152-154) gives an example of this design strategy with a simple mobot 
made up ofthree layers. 
Allen 
Allen (named after Allen Newell, a well-known proponent of the traditional SMP A 
approach) was one of the first mobots that Brooks built using a sUbsumption architecture 
(Brooks, 1986 cited in Brooks, 1991b). Brooks' aim was to build a simple robot that 
avoided people and other moving obstacles while also avoiding collisions with static 
objects in a real-world university office environment. When not avoiding things Allen 
could also set out to get to certain places that it had 'decided' were worthy destinations. 
Such a simple sounding robot has been embarrassingly difficult to build using traditional 
techniques. Yet Allen successfully lived in the MIT office environment using a very simple 
internal architecture. 
The first layer (AVOID) enabled the mobot to avoid hitting static and moving objects (via 
a ring of twelve ultrasonic sonars). Its default activity was simply to sit still unless it 
detected a nearby obstacle (e.g., a wall a certain distance ahead or to the side or a person 
moving within a certain range). Upon sensing an object the mobot reoriented itself in order 
to move in an unobstructed or least obstructed direction. 
With the second layer (WANDER) added, the mobot wandered about in random directions 
when not in 'object avoidance mode' (although it continually attempted to move as best it 
could in the direction that it has 'decided' to wander). Thus the WANDER layer was 
overridden by the AVOID layer in obstructed surroundings, and the AVOID layer was 
subtly modified by the 'decisions' ofthe WANDER layer. 
The third layer (EXPLORE) enabled the mobot to look for distant places to move toward. 
This layer suppressed the WANDER layer when a suitable 'distant place' was located but 
it was still susceptible to course changes when the AVOID layer was activated by, for 
example, a person walking in front of the mobot. This simple mobot performed in the real 
world (of the MIT labs) in a robust, adaptive, and seemingly intelligent manner even 
though it possessed no central executive 'command and control' system that created 
models of the world or plans for activity. 
Some More Examples 
Brooks' student Jon Connell used Allen's basic architecture as a foundation for building a 
more complex robot called Herbert (after Allen Newell's colleague Herbert Simon). A 
further three layers were added to Allen's basic design to transform the mobot into a Coke 
can collecting machine. Herbert wandered the MIT labs looking for empty soft drink cans, 
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of which there were many (although no one mentions how Herbert could tell an empty can 
from a full one!). It used a laser combined with a video camera to detect cans and an arm to 
collect them in cluttered office environments. Herbert is described as being moderately 
successful (Brooks & Connell, 1986 cited in Brooks, 1991a; Connell, 1989 cited in 
Brooks, 1991b; see also Clark, 1998, pp. 507-509 for a description). 
Brooks and his students have also built a collection of robotic autonomous walking 
vehicles (called Genghis, Attila, Hannibal, and Boadicea) that can traverse uneven surfaces 
and even for get themselves out of trouble when they tip over. The impetus for these 
robotic designs derives from a demand for machines that can explore distant places where 
remote control is difficult (due to radio transmission lags) or impossible (due to an inability 
to maintain radio contact) (e.g., Mars, volcano caldera). The behaviour layers in these 
robots consist primarily of systems for producing adaptive movement. For instance, 
Genghis consists of a collection of layers that implement the ability to stand up, enable the 
robot to walk with feedback, adjust motor activity for rough terrain and obstacles using 
feedback, and modulate for this using pitch and roll inclinometers (Brooks, 1989 cited in 
Brooks, 1991b). 
Cognitive Robotics 
In recent times Brooks and his colleagues (Brooks, 1997; Brooks & Stein, 1994; Brooks et 
a1., 1998) have begun building a much more sophisticated humanoid robot called Cog. The 
goal of the Cog project is to build a human-like robot using the subsumption architecture 
methodology. So far Cog only has a head (with eyes and ears), arms, hands, and a 
swiveling torso. The main objective of the Cog research to date has been to approximate 
the sensory and motor dynamics of a human body by simulating human visual, auditory, 
tactile, and proprioceptive sensory-motor activities. However, the ultimate hope is that 
robots like Cog will be capable of something like human intelligence. Brooks has referred 
to this new research project as cognitive robotics. According to Brooks (1997) the key 
differences between cognitive robotics and his earlier behaviour-based robotics are: an 
increased concern with the importance of bodily form, motivation and processes necessary 
for 'deciding' which activity is most appropriate in a particular situation; designing 
systems for ensuring that the large number of behavioural layers that must exist within 
such systems can exhibit coherent behaviour; and implementing the ability to learn and 
modify behaviour in response to physical and social interactions (see also Christensen & 
Hooker, 2000 for a critical discussion of some of these issues). Importantly the goal of 
Brooks' team is to simulate human-like intelligence using the same basic non-cognitivist 
design philosophy that has been successfully applied to their earlier robots. This 
motivation is supplemented by a belief that human intelligence is inherently 
developmental, social, embodied, situated, and multimodal (see Brooks et a1., 1998). 
91 
In sum, situated robotics research aims to design and build usually simple, mobile robots 
that act in an appropriate, timely, robust, and flexible manner in real-world environments. 
To this end situated roboticists have parted with their traditional symbolic AI kin by 
building their 'creatures' out of relatively independent, behaviour-producing layers rather 
than by adopting a centrally-controlled, sense-model-plan-act architecture. Moreover, these 
mobots do not store or construct models of their environments in order to plan how to act -
moboticists eschew the use of mental representations (at least in the traditional sense). 
Rather, behaviour arises from the coupling of the mobots' simple reflex subsystems and 
the unique structure of the local environment. Such activity is said to be interactively 
emergent (see chapter 4). That is, the often complex-looking, seemingly goal-oriented 
behaviour is not prespecified (encoded, programmed, or discoverable) in either the mobot's 
innards or the world in which it acts. Rather, it is the outcome of a dynamic coupling of 
body structures and the layout of the world. The implications of this research framework 
are profound: of primary importance is the notion that the agent (in this case, the mobot) 
does not need to explicitly re-present either the outside world or its 'goals' or 'choices' in 
order to produce complex activity. 
Interactive Vision 
The field of interactive vision (also known as animate vision, active vision, and perceptual 
activity theory) has also arisen from robotics-related research (e.g., Ballard, 1991), 
although a number of psychologists and neuroscientists have also begun to investigate 
vision and other senses from an interactive perspective (e.g., Ballard, Hayhoe, & Pelz, 
1995; Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rajesh, 1997; Churchland, Ramachandran, & Sejnowski, 
1994; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Zelinsky, Rao, Hayhoe, & Ballard, 1997). Within 
robotics, interactive vision researchers have found that artificial visual systems often 
achieve their goals better and in a more efficient manner when detectors can move about 
and rapidly interrogate the surroundings for needed information. Thus, artificial interactive 
vision systems "have anthropomorphic features such as binocularity, foveas, and most 
importantly, high speed gaze control." (Ballard, 1991, p. 58). From a psychological 
perspective the interactive perspective involves the claim that our sensory mechanisms are 
not designed to construct detailed representations of our surroundings (as in, e.g., Marr, 
1982), but rather are viewed as being made up of anatomically overlapping perceptual 
instruments (smart perceptual mechanisms [Runeson, 1977]). These instruments are 
deployed to rapidly and actively interrogate the local environment for specific task-relevant 
qualities. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the key differences between the interactive 
approach and the traditional approach to understanding vision within cognitive science. 
Computational simulations using the interactive vision paradigm have revealed that tasks 
that make massive demands on the speed and capacity of the classically designed systems 
can often be avoided by using computationally cheap interactive systems (Ballard, 1991). 
1- .' 
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Ballard et al. (1995, 1997) describe a simple simulation carried out by Whitehead and 
Ballard (1990) that illustrates this point. They simulated a simple 'hand and eye robot' 
whose job was to retrieve a green block from a variety of situations where the block could 
be found amongst, and often under, other coloured blocks. A classically designed system 
would typically build up a complex internal model of the situation and locate each of the 
blocks within some kind of spatial coordinate system. A plan would then be formulated for 
moving blocks off the target to other parts of the modelled environment. Whitehead and 
Ballard's interactive system, however, could achieve the task by applying a deictic strategy 
consisting of a repeating sequence of simple sensing and manipulation steps that required 
no detailed model or plan. The system used fixations on simple properties of the 
environment (e.g., fixate on the green block) and manipulations directed to where the 
system was fixating (e.g., pickup what I am looking at). 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Interactive Vision and Pure Vision Approaches 
(based on information in Churchland et aI., 1994) 
Pure Vision Interactive Vision 
Task of visual system To create a fully elaborated model of To guide action and motor control in 
the world in the brain. the service of basic survival skills. 
Influenced by activity in motor and 
other sensory systems as well as 
overall goals and functions. 
Scene analysis process Whole scene is mapped out in a task- We analyse only partially elaborated 
neutral fashion before analysis aspects of the visual scene. Visual 
directed toward 'pulling out' objects of system uses saccades and small 
interest. receptive field of fovea to obtain 
snippets of information about 
important aspects of local 
environment. Unattended objects are 
only minimally attended and often 
not visually experienced at all. 
Nature of vision Vision is largely passive. Information Vision is exploratory and predictive. 
enters process as 'snapshot'. Prediction is improved by use of other 
modalities. Ongoing active 
exploration used to identify objects. 
Relation to motor activity Scene is fully elaborated before 'Motor assembling' (for eye and head 
motor activity movements, postural control) begins 
on basis of preliminary and minimal 
visual analysis. 
Relations between stages of Processing is hierarchical and Processing is richly recurrent with 
visual processing unidirectional passing through early, action planned and feeding back into 
middle, and late stages. all stages of processing. 
Relation to memory Vision is informationally Visual learning modifies what is seen 
encapsulated; not affected by other and the exploratory strategies used 
'cognitive functions'. by visual system. 
Pragmatics of research Vision can be studied independently Need to take into account 
of other 'cognitive functions'. relationships between visual and non-
visual functions. 
,-.~, 
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Importantly there is evidence that these ideas are not just useful for making more efficient 
kinds of robotic devices but also that it is very likely that humans and other animals engage 
in just the kinds of activity that the interactive vision approach proposes. For instance, 
Ballard et al. (1995) and Ballard et al. (1997) have conducted research that shows that 
when people engage in simple sensorimotor tasks they do not exhibit activity that is 
consistent with the building of detailed inner models of their environment. Rather they 
seem to continually manipulate it and mine it for information. 
In a series of experiments Ballard et al. (1995) asked participants to manually replicate a 
model pattern of coloured blocks in a workspace using blocks from a resource space. The 
participant's eye and hand movements were tracked. Ballard et al. suggest that from a pure 
vision perspective we might expect each participant to first fixate on the physical model 
and use the information gathered to build a relatively detailed cognitive representation of 
the block pattern. They claim that it is well within the capacity of visual memory to 
remember (i.e., to store in one's head) the characteristics of eight blocks by looldng at the 
pattern four times (i.e., holding a single two block subpattern in one's head at a time). One 
would expect a participant to look at the model maybe four times and look at the 
workspace and the resource area the rest of the time. What they found, however, was that 
participants fixated on parts of the model display a lot, sometimes up to eighteen times. 
There seemed to be a lot of 'extra' looking going on. 
By far the most common pattern of fixations was, what they called, the MPMD pattern 
(where M stands for model, P for pickup, and D for drop). The MPMD pattern consisted of 
the following strategy: glance at the model (for a coloured block), glance at the resource to 
pickup an appropriate coloured block, glance back at the model to ascertain the block's 
position, and then glance at the workspace to see where to position it. They suggest that 
each fixation gathers just one piece of information, for example, a single block's colour or 
location (but hardly ever both). 
Ballard et al. hypothesised that other strategies would occur when one of the features 
(colour or location) was known (remembered, or possibly, 'obvious'). As the task wears on 
there exist more constraints on possible block choices. Participants do not need to check 
for colour for the last block if the correct number of blocks are present in the resource area. 
They also suggest that repeated visits may lead to some extra information being picked up 
for longer than one cycle of block copying. They hypothesised that different (non MPMD) 
strategies are consistent with knowing different amounts of information about a block: 
If colour is known a PMD sequence should occur - one knows the colour so there is no 
need to check the model for colour first. If location is known (something one would expect 
would be harder to remember - therefore one would expect a lower number of occurrences 
of this strategy) an MPD sequence should occur. One checks the model for colour, grabs 
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the block from the resource area, and then drops it. And if both colour and location are 
known a PD sequence - grab and drop - is likely. 
Ballard et al. anticipated the objection that the extra eye movements may have nothing to 
do with the incremental, sequential acquisition of information. Perhaps people do build an 
internal mental model but, because eye movement is faster than hand movement, they have 
time to look about and, perhaps, do some checking to see that things are going okay. To 
test this possibility Ballard et al. ran the experiment using a collection of uniformly 
coloured blocks. If the objection is correct there should be the same number of 'extra' 
fixations in this condition as in the original experiment. 
Contrary to the claims of this 'fast vision' objection they found that the number of 
fixations dropped dramatically in the uniform colour condition. In such a condition there is 
no need to ascertain the colour of individual blocks. If the one fixation-one information 
idea is right, the number of uses of model-first strategies should drop (MPMD, MPD) and 
the number of pickup-first (PMD, PD) strategies should increase relative to the first 
experiment. That is just what Ballard et al. (1995) found. 
In another experiment Ballard et al. (1997) tried to further ascertain the nature of the 
information picked-up by the participants by changing the colour of one of the uncopied 
blocks in the model as the participant was saccading from a previous position (in the 
resource area or workspace) to the model. They predicted that if the participant had just 
detected colour information they would show some sign of noticing something was wrong. 
However, if the participant had just detected location information - and thus discarded any 
knowledge of colour (because we are assuming that participants only pick up one bit of 
information at a time) - they would not notice any change. 
Ballard et al. changed a model block 25% of the time. The 'colour information in mind' 
group were those participants that had just picked up a block from the resource area and 
were saccading to the model area to assess location (the After Pickup condition). The 'no 
colour information in mind' group were those participants who had just dropped a block 
into position in the workspace and were saccading to the model to select the colour for a 
new block to pickup (the Before Pickup condition). They measured the length of fixations 
at the model when the block was changed/ not changed. 
What they found was that participants hardly ever noticed the change in colour of the block 
in the model. More interestingly however, those in the 'colour information in mind' group 
exhibited significantly longer fixations at the model when there had been a block change 
than when there had not. The 'no colour information in mind' group showed no significant 
change. These results are consistent with the idea that colour is detected using fixations 
before location. 
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In sum, it appears to be the case that at least some visual activities involve the rapid and 
task-focused eye, head, and hand movement aimed at picking up very minimal pieces of 
environmental information. Vision, in this view, consists of many relatively rapid cycles of 
information collection and environmental exploration. No overall picture of the 
environment is ever built-up. Rather animals' sensory systems are understood as being 
primarily designed to detect either those bits of information that are useful for directly 
modulating behaviour, or those bits of information that might help find other information 
useful for modulating behaviour. This stands in contrast to the conventional cognitivist 
view that vision is primarily concerned with building sophisticated 3D models of the 
perceived world. 
Dynamical Systems Approaches 
Dynamical systems research in the study of cognition, action, and development addresses 
many of the same themes that have emerged in the field of situated robotics. In last decade 
or so a number of psychologists and other cognitive scientists have made use of ideas and 
tools from dynamical systems theory (DST) that have been used to understand patterns and 
processes of phenomena studied within the natural sciences (e.g., Goldfield, 1995; Kelso, 
1995; Kugler & Turvey, 1987; Port & van Gelder, 1995; Saltzman, 1995; Thelen, 1994; 
Thelen & Smith, 1994; van Gelder, 1995, 1997). Dynamical systems theory provides 
rigorous mathematical and conceptual tools for understanding, describing, and explaining 
complex (often nonlinear and chaotic) behaviours, forms, and patterns. Although many of 
the psychological applications of dynamical concepts have been more metaphorical than 
quantitative in nature, they have resulted in some rather revolutionary ideas about the ways 
in which behaviour, including complex human behaviour, may be generated. Of particular 
interest here are the two dynamically-inspired claims that many complex behaviours and 
behaviour developments can be generated without recourse to any internal representations 
or programs (of both the genetic and neural varieties), and that elements of the agent's 
surroundings must form a significant part of the causal network that leads to behaviour 
production. 
In what follows I will briefly outline some of the important insights and solutions 
dynamical theorists have suggested might form the basis of a dynamical framework for 
understanding cognition and action. I will illustrate these points with examples from 
research. A more in depth examination of dynamical systems concepts can be found in 
chapter 5. 
Some of the most interesting research conducted under the dynamical systems banner has 
examined the ways in which complex patterns of behaviour can emerge and evolve from 
within a body-environment system composed of a collection of coupled subsystems (e.g., 
link-segment, musculotendon, neural, and circulatory subsystems [Goldfield, 1995, chap. 
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4]). These systems have occasionally been modelled by dynamical equations that pull out 
high-level abstract parameters and variables from the behavioural situation. Such research 
is often couched in terms of the self-organising features of systems made up of body, brain, 
and environmental components. Self-organisation is a characteristic of physical systems 
that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium (courtesy of the continuous inflow of energy), 
are dissipative (roughly, creators of disorder), and are complex (composed of a large 
number of, often heterogeneous, components) (see, e.g., Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Kelso, 
1995; Prigogine & Stengers, 1985). Intuitively it may seem likely that such systems would 
inhabit a massive number of states (have a large number of degrees of freedom) but, under 
appropriate conditions, they actually spontaneously generate a relatively small number of 
ordered states. Moreover animals and other living things seem to be fine examples of such 
systems (see, e.g., Ho, 1993; Kauffman, 1993). A number of researchers are now pursuing 
the idea that the behavioural patterns exhibited by humans and other animals may be the 
product of this kind of spontaneous organisation rather than the result of instructional 
commands sent down by some kind of neurally-realised command and control centre. 
These ideas can be illustrated with a widely cited example from the work of Thelen and 
colleagues (Thelen & Fisher, 1982; Thelen, Fisher, Ridley-Johnson, & Griffin, 1982; see 
also Thelen & Smith, 1994, chap. 4). They found that the disappearance of infants' reflex 
stepping pattern around two months of age is due, not to maturational change in some 
neurally-instantiated central pattern generator, as had been previously hypothesised, but 
rather to the changes of infants' leg mass due to increases in subcutaneous fat. The 
stepping reflex disappears simply because the infant does not have the required muscle 
strength to lift the heavier leg. Thelen and her colleagues showed that this is the case with a 
couple of clever experiments. In normal non-stepping infants the reflex reappears when the 
infants are held upright in warm water (thereby reducing the effective mass of the legs) 
(Thelen et aI., 1982), or when they are held upright with their feet touching two moving 
treadmills (thereby assisting the infant to help stretch their legs backward - the hard part of 
the task - and letting them complete the stepping pattern with the still controllable forward 
leg-spring) (Thelen, 1986). Similarly, by increasing the leg mass of stepping infants (by 
adding small weights) Thelen, et aI. (1982) could make the reflex disappear. Thus it 
appears that the ability to step is an ability that spontaneously self-organises from a system 
made up of coupled components ofleg muscles, leg 'weight' (subcutaneous fat and bone), 
and environmental support (effective gravity, external leg moving forces). Thelen and 
Smith (1994, chap. 9) have also used this framework to explore the development of 
infants' reaching abilities (Thelen et aI., 1993) and the development of object permanence 
skills (measured by the A-not-B problem) (Smith, Thelen, Titzer, & McLin, 1999; Thelen 
& Smith, 1994, chap. 10), as well as infants' ability to understand the physical laws of 
objects that Spelke (1990) and Baillargeon (1986, 1987; Baillargeon, Spelke, & 
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Wassennan, 1985) attribute to innate internal programs (Thelen & Smith, 1994, pp. 223-
236). 
This kind of framework is not only relevant to the study of motor development in children. 
One could extend these ideas to explain culturally different walking styles and styles of 
'sitting' (amongst other bodily skills). Ingold (1996) reviews literature that points to the 
different ways in which people of different societies use their bodies to accomplish tasks. 
Prior to Western influence, Japanese children learnt to 'walk from the knees' rather than 
'walk from the hips'. This technique may seem odd to Westerners but, as Kawada (1996 
cited in Ingold, 1996) has shown, the resulting lowered centre of gravity is a very efficient 
way of carrying heavy weights suspended from long poles on uneven ground - a common 
practice in pre-Western influenced Japanese society. A similar analysis can be had of the 
Western notion of sitting on chairs versus the much more widespread practice of squatting. 
These phenomena show that dynamical systems analyses could be fruitfully extended to 
the more complex issues where particular kinds of artifacts and tools, and the tasks that are 
accomplished by their use, lead to the self-organisation of energetically efficient bodily 
postures and skills in much the same way that a cat, for instance, 'adjusts' its gait to deal 
with uneven terrain or having a leg in a cast. These sorts of ideas have recently been used 
in the construction of walking robots. Keijzer (1998a) reports related robotics work by 
Taga and colleagues (Taga, Yamaguchi, & Shimizu, 1991; Taga, 1994) that successfully 
simulates walking in unpredictable environmental conditions (e.g., changes in profile of 
the ground) using a self-organising system made up of three coupled subsystems: a 
rhythm-generating neural network, a musculo-skeletal subsystem, and the local 
environment. This architecture is radically different from that used in traditional AI and is 
most easily understood in dynamical systems tenns. 
These dynamical analyses of self-organising systems have a couple of major advantages 
over cognitivist-inspired explanations of the production of behaviour. The first advantage 
is that dynamical systems theory provides a rather nice solution to the instruction problem 
(Keijzer, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). Recall that this is the problem of how it is that a cognitive 
system can produce essentially the same distal behaviour in many different circumstances 
via different proximal behaviours. The second advantage of a dynamical approach is that it 
can quite naturally account for sudden changes in the behaviour of a system without 
needing to postulate the influence of a new causal variable. As it turns out, both of these 
aspects of dynamical systems explanations are simple consequences of systems with a 
particular mathematical or lawful structure. Self-organising systems tend to be both stable 
and able to inhabit multiple ordered states. In order to better make sense of these ideas it 
will be helpful to use some examples from dynamical analyses of simple rhythmic 
behaviours. 
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According to Hooker (1997) (after Smith and Thelen, 1994), cognitivist (or, what he calls, 
structuralist) accounts of behaviour fail to explain two important features of· animal 
behaviour: 1) they do not account for the actual fine-grained variability of real-time 
performances, and 2) they cannot account for the production of essentially similar 
performances under variable conditions (see also Keijzer, 1997, 1998b). Each time an 
anima150 performs a particular kind of activity (chewing on some food, walking across an 
open space, climbing a tree), it accomplishes it using a unique combination of fine-grained 
movements. ~s Hooker (1997, p. 104) notes "in each case there is a relevant sense in 
which it is the same action being performed and yet in each case our precise inner 
condition is in some degree unique to that occasion." A cognitivist explanation of a 
behaviour tends to be couched in terms of the broader, behavioural kinds as being 
'represented' within the internal plans for action. The question of how such broad plans are 
tailored to the specific circumstances so that they produce the appropriate finer-grained 
movements is never properly dealt with. Such issues form the basis of the problematic 
instruction problem. Dynamical systems explanations, however, can rather easily account 
for these sorts of issues. The basic idea can be illustrated by Saltzman's (1995) work with 
phoneme production. 
Saltzman and his colleagues (Saltzman, 1995 and references therein) have modelled the 
human speech-production system using the tools of dynamical systems theory in order to 
account for a collection of interesting phenomena related to the production of speech 
sounds. In particular they have produced a dynamical model that can predict the effects of 
tugging on the jaw as a person attempts to produce a particular syllable (e.g, /bad or 
/breb/). What is typically found when this occurs is that other parts of the speech system 
rapidly compensate (within 20-30 msec) for environmental perturbations (i.e., jaw tugging) 
so that the same overall outcome (i.e., a particular speech sound) is maintained. The speech 
system, then, is a resilient, roughly homeostatic, self-organising system made up of a 
collection of equally contributing parts that continuously modulate each other's activities. 
Such a system can be dynamically modelled using a collection of rather abstract variables 
and parameters that are grounded in the collective activity of the speech system anatomy. 
This is in contrast to the cognitivist vision of a neurally-instantiated planner and controller 
50 Hendriks-Jansen (1996, pp. 141-149) notes that this is also the case for Brooksian mobots. In his 
discussion of Mataric's (1991) navigating robot he points out that, although the robot can be understood to 
be 'wall-following' at a broad grain of analysis (what Keijzer [1997, 1998b] calls its distal behaviour), no 
two wall-following events are ever exactly the same at a finer-grain of analysis (what Keijzer [1997, 1998b] 
calls its proximal behaviour) because the behaviour produced is an interactively emergent product of robot 
and environment. Brooksian mobots do not 'behave' by attempting to execute an internal 'movement 
template' (i.e., set of prescribed movements). The patterns of activity produced by these robots cannot be 
summarised as if they were variations on a particular sequence of spatial coordinate transformations. 
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that 'tells' each peripheral body part what to do - what Saltzman refers to as the strawman 
hypothesis that "a central executive or homunculus ... produces a given movement pattern 
with reference to an internal kinematic template of the form, tracing out the form provided 
by the template, and using the articulators as a physiological and biomechanical 
pantograph to produce a larger version of the pattern in the external world." (p. 151)51. In 
such a case we would predict that the perturbing of one's subsystem's activity (i.e., the 
jaw) would disrupt the phoneme production by altering the overall shape of the speech 
system. (Saltzman, 1995, p. 158). 
Thus the dynamical model not only provides accurate predictions of such behaviour in a 
way the representational-computational model usually does not, but it also can account for 
the common intuition that "there is a subtle underlying invariance of control despite an 
obvious surface variability in performance." (Saltzman, 1995, p. 152). In sum, a dynamical 
description of a self-organising system nicely accounts for the ways in which the system 
compensates for environmental peculiarities in the production of a particular kind of 
behaviour. But such systems are not doomed to a kind of 'inflexible' homeostasis where 
every environmental change is compensated for by the system's self-organising dynamics. 
Obviously no sensible animal tries to do the same thing in the face of every kind of 
environmental perturbation. The very same sort of system that exhibits stability over a 
range of environmental perturbations can, seemingly suddenly, jump to a new ordered state 
when a certain 'intensity level' of environmental 'influence' is reached. 
This is important for dynamical explanations of behaviour and cognition because it 
suggests a mechanism whereby a single dynamical system can exhibit a reasonably stable 
set of behavioural responses within a certain range of environmental conditions as well as 
an ability to jump into a new adaptive behavioural state once a certain threshold is reached. 
For example, such a dynamical system may be at work in an animal that can continuously 
maintain a safe distance fi;Qm a potentially dangerous rival that is moving within a range of 
relatively slow speeds, but that turns tail and runs when the rival's speed reaches a certain 
critical point. 
Such phase transitions have been investigated and subsequently modelled by Kelso and his 
colleagues' study of rhythmic behaviours such as walking, swinging arms and (in one 
widely cited study) finger waggling (see Kelso, 1995 and references therein). Kelso and his 
colleagues found that people can waggle their two index fingers side to side either in-phase 
51 Although this view is indeed a strawman in its baldest fonn, the general idea is alive and well within 
mode11l; cognitive science. Pinker (1997, pp. 11-12), for instance, compares a human ann to an architect's 
lamp and marvels at the complex computations it must perfonn to get the trigonometry right and to 
compensate for the effects of the ann's momentum as it moves about. 
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(moving toward each other and then away from each other) or anti-phase (moving like 
windshield wipers on a car) but not (easily) at any other phase when the frequency of 
waggling was relatively low. These two states can be maintained over a range of 
frequencies but, at a certain higher frequency the system becomes unstable and suddenly 
kicks into a single state in-phase regime52. It is likely that such a change occurs because, at 
certain higher frequencies, there exists only one state that is energetically efficient53 • The 
dynamics of this phenomenon have been successfully modelled by Haken, Kelso, and 
Bunz (1985 cited in Kelso, 1995) with their HKB model. This equation includes the 
control parameter of 'waggling frequency' and the collective variable relative phase. With 
it the change from one attractor dynamics to another can be accurately predicted and, 
indeed, explained (see chapter 5 for the discussion of the vexed question of whether 
dynamical analyses actually explain behaviour). This model successfully explains many 
kinds of interlimb coordination and, with a few modifications may provide the basis for a 
general theory of meter which may be applicable to other fields such as simple speech 
tasks (Chemero, 1999, pp. 22-23). 
These kinds of phenomena are nicely illustrated by dynamical analyses of the gait changes 
in quadrupeds and, more recently, in hexapods such as the humble cockroach (see, e.g., 
Beer, 1995a, 1995b; Stewart, 1998, chap. 9; Turvey, 1990). The research in this area of 
interlimb coordination shows that changes in gait (from trotting to cantering to galloping 
and so on) occur as the rate of movement (the control parameter) increases. The savings in 
energy conferred by such changes are obviously beneficial (adaptive) for fleeing or chasing 
animals (i.e., they can go further and faster by doing this). These sorts of changes have 
been modelled using relatively uncomplicated dynamical analyses as well as using 
dynamical interpretations of pattern-generating neural networks. Such modelling has 
shown that a single neural pattern generator with a nonlinear dynamics can account for the 
kinds of gait pattern that emerge at different movement rates. The need to embrace the 
more cognitivist ploy of multiple central pattern generators or a single pattern generator 
with multiple 'gait programs' is refuted by such research (see Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
52 In the language of the dynamical systems equations used by Kelso and his colleagues, the in-phase 
condition reflects an attractor at relative phase ° and the anti-phase condition an attractor at relative phase .5. 
There is a change in the phase portrait (a phase transition) at the critical frequency point which results in the 
disappearance of the relative phase .5 attractor. 
53 Thelen (1994, p. 342) notes that attractor states may also result from "special learning". By this she 
presumably means movement patterns that people and animals 'fall into' as the result of intensive training. 
For instance, Stewart (1998, p. 178) notes that most horses do not naturally canter (attractors at relative 
phase 0, .8, .8, and.5 for the front left, front right, back left, and back right legs) but must be trained to do so. , o. :.' 
101 
In sum, dynamical systems researchers have provided arguments and evidence to suggest 
that behaviour can be generated in distinctly uncognitivist ways. First, stable, ordered 
patterns can be produced by far from equilibrium systems made up of coupled components. 
In such systems potentially massive problems of controlling the possible states that an 
agent may enter are reduced by the mutually constraining effects of the coupled system 
components. 
Second, such systems require little in the way of a 'command and control' centre for 
computing how an animal or robot should move its body in order to accomplish a 
particular kind of behaviour. The neural component of such a behaviour system may 
consist of no more than a rhythm generator or oscillator which supplies vital but 
insufficient structure (or 'information') for producing the appropriate behaviour. Other 
subsystems, including the local environment, are equally important 'informational' 
partners. Such observations can be used as ammunition against cognitivist arguments that 
complex behaviour necessarily requires the manipulation of complex internal 
representations of the environment that are had via the transduction of energy into 
neurally-coded semantic information. 
Finally, self-organising systems are often resilient in the face of environmental 
perturbations. These systems can often produce 'task appropriate' behaviour in a variety of 
conditions via the rapid compensation by other subsystems. In addition changes in 
environmental conditions may 'push' the system into a new stable behavioural pattern 
more suited to dealing with the current environmental climate. 
Cognition in the Wild: Distributed Cognition and Situated Action 
Research 
The past decade and a half has witnessed a move amongst some researchers to study 
human cognition in the full cultural and natural complexity of people's everyday worlds-
a move which Hutchins (1995a) has aptly referred to as the study of 'cognition in the wild' 
and Geertz (1983) has called 'outdoor psychology'. Typically the psychologists, 
sociologists, and anthropologists engaged in these studies do not consider themselves to be 
doing applied research but rather ecologically valid pure research into the fundamentals of 
cognitive activity. They have studied cognitive activity in situations such as photocopier 
use (Suchman, 1987), nuclear powerplant operation (Vicente & Bums, 1996), maritime 
navigation and piloting (Hutchins, 1995a), aircraft piloting (Hutchins, 1995b), formal 
schooling programmes (Greeno & the Middle School Mathematics Through Applications 
Project Group, 1998; Perkins, 1993), work in a milk-processing plant (Scribner, 1986), the 
organisation of children's mealtimes (Val siner, 1997), and everyday uses of mathematics 
in shopping, budgeting, and dieting (Lave, 1988). 
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I have grouped together distributed cognition and situated action research because the two 
frameworks share many similar ideas about cognitive activity. It should be noted, however, 
that situated action research has a different flavour to it from distributed cognition research 
and that this flavour derives from its different intellectual background. Distributed 
cognition research owes an allegiance to some basic sort of information-processing 
account. Situated action research, by contrast, derives from sociological and 
anthropological movements such as ethnomethodology (Suchman, 1987, 1993) and 
practice theory (Lave, 1988), as well as ecological psychology (Costall & Leudar, 1996; 
Vicente & Bums, 1996). It is probably fair to say that most distributed cognition and 
situated action researchers are aware of, and sympathetic to, the ideas in the other related 
fields and differ primarily in their emphases and reasons for engaging in research54. Of 
course, even within each programme one finds different ways of doing things and 
interpreting phenomena. My emphasis here will primarily be on the similarities. Where 
appropriate I will signal which tradition provides a more in depth analysis of a particular 
aspect of the shared problem domain. The sketch I provide here draws heavily on the work 
of the cognitive ethnographer Edwin Hutchins (1995a, 1995b) but it is also informed by 
the theorising of Norman (1993a, 1993b), Pea (1993), Perkins (1993), Suchman (1987, 
1993) and others. 
The Distribution of Resources for Cognitive Activity 
The fundamental assumption underlying distributed cognition research is that most 
everyday cognitive activity cannot be understood as purely in-the-head cogitation, because 
it takes place within a wider system that includes resources from the local physical and 
social environments - environments, moreover, that are usually themselves the ever-
changing product of cultural evolution. Indeed the environments in which even the most 
mundane social activities occur are in an important sense 'designed' to make certain 
cognitive activities possible. Thus distributed cognition researchers often endorse a 
softening of the boundary between brain and world in their analysis of cognitive activity. 
The furniture of our surroundings actually forms part of a distributed cognitive system that 
Hutchins (1995a) calls afunctional system rather than merely providing inputs and a place 
to 'output' behaviours. The structured surround is viewed as providing important cognitive 
resources - vehicles for thought, stores of information, control structures, as well as goal-
setting and decision-making systems. Pea (1993) claims that "the distributed-intelligence 
framework sees a much more substantial haze around the boundary of the person and 
shines the light of attention on the more invisible intelligence in the artifactual, physical, 
54 See the special issue of Cognitive Science on Situated Action (Nonnan, 1993a) for a fairly thorough 
examination of the varied ideas held by proponents of the different approaches. 
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symbolic, and social surrounds, as brought into relief in the configurations of distributed 
intelligence by which activity is achieved." (pp. 53-54). 
Thus we find, for instance, Perkins (1993) advancing what he calls, the equivalent access 
hypothesis. Roughly speaking, this is the claim that the locus of knowledge 'storage' and 
knowledge construction in a 'knowledge-processing-system' is not always in the agent's 
head, and that the functionally important aspect of such a system is the degree and 
efficiency of access to knowledge vital for the performance of a particular cognitive 
activity. Perkins, thus discusses distributed cognition within an access framework. Like 
Hutchins he treats external mediating structures as if they were 'parts' of 'the mind' and 
uses a modified information-processing model to describe their properties and processes55 
(see also Clark & Chalmers, 1995). However, Hutchins (1995a) has moved well beyond a 
simple application of information-processing concepts to broader functional systems and 
has introduced a variety of new terms and concepts for making sense of the unique 
phenomena associated with cognition within distributed cognitive systems. I discuss many 
of these ideas in the following sections. 
Functional Systems and Mediating Structures 
Extended cognitive systems are understood as functional systems because the focus is on 
the functions of parts of the cognitive system rather than whether those parts are located 
inside or outside the skull. A functional system is a dynamic entity made up of continually 
changing interacting mediating structures (a.k.a. media or structures). Mediating structures 
are simply tools or artifacts or human cognitive abilities that can both hold information in a 
particular format and transform that information in a useful manner. One of Hutchins' 
(1995a) favourite examples of a mediating structure is the nautical slide rule. Others 
include calculators, sketch pads, maps, physical models, filing systems and so on. In 
functional systems information is propagated across the various mediating structures until 
it reaches a point where it can be used to produce some kind of action. By propagation 
Hutchins (1995a) means that the transformed information from one mediating structure is 
fed into a subsequent structure where it can be further manipulated. These ideas are nicely 
illustrated in Hutchins' study of the dynamics of a US Navy navigation team. 
Hutchins (1995a) focuses his attention on the work done by a navigation team on the 
bridge of the military vessel (an amphibious helicopter transport) that he calls the USS 
55 In Hutchins' case the use of infonnation-processing tenninology is explicitly metaphorical. At times 
Hutchins suggests that using the infonnation-processing framework to understand 'high-level' socio-
technical systems seems "a much more solidly grounded application of the computational metaphor to a 
cognitive system than the application of this metaphor to the workings of an individual mind." (1995a, 
p.185, see also chap. 9) 
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Palau (a pseudonym). His particular concern is with the way in which the ten-member 
team56, known as Sea and Anchor Detail, takes bearings in order to keep a constant record 
of the ship's location as it traverses shipping lanes near harbour. The position fixing 
activity perfonned by Sea and Anchor Detail is known as a fix cycle. It consists of the 
following operations and interactions (see Hutchins, 1995a, chap. 3, 4, and 8 for more 
detail). 
First, a seaman (the bearing taker or pelorus operator) stationed on either the port or 
starboard bridge wing points his alidade (a kind of combination telescope and compass 
readout) at a designated landmark and takes a reading from the gyrocompass scale. This 
turns a visual perspective into a string of three digits that represent the actual bearing of the 
landmark with respect to true north (the "true bearing"). The pelorus operator 
communicates this number to the bearing recorder over a phone circuit. The recorder notes 
the figure in the bearing log in standard digital fonnat. He then communicates this 
infonnation to the bearing plotter, who stands near the recorder in the pilothouse. The 
plotter uses the spoken infonnation to set his hoey (a protractor with a long 'ann' 
attached). The spoken bearing digits are used to set the hoey's arm at a particular angle. 
The hoey is then brought into coordination with the chart of the local waters. The angle of 
the hoey's arm is used to mark the chart with the ship's line of position with respect to the 
landmark originally spotted by the pelorus operator. A line of position (LOP) is a line that 
passes through both the ship and the landmark. The LOP does not fix the exact position of 
the ship on the chart. Rather the vessel lies somewhere upon that line. In order to fix the 
ship's position another two LOPs must be plotted using two more landmarks. The area (a 
triangle) about which the three lines intersect represents the ship's approximate position. 
In the navigation team's attempts to plot fixes of the ship's position, infonnation necessary 
for the plot-fixing task enters the system with the pelorus operators finding and 'shooting' 
a designated landmark with their alidades. Infonnation is then grasped from this situation 
and embedded in various artifacts in different representational fonnats. Each fonnat is 
tailored to different subtasks. Digital fonnat can serve to make arithmetic operations 
possible or to enable 'portability' and transmission over the limited bandwidth of the 
phone circuit (i.e., its easier to say a number than to try and describe the relationships in 
the visual scene). Analog fonnat, such as the angle of the hoey's ann and the layout ofthe 
nautical chart, makes it possible to carry out geometrical computations such as plotting the 
ship's position on the chart. 
56 See Hutchins (1995a, pp. 178-185) for a breakdown of the different crew in this team. Here I only focus 
upon the two pelorus operators, the recorder, and the plotter. Other crew include helmsmen and the 
fathometer operator. 
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When this cycle is perfonned time after time the position of the vessel can be seen as the 
point where multiple lines of position intersect. Hutchins' analysis of various fix cycle 
events on the Palau is fascinating because it reveals a number of possibly counter-intuitive 
issues associated with real-world cognitive activity. Firstly, he shows that only by 
examining an entire functional system (in this case the navigation team, their tools, 
practices, and accompanying social positions) can an accurate picture be built up of what is 
going on and why. Elsewhere Hutchins argues forcefully that "the outcomes of interest are 
not detennined entirely by the infonnation processing properties of individuals. Nor can 
they be inferred from the properties of the individual agents, alone, no matter how detailed 
the knowledge ofthe properties of those individuals may be." (p. 265). 
So in Sea and Anchor detail the task of plotting the ship's position is achieved by a 
functional system that includes at least four crew members, a1idades, a gyro-compass, 
phone circuit, bearing log, hoey, chart, at times a calculator, as well as the social rules and 
routines and nonnative computational procedures of naval practices. The behaviour of 
interest, the position-fixing, is not controlled or fully comprehended by any individual (and 
thus is not explainable in tenns of any crew member's cognition). Indeed, many of the 
computations that occur within the task do not occur in anyone's 'head' but are simply 
made by manipulating a tool or artifact and passing the results of that manipulation onto 
the next tool in line. 
In order to discuss and theorise about the distribution of cognitive process implied by 
cognitive activities such as the routines of the Sea and Anchor Detail, Hutchins has coined 
a number of useful tenns for understanding the roles of artifacts and other mediating 
structures in distributed cognitive activity. Mediating structures can be understood to 
contain content-level knowledge, contain complex tacit knowledge, distribute workload 
over time, constrain the organisation of activity, and transfonn the kinds of activities that 
people perfonn. 
Mediating Structures Contain Content-Level Knowledge 
Mediating structures such as artifacts can contain what Perkins (1993) calls content-level 
knowledge in a fonnat specially tuned to its place within the broader cognitive ecology of 
the functional system. Content-level knowledge is simply that basic sort of infonnation 
used in a task that can often be 'kept in your head' such as a compass bearing or phone 
number. Tables, databases, books and so on are typical repositories of content-level 
knowledge. The notion of cognitive ecology refers to ways in which the mediating 
structures (including artifacts, techniques etc.) fit and relate to each other. Particular 
artifacts or techniques are usually designed so that their products (i.e., output) mesh in 
some useful way with other mediating structures within the system. 
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Mediating Structures Contain Complex Tacit Knowledge 
Artifacts (and other media) also 'store knowledge' in a deeper sense that includes 
knowledge of what to do and how to do it, and when it should be done. Hutchins (1995a) 
refers to this knowledge as artifact memory. Artifacts typically 'contain' a kind of tacit 
knowledge about procedures or things that would be difficult or impossible to use if one 
was relying entirely upon one's native cognitive abilities. Tacit knowledge is knowledge 
that cannot be simply read off an artifact, such as a bearing on a compass. Rather it is 
'knowledge' in the sense of structural relations and regularities of the artifact that constrain 
the kinds of calculations or cognitive products that can be generated using the artifact. 
Hutchins (1995a) argues that these action constraints typically "embody kinds of 
knowledge that would be exceedingly difficult to represent mentally." (p. 96). He 
illustrates these ideas by examining the astrolabe, an ancient navigational device for 
predicting the movement of the sun and the stars at various latitudes. The astrolabe can 
control spatial relationships of the heavens and is precise and durable in a way that one's 
own 'mental models' could never be. The astrolabe's tacit knowledge exists in its ability to 
maintain and transform the spatial relationships between many heavenly bodies. Such 
knowledge simply be 'read off' and used subsequently in unaided mental modelling. 
Mediating Structures Distribute Workload Over Time 
Importantly, artifacts can make activities possible and/or alter the time they take or the way 
they are done by distributing the workload involved in cognitive activity over time - a 
phenomenon that Hutchins refers to as precomputation. Precomputation is simply the 
preparation of the working environment in advance so as to support cognitive activity 
when a particular task arises. Hutchins (1995a, pp. 167-168) notes that we should 
understand precomputation as occurring on various time-scales from the "setting of the 
hoey, which was done a few seconds ago" to the "changes to the chart that were plotted a 
few days ago" to the "nature of the plotting tools, which were designed a few decades ago" 
to the "mathematics of the projection chart, which was worked out a few centuries ago" 
(pp. 167-168). Each of these past cognitive achievements plays an important role in the 
production of the present activity. A full and proper understanding of a cognitive activity 
requires us to acknowledge the ways in which a person, and others inhabiting the person's 
environment, have modified tools, artifacts, and layouts of the environment in order to 
change (improve, speed up, make possible) the ways we perform those cognitive activities. 
Precomputation is made possible by 'freezing' task-specific invariants (things about the 
task that we are doing that do not change over a significant period of time) into our tools 
and layouts (Hutchins, 1995a, pp. 165-167). Information that does not change over a period 
when a task may be carried out can be 'frozen into' an artifact or a layout so that a user 
does not need to needlessly re-calculate that required information every time the task is 
performed. A simple example may include stacking nautical charts in the order in which 
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they will need to be used. This cuts down on the time needed to search through chart piles. 
Indeed the ability to 'search' is frozen into the environmental layout so that the simple 
situated skill of 'moving the top chart' will instantly 'locate' the next required chart. A 
more complex example can be seen in the use of the parallel motion protractor (PMP). 
When used in the navigation the PMP can automatically correct bearings for magnetic 
variation. Without this ability one would have to plot a line of position and then modify it 
with information about the difference between true bearings and magnetic bearings. Thus, 
by freezing this invariant (which is invariant over tens of nautical miles and tens of years) 
into the structure of the PMP, navigators relieve themselves of the task of doing an extra 
'reflective' cognitive calculation. 
Mediating Structures Constrain the Organisation of Activity 
Artifacts also serve as constraints on the organisation of action by having particular ways 
of doing things embedded into their structure. Artifact-filled functional systems can 
increase the efficiency and decrease the error-rate of cognitive activities by making it 
impossible to perform incorrect calculations. This is achieved by building error-proof 
constraints into the artifacts or layouts themselves. The nautical slide rule (and its relative 
the nomogram) prevent operations that violate the rules (syntax) of nautical calculations 
regarding distance, elapsed time, and rate of speed. They "obviate or lock out such 
relations among terms. The relations D=RT, R=DT, and T=DIR are built into the structure 
of the nomogram and slide rule. The task performer has no need to know anything about 
these relations, either implicitly or explicitly." (Hutchins, 1995a, p. 150). Thus, artifacts 
can guide the user to correct conclusions in various ways by, in a sense, setting goals and 
making decisions. By constraining the kinds of possible outcome, the slide rule is 
'deciding' what kind of operation is permissible. By contrast an individual performing 
speed calculations may arrive at an incorrect result by, for example, deploying the wrong 
formulae (e.g., D=TIR). 
Mediating Structures Transform the Cognitive Activities Required of the Agent 
The use of an artifact therefore transforms the cognitive activities that the navigator, in this 
case, needs to carry out to accomplish the task at hand (Hutchins, 1995a, pp. 153-155, p. 
170). Central to the notion of pre computation is the fact that precomputing usually changes 
the component activities required to accomplish a particular task. The building of a 
calculator changes addition from a pencil and paper or in-the-head procedure for 
implementing simple algorithms to a button pushing, screen-reading activity. The PMP 
changes the calculation of magnetic variation from a computation to a simple scale-
alignment and scale-reading operation. 
Both the distributed cognition and situated action frameworks take the above focus reliance 
on the environmental backdrop for activity as signalling a new view of what it is that the 
_.,.'.' 
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individual does and contributes to cognitive activity. Cognitivism and associated 
philosophies in the social sciences typically take the individual to be a relatively self-
contained planner of activity and controller of the world. By contrast both distributed 
cognition research and situated action research paint a picture of the agent as mostly in the 
job of coordinating external cognitive resources and using them to promote the use of more 
embodied, perception and action skills. For instance, instead of engaging in effortful 
mental arithmetic (internal cogitation) to evenly divide a pile of objects into several 
smaller piles, a person might just sort objects into piles that look to be about the same size 
(effortless, embodied, perceptual skill). Within the navigation context this idea is nicely 
illustrated by the way in which a nautical slide rule can be used to transform the effortful 
activity of doing mental arithmetic (multiplication, division, calculating distance covered 
from current speed and time, etc.) by simply aligning the scales on the slide rule using 
simpler perception and manipulation skills. The 'difficult' cognitive activities of reasoning 
and problem solving are often accomplished, not so much by individual, internal 
cogitation, as by rearranging tools and other environmental entities in order to present us 
with simpler and more 'intuitive' ways of getting information from the world. We use new 
skills to complete tasks; often swift, simple, 'situated' or 'experiential' skills such as object 
manipulation and pattern recognition, to perform what would otherwise be time-
consuming, effortful (or even impossible) 'reflective' skills. 
These tools pennit us to transfonn difficult tasks into ones that can be done by pattern-matching, by the 
manipulation of simple physical systems, or by mental simulations of simple physical systems. These tools 
are useful precisely because the cognitive processes required to manipulate them are not the computational 
processes accomplished by their manipulation. The computational constraints of the problem have been built 
into the physical structure of the tools (Hutchins, 1995a, p. 171). 
Norman (1993b, pp. 26-27) notes that these situated and experiential procedures, that are 
deployed when cognizing with the aid of artifacts, are often less effortful and prone to 
disruption than those that require reflection and concentration. Precomputation can save 
time and effort and avoid error by transforming the type of problems people need to tackle. 
Thus the basic idea that underlies much of the theorising in distributed cognition and 
especially situated action research is that people are 'designed' to make use of mediating 
structures. Human cognition is intrinsically cultural in the sense that people make and use 
environments that promote and support particular kinds of activity (Hutchins, 1995a). 
Moreover this process is an importantly cultural and historical feature of human 
evolution57• People have systematically modified their environments in order to " ... change 
57 It is certainly within the realms of possibility to argue that human anatomy and physiology have co-
evolved with certain cultural practices. Deacon (1997), for instance, argues that language has co-evolved 
with human culture, over millions of years. And, if we take notice of the claims of evolutionary 
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the nature of certain computational problems so as to make them more tractable to 
perceptual, pattern-completing brains ... " (Clark, 1997, p. 77) for thousands if not millions 
of years. As we have seen, Hutchins (1995a) makes this clear when he argues that we must 
understand much modem cognitive activity in the context of, often hundreds of years, of 
precomputing by our ancestors. What we do now relies on what has been done before both 
by ourselves and especially by others. Human cognitive activity is deeply and intrinsically 
embedded in the ways in which people have systematically altered their surroundings. 
The vision of the agent that emerges from this analysis is one where our primary 
engagement with our surroundings is at the level of pattern recognition and skilful 
sensorimotor activity. Distributed cognition and situated action analyses seem to strip the 
individual of the traditional cognitivist powers of reflective cogitative, creativity, and 
effortful planning and replace them with a manipulator of 'mediating structures' and a 
recogniser of patterns. The typical agent becomes more of a 'situated seer and doer' (a 
specialist in experiential cognition [Norman, 1993b]) deploying embodied skills rather 
than behaving like a Rodin-like thinker. 
Summary 
It may seem that distributed cognition and situated action research focuses on an entirely 
different level of analysis compared to that of basic cognitive psychology. The focus on 
external resources in the production of cognitive activity may appear to be simply an 
attempt to apply basic cognitivist analyses to real-world situations. Indeed much 
distributed cognition and situated action research has started with this possibility in mind. 
What distributed cognition and situated action researchers have found, however, is that the 
traditional cognitive psychology approach of thinking that most cognitive activity is an 
internal affair that involves some kind of manipulation of inner models in order to produce 
plans for action conflicts with the stubbornly 'situated' approach people seem to take to 
many cognitive tasks; "[i]t is notable how vigorously we human beings, given half a 
chance, function as agents recruiting into the cognitive enterprise not only other people but 
the insentient physical things around us, arranging them and refashioning them so that they 
become 'partners in cognition'." (Perkins, 1993, p. 107). 
psychologists like Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992) who argue that modem human biology and 
psychology is adapted to our hunting and foraging niche in a Pleistocene environment, it makes sense to 
suggest that we are likely to have, for instance, neural traits that support living and reproducing in 
Pleistocene societies, which involved the use of tools, artifacts, and various social practices. Cosmides 
(1989), for instance, has argued that we possess a cheater detection 'module' to cope with such a social 
environment. It is only a short step from such claims to the idea we may well have co-evolved situated 
cognitive mechanisms and the ability to produce mediating structures. 
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Everyday human cognitive activity seems to be defined by the fact that people lean heavily 
on modifications they, or others, have made to the environment and its furniture so that 
they can deploy fast and often efficient experiential cognitive abilities such as pattern 
recognition and sensorimotor skills. Theorists like Suchman (1987, 1993) and Costall and 
Leudar (1996) argue that modelling and planning, even in its so-called subpersonal and 
unconscious guise, is not as ubiquitous a feature of thoughtful human activity as traditional 
cognitive science has claimed. When they do occur such processes should be understood as 
particular kinds of personal-level activity that are products of social/cultural learning, 
rather than being steps in every internal computational implementation of a cognitive 
activity (see also Clancey, 1993, 1997). Distributed cognition and situated action 
researchers argue that traditional cognitive science has misrepresented everyday human 
cognition in an important way by making it seem a good deal more cogitative and 
internally focused than it really is. By contrast distributed cognition researchers such as 
Hutchins (1995a) 
believe that the real power of human cognition lies in our ability to flexibly construct functional systems that 
accomplish our goals by bringing bits of structure into coordination. That culturally constituted settings are 
rich in precisely the kinds of artifactual and social interactional resources that can be appropriated by such 
functional systems is a central truth about human cognition. The processes that create these settings are as 
much a part of human cognition as the processes that exploit them, and a proper understanding of human 
cognition must acknowledge the continual dynamic interconnectivity of functional elements inside with 
functional elements outside the boundary of the skin (p. 316). 
Critics such as Clark (1996b) argue that we must be careful how we use these distributed 
cognition and situated action arguments for it is surely the case that people can, and often 
do, 'do things in their heads' without relying upon external cognitive resources. This, Clark 
argues, leaves room for a modified computational view of mind, one he believes will be 
based upon something like the architectures of artificial neural networks (see Clark, 1993, 
1997). Clark is, without doubt, correct in making this observation and I suspect that most 
distributed cognition and situated action theorists would agree with the spirit of his 
criticism. The question is, however, just what kind of 'internal thinking' will fit the bill and 
how much of it comes t<:> us naturally and how much is a product of 'internalising' skills, 
such as mental arithmetic, that we originally learnt in an extended cognitive system 
consisting of such things as teachers, pencils, paper, and number blocks. The notion that 
private, in-the-head thinking may arise from the appropriation of public, social skills is 
central to the sociohistorical approach pioneered by Vygotsky. It is to this perspective that 
we turn next. 
The Sociohistorical Approach 
The sociohistorical (a.k.a. sociocultural, cultural-historical, Vygotskian) approach to the 
study of development derives from the work of Vygotsky (1930-1935/1978, 1934/1986) 
111 
and his colleagues and students including Luria and Leontiev58. Although the 
sociohistorical approach is often only mentioned in passing, if at all, in most modem 
discussion of ESD perspectives on cognition, I believe that it contains a number of 
important insights for interactionist theorists. 
Vygotsky's work has been developed in a number of directions by psychologists working 
in several countries. Vygotsky's sociohistorical ideas are important historical precursors to 
many of the ideas within distributed cognition research and, to a lesser extent, situated 
action research. Vygotsky, like distributed cognition and situated action researchers, 
emphasised the role of resources outside of the individual's 'natural mind' in the 
production of complex human cognitive activity. In particular, Vygotsky and his 
colleagues focused upon the ways in which humans make use of both technical tools (e.g., 
spades, cars, spectacles) and psychological tools (e.g., words, routines, books, the 
assistance of an expert) to mediate their interactions with their surroundings. 
Modern man does not have to adapt to the external environment in the way that an animal or primitive man 
does. Modern man has conquered nature and what primitive man did with his legs or hands, his eyes or ears, 
the modern man does with his tools. Cultural man does not have to strain his vision to see a distant object-
he can do it with the help of eyeglasses, binoculars, or a telescope; he does not have to lend an attentive ear 
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to a distant source, run for his life to bring news, - he performs all these functions with the help of those 
tools and means of communication and transportation that fulfil his will. All the artificial tools, the entire 
cultural environment, serve to 'expand our senses' (Viner, 1909). Modern cultural man can allow himself the 
luxury of having the worst natural abilities, which he amplifies with artificial devices thus coping with the 
external world better than the primitive man who used his natural abilities directly. The latter broke a tree by 
beating it on a stone, modern man takes an ax or a frame-saw and does this work quicker, better, and with 
less energy wasted. (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993, pp. 169-170) 
Aside from its old-fashioned, progressivist ideas the framework set out here is deeply 
reminiscent of those described by Hutchins (1995a) and Perkins (1993) in the previous 
section. The framework sketched by Vygotsky and his contemporaries has been fleshed out 
in different ways by a variety of modem theorists and researchers (e.g., Berk, 1994; 
Bruner, Greenfield, & Olver, 1966; Scribner & Cole, 1981; Rogoff, 1990; Nelson, 1996; 
Val siner, 1997; Wertsch, 1985, 1991). 
However, this emphasis on the distribution of cognitive resources formed only one thread 
in Vygotsky's work. Vygotsky's other focus involved the hypothesis that psychological 
tools could gradually be taken on board by the individual and used to restructure their basic 
mental abilities. Indeed, Vygotsky saw this sort of cultural process as central to the 
development of modem humans. Vygotskian socio-historical views oppose or complement 
(depending on one's theoretical predilection) the individualistic and self-organising ideas 
58 See Kozulin (1986) for a more complete list ofVygotsky's collaborators and their contributions. 
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of Pia get ian approaches to development. Instead of following Piaget's (1970) vision of the 
child as moving from an egocentric being to a socialised one, sociohistoricists argue that 
children first learn how to live and act in the social world and then progressively 
internalise (or appropriate) these intrinsically social resources for their own individual 
uses. The individual skills of reflective thought, voluntary memory, and so on, are the 
products of social activity rather than necessary components for making that activity 
possible. Early childhood consists of a gradual taking over of the behaviour-regulating 
activities and processes that parents and caretakers use to direct and focus the child's 
behaviour. This basic idea is given in Vygotsky's oft quoted claim that: 
Each function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the socia11eve1, and later, on the 
individua11eve1; first, between people (interpsycho1ogica1), and then inside the child (intrapsycho1ogica1). 
(Vygotsky, 1930-1935/1978, p. 57)59 
A well rehearsed example of this principle comes from Vygotsky's analysis of the 
emergence of pointing in infancy from a grasping action toward an out of reach object (see 
Kozulin, 1986, p. xxvii; Lock, 1980). Initially this grasping action (that Vygotsky referred 
to as the action-in-itself) is nothing more to the child than a personal attempt to reach 
something. However, an adult or more socially experienced partner may perceive the 
action as a pointing gesture, or, in any event, see it as an attempt by the child to get an 
object. This person naturally helps the child to get the object (or if the object is 'offlimits', 
move it from their reach). Either way the object enters into a triadic relationship with the 
child and the adult. The network as a whole 'interprets' the action as a pointing gesture. 
Vygotsky called this state of affairs the 'action-for-others'. The child's experience with 
such situations leads to a gradual bringing under control and tuning of the grasping 
movements by the infant as they become a socially communicative act of pointing 
complete with a dawning awareness of the meaning (social implications) of the action. 
Deliberate pointing becomes, what Vygotsky called, an 'action-for-oneself. 
This movement from public to private cognitive ability is particularly important in the 
development of both thought and language. Thinking and speech are seen as independent 
cognitive abilities that come together, interpenetrate each other, and then develop 
reciprocally over the lifespan. Particular emphasis is given to the role of public symbolic 
ability (speech, the use of mnemonics, and memory aids, etc.) in the restructuring of basic 
cognitive abilities (the natural or elementary mental functions such as elementary 
perception, memory, attention, and will [Kozulin, 1986, p. xxv]) into "higher mental 
functions" such as voluntary memory, reflective verbal thought and the like. The basic idea 
is that the speech of others is used to influence the child ("take this", "don't touch that!") 
59 Kozu1in (1986, p. xxvi) credits Pierre Janet with being the first to propose this kind of idea. 
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and, as the child comes to learn how to use langUage to communicate and 'regulate' the 
behaviour of others, they find that they can redirect that speech toward themselves to 
remind themselves of things and to focus their attention (Berk, 1994). Thus, such abilities 
are evidenced by an increased capacity for the self-regulation of behaviour (the ability to 
work and think independently of the external constraints of social norms and physical 
prompts, restraints, and environments). The following passage from Vygotsky (1930-
193511978) shows how he applies these ideas to the development of voluntary memory: 
A comparative investigation of human memory reveals that, even at the earliest stages of social development, 
there are two, principally different, types of memory. One, dominating in the behaviour of nonliterate 
people, is characterised by the non-mediated impression of materials, by the retention of actual experiences 
as the basis of mnemonic (memory) traces. We call this natural memory, and it is clearly illustrated in E. R. 
Jaensch's studies of eidetic imagery. This kind of memory is very close to perception, because it arises out of 
the direct influence of external stimuli upon human beings. From the point of view of structure, the entire 
process is characterised by a quality of immediacy. 
Natural memory is not the only kind of memory, however, even in the case of non-literate men and women. 
On the contrary, other types of memory belonging to a completely different developmental line coexist with 
natural memory. The use of notched sticks and knots, the beginnings of writing and simple memory aids all 
demonstrate that even at early stages of historical development humans went beyond the limits of the 
psychological functions given to them by nature and proceeded to a new culturally elaborated organization 
of their behaviour. (Vygotsky, 1930-1935/1978, p. 38-39)60 
In the terminology used here, sociohistorical approaches view our distinctly human time-
space distancing powers as arising from the immersion of the relatively 'naked brains' of 
infants in complex social and cultural environments. 
A classic example of this principle is supposedly evident in an experiment conducted by 
Alexei Leontiev in 1932 (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxviii). In this study Leontiev supplied a set of 
coloured cards to people from three different age groups (preschoolers, adolescents, and 
adults) to use as external support in a colour naming game. In this exercise the participants 
were required to answer the experimenter's questions without using certain forbidden 
colour names. The cards could therefore be used as reminders (psychological tools) of the 
forbidden colours and consulted as each question was asked. Leontiev found that success 
increased with age. More significantly, however, he found that the preschoolers and the 
adults did not use the cards as external memory and attention scaffolds. The adolescents, 
on the other hand, did. Leontiev, and Vygotsky after him, argued that the preschoolers had 
60 This distinction is reminiscent of Tulving's (1972) distinction between semantic and episodic memory. 
Sherry and Schacter (1987) provide a non-social, evolutionary hypothesis for the existence of these two 
kinds of memory. Nelson (1993, 1996) combines evolutionary and social ideas by arguing that semantic 
(generic memory) and episodic memory exist in some other higher animals and thus are hard-wired into 
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not yet learnt how to mediate their natural cognitive abilities using symbolic structures 
whereas adolescents and adults had. Adolescents by using the actual cards and adults by 
using a similar 'internal' strategy. They thus concluded that this evidence supports the 
contention that people gradually develop an ability to mediate their natural (elementary) 
abilities using socially-supplied symbolic structures (whether externally or internally) to 
produce higher psychological abilities. With development, skills for using external 
symbolic structures (psychological tools) to mediate activity are internalised as, for 
example, inner speech and mental imagery. 
Leontiev's demonstrations may not convince the modem psychologist who may argue for 
different interpretations of the data and perhaps question the accuracy of the data in the 
first place61 . However a good deal of recent research points to similar conclusions albeit in 
slightly modified form (see, e.g., the discussion of private speech research in the next 
section). 
Although these laboratory experiments were suggestive, Vygotsky's primary interest was 
in the ways different cultural practices, such as literacy, impacted upon and reorganised 
people's cognitive abilities. Vygotsky arrived at similar conclusions to those made from 
the laboratory studies from his expedition with Luria into the rapidly industrialising parts 
of Soviet Central Asia in the 1930s (Luria, 1976). They found some surprising differences 
in the cognitive skills of illiterate peasants and their recently formally educated kin. For 
instance, they found that those who had not been exposed to Soviet education had extreme 
difficulty (almost an unwillingness) in solving abstract reasoning problems that conflicted 
with concrete, sensible everyday situations - the sorts of reasoning skill that Piaget claimed 
nearly everyone develops when they move to the formal-operational stage)62. Vygotsky 
humans. Autobiographical memory (a key part of episodic memory), on the other hand, arises from social 
influences on episodic memory. 
61 Where, for instance, are the checks to see whether the preschoolers understood the task in the same way as 
the adolescents and the adults? It also seems questionable that adolescents would be unable to 'imagine' 
using the coloured cards in the same way that the adults were supposed to have done. As Kozulin and others 
have noted, the procedural aspects of Soviet experiments were generally not reported in great detail within 
books such as Vygotsky's even though unpublished reports were generally available from the experimenters 
themselves at the time. Kozulin (1986, p. xxxi) notes that "the studies by Vygotsky's followers have shown 
that the basic findings are sound, and that argument may arise only as to the interpretation of these fmdings." 
62 Scribner and Cole's (1981) in-depth research of the effects of literacy among the Vai people of Liberia 
revealed that formal-schooling, and the kind of literacy developed within that context, seems to be a more 
likely reason for the production of educated, 'Western' styles of thinking such as abstract syllogistic 
reasoning. They, among other researchers, have shown that 'traditional' peoples can and do use these kinds 
of reasoning in familiar and sensible-sounding contexts, and that with sufficient prompting and scaffolding 
they can produce the 'correct' answers. Barton and Hamilton (1996) suggest that there are multiple pathways 
115 
and Luria claimed that these findings provide support for the idea that the psychological 
tools given by literacy and formal schooling had been used to mediate the way these people 
used their cognitive skills. 
Vygotsky used the term internalization to describe this phenomenon of deriving personal 
and private skills from the self-directed use of social and public skills. Modem Vygotskian 
researchers argue over whether the notion of internalization (the movement of external 
abilities or strategies to the 'inside') or the concept of appropriation (the gradual taking 
over of elements of jointly carried out skills by the learner from a guide or expert) more 
accurately captures what goes on with development (see Va1siner, 1997, for a defence of 
internalization and Rogoff, 1990, pp. 193-197 for advocacy of appropriation). 
Appropriation fits more comfortably with the distinctly Vygotskian notion of the zone of 
proximal (sometimes potential) development or ZPD. Vygotsky (1930-193511978) 
characterised the ZPD as "the distance between the actual developmental level as 
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as 
determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more 
capable peers." (p. 86). He argued that psychological research should not only pay close 
attention to the individual abilities of a child but also to those things the child is able to do 
in interaction with an adult or other guide (this no doubt derived from his interest in 
education and pedagogy). If a child can accomplish a certain task with the help of someone 
else, then it lies within the child's zone of proximal development. Vygotsky argued that the 
child can then be supported to take over an increasing proportion of the task until they can 
perform it on their own. However if all aspects of the task are beyond the child, that is, lie 
outside the child's ZPD, then there is no possibility that the child can be guided toward 
acquiring an independent ability to do the task. 
In recent years a number of psychologists have utilised Vygotsky's ideas to understand 
various aspects of children's cognitive development. One increasingly popular area of 
research is the exploration of the phenomenon of private speech (a.k.a. egocentric speech, 
self-directed speech). The notion of private speech was central to Vygotsky's deep interest 
in the relationship between language, as a social symbolic phenomenon, and thought. 
for developing these abstract cognitive skills, not all of them reliant upon literacy. Rather, different societies 
can make explicit the meanings in language in different ways. The metalinguistic role of word signs and their 
relation to meaning are said (by the likes of Olson [1996]) to be made explicit and this explicitness is said to 
enable many abstract modes of thought. Western society has done this primarily via the expository text, but 
other societies have different 'ways of speaking' which perform similar expository functions. Notably, none 
of these critiques deny the basic Vygotskian premise that cultural practices do alter the ways in which we 
deploy our basic cognitive skills. 
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Modern Private Speech Research 
Vygotsky made many proposals about private speech based upon his own research as well 
as that of his colleagues. However, his interests were such that many of his ideas were 
never tested during his short life. Indeed, many of his thoughts about private speech defy 
any straightforward sort of empirical investigation. Briefly, Vygotsky argued that speech 
gradually combines with pre-verbal thought, the sort of thought possible, for instance, in 
chimpanzees, to create verbal thought. According to Vygotsky (1934/1986, chap. 4) verbal 
thought possesses many of the qualities that are commonly considered to be central to 
human cognition - qualities such as logical conceptualisation, voluntary memory, and 
objective representation. Vygotsky (1930-1935/1978) argued that verbal thought derives 
from a prior ability to use speech in social contexts and that private speech is a transitory 
stage between overt social speech and silent inner speech. 
[W]hen children [rod that they are unable to solve a problem by themselves ... [t]hey then tum to an adult, 
and verbally describe the method that they cannot carry out by themselves. The greatest change in children's 
capacity to use language as a problem-solving tool takes place somewhat later in their development, when 
socialized speech (which has been previously used to address an adult) is turned inward. Instead of appealing 
to the adult, children appeal to themselves; language, thus takes an intra personal function in addition to its 
interpersonal use. When children develop a method of behavior for guiding themselves that had previously 
been used in relation to another person, when they organize their own activities according to a social form of 
behavior, they succeed in applying a social attitude to themselves. The history of the process of the 
internalization of social speech is also the history of the socialization of children's practical intellect. (p. 27). 
Children experience speech with adults and other behavioural guides (older peers, siblings) 
in situations of joint activity where the guide verbally instructs and scaffolds the child's 
actions in their ZPD. In such situations language has the function of channelling and 
modulating the child's basic cognitive skills. The child gradually takes over this guiding 
language a~d uses it to 'tell themselves what to do' (direct attention, inhibit the wrong 
actions, work out what to do next, and so on). For Vygotskians, speech is both a higher 
mental function and the means by which other elementary skills are organised into higher 
functions. Talking to oneself forms the basis for bringing basic skills under control. 
Recent research has unearthed much supporting evidence for many of Vygotsky' s claims, 
brought into question some hypotheses, and revealed a variety of conflicting findings for 
other Vygotskian claims (table 3.2 summarises some of these findings). Overall the main 
thrust of Vygotsky's ideas has received considerable empirical support: private speech 
does seem to develop during a child's preschool years and seems to derive from skill in 
using social speech; private speech often serves a self-regulatory role, improving 
performance on effortful, reflective tasks; and over the early school years private speech 
becomes increasingly internalised - although it appears that it persists into and throughout 
adulthood in difficult task situations (see, e.g., John-Steiner, 1992). 
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Importantly for the ideas being mooted here, private language ability seems to playa major 
role in the kinds of effortful and reflective skills (modelling·environments, counterfactual 
reasoning, thinking about things that are not present) used to negotiate complex cognitive 
domains. Frauenglass and Diaz (1985) found that more private speech is prompted in 
children when they attempt to solve semantic tasks (e.g., picture classification, picture 
ordering) than when they work on perceptual tasks (e.g., puzzles and block design). This 
suggests that some kind of verbal mediation is required when we are engaged in effortful 
and reflective tasks as opposed to tasks that can be achieved using experiential cognition 
(Norman, 1993b) or 'situated seeing'. 
Table 3.2: Summary of Recent Private Speech Research Findings 
(based on Berk, 1992) 
Finding References63 
Strong positive correlations between child's level of Berk & Garvin, 1984; Kohlberg, 
social interaction and the complexity of their private 
speech. 
Yaeger, & Hjertholm, 1968 
Development of private speech mediated by verbal Berk & Garvin, 1984; Diaz, Neal, & 
and socially responsive home environments. Vachio, 1991 
Movement from externalized (out loud) to internalized Berk, 1986; Berk & Garvin, 1984; 
(inaudible muttering, mouth movements) private Berk & Potts, 1991; Bivens & Berk, 
speech occurs over preschool and early school years. 1990; Dickie, 1973; Frauenglass & 
Diaz, 1985; Klein, 1964; Kohlberg et 
aI., 1968 
Level of private speech development correlated highly Berner, 1971; Bivens & Berk, 1990; 
with general cognitive ability in preschool and early Deutsch & Stein, 1972; Diaz, Padilla, 
school years (IQ, school ability). & Weathersby, 1991 ; Frauenglass & 
Diaz, 1985; Kleiman, 1974; Kohlberg 
et aI., 1968; Pechman, 1978; 
Roberts & Tharp, 1980 
Amount of private speech displayed increases with Beaudichon, 1973; Behrend et aI., 
difficulty of task. 1989; Berk & Garvin, 1984; Deutsch 
& Stein, 1972; Dickie, 1973; 
Kohlberg et aI., 1968; Murray, 1979; 
Roberts, 1979; Zivin, 1972 
Private speech has a self-regulatory function (as well Azmitia, 1992; Beaudichon, 1973; 
as other possible functions). Level of private speech is Behrend, Rosengren, & Perlmutter, 
correlated with success in various tasks. 1992; Bivens & Berk, 1990; Flavell, 
Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Goodman, 
1981; Keeney, Canizzo, & Flavell, 
1967; Klein, 1964; Murray, 1979; 
Roberts, 1977, 1979 
Private speech seems to be a universal feature Berk, 1986; Bivens & Berk, 1990 
amongst children. 
Private speech is often used to solve difficult 
(semantic) tasks rather than practical tasks that are 
Frauenglass & Diaz, 1985 
solvable using perceptual strategies. 
63 All references are cited in Berk (1992). The following references were 'in press' in that publication and 
have been updated in this table: Berk & Potts (1991), Diaz, Neal, and Vachio (1991), and Diaz, Padilla, and 
Weathersby (1991). 
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A number of studies support Vygotsky's claim that challenging tasks elicit more private 
speech than simple tasks or tasks that lie beyond the child's current ability (e.g., Behrend, 
Rosengren, & Perlmutter, 1989). There has been some debate over the generality of the 
claim that private speech seems to serve a self-regulatory function when dealing with 
challenging, off-line kinds of tasks. However, much of the research that challenges this 
idea derives from experiments that involve only a brief analysis ofthe children's activity in 
artificial laboratory situations. Berk (1992) suggests situations such as this may not tap 
into children's natural and spontaneous problem-solving strategies because they may cause 
self-consciousness and because there is not the same motivation to tackle problems as there 
are in more natural settings. 
Berk (1986) and Bivens and Berk (1990) found that private speech occurs much more often 
in natural environments with ability-related challenges when they studied children's 
mathematics problem-solving behaviours in their classrooms. Indeed in a three year 
longitudinal study (Bivens & Berk, 1990) they found that individual development in 
private speech mirrored increases in an ability to sustain attention and concentration while 
working on academic problems. 
Summary of the Sociohistorical Position 
Vygotsky's sociohistorical theory suggests that many of our distinctly human cognitive 
abilities are a joint product of our natural cognitive capacities and the effects of being 
immersed in social and symbolic human environments. Vygotsky hypothesised that the 
human psychological development of higher mental functions involves an intemalisation 
of skills and abilities that are initially used in social interaction. One of his core interests 
was in the way language provides an ability to restructure the way people think. He argued 
that in private speech children access and utilise the focusing and regulatory functions of 
social speech in their own individual activity. Adults can guide a child's activity using 
language and the child can subsequently take over that language and use it as guide in 
independent contexts. The implication is that much of the content of modem cognitive 
psychology is not just part of our native neural endowment but in fact is socially and 
linguistically constituted. Higher mental functions such as explicit memory, problem-
solving, and reasoning consist of natural skills that are 'glued together' in the course of 
social interaction. This means that "[i]f one decomposes a higher mental function into its 
constituent parts, one finds nothing but the natural, lower skills." (Kozulin, 1986, p. xxv). 
This theme is at odds with the cognitivist attempt to use formal task analysis to derive 
cognitive algorithms from analyses of the problems that agents face and to map them onto 
neurobiological structures and processes. 
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Summary 
In this chapter I have described five different fields that have influenced recent ESD 
interactionist thought. Although the views of human and animal psychology held by 
proponents of these different fields are by no means identical, they are united by the fact 
that they all challenge some or all of the assumptions that are central to cognitivism. 
Specifically, they all challenge the idea that cognition can best be understood as a purely 
in-the-head affair that involves the construction of detailed models of the environment and 
detailed plans for action. The next chapter extracts a collection of shared themes from the 
insights of the research in these fields. Together the themes provide us with the beginnings 
of a statement of the core commitments of an interactionist alternative. 
4. Embodied, Situated, and Distributed 
Interactionist Principles 
A person is a unique mode of confluences and divergences, a moving locus of interactions. 
Susan Oyama (1993, p. 488). 
The Main Principles of the Interactionist Approach 
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The embodied, situated, and distributed interactionist viewpoint that derives from the 
research traditions described in the last chapter can be understood as a collection of 
mutually reinforcing principles and assumptions. In this chapter I will describe what I 
believe are the central shared themes of interactionist researchers. 
ESD theorists tend to assume that the most profitable place to start the study of cognition is 
with as few preconceived boundaries as possible. Thus these researchers tend to focus on 
(1) the agent-environment system as the primary unit of analysis and view all of its 
components as contributing to the production of cognitive activity as equal partners. 
Because of this emphasis ESD thinkers (2) pay close attention to the ways in which causal 
influences criss-cross the boundaries of the brain, body, and world. In particular, 
interactionists commonly analyse cognitive activity in tenus of perception-action cycles. 
These assumptions are borne out and reinforced by other findings including (3) the fact 
that the internal structure of agents (especially their nervous systems) are usefully viewed 
as decentralised (made up of interacting activity layers with no central command and 
control centre) and essentially reactive (they mostly respond directly to environmental 
'input' rather than engaging in complex modelling and planning) architectures. In other 
words, natural-born cognizers excel at hooking directly into their surroundings and 
producing coordinated action. By contrast people seem to find effortful tasks such as 
planning, reasoning, and logic more difficult to tackle and slower to achieve. This suggests 
that the basic design of natural cognition is, as Clark (1997) puts it, to be "bad at logic, 
good at frisbee". ESD-friendly research thus shows (4) how often complex-looking 
behaviour is the outcome of this natural 'good at frisbee' architecture coupled to highly 
structured environments. The difficult bits of cognitive activity (keeping track of past 
achievements, juxtaposing these achievements, etc.) are often off-loaded on to 
environmental structures. (5) This coupling, or constant looping of activity, environmental 
alteration, and perception, results in the interactive emergence of complex, dynamic 
activity. Perhaps the most important implication of interactive emergence is that it shows 
how complex 'high-level' cognitive activity can arise from the interaction of simple, low-
level reflexes (orchestrated by activity layers) and structured surroundings where goals, 
decisions, and procedures do not exist pre-coded in either internal or external resources. 
Behaviour, or even behaviour potential, can not be 'decoded' just from the structures 
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inside the agent or just from the contingencies offered by the environment. (6) The 
behaviour-relevant structure of an agent can only be understood within the context of the 
environment that the agent lives in and the historical environment that the agent's ancestors 
inhabited. Similarly the behavioural environment itself must be understood in a relational 
manner. Because of this many ESD theorists make use of some version of the notion of 
'the environment from the point of view of the perceiver' (effective environments or 
Umwelten) to describe the 'problems and tasks' that the agent faces. Effective 
environments describe what the world "offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, 
either for good or ill" (Gibson, 1979/1986, p. 127), where such an interpretation derives, 
not from some sort of subjective interpretation by the agent, but rather from a "creature's 
morphology, its sensori-motor characteristics, and the activity patterns it performs ... " 
(Hendriks-Jansen, 199411996, p. 285). Thus the description of effective environments 
helps to show how and why creatures do what they do when in varying conditions. 
The rest ,of this chapter involves a more detailed analysis of these six major interactionist 
themes. 
The Equal Partner Assumption and the Agent-Environment Complex 
Central to all interactionist accounts is the idea that cognition goes on inside a system that 
is substantially larger than an individual mindlbrain. This idea involves the ontological 
claim that "[ c ]ognitive processes are not located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing 
organisms" and the epistemological claim that "[i]t is not possible to understand the nature 
of cognitive processes by focusing exclusively on what is occurring inside the skin of 
cognizing organisms." (Rowlands, 1999, p. 22). The extended cognitive system is typically 
thought to be a dynamic one that continously changes size and composition. It consists not 
only of the agent's brain but also their body, tools and artifacts that they use, the layout of 
the local physical environment which is often deliberately altered to accommodate 
particular activities, the local social environment of tutors, colleagues, friends, novices, 
apprentices, and passersby, and the wider social and cultural environment consisting of 
social norms, practices, routines, collectively created plans and procedures, discourses, and 
so on. 
The embedded components of these agent-environment systems64 share an equal role in 
the ongoing production of cognitive activity. No one component is more central or 
important than another in the production of any particular behaviour. Epistemic credit 
(Clark, 1997, p. 69) should be spread amongst all of the 'components' that playa vital role 
in the production of cognitive activity no matter which side of the skin they lie on. The 
64 Also known as extended mind systems (Clark & Chalmers, 1995), functional systems (Hutchins, 1995a), 
and behavioural systems (Keijzer, 1997). 
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idea that we should distribute epistemic credit to bodily and environment, as well as neural, 
structures amounts to an acknowledgment that the 'information' necessary for the 
production of activity is also distributed throughout the wider cognitive system. For this 
reason I refer to these embedded components as enablers as they all enable various kinds 
of cognitive activity. For example, the production of a particular essay within a particular 
timeframe can be disrupted by both the brain dysfunction and the loss of a valuable 
reference text. And although some sort of writing may be able to be produced without the 
text, or indeed with some sort of neurobiological disorder, it would not result in the 
successful accomplishment of the task at hand. This is not to say that some elements of the 
typical extended cognitive system are not always at hand or not necessary for all cognitive 
activity. It is not even to claim that such equal causal influence precludes the existence of 
principled boundaries between brain, body, and world (Clark, 1998, pp. 513-516). It is 
simply the claim that that some activities are only possible using particular enablers that 
reside outside bfthe body. 
Frequent Boundary Crossings 
One important implication of moving the focus of inquiry from the mindlbrain to the 
agent-environment system is an increased attention to the subtleties of the dynamic 
interactions between brain, body, and world. ESD theorists are obliged to pay close 
attention to the ways in which agent-environment systems hang together as well as to the 
kinds of systemic patterns that emerge from the coupling of each system's components. In 
particular, interactionists hold that cognitive processes often include environmental 
manipulation. 
Action Loops and Perception-Action Cycles 
The importance of considering the interplay of environment and agent is found in the 
roughly equivalent ESD notions of the perception-action cycle (Goldfield, 1995; Kugler & 
Turvey, 1987; Reed, 1996; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 1996), perceptually-guided 
action (Varela et aI., 1991), active perception (Wheeler, 1996) and the action loop (Clark, 
1997). The basic idea underlying all of these concepts is that cognitive activity, in both its 
fundamental 'low-level' sense (e.g., moving around, manipulating objects, avoiding 
obstacles) and its advanced reflective form (e.g., solving problems, constructing artifacts, 
writing a book), involves constant cycles of information-seeking and environmental 
manipulation in the service of making new (or altered) information available. Rowlands 
(1999) suggests that, central to the interactionist perspective, is the manipulation thesis 
which holds that "cognitive processes are, in part, made up of manipulation of relevant 
structures in the cognizer's environment." (p. 24). Rowlands does not restrict this idea to 
manual manipulation of objects in the environment but also includes the changes that 
animals make to the information they have access to when they, for instance, move their 
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head or eyes. On this reading the movements of sensors in interactive vision, mentioned in 
the last chapter, constitute a kind of environmental manipulation. Cognition is thus 
characterised in terms of a continuous interplay of body, brain, and world. Clark (1997, p. 
36) puts it nicely when he characterises an action loop as "an intricate and iterated dance in 
which "pure thought" leads to actions which in tum change or simplify the problems 
confronting "pure thought"." (p. 36). 
This simple idea challenges the cognitivist tendency to view perception and action as the 
two relatively low profile end points of a cognitive episode. Action (output) and, to a lesser 
extent, perception (roughly, input) are viewed by the cognitivist as inhabiting the border 
area between the environment and the 'cognitive processing' of the agent. Moreover, 
perception and action are typically treated in terms of the transduction of environmental 
energy into 'internal symbolic computation' and vice versa. Cognitivist research 
overwhelmingly· focuses on what goes on between input and output, almost completely 
ignoring the important ways in which agents continuously explore and manipulate their 
surroundings. This is the case despite the fact that much of our activity consists of a fine-
grained ongoing 'mutual tuning' of body and world that Smith (1996) calls pure 
connectedness and Clark (1997, 1998a) refers to as continuous reciprocal causation. 
Indeed, this sort of deep coupling with the world may form the basis of our more complex 
temporally-extended activities that are central to most cognitive psychology. For instance, 
a person solving a classic cognitive psychology puzzle (e.g., the Tower of Hanoi, 
Cannibals and Missionaries, or the Water Jug problem; see Eysenck & Keane, 1995), 
playing Scrabble (Kirsh, 1995), or putting together a jigsaw puzzle (Clark, 1997) may be 
traditionally depicted as working their way through a 'problem space' in one or two 
complicated off-line ponderings. An ESD-inspired analysis would pay close attention to 
the often rapid, short duration exchanges of the person exploring and manipulating the 
puzzle components whilst looking for patterns and points where various actions are 
appropriate. 
One relatively simple task, that demonstrates that environmental manipulation is crucial to 
successful action, is doing a jigsaw puzzle. Kirsh (1995) uses jigsaw puzzling as an 
example of the way in which we manipulate our environment to simplify the 'cognitive 
operations' we must carry out to accomplish a task. When assembling a jigsaw we do not 
simply stare at all of the pieces lying on the table, build a model of them, and then mentally 
manipulate them until a plan for putting them together is achieved which can result in the 
production of the appropriate 'motor program'. Instead we engage in many environmental 
manipulations such as: 
1. Grouping all of the flat edged pieces together so that we can build the edges first. 
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2. Grouping all of the similar (colour, texture) pieces together (they probably fit into the 
same area) so that we can make fine-grained comparisons for a smaller area. 
3. Physically rotating and fitting pieces into holes, trying them out one by one, rather than 
trying to figure out which holes they will fit in by eye. 
This latter environmental manipulation strategy is central to another cognitive activity -
the playing ofthe computer game Tetris. Kirsh and his colleague Paul Maglio (1994) have 
carried out a number of experiments using Tetris. The findings again show the importance 
of environmental manipulation in cognitive processes and not just carrying through actions 
and the problems with traditional formal task analyses. 
The point of Tetris is to prevent various shaped 'zoids', which fall from the top of the 
screen, from accumulating beyond a certain height. This is achieved by spinning and 
moving the falling zoids so that they fit together in layers. Once a layer is formed without 
any gaps it disappears thereby avoiding a game-losing acyumulation of zoid piles. Thus 
Tetris requires the player to work out where a zoid can be best placed to produce gap-less 
layers. 
Kirsh and Maglio, (1994, pp. 518-522) found that Tetris players did not make the kinds of 
moves that might be expected from a formal task analysis of the 'problems' a player faces 
in Tetris65 . In particular, they expected that players would first examine the current layout 
of the game and the position of the dropping zoid before moving the it. They also 
suspected that players would only move the zoid in order to put it into position. They could 
thus calculate the average amount of keypressing needed to achieve this task. However 
what they found was that players rotated much more often than was necessary for simply 
placing blocks. 
After examining their data and talking to the players Kirsh and Maglio decided that 
players, especially skilled players, perform two distinct kinds of actions when playing: 
pragmatic actions and epistemic actions. Pragmatic actions (or performatory actions, [see 
Reed, 1996]) are deployed to utilise or alter some part of the agent's surroundings in order 
to achieve some goal or task. For Tetris players dropping a zoid into place is a pragmatic 
action. Epistemic actions (or exploratory actions), by contrast, are aimed at re-presenting 
some aspect of the world in order to make it easier or possible to perceive a particular 
65 In fact Kirsh and Maglio designed a classical SMPA simulation of a Tetris player called RoboTetris. 
RoboTetris worked through a series of four processing phases: Phase one involved creating an early, bitmap 
representation of selected features of the current situation; phase two involved encoding the bitmap 
representation in a more compact, chunked, symbolic representation; phase three consisted of computing the 
best place to put the zoid; and the final phase involved computing the trajectory of moves to achieve the goal 
placement. (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994, p. 519). 
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feature or property of the environment. Epistemic actions are performed purely for the 
purpose of providing new and informative views of manipulated objects so that the uses of 
the object can be made (more) salient. In the Tetris example players often spun zoids to 
ascertain whether they would fit into a gap in the accumulating zoid layers and to discover 
what kind of zoid was available when only a small part of it had appeared from the top of 
the screen. This was particularly important because several zoids come in normal and 
mirror-image forms and these forms may not be easily discriminated without physically 
manipulating them within the time constraints of the game66 • In addition a number of 
expert players used 'epistemic translations' as well as rotations for establishing the column 
position of the zoid. 
In addition to this relatively high-level kind of activity other research suggests that this 
kind of perception-action looping occurs at even more fundamental levels of cognitive 
activity. Kugler and Turvey (1987; see also Goldfield, 1995) hypothesise that organisms 
couple with their environments in two ways. The first is with low energy interactions with 
flow fields, such as reflected and ambient light, and the second is with high-energy 
interactions with force fields, such as bodily manipulation of environmental furniture. 
These two kinds of interaction can be glossed as perception and action respectively. 
Organisms are 'designed' to couple the former with the latter - which is just a fancy way 
of saying that natural agents tum low energy stimulation into high-energy interaction in an 
adaptive manner. A simple example will serve to illustrate the low-level nature of some 
action loops. 
Consider the very basic behaviour of a fly 'deciding' to flap its wings in order to take off 
(Marr, 1982, pp. 32-33). This, if anything may seem to be a prime candidate for an 
environmentally-independent process whereby the fly's brain simply instructs the wings to 
flap in response to some sort of external or internal stimulus. But flies do not use this kind 
of process. Instead the fly's wing-flapping circuits are wired up to the fly's feet. When the 
feet are touching a surface the wings remain still but when they cease to be in contact with 
a surface (typically when the fly 'jumps') a signal triggers the wing-flapping behaviour. 
McClamrock (1995) describes the external loop in the following way: 
Flight control depends not on signals from the brain to the wings. Instead, the fly exploits the environmental 
regularity provided by the surface (as well as its own sensory capacities) to run a part of its control loop 
outside its body and through its immediate surroundings. The local surface mediates the signal which, in a 
slightly roundabout but quite reliable way, makes its way from brain to wings. The fly beats its wings 
66 Presumably a player would have to be able to 'mentally rotate' these zoids in order to judge their form if it 
was not possible to physically rotate them. Kirsh and Maglio (1994) calculated that such mental rotations are 
much slower to perform than physical epistemic actions. They estimate that it takes 800 to 1200 ms to 
mentally rotate a zoid 90° but only 100 ms to physically rotate it. 
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directly in response to a stimulus in the environment - the tactile change at its feet - but also consistently and 
reliably manipulates that stimulus so as to control flight from the brain as well. (pp. 85-86) 
This process is a basic, but robust, action loop par excellence. 
Interpreting Boundary Crossing 
Questions arise as to whether we should interpret these sorts of boundary crossings as 
'messages between representational arenas' or as a continuous interplay of resources. The 
former interpretation can be captured by an extended representationalist strategy that Clark 
has called catch-and-toss (1997) or interactive (1996) explanation. The basic idea is that 
our internal cognitive components should still be understood as representations 
manipulated according to particular computational rules albeit in a much more attenuated 
form than those that feature in classical cognitive science. Internal components correspond 
to partial (localised, action-oriented, deictic) representations containing part of the content 
needed for modelling and/or planning cognitive activity. The idea here is that the 
environment, or possibly a non-neural part of the body, contains some of the structure 
('content') that makes an activity possible and, importantly, that this external structure 
does not need to be copied into the agent's internal structure for it to play such a role. It is 
rather like the distributed cognition activities where much of the 'information processing' 
goes on in artifacts outside the body. For instance, a person-and-calculator system can 
multiply two large numbers, but what is represented inside the agent during such 
operations are things like 'the first number is 71 986' and 'push the x key for 
multiplication' rather than any detailed mapping of numeric structures - that, in an 
important sense, goes on inside the calculator. Thus what goes on 'in the head' are 
essentially 'contentful states' involved in manipulating and perceiving the environment. Of 
course examples such as this one can be attacked on the basis that it is possible to do 
mental arithmetic in one's head. However others (e.g., Ballard, 1991; Churchland et a1., 
1994) argue that the 'partial representation' approach applies even to basic low-level 
activities such as object recognition and related visual processes because these processes 
also involve frequent boundary crossings. And in situations where boundaries are 
frequently crossed the activity outcome is grounded in the mechanisms resident on both 
sides of the boundary. Thus 'overall content' (roughly, the representation of the activity 
situation) is not found only within the head. 
Take Marr's fly example mentioned earlier. A proper explanation of the fly's flying 
behaviour cannot be had just by examining the fly's internal machinery. One could gloss 
the 'conten( of the component that lifts the fly off the surface it rests on as jump but its 
significance in terms of observable and ecologically significant behaviour is that it leads to 
the fly flying. Indeed that is probably why such a component is in the fly (courtesy of 
natural selection) in the first place. So the overall representational content of the activity of 
flying can be said to reside, not just in the appropriate neural circuits that cause jumping 
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and wing-flapping-when-my-feet-aren't-touching-anything but also partly in the local 
environment where the control loop is completed. 
The latter non-representational viewpoint is better captured from an emergentist and 
dynamical coupling standpoint. Smith (1996) likens this sort of relation between world and 
agent to the relationship that exists between a jacket and its wearer. 
It would be bizarre to say that the jacket 'detects' your motion--even though, sure enough, it changes states 
in a way that is lawfully correlated with your motion. It changes state subject to the constraints of 
overarching physical law because it is connected to you--by coming along with you. (Smith, 1996, p. 219) 
Under this interpretation of frequent boundary crossing, when an agent and an object in its 
local environment are 'connected', it is simpler to understand the relationship in terms of 
coupling than it is to resort to a 'ping-pong' kind of representational explanation where 
there is a rapid cycling between world changes and partial representational constructions. 
The choice as to which interpretation, representational or dynamical, is more correct 
depends on whether you think that it is still possible to assign at least some sort of minimal 
content to the physical states of the components within any of the subsystems that make up 
a behavioural system. Clark (1997) argues that, despite the inroads that ESD-related 
research has made into the traditional conception of mental representation, it is still useful 
( and possible) to assign some sort of useful informational or semantic content to the 
embedded components of a behavioural system: 
Rather than amounting to a clear case against computationalism and representationalism in general, what we 
confront is another body of evidence suggesting that we will not discover the right computational and 
representational stories unless we give due weight to the role of body and local environment - a role that 
includes both problem defmition and, on occasion, problem solution .... Nonetheless, this whole complex of 
important insights is fully compatible with a computational and representational approach to the study of 
cognition. (p. 154) 
However Clark (1997, 1998, pp. 513-516) acknowledges that there exist some forms of 
boundary crossing where "the spatial envelope demarcating each component [e.g., brain 
and world] is of little significance if our object is to understand the evolution of the real-
world behaviors." (1998, pp. 514-515). He gives as examples a radio receiver and 
transmitter system that is rigged up so that the receiver.modulates the transmitter (1998, p. 
514) and a two-'neuron' system that exhibits an oscillatory dynamics even though neither 
neuron does so by itself (1997, p. 164). In both cases it is impossible to pin down the 
activity of the overall system to 'instructions' (representations) buried inside just one 
component. The analogical mapping that he is suggesting here is of the agent onto the 
receiver or one neuron, and environment onto the transmitter or the other neuron. He 
speculates that such continuous reciprocal causation may well occur in situations such as 
an improvised jam session by a jazz trio, dancing, interactive sports, and in group 
conversation. In such cases little explanatory mileage can be made by trying to single out 
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one component as being the source of input and the other as the 'processor' of that input, 
because "the target phenomenon is an emergent property of the coupling of the two 
(perfectly real) components, and should not be "assigned" to either alone." (Clark, 1997, p. 
164). He concludes his analysis of agent-environment dynamics with what may seem to be 
an extraordinary backdown for a confessed representationalist: 
Where the inner and the outer exhibit this kind of continuous, mutually modulatory non-decouplable 
coevolution, the tools of information-processing decomposition are, I believe, at their weakest. What matters 
in such cases are the real, temporally rich properties of the ongoing exchange between organism and 
environment. (Clark, 1997, p. 166) 
He argues, however, that taking the representation out of activities involved in 'local 
environmental contact' does not obviate the need for a representational account of those 
parts of cognition where the referents of the cognitive activity lie outside the agent's 
perceptual range. A discussion of these representation hungry situations is of course vital 
to any developed theory of human cognition and constitutes a major theme of coming 
chapters. For now, however, it is important to note that there exist robust non-
representational candidate explanations for action loop phenomena. 
Reactive, Decentralised Architectures 
ESD interactionism's focus on the importance ofthe interactions between brain, body, and 
world has forced a rethink of hypotheses about the way agents' brains and bodies are put 
together. By taking the role of the environment more seriously than cognitivism typically 
does it has become obvious that the place of the agent in the production of activity may 
also need to change as well. We have seen how situated robotics research is founded upon 
quite a different architectural philosophy from that of classical AI. And we have seen that 
situated action theorists cast humans as primarily deploying embodied skills to deal with 
the contingencies of the immediate and local environment. One of the implications of 
understanding cognitive processes as partly worldly phenomena is that the traditional 
formal task description approach of cognitivism will prove to be insufficient for 
characterising the actual structure and organisation of the 'cognizer's innards' (see my 
discussion of the emergent functionality problem in chapter 2). Rowlands (1999) calls this 
implication the principle of the non-obvious character of evolved internal mechanisms 
(NOC). He describes NOC in the following way: 
For the performance of a given task T, and for any internal mechanism M which has evolved in organism ° 
and which, when combined with suitable environmental manipulation on the part of 0, allows ° to perform 
T, the nature ofM is not always obvious on the basis ofT. (p. 81) 
Hendriks-Jansen (1996) suggests that NOC is one ofthe central lessons of situated robotics 
research and studies in ethology. Within ethology behaviour has often been shown to 
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derive from a collection of semi-independent fixed-action patterns 'triggered' by particular 
sign stimuli in the environment67 . What glues these activity patterns together into a 
coherent looking and adaptive coalition is not some internal executive program, but rather 
the structured layout of the local environment in which the species in question has evolved. 
Because there tend to exist recurring, well-structured spatial layouts and temporal patterns 
in these species-typical environments, the animal does not need to 'represent' these 
relationships in its mindlbrain. Indeed, extended patterns of activity made up of 
environmentally triggered fixed action patterns tend to be more robust and adaptive than 
those that rely upon internal models of the world because they respond directly to the 
unique layouts of specific environments. No two local environments are ever the same 
even though they may contain recurring elements (sign stimUli) organised in reasonably 
regular ways. The similarities between these ethological notions and the ways in which 
situated robots built with subsumption-architectures work are quite striking. Hendriks-
Jansen (1996) argues that ideas from both fields should be brought together to further 
illuminate the organisation of the innards of natural cognizers. 
These ideas all stand in opposition to the classical vision of the agent as a centralised 
infernal modeller and planner. When one distils out the commonalities in these approaches, 
a list of what can be called principles of good design can be formulated. These principles 
are of use, not only to ESD-inclined AI engineers, but also to those who seek to build 
models and theoretical frameworks for explaining the activity of natural cognizers. The 
principles I will discuss here are the principle of reactivity, the 007 principle of parsimony, 
the opportunism principle, and the soft-assembly and decentralisation principle. 
The Principle of Reactivity: React Rather than Predict 
This principle holds that natural cognizers and well-designed robots primarily respond to 
the contingencies and 'signals' in the immediate, local environment rather than attempting 
to predict or model distant environments. Situated robotics research has shown that mobots 
that are designed to pay primary attention to what is happening in the current, local 
67 Hendriks-Jansen (1996) describes a fIxed action pattern as "a unit of behavior with a rigid motor 
component and - optionally - an orienting component to direct its course." (p. 219). The classical 
ethological notion of a fIxed action pattern has been modifIed by more recent expositions in order to 
downplay the fIxed, internal, and innate aspects that Lorenz (e.g., 1957) argued were central. Thus G. 
Barlow (1968) coined the term modal action pattern and Hendriks-Jansen (1996, chap. 12) refers to 
emergent activity patterns. A sign stimulus is an "uncomplicated feature of the environment, such as a 
particular size, shape, or color, which singly or in combinations, trigger the IRM [innate releasing 
mechanism]." (p. 219). Lorenz conceived of an innate releasing mechanism as the internal mechanism which 
responds to the sign stimulus and triggers the activation of the fIxed action pattern. All of these concepts 
have been critiqued within modem ethology (see Hendriks-Jansen, 1996), but the idea that behaviour arises 
from the environmental activation of a collection of action-pattern mechanisms remains useful. 
, --r-··-
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environment are more robust and adaptable than those that constantly attempt to look 
ahead. McClamrock (1995) suggests that such an in-built procrastination design makes use 
of the fact that it is often the case that useful information is available from the local 
environment around the time an agent will need it, often for the simple reason that 
immediate threats and benefits are of primary importance when agents need to 'decide' to 
act. 
This basic reactive architecture made up of simple reflex-like responses to easily detectable 
aspects of the mobot's species-typical environment can be subtly modified to anticipate 
upcoming events by, for instance, building a simple associative conditioning layer on top 
of the basic reactive architecture (Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b; see also chapter 7). 
In Pfeifer and Verschure's Distributed Adaptive Control architecture this additional 
conditioning layer (realised using an embodied neural network) leads the robot to 
anticipate collisions, after a few collision experiences, and take appropriate action before 
they occur. This sort of modification of a basic reactive architecture differs substantially 
from the design philosophy of cognitivist-inspired robots in that anticipative behaviour is 
understood as a kind of diachronically extended reactivity rather than as involving a 
dedicated forward planning system. Situated subsumption architectures bypass many of the 
difficulties of internal modelling architectures by avoiding 
the costs of maintaining a rich model of a highly dynamic environment by relying less on predicting and 
modeling and more on perception .... We can trade complexity of modeling against speed, reiiability, and 
flexibility in perception. We can take a strategy of waiting longer and looking more; but to do so, you'd 
better be able to quicldy and reliably read the right kinds of properties off the perceptual environment ... In 
general, we "cheat" off correlations between easily-parsed properties of the environment and the ones that 
we care about for action. (McClamrock, 1995, pp. 94-95) 
Human beings also seem to spend a large amount of their time reacting to local 
contingencies rather than looking beyond their current situation (see, e.g., Suchman, 1987). 
Thus humans may not be entirely unlike situated robots in much of their day-to-day 
activity. McClamrock (1995) gives the following example of human 'reactive cognition'. 
When we drive a car, much of the fmer-grained structure of the complex-path we take through traffic - when 
we stop, when we change lanes, etc. - is dictated by the contingencies of the driving environment. My 
behavior with respect to any given stop sign is relatively simple; while the complex pattern of stops and 
starts is a clear reflection of the complex pattern of locations of such signs in the surrounding environment. 
(p.84) 
What needs to be 'internally planned', if anything, is only a set of rather basic motivating 
goals such as, in McClamrock's example, "getting across town to the supermarket." The 
complexity of the finer-grained activity comes from reacting to the local environment. 
Similarly, Clark (1997) suggests that human cognition is, at base, of the 'good at frisbee, 
bad at logic' kind - the sort of reactive, perception-action skill that is nicely modelled by 
intrinsically pattern-recognising and pattern-completing connectionist networks. 
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The 007 Principle of Parsimony (a.k.a. the Barking Dog Principle) 
The second principle arises naturally as a consequence of the first: the well-designed, 
adaptive and robust agent should off-load as much behavioural control and needed 
knowledge ~mto the environment as is possible in order to produce behaviour that is 
adaptive and efficient (see, e.g., Hendriks-Jansen, 1994/1996). Clark (1989, 1997) refers to 
this idea as the 007 principle: 
In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process infonnation in costly ways when they can use the 
structure of the environment and their operations upon it as a convenient stand-in for the infonnation-
processing operations concerned. That is, know only as much as you need to know to get the job done. (p. 
46) 
Rowlands (1999) refers to this idea as the barlang dog principle68 and develops a detailed 
evolutionary argument as to why we should expect natural cognizer's to favour 
environmental manipulation strategies over strategies which demand complex internal 
mechanisms. He argues that internal mechanisms require a higher investment in energy for 
both their implementation and maintenance than it does to implement and maintain 
reactive, environmental manipulation mechanisms. It is thus differentially selectively 
disadvantageous for an organism to develop an internal mechanism to tackle a task if a 
manipulation mechanism will do the job just as well. We have already seen this kind of 
principle at work in situated robotics research and interactive vision research where 
reactive manipulation strategies do tend to be computationally cheaper compared to 
classical AI alternatives. 
The 007 principle is useful partly because the local environment often contains rich and 
redundant sources of information that a surrogate internal model may not (see, e.g., 
Gibson, 1979/1986; McClamrock, 1995, pp. 93-95). The artificial environments created by 
earlier AI workers69, that were originally intended to simplify the problems cognitivist-
inspired robots face when dealing with unbounded environmental novelty and the 
exponentially increasing computational demands of planning further and further ahead, can 
actually make things "too hard because they are too simple." (Chapman, 1990, p. 1 quoted 
in McClamrock, 1995, p. 93). Norman (1993b) makes the same sort of observation from a 
more psychological point of view: 
68 Clark (1997) calls it the 007 principle because it suggests that natural cognizers, like spies, should only 
have access to that knowledge that is necessary for them to carry out their task and no more. Rowlands 
(1999) derives his barking dog principle from interpreting the old adage "why keep a dog if you are going to 
bark yourself' as "if you've got a dog you won't need to bark yourself." 
69 For example, the computer-modelled block world in which Winograd's 'virtual robot' Shrdlu lived and 
the high-contrast, simply furnished real world environment of Shakey (see Copeland, 1993; Dennett, 1991). 
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With a disembodied intellect, isolated from the world, intelligent behavior requires a tremendous amount of 
knowledge, lots of deep planning and decision making, and efficient memory storage and retrieval. When the 
intellect is tightly coupled to the world, decision making and action can take place within the context 
established by the physical environment, where structures can often act as a distributed intelligence, taking 
some of the memory and computational burden off the human. (pp. 146-147) 
One important finding of situated robotics and interactive vision researchers has been the 
discovery that real-world environments provide a host of 'cues' (information sources) that 
mobots can use to latch onto important properties, objects, or events. So, for instance, the 
coke can collecting mobot Herbert, mentioned in the previous chapter (Connell, 1989 cited 
in Clark, 1997), uses a laser and a video camera to detect a rough outline of a can rather 
than going through a hugely demanding Marr-like (Marr, 1982) process of computing a 
context independent 3D object from the light falling on an array of photo receptors (see also 
Horswill & Brooks, 1990). Another Brooksian robot (Horswill & Brooks, 1990; Horswill 
1992) can detect and track objects using a pair of simple and rather crude visual systems: a 
'segmenter' that roughly isolates 'objects' (a large band of spectral frequencies that have 
no energy in the markings of background surfaces) from the background and a motion 
detector that manages to (reasonably often) 'stick' to moving objects. Although both of 
these systems are rather poor at their jobs they work well enough when operated together 
and in conjunction with the robot's other behaviour layers. Importantly, both the segmenter 
and motion detector are designed to work in a particular kind of habitat where (roughly) 
objects stand out from their background (the background texture constraint) and where the 
robot and other objects rest on the same surface (the ground plane constraint). In other 
words, the segmenter and the motion detector are designed on the assumption that the 
robot will 'live' in a species-typical environment (i.e., the MIT labs) characterised by these 
constraints 70. 
Moreover, such 'quick and dirty' methods of picking out important objects, events, and 
properties can be even more efficient when used in particular contexts. As McClamrock 
(1995, pp. 96-97) notes, once a particular object (or whatever) has been picked out in a 
certain situation an agent no longer needs to have some procedure for picking it out in all 
possible environments, but only within the restricted array of objects in the current local 
environment. Thus an agent can use very simple basic cues to 'locate' previously 
'identified' objects. And this ability can be further extended by modifying local 
70 This idea that natural cognitive mechanisms are often 'designed' to make efficient use of environmental 
assumptions is essentially the same kind of claim made by Marr (1982) and, more recently, by evolutionary 
psychologists (e.g., Barkow et a1., 1992). For instance, Ramachandran (1988) argues that the vertebrate eye 
design assumes that the world is illuminated from above. However, in these reasonably mainstream 
cognitivist approaches the mechanism itself is not usually considered to be distributed across world and 
organism as it is in Horswill and Brooks' robots. 
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environments to intensify simple perceivable differences between items by, for instance, 
marking items, moving them to and/or keeping them in a standard location, or by attaching 
them to another ~oticeable item (essentially an external form of classical conditioning; for 
a related argument see Dennett, 1993). 
This lesson can be fruitfully extended to the behaviour of natural agents by thinking of an 
animal's species-typical environment as a kind of 'particular context' in which specific 
perception-action reflexes are specially suited, thereby making much or all perception-
action activity largely a use of 'quick and dirty cue usage'. Indeed, Hendriks-Jansen's 
(1996, pp. 81-86; see also R. Barlow, 1990) discussion of the peculiar visual system71 of 
the Horseshoe crab (Limulus polyphemus) provides a possible case in point. It turns out 
that the visual system of Limulus exists primarily for the rather specific job of spotting 
another crab to mate with at night, on a beach, at high tide. And it seems to do this by 
increasing the receptivity of its ommatidia at night to crab-sized objects moving across its 
field of vision at the speed at which horseshoe crabs move. The crab does not distinguish 
'movement across the visual field' in terms of whether this movement is due to its own 
motion or that of its target because it does not matter in terms of the 'task' it is faced with. 
Indeed the entire visual system of the crab seems to capitalise on (and lean rather heavily 
on) the regularities of one of its species-typical environments. 
One implication of thinking in these terms is that it should bring into question the 
assumption in much cognition research that animals' perception-action systems are 
primarily in the job of abstracting the same 'objects' from multiple environments, as in 
Marr's (1982) paradigm. It may well tum out to be the case that many animals, including 
possibly humans72 in much oftheir day to day activity, do not and cannot see or recognise 
the 'same' object in two different kinds of environment. Indeed, what would be the 
71 'Peculiar' because, until recently, no one knew just why the crab had a visual system at all. Apparently it 
does not use it to find food or to detect predators. 
72 Clark (1997, pp. 25-31) and Churchland et al. (1994) provide several examples of how human contact 
with the environment is skewed toward task-specific ways of 'accessing the world' rather than pulling out a 
relatively general and value-free objective representation of the external world. Although our 
phenomenology is often of a clear, objective picture of our surroundings a number of clever experiments 
have shown that we only access what we need to get by. For instance, by tracking eye movements and 
tailoring the input to the small part of the visual field focused upon, junk text can be introduced to the other 
parts of visual field in such a way that it is not even noticed. To the experimental participant it appears that 
meaningful text exists in the rest of the visual field. The impression of a clear wider picture encompassing 
our entire visual field, rather than just the 0.01 percent that we foveate, may result from the fact that our 
"visual perceptual instruments ask and answer their questions so quickly and effortlessly that it seems as 
though all the answers are already, and contemporaneously, in our minds." (Thomas, 1999, p. 221; see also 
Church1and et aI., 1994, p. 37) 
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biological point in doing so where the usefulness (or affordance) of an object depends upon 
the context in which the world is encountered? 
So far 'environmental leaning' has been discussed at quite a low level in tenns of the use 
simple mechanisms make of local environmental structure. But as we have already seen 
people make extensive use of social surroundings to modulate existing cognitive abilities. 
The notions of precomputation (Hutchins, 1995a), enforcement (McClamrock, 1995), and 
scaffolding73 (Clark, 1997) all encompass the idea that people (and perhaps other animals) 
often deliberately modify their surroundings in order capitalise on their basic (experiential, 
perception-action, situated, quick-and-dirty) cognitive skills. But not all environmental 
scaffolding is deliberate in nature. The social activity of agents can also have profound 
unintended consequences on the behavioural complexity of agents. Hutchins (1995a) 
illustrates this with a modified version of Simon's (1981) tale of the ant on the beach. 
Simon (1981) notes that if we follow an ant's movement over a beach it will appear to us 
that its complicated behaviour is due to some sort of complex 'path planning and 
implementing' machinery realised in the ant's nervous system. But this would be a 
mistake, Simon argues, because the complexity of the behaviour viewed can be equally 
well, and more parsimoniously, explained by taking the ant to have basic sensori-motor 
reflexes for responding to encounters with twigs, gullies, sandy mounds and so on. In 
Hutchins' (1995a) parable a community of these ants finds itself upon a beach newly 
smoothed by a recent stonn. 
Generations of ants comb the beach. They leave behind them short-lived chemical trails, and where they go 
they inadvertently move grains of sand as they pass. Over months, paths to likely food sources develop as 
they are visited again and again by ants following fIrst the short-lived chemical trails of their fellows and 
later the longer-lived roads produced by a history of heavy ant traffIc. (p. 169) 
After several months we observe an ant quickly and, apparently intelligently, move about 
the beach to many food-rich locations. The ant seems smarter than its ancestors of months 
ago but this cleverness, Hutchins notes, is not due to anything within the ant, but rather to 
the new 'culturally-shaped' environment of chemical trails and physically scoured out 
paths. The ant still possesses only a basic reactive architecture, but its behavioural 
complexity has changed significantly. 
73 The notion of scaffolding, the process of being guided and tacitly tutored a skill, derives from the work of 
Jerome Bruner (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976) who was in tum influenced by the likes of Vygotsky and 
Luria. Bruner originally used the term in the context of the vital supportive environment that caregivers 
supply children with as they develop language. This language acquisition support system was meant to 
supplement and contrast with Chomsky'S hypothesised innate and internal language acquisition device. Clark 
(1997) and others have subsequently generalised the notion of scaffolding to refer to any kind of 
environmental feature that plays an important role in the production of cognitive activity. 
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Hutchins and Hazlehurst have constructed a number of computer simulations that provide 
some empirical support for the idea that behavioural complexity can be created 
unintentionally through cultural environmental evolution (Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 1991, 
1995; Hazlehurst & Hutchins, 1998). These simulations consist of a group of simple neural 
nets ('citizens' in a virtual community) that deal with problems in their virtual world either 
directly, by observing the natural world, or indirectly, via a 'symbolic system' that enables 
the communication of information about the natural world between agents. The symbolic 
system begins randomly with each agent deploying a particular sign idiosyncratically to 
each environmental event. Each agent gets feedback on the success of their efforts to 
communicate with other agents (obviously two communicating agents who use the same 
signal for an event will succeed) and eventually a 'socially-agreed upon' signal-event 
repertoire emerges. 
The simulations are run over many generations of agents. Old agents, and the weights on 
their neural nets, die and new agents are born with the same initial network weights as their 
forebears. Thus, after the initial generation each generation of agents consists of a group of 
older 'more learned' agents and a group of young ignorant agents. The evolving symbol 
system (realised in the neural nets of each generation) is passed on from generation to 
generation from the older agents to the younger ones. This happens despite the possibility 
of the new agents' ignorant attempts at communicating disturbing the previous 
generations' gains in communicative consensus. 
What Hutchins and Hazlehurst have found is that later generations, despite being 
structurally identical to earlier generations, are able to solve problems that earlier 
generations cannot. They are smarter due to changes in the external public resource of the 
symbol system and not because their innards (basic reactive, pattern-completing 
architecture) had been improved. Clark (1997) nicely captures the spirit of this research 
when he writes "advanced cognition depends crucially on our abilities to dissipate 
reasoning ... Our brains make the world smart so we can be dumb in peace." (p. 180). 
The Principle of Opportunism 
Opportunism, according to McClamrock (1995, p. 87), is "a way to take advantage of the 
dynamic and unpredictable environment by letting it cue the activation of explicit goals." 
He gives a homely example of opportunism in terms of a visit to the store: "you take 
advantage of the opportunity to get milk, because you're at the store, you need milk, and 
seeing milk at the store reminds you of the goal to get milk." (p. 87). So opportunistic 
agents can also leave their 'goals' (and 'decisions' and 'choices') to the tender mercies of 
the environment rather than storing them 'inside' and requiring a complex goal-setting and 
goal-planning architecture. Or put in more ESD-friendly terms, for the opportunist, goals 
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arise from the interplay of the layout of the local environment and the bodily states of the 
agent. Hendriks-Jansen (1994/1996) puts it this way: 
The 'control mechanism' which makes the 'decisions' or 'choices' is thus inextricably embedded in the 
world. This does not mean that the system as a whole can be conceptualized as a behaviourist stimulus-
response engine. Its perceptual and behavioural history will affect its responses to current stimuli, and the 
same stimulus may elicit different responses on different occasions. In the terminology of dynamical systems 
theory, perturbation by the environment alters the systems parameters and affects its evolution equation. (p. 
285) 
Thus, in contrast to the cognitivist agent who is always explicitly trying to satisfy one or 
more goals (in, perhaps, a roughly Newellian and Simonesque [1972] problem-solving 
manner) an ESD agent simply 'meshes' its bodily states with what goes on in the 
surroundings taking advantage of whatever features of the local environment present 
themselves for use. A simple example may be a mobot that can seek out a power supply 
socket to recharge itself. It may operate in a Brooksian manner ('wander with intent') until 
its internal energy supplies drop below a certain threshold level at which point a 'move 
towards a power socket if sighted' behaviour layer begins to override other behaviour 
layers in the ongoing 'bidding war' that occurs between the various activity layers that 
make up the mobot's subsumption architecture. The mobot does not actively seek out a 
power supply until the environment provides the appropriate cues for initiating the relevant 
activities. As Hendriks-Jansen (1996) notes in a related discussion of Mataric's (1991) 
robot Toto: 
If it makes any sense to talk about a decision-making process that activates one reflex rather than another, 
that process clearly cannot be located inside the robot. To a large extent, it is the particular environment for 
which the robot was designed that serves as the choice mechanism between the various low-level reflexes. 
This does not mean that the robot merely responds to its environment. Its own movement is as much 
responsible for the behavioral "choices" that result in wall following as is the structure of its environment. If 
the robot did not move, the environmental contingencies that cause the low-level reflexes to come into play 
would not arise. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, pp. 190-191)74 
Opportunism is thus one more design principle which can reduce the 'computational 
burden' of complex tasks such a environmental searching, goal setting, and so on that 
require a complex spatial and temporal breakdown of the environment to produce internal 
models of actual and desired environments. Within an appropriately structured 
environment (e.g., a series of rooms with a number of accessible power sockets) with an 
appropriately designed agent-architecture (e.g., an early enough low energy warning 
threshold for the activation of the 'power socket approach' behaviour layer) an agent can 
'survive' quite happily without the need for complex, high-level behavioural planning 
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systems. Of course, environmental change (e.g., a reduction in the amount of available 
power sockets) could spell curtains for such a situated opportunist, but not perhaps for a 
planful and thereby more flexible cognitivist agent. However, as I will argue in chapter 8 
this more advanced intentional behaviour may be explainable in terms of a social/cultural 
reuse of a basic, opportunistic, situated architecture without requiring an internal model-
building system. 
The Principles of Soft Assembly and Decentralisation 
Soft assembly is a term used by Thelen and Smith (1994), Goldfield (1995), and others to 
refer to the activity of a functioning system that constructs itself or self-organises from a 
collection of coupled subsystems (e.g., nervous system, skeletal or link-segment system, 
musculotendon system, circulatory system). The activity of each subsystem perturbs other 
subsystems and ultimately this mutual perturbation leads to the establishment of a stable, 
usually adaptive, systemic behavioural pattern. Furthermore, when certain parameters are 
changed within one of the subsystems the overall system will (often) re-organise into a 
new and different stable state. For instance, the overall behaviour of Brooks' mobots 
derives from the mutual interaction ofthe different behaviour layers (subsystems). This is 
in contrast to 'hard-assembled' systems that derive their ordered behaviour patterns from 
the constraining effects of a central command and control centre. Similarly, Thelen and 
Smith (1994) (and others that base their work on the influential ideas of Nicholas 
Bernstein; see Thelen & Smith, 1994, pp. 75-77) contrast the emerging view of human and 
animal movement as the outcome of the self-organising, soft assembly of skeletal, 
neuromuscular, and local environment systems, with the more cognitivist view of 
movement as the outcome of commands from central pattern generators in the nervous 
system (see Goldfield, 1995; Saltzman, 1995; Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
Maes (1995; see also Clark, 1997) illustrates the difference between a centralised, hard-
assembled system and a decentralised, soft-assembled system by contrasting two ways of 
robustly controlling a multiple-processor computer network so that it efficiently deals with 
the numerous subtasks that make up its overall job. The classical system has a separate 
central controller that gathers information from each of the processors and uses various 
rules and heuristics to work out which jobs should be assigned to each processor. The 
decentralised system, by contrast, consists only of the multiple machines linked in a clever 
way. As each machine works it will, from time to time, create new jobs. At such times the 
machine sends out 'requests' to the other machines for estimates of how long the job will 
take given its current workload. The 'highest bidder' (the machine that signals the most 
74 See Hendriks-Jansen (1996) and Maes (1995) for defences of this view against traditional models of 
behaviour selection. 
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efficient delivery of a job) is assigned the job. This soft-assembly system thus self-
organises an emergent scheduling system in a computationally-efficient and robust 
manner; it does not suffer when a machine crashes or is damaged and it is not hampered by 
model-updating problems that may strike a centralised system. 
Soft-assembled systems have the virtue of being able to easily and adaptively deal with a 
variety of environmental and task conditions (e.g., changes in terrain, damage to muscles 
or limbs, differing energy demands for moving at different speeds, movement while 
encumbered by clothes or footwear). In all of these cases a system must carefully 
'rebalance' the contribution from the various subsystems in order to continue producing 
the requisite behaviour. A cat, for instance, can continue to walk, balance and so on with a 
leg in a cast by subtly altering the kind of gait it uses via different muscular and neural 
activity. A simple walking robot, by contrast would likely tip over or move in circles 
unless it could compensate for such changes. Such hard-assembled systems are 
characterised by brittleness in changing conditions and by the incredible demands on 
internal 'command and control' complexity when dealing with increasingly dynamic 
environments. Self-organising systems seem to be able to naturally deal with many kinds 
of perturbation of the agent's body by either compensating for changes or by moving into a 
new kind of adaptive, stable state (see also Clark, 1997, pp. 42-45). 
Interactive Emergence 
In the previous section it was noted that the observed behaviour of environmentally-
exploitative systems, such as situated robots and dynamically-coupled systems, is not 
completely specified in the internal structure of the agent. That is, the structure of the 
environment plays a very significant role in the shape and structure of the behavioural 
activity that is produced. This stands in contrast to the view that the agent controls the 
behavioural outcome via an inner 'kinematic template' (Saltzman, 1995) that specifies the 
exact form of the behaviour to be produced. Behaviours that cannot be predicted from, or, 
more importantly, are not solely caused by, the internal structure ofthe agent's mindlbrain 
are said to be interactively emergent (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; see also Clark, 1997; Steels, 
1995)75. 
75 The prefix interactive distinguishes this form of emergence from others where a high-level phenomenon 
occurs by virtue of the interaction of many components within a system such as the emergence of orderly 
convection rolls from the microinteractions of molecules in a pan of heated oil (see Kelso, 1995). This 
contrast is not meant to imply that within-system emergence does not occur within interactively emergent 
systems - situated robots with neural network architectures (which are 'within-system emergent') are a case 
in point. 
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Patterns of activity whose high-level structure cannot be reduced to specific sequences of 
movements may emerge from the interactions between simple reflexes and the particular 
environment to which they are adapted (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, p. 8). Hendriks-Jansen 
(1996) notes that in systems whose behaviour is interactively emergent 
[t]here is no differentiation of the activity as a whole into a fIxed and a variable component. Indeed, the 
explanation of why certain activity patterns appear fIxed, in the sense of being easily recognizable, does not 
reduce to a fonnal representation or generative mechanism for those patterns inside the creature. ... The 
emergent pattern of activity will not have a correlate in the creature's nervous system, but it can be 
decomposed into simpler activities, which may themselves have neural correlates, or be further 
decomposable into even simpler activities. The synthesis of these activities, producing the emergent activity 
pattern, cannot be paralleled in a corresponding synthesis of their neurophysiological correlates or their 
mathematical characterizations. Interactive emergence means there exists no overall fonnal description of the 
high-level phenomenon, though its pattern will be clearly recognizable within the context of the creature's 
environment. (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, pp. 228-229) 
Interactive emergence is nicely illustrated by some examples within the ESD-related 
literature. Hallam and Malcolm (1994 cited in Clark, 1997, pp. 111-112) have suggested a 
simple design for interactively creating a wall-following behaviour in a robot. Such a robot 
need only possess an in-built bias to steer slightly to the right and a collision detector 
(which could be as simple as a springy rod) that signals the robot to tum slightly left for a 
brief period. Together these two subsystems, in interaction with the environment, could 
successfully create a wall-following strategy of the 'veer and bounce' variety. A more 
complex design that uses infrared reflection and deflection to mediate environmental 
contact has been implemented by Nehmzow, Smithers, and McGonigle (1993 cited in 
Steels, 1995; see also Smithers, 1992). It essentially makes use of the same two behaviour 
layers - an object avoidance layer (akin to the collision detector) and a wall-seeking layer 
(akin to the steering bias). The layers use infrared reflection from a lateral surface (a 
'wall') to modulate an 'attraction' (inclination to steer) toward the surface. The closer the 
mobot gets, the lower the attraction. When tuned adequately the activity of the two layers 
results in a kind of attractive/repulsive equilibrium that maintains the mobot's wall-
following behaviour. This behaviour is emergent "because the category 'equidistance to the 
(left/right) wall' is not explicitly sensed by the robot or causally used in one of the 
controlling behavior systems." (Steels, 1995, p. 92). Similar designs are found in the 
mobots created by Brooks (1991a, 1991b), Mataric (1991), Pfeifer and Verschure (1992a, 
1992b). The primary lesson of the ways in which the wall-following behaviour is 
assembled by these systems is nicely summarised by Clark (1997, pp. 111-112) when he 
writes "the wall-following behavior ... emerges from the interaction of between the robot 
and its environment. It is not sub served by any internal state encoding a goal of wall 
following. We, as external theorists, lay on the wall-following description as a gloss on the 
overall embedded behavior of the device." 
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Interactive emergence is also clearly seen in situations where populations of simple 
reactive and reflexive agents interact with both each other and their surroundings. Craig 
Reynolds (1987) provides a simple example with his research attempts to model the 
flocking, herding, and schooling behaviour of various animals by supplying the 'agents' in 
his computer program (he calls them Boids) with three simple 'reflexes': 1) maintain a 
minimum distance from other objects (including other boids), 2) match velocity with that 
of neighbouring boids, and 3) move toward the perceived centre of mass of the boid flock. 
When each boid follows these simple 'rules' complex flocking patterns emerge. These 
include flying around obstructions in a natural looking ,way by breaking into subflocks and 
then reuniting once the obstruction has been negotiated. Notably such behavioural goals 
are not explicitly 'stored' within any of the boids. Reynolds' boids can flock without 
having any dedicated 'flocking mechanisms' for splitting, regrouping, subflocking and so 
on. All of these behavioural patterns are high-level 'side effects' of a low-level agent-
environment dynamics (For related research see Stewart [1998, chap. 10] and Hodgins and 
Brogan [1994]). 
A similar simulation by Resnick (1994) attempts to show how tennites collect woodchips 
into piles. Instead of programming each tennite to take each chip to a selected spot Resnick 
imparted each virtual tennite with two basic reflexes: if the tennite is not carrying anything 
and it bumps into a chip it picks it up, and if it is carrying a chip and bumps into another 
chip put the chip down. With these two simple rules 2000 chips are sorted into just 34 piles 
after several thousand steps even though there is no rule specified to avoid picking up chips 
from existing piles (indeed tennites are 'encouraged' to do so) or to build piles. Pile-
building occurs because once the last chip is removed from a spot a pile can never be 
started at the spot again (because a tennite must encounter a chip to drop its load). These 
'void areas' are agent-environment entities that specify what the tennites can and cannot 
do at those points. Thus pile-building interactively emerges from the layout of the 
environment and the simple internal structure of each tennite. 
Kugler and Turvey (1987) examine the behaviour of real tennites in a similar way. Some 
tennites build their nest out of elaborate mudball columns and arches. It is unlikely that 
these tennites possess some sort of built-in instructions for creating such structures and it 
turns out that the columns and arches interactively emerge from the tennites basic 'habits' 
of leaving a chemical trace on each mudball that they deposit and their tendency to drop 
the balls where they detect the strongest concentration of the trace. The tennites start their 
mudball construction in the same way as Resnick's virtual tennites do by creating piles 
(columns) of mud. However arches emerge when the chemical trace of a nearby column 
'overlaps' with that ofthe column that the tennite is on. The result is a skewing of the high 
point of concentration toward the edge of a tennite's column in the direction of the 
neighbouring column. Gradually, through the efforts of many tennite builders, the two 
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columns will grow together with their upper layers getting closer and closer to each other. 
The result is an interactively emergent arch. Other nest structures seem to evolve in similar 
ways. 
Luc Steels (1995) has attempted to provide a deeper analysis of these sorts of emergent 
behaviours in terms of the controllability and visibility of significant behavioural variables. 
Steels' first characterisation of emergence involves the distinction between controlled and 
uncontrolled variables. An uncontrolled variable is simply some aspect of the agent's 
behaviour that the agent cannot directly influence. Thus an emergent behaviour is a 
behaviour that is not directly controlled by an internal component. Instead the behaviour 
emerges from the interactions between the agent's internal components and between the 
agent and its environment. To give a simple example, one's car's speed is (hopefully) a 
controlled variable. One (connected appropriately with the car engine) can systematically 
influence the car's speed. By contrast, the fact that the car rattles ominously at 85 kmIh is 
an uncontrolled variable of the 'automotive system'. It is not possible to directly influence 
the speed at which the rattling occurs. It does not make sense, for example, to ask the 
driver to change the 'rattling speed' to 100kmlh. Clark (1997, p. 110) gives a similar 
example of the uncontrolled variable view of emergence that derives from Hofstadter's tale 
of a computer system that thrashed about when 35 users were hooked into it. Again it 
makes little sense to ask a computer analyst to shift the 'thrashing number' to, say, 60. 
'Thrashing' is an uncontrolled variable - a side-effect of the wayan entire system is put 
together. Interactive emergence can be understood in these terms if the parts of the entire 
system causing the behaviour include aspects of the environment. 
Steels also provides an invisible variable characterisation of emergence that is meant to 
provide a basis for the intuition that emergent behaviour is behaviour that looks (to a 
human observer) as if the system (e.g., an agent) is using a particular feature of the 
environment to modulate its behaviour, but is in fact using some other kind of 
environmental hook-up. Again an example will help to illustrate this idea. A person-
avoiding mobot (say Herbert) may always maintain a 1 metre gap between itself and 
people wandering about the MIT labs. This may look as if Herbert is somehow explicitly 
measuring that 1 metre distance (e.g., by extending a tape measure or by calculating 
distance via sonar returns) and using an explicit internal representation (call it d)' derived 
from such sensing to modulate its behaviour (e.g., IF d<l THEN move backwards). In this 
case d is, what Steels calls, a visible variable. However, Herbert may in fact only be 
maintaining that distance indirectly by, for instance, not letting objects take up more than a 
particular proportion of its visual field (a sort of 'looming detector') or by not letting the 
sound-level of footfalls exceed a certain level. In both cases d is not calculated or used by 
the robot. It belongs entirely within the observer's cognitive domain. This view of 
142 
emergence can be used to describe interactive emergence if the mechanisms underlying the 
assembly of the 'invisible-variable behaviour' include environmental features. 
Both of Steels' criteria for deciding whether a behaviour (or other phenomenon) IS 
emergent rest on the basic idea that some patterns of activity are not exclusively 
determined by a single internal subsystem and cannot be described in terms of the activity 
of that subsystem. In cases of interactive emergence even the entire set of internal 
subsystems does not exclusively determine the activity that results; rather, it is the way in 
which the 'agent-side' subsystems interact with the 'environment-side' structures that 
gives rise to activity. 
Two questions should spring to mind given these analyses of the notion of interactive 
emergence: What are the advantages (and disadvantages) of producing behaviour 
emergently?, and Why should we believe that the behavioural patterns of animals are 
interactively emergent? What we find is that answers to the first question partly answer the 
second question. 
The advantages of producing behaviour via interactive emergence (by contrast with central 
control) have already been covered in the discussion of situated robots and softly-
assembled systems. To recap these reactive, decentralised systems produce behaviours that 
are more robust, flexible and efficient than traditional centrally-controlled behaviours76 (see 
Steels, 1995; Maes, 1995). Task-specific, softly-assembled systems seem to be able to deal 
well with the problem of creating the same ldnd of behaviour (distal behaviour) in different 
environments by varying the particular contribution of the agent's proximal behaviour in 
an appropriate way. Centrally-controlled systems by contrast are likely to provide the same 
sequence of movements (proximal behaviour) in different environments, thereby creating 
different kinds of large-scale activity (distal behaviour). So interactive emergence is 
particularly likely to be operating in the case of activities that are flexibly adapted to the 
idiosyncrasies of the local environment. It is not too difficult to see that real animal activity 
is better approximated by the characteristics of interactively emergent, softly-assembled 
behaviours. 
76 Actually Steels (1995) claims that one of the disadvantages of emergent behavioural systems is their 
inefficiency. Unfortunately this remark has no surrounding context, so it is not clear what he means by this. 
It is possible, from his engineering point of view, that he means it is more difficult to design and build robots 
that make use emergent behaviours. This would be certainly in keeping with claims of Brooks (1991a) and 
others in their struggles to adequately tune their mobots so that they work properly. This however is not what 
I mean by efficiency. I take efficiency to be the efficient use of internal structures within an agent - what 
others refer to as the reduction of computational burden. As discussed above, architectures that demand long-
range, look-ahead and detailed modelling of the environment require complex computation in order to 
produce adaptive behaviour. 
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Hendriks-Jansen (1996; see also Rowlands, 1999) has provided an additional evolutionary 
argument as to why natural cognizers are likely to have reactive and decentralised 
architectures and thus why it is likely that we need to understand behaviour from an 
interactive emergence perspective. Natural selection works on organisms-in-their-species-
typical-environments (basically on agent-environment systems) which is just a way of 
saying that fitness is defined relative to the challenges an organism faces in its 
surroundings (competition from other species, environmental adversities, etc.). The bodies 
(including nervous systems) that will be selected will be those that produce the right kinds 
of behaviour within that particular context. Therefore, the internal components that get 
selected will form the agent-side portion of the distributed mechanism necessary for 
producing a particular interactively emergent behaviour77. 
In sum, ESD-related fields seem to constantly tum up examples of behavioural patterns 
that are better thought of as emerging from low-level agent-environment interactions rather 
than being 'executed' or 'initiated' by an internal behaviour controlling mechanism. The 
implications of such findings are profound. Firstly, they suggest that modellers of cognitive 
activity need to distinguish between uncontrolled variables and controlled variables, 
invisible variables and visible variables, before launching into the work of describing the 
'computational architecture' of a behaving agent. Failure to adequately work out what the 
agent senses and uses to modulate its behaviour will lead to the wrong internal dynamics 
being hypothesized (This is the frame of reference problem and is discussed more fully in 
the section on effective environments below). 
Secondly, the phenomenon of interactive emergence makes it clear that we cannot even be 
sure of the behavioural function of inner components if we only examine the internal 
economy of the agent's mindlbrain. No adequate characterisation of the inside can be had 
without an appreciation of its relations to the outside. The next section is devoted to an 
analysis of this implication of interactive emergence. 
77 It is important to distinguish this argument from the related claim, made by evolutionary psychologists 
(e.g., Barkow et at, 1992), that the mind/brains of natural cognizers will contain cognitive mechanisms 
designed to deal with the recurring and stable features of their ancestral environments (e.g., Cosmides' 
[1989] claim that humans have evolved a cheater-detection module). Hendriks-Jansen's (and Rowlands') 
argument is that, since much behaviour is an emergent outcome of neural, bodily, and environmental 
constraints, and thus controlled by a distributed mechanism, natural selection will more likely preserve an 
adaptive partial control structure realised in the nervous system and body of the animal rather than a 
complete, in-the-head control system. The two different claims are not necessarily inconsistent with each 
other. However, much evolutionary psychological work does give the impression that the hypothesised 
modules and Darwinian algorithms designed to deal with recurring environmental features involve complete, 
in-the-head control systems rather than distributed ones. 
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The Mutual Definition of Agent Architecture, Environment, and Activity 
Environment dynamics, agent architecture, and behavioural activity are all vital 
components of a theory of cognition (see Horswill, 1992; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). The 
environment stimulates and 'perturbs' the agent's body, which in tum compensates, 
producing sentient movement which we call behaviour. This movement results in changes 
to the environment, and the positioning of the agent in that environment, thereby changing 
the ways in which the environment affects the agent. These relationships are tight, 
continuous, ones. Activity, in the sense of movement, is not a separate material entity from 
the agent's body but describes its changes and realignments within the environmental 
milieu. It should thus be clear that these notions of agent, environment,. and activity cannot 
be understood to refer to independent explanatory entities. Cognitive theory must 
understand them as relational terms. Yet traditional cognitive science, at base, does treat 
these explanatory entities as relatively independent. There is an emphasis in cognitivism on 
the environment as a viewer-independent and objective entity that must be recovered in 
great detail before meaningful activity can be initiated. This environment is usually 
understood in one of two ways: as the world described by physics or, more commonly, as 
the commonsense world of everyday human life (Chemero, 1998a, chap. 5)78. 
Cognitivism also portrays the agent's innards as containing fully-fledged plans of action 
and models of the world. Behaviour is seen to be an outcome of internal behaviour 
programs that specify what to do (the fixed component of behaviour). The environment 
only serves as a set of constraints that may frustrate the workings of this inner behavioural 
system (the variable component of behaviour). Thus, for the most part behaviour can be 
understood almost entirely in terms of what is represented within the agent79. 
78 Gibson (1979/1986) and his followers suggest that the environment should be understood at an ecological 
level of analysis in terms of the behavioural possibilities it affords animals (a common-sense world of all 
animals). This is a significant improvement over the other two approaches, but it has been criticized for 
wavering somewhat between providing an objective analysis of environment (relevant to all animals) and 
advancing a relational, species- or individual-relative notion of the environment (e.g., Costall, 1995; Varela 
et a1., 1991, chap. 9). 
79 Within philosophy of mind these ideas correspond closely to the claims of internalism, of which Fodor's 
(1980) methodological solipsism is perhaps the best known variety. Internalism's basic claim is that 
behaviour can be purely understood in terms of the 'meanings' (or narrow content) stored within the 
mindlbrain. Externalists by contrast (e.g., Lalor, 1997; McClamrock, 1995) argue, after Putnam (1975, p. 
227) that "'meanings' just ain't in the head!", and that one must view the operation of internal cognitive 
components as being deeply context-dependent. This means that, amongst other things, two identical twins 
could be in identical brain states, but have different 'mental contents' because of the differing contexts 
within which they are embedded (the infamous Twin Earth thought experiments are often used to illustrate 
this point). The concerns of the internalism-externalism debate do not obviously impact on ESD issues 
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Representations, once they have been constructed within the mindlbrain, are understood to 
be independent of, or more specifically have content independent from, the vagaries of the 
local environment. 
By contrast, ESD interactionists have come to eschew any attempts to think of 
environment, agent, and activity as anything but mutually defining entities. This is not, for 
the most part, anything to do with obscure philosophical argumentation, but rather for the 
practical reasons of understanding how natural agents work and how situated robots should 
be built. In light of these demands interactionists have come to think of the behaviourally 
significant environment of the agent as an Umwelt (Von Uexkiill, 1934/1957) or effective 
environment (Clark, 1997) that is mutually defined by the characteristics of the world and 
the sensory characteristics of the agent. Similarly, they have begun to think that the roles 
and functions of the internal components of the agent can only be properly understood in 
terms of the structure of the environment in which the agent is embedded. Behaviour is 
understood to emerge interactively and no amount of inspection of the inner economy of 
mindlbrain will deliver up behaviour programs. 
Effective Environments 
ESD interactionists are making increasing use of the notions of effective environment and 
Umwelt in their studies of cognitive activity. Roughly speaking, the terms effective 
environment and Umwelt refer to 'the world as it is understood from the perspective of the 
agent'80. An Umwelt is the world that an agent has access to courtesy of the way that its 
bodily systems, particularly its sensory systems, are wired together. In the words of 
Merleau-Ponty (1965) "it is the organism itself - according to the proper nature of its 
receptors, the thresholds of its nerve centers, and the movements of the organs - which 
chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive." (p. 13). 
Moreover because of the demands of natural selection on sensory systems an Umwelt is a 
description of the world in terms of what the organism can do with it - an Umwelt describes 
because they have usually been directed at the contents of folk psychological propositional attitudes (such as 
beliefs and desires) (see Keijzer, 1997, pp. 97-106). However Clark and Chalmers (1995) have argued that 
ESD research should encourage us to adopt an active externalism where behaviour is seen to be the product 
of environmental and bodily structure (and not just a passive context 'interacting' with a folk psychological 
'mind'; but see also Lalor, 1997 and McClamrock, 1995 on how no externalism is really all that passive). 
Clark and Chalmer's active externalism is almost synonymous with the notion of interactive emergence and 
thus obviously central to ESD ideas. It is not clear however what implications such an approach has for 
understanding cognition in representational terms. 
80 Similar sorts of ideas are evident in the notions of ecological level, affordance (Gibson, 197911986), 
Lebenswelt, frame of reference (Clancey, 1989; Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a), features (Stewart & Cohen, 
1997), and enaction (Varela et al., 1991). 
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a space of possibilities for action. Thus instead of seeing an 'objective' collection of 
objects, properties, and situations (e.g., a red block 10 metres to the north) animals, 
including humans, see the world in terms of affordances (e.g., a thing to hide behind before 
that predator sees me). Animals do not see a valueless object and then, once a value-free 
representation has been constructed, mentally implant it with meaning and value (see, e.g., 
Smythe, 1992a). Rather, the structure of an organism's sensory systems (in the broadest 
sense) permits interaction with the world-as-it-is in a particular way that is determined by 
the survival and reproduction requirements of that organism. The objective world is 
sampled and aspects of it are accessed in ways that are useful to the specific animal81 . A 
couple of examples may help to make these ideas clearer. 
Perhaps the most well-rehearsed example comes from Von Uexkiill's (193411957) analysis 
of the behaviour of the tick - an animal that seeks out warm mammalian skin for laying its 
eggs. According to Von Uexkiill the tick's entire perceptual and cognitive world (its 
Umwelt) consists of just three distinct entities (objects, properties, features) that correspond 
to what we know as butyric acid (found on mammalian skin and thus a sign of nearby 
food), tactile contact with mammalian skin, and body heat. Each stimulus sets off a 
particular behaviour: butyric acid causes the tick to drop onto its potential host, tactile 
contact is the sign to move about in search of heat, and heat is the cue to burrow into the 
skin in search of a place to reproduce. 
The effective environment ofthe coral octopus has been described as consisting of "'food' 
(small things that move or are carried in forceps) and 'non-food' (everything else). 
However, the 'everything else' category is subdivided into 'useful crevices' (big enough to 
squeeze into, too small for a predator to follow), 'home crevice' (I live here), and 'the rest 
of geography' (not distinguished)." (Stewart & Cohen, 1997, p. 166). Stewart and Cohen 
call these divisions of an animal's effective environment 'features' (pretty much equivalent 
to the Gibsonian notion of an affordance82). 
81 This is not to say that we humans, for instance, cannot and do not further interpret what we perceive in 
particular ways according to our 'high-level' plans and expectations (for instance, interpreting someone's 
lateness as indicative of their disorganised character). The main point being made here is that even our most 
basic, subpersonal encounters are, in a sense, interpretations of the world-as-it-is. There is no fundamental 
objective contact with this mind-independent reality. 
82 Gibson (1979/1986) thought of an affordance as a agent-relative feature of an object or event in the 
environment. Objects and events may have multiple affordances (a chair may afford sitting on and standing 
on to get something off the top of a shelf for a person) and these affordances may not always be obvious or 
noticeable (the term 'attensity' has been used by Gibsonians to capture the idea that an affordance may be 
more or less noticeable - an ergonomically designed tool should have a higher attensity than a badly 
designed one). Thus Gibson was convinced that affordances are objective and real entities (not just 'things in 
animals' minds') that can be detected because evolution sees to it that an animal is in contact with important 
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Finally Hendriks-Jansen (1996, p. 254) examines the early interactions of an infant with its 
caretaker (usually its mother) from an Umwelt perspective. Human infants, it turns out, are 
blessed with a variety of abilities that, in combination with their need to be closely 
monitored due to their relative helplessness, create an Umwelt centred on their mothers' 
faces and the myriad events that occur there. These 'abilities' include poor visual depth of 
field and early visual fixation patterns. Hendriks-Jansen's example raises a couple of 
important points. Firstly, that an agent's Umwelt gradually changes with development, and 
secondly that early, immature Umwelten may play an important focusing and scaffolding 
role for the development oflater skills and distinctions. Infants, so Hendriks-Jansen argues, 
are designed so that their early behavioural capacities single out important sources of 
stimulation (e.g., mother's vocalisations, mother's gaze) for the development of later 
abilities (e.g., development of dialogue and turntaking) (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, chap. 15). 
Thus Umwelten reflect a perspective on the world skewed toward what an animal needs 
from the world in order to behave adaptively in its species-typical environment. From an 
adult human perspective the Umwelt of other animal species may seem to 1) exclude or 
include aspects of the world, 2) group dissimilar things or distinguish similar things, or 
more subtly, 3) accentuate or diminish regions within perceptual continuities. 
A simple example of inclusion/exclusion can be seen in the fact that many insect species 
are perceptually sensitive to ultraviolet radiation, whereas we are not. Varela et al. (1991, 
pp. 180-184) provide a more complex example; they point out that while human vision is 
trichromatic, being facilitated by three types of photoreceptors (for hue, saturation, and 
brightness), some other animal species have fewer or more dimensions to their 'colour' 
spaces. Rabbits, squirrels, tree shrews, and some New World monkeys, for instance, have 
dichromatic vision, whereas goldfish, pigeons, and ducks are tetrachromats. All animals 
'see' the same world-as-it-is, but they all have profoundly different perceptual worlds of 
'colour'. Notice how the insect-vision example differs from the colour-space one. In the 
former insects seem to have access to part of the electromagnetic spectrum that we do not. 
Whereas in the latter the very same electromagnetic radiation has different perceptual 
consequences depending on the anatomy ofthe respective animal's visual systems. 
Dennett (1991) nicely summarises the idea that animals' perceptual worlds may seem to 
split apart or glue together, what may seem to us to be peculiar combinations of objects and 
(for fitness) parts of the world. He argues that a set of affordances should not be understood to be a 
phenomenal environment: "This can be taken erroneously to be the "private world" in which the species is 
supposed to live, the "subjective world," or the world of "consciousness." The behavior of observers depends 
on their perception of their environment, surely enough, but this does not mean that their behavior depends 
on a so-called private or subjective or conscious environment. The organism depends on its environment for 
its life, but the environment does not depend on the organism for its existence." (Gibson, 1979/86, p. 129) 
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events, when he writes: "If some creature's life depended on lumping together the moon, 
blue cheese, and bicycles, you can be pretty sure that Mother Nature would find a way for 
it to 'see' these as 'intuitively just the same kind of thing.'" (p. 381). A slightly less 
colourful, but realistic example comes from the Umwelt of the mantis shrimp (Squilla 
mantis). At a particular stage of its life cycle (the antizoea) the mantis shrimp treats 
anything less than half its size which moves as food (Stewart & Cohen, 1997, pp. 165-
167). To us floating bits of seaweed, plastic, wood, as well as small fish, do not seem very 
similar objects. Ironically many ofthe things that the shrimp sees as food (and thus attacks 
in an attempt to snip off any appendages) are not nutritious at all. 
More subtly, other species' Umwelten may accentuate or magnify regions within, what 
appears in other schemes to be, various perceptual continuities, and thereby diminish the 
'size' of other differences. That is, what appears to us, or scientific measurement, to be 
changing in a linear fashion may be importantly non-linear to another species. And other 
animals' linearity may appear non-linear to us. Our ability to perceive phonemes in a fairly 
discontinuous manner (when the actual acoustic features, such as voice-onset time or onset 
frequency of the lowest formant, change linearly) provides one example (see, e.g., Eimas, 
1985; Wood, 1976). One could also imagine that heightened sensitivity to parts of the 
electromagnetic spectrum may provide access to subtle changes in colour that signal 
different kinds of food quality. By the standards of other schemes such non-linearities 
serve to strongly tie animals to important parts of the environment so that adaptive 
behaviour can be produced. 
The combination of these features shows how Umwelten 'constitute the natural joints of 
the world' for animals. An Umwelt is a specific selection of 'bits' ofthe world-in-itself and 
also a useful transform of those 'bits' accessed. And this 'categorising scheme' of the 
world is most likely to make rough sense in terms of the behaviours that a species needs to 
produce in order to survive and reproduce (in the ancestral environments in which the 
species' body structures were selected). No doubt there is much room for 'noise' and 
'inaccuracy' even within such schemes. For instance, a particular animal may see 'a 
dangerous situation that requires fleeing' in many situations that do not require such 
behaviour without it adversely affecting the animal's survival and chances of reproduction. 
As long as a behaviour that is based upon a particular perceptual scheme does not 
jeopardise survival and reproduction, the mechanisms underlying it can be selected for. 
Natural selection, as Varela et al. (1991, chap. 9) forcefully point out, deals in viability not 
optimality. 
But even though each agent's perceptual systems arrange the world in different ways 
according to its needs and capabilities, the Umwelt concept does not imply a complete 
rejection of any kind of objectivity. An animal that possesses a particular Umwelt can still 
act in an 'objective' (rational, adaptive, realistic) manner by accurately tracking changes 
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signalled within that scheme as the world about it changes. Since most significant (i.e., 
important for survival and reproduction) changes in the real world will be detected as 
changes within the Umwelt, it will provide the animal with the appropriate information 
required to act adaptively. 
The Frame of Reference Problem 
Interest in the effective environment concept has arisen because ESD researchers have 
become increasingly aware that patterns of activity can potentially be produced by a 
variety of underlying mechanisms. That is, there is a difficulty in working out whether an 
objectively-described ('viewpoint-independent' or 'third-person perspective') aspect of the 
environment that an agent seems to use to modulate its behaviour is a visible or invisible 
variable (Steels, 1995). 
As we have seen already, the work of situated roboticists provides a number of nice cases 
in point. A variety of intelligent-looking behaviours have been simulated in robots using 
subsumption architectures rather than the more traditional sorts of architectures that are 
based on a formalised folk-psychological analysis of behaviour. The nagging worry that 
has arisen from these findings is that perhaps cognitive science's traditional formal task -
analytic approach to constructing 'cognitive architectures' (whether they be in theories 
about human cognition or in plans for building intelligent agents) is fundamentally flawed 
and unlikely to enlighten us about the ways cognitive beings are put together. 
Functionalism's grand claim that we need only analyse the multiply-realisable, algorithmic 
level of cognitive architecture comes into question. In order to deal with these problems 
ESD researchers have tried to make more explicit, what Clancey (1989; see also Pfeifer & 
Verschure, 1992a) has called, the frame of reference problem. This is the problem of 
working out what it is that an agent is tuned to in their surroundings (what constitutes its 
effective environment) and how it uses those sensitivities to modulate its behaviour. Or, in 
Steels' (1995) terminology, it is the problem of discovering the controlled variables in a 
behavioural system. 
Pfeifer and Verschure (1992a) illustrate the sorts of difficulties associated with the frame 
of reference problem with an example from work of Franceschini, Pichon, and Blanes 
(1991) that attempts to model the behaviour of flies. 
[T]he fly only has motion detectors, i.e., if the fly is not moving and nothing moves in the environment, the 
fly is 'blind'. Let us assume that the fly has a mechanism for turning if it is approaching something fast. Now 
we are inclined to think that we need an adaptive mechanism for adjusting the distance at which the fly 
should tum to avoid the obstacle: if it is flying fast it should tum earlier than if it is flying more slowly. 
However, since the fly is equipped with motion detectors the case where it is approaching a nearby object 
slowly is - from the point of view of the fly - identical to one where the fly is flying fast and the object is 
further away. Indeed, the action to be taken is exactly the same in both cases. It should be noted that only for 
us, the observers, are there two cases. (p. 320) 
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Thus, Pfeifer and Verschure show that it is vital to understand what constitutes an animal's 
world (its Umwelt) before plunging into hypotheses about the mechanisms that underlie its 
behavioural patterns. Cognitivism, it is widely argued by ESD interactionists, is none too 
careful about such issues83 . There is a growing suspicion among interactionists that a 
proper understanding of the Umwelten of animals will reveal a number of holes in the 
representational-computational position. 
Understanding the Role of Internal Mechanisms 
Interactionists not only regularly make the theoretically significant notion of the 
environment relative to the characteristics of the agent, they also commonly think of the 
role (function, content, 'meaning') of the agent's inner components as an intrinsically 
context-dependent affair. As was noted in the previous section dealing with frequent 
boundary crossings, ESD representationalists like Clark (1997), propose that it makes 
sense to talk of inner components as containing a kind of partial content. These partial 
internal representations have been called action-oriented representations (or AORs, Clark, 
1997), pushmi-pullyu representations (Millikan, 1996 cited in Clark, 1997), and deictic 
representations (Agre & Chapman, 1987; see Chemero, 1998a, pp. 154-157 for a 
discussion of all of these). Clark (1997) describes AORs as "representations that 
simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe possible actions, and are poised 
between pure control structures and passive representations of external reality" (Clark, 
1997, p. 49) and that they "are not neutral descriptions of the world so much as activity-
bound specifications of potential modes of action and intervention." (p. 51). In other words 
AORs are simply mechanisms that make use of the cues and minimal world slices captured 
by a creature's specially sensitised (to survival - relevant features) sensory systems. The 
internal 'computations' do not work on sense-data or representations of wordly features 
(e.g., 'a red box' or 'the slowly moving object to the north') but rather upon the 
'interpretations' the organism's sensory systems have made of the world (e.g., 'the 
opportunity for energy recharging within six steps' or 'the-thing-I-just-kept-away-
from').The primary rationale for postulating entities such as AORs is to argue that an 
agent's inner components relate to (and 'capture' in their content) personally relevant 
aspects of the environment required to directly modulate activity. 
However, Clark's enthusiasm for continuing to think of agent's inner components as 
representational in nature is not shared by all ESD theorists. ESD interactionists (such as 
83 Although a strong advocate of the infonnation-processing approach to cognition, Marr (1982) makes a 
very similar point when he argues that psychological research should begin by paying attention to the 
computational understanding of a psychological phenomenon (see my discussion of fonnal task description 
in chapter 2). ,". :'-' 
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Hendriks-Jansen, 1996 and Keijzer, 1997) argue that it makes little sense to try and think 
of internal components as representing the outside world. Continuous, mutual modulation 
between internal components and environmental structure cannot be adequately captured 
using the idea of representational content (see the arguments advanced in the section on 
frequent boundary crossings earlier in this chapter). This is partly the case because the 
operation and function (roughly, content) of inner components of agents are context-
dependent (McClamrock, 1995). What a component actually contributes to an activity 
depends upon the state of other bodily components and the state of the environment. Clark 
(1996a) himself is aware that homuncular (componential) analysis will not provide us with 
much illumination when we study non-homogenous systems where "the contributions of 
the parts are highly inter-defined, that is, the role of a component C at time 11 is determined 
by (and helps determine) the roles ofthe other components at 11, and may even contribute 
quite differently at a time 12, courtesy of the complex feedback and feedforward links to 
other sub-systems." (p. 269). 
What we strike when we begin to accept that the 'content' of specific inner component 
states depends upon where the component is situated within the overall brain-body-
environment system is the distinct lack of utility of the content notion. Developmental 
biologists have already struck these problems when trying to maintain the notion of 
'genetic content' (i.e., what kind of phenotypic traits are specified by stretches of DNA) in 
the face of evidence that phenotypes with identical genomes can vary depending upon 
variations in the cytoplasmic environment as well as differences in habitat in which the 
organism develops84. Theodosius Dobzhansky introduced the notion of the norm of 
reaction to try to deal with this problem (see Gray, 1992, pp. 172-174). The basic idea is to 
map out the phenotype as a joint product of the environment and the genome. This may 
serve as a reasonable approach for organisms, such as plants, that tend to develop in a 
single habitat but, as Gray (1992) and Ho (1986) point out, animals (and even many plants) 
alter their surroundings and also often move into different habitats. Because of this, 
organismic activity, as well as the layout of the environment, must enter into a complete 
causal explanation of the construction of a phenotype. Even in cases where a particular 
phenotypic trait is strongly canalised (i.e., reliably appears in a large range of 
environments) the equation of genetic structure with the primary informational content for 
84 Within a gene-focused framework this fInding can be understood in terms of the switching on of different 
genetic programs. Notice, however, that this implies some sort of sensitivity to the enviromnent by the 
organism's genotype. So the enviromnent again enters into the phenotype construction equation. For a 
thorough thrashing out of gene-centred versus developmental systems views see (in the chronological order 
of the debate) Sterelny & Kitcher (1988), Gray (1992), GriffIths & Gray (1994), Sterelny, Smith, & Dickison 
(1996), and GriffIths & Gray (1997). 
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building the phenotype is a fundamental misconception. Griffiths and Gray (1994) note 
that such a belief in an 'informational asymmetry' between genes and environmental 
resources is an unjustifiable prejudice. 
Thus modem developmental biology has begun to portray development as a dynamic, 
multiple-resourced process (e.g., Gottlieb, 1992, 1998; Griffiths & Gray, 1994; Oyama, 
1985). The idea that 'informational content' for the shape of the 'final' phenotype pre-
exists within any particular developmental resource (i.e., implicit preformationism) is 
rejected in favour of the notion that "information has its own ontogeny". This is Susan 
Oyama's (1985) claim that the way a resource or structure 'informs' the outcome of the 
entire system is a continuously changing quality dependent upon the mutual modulatory 
effects of other relevant resources (i.e., probabilistic epigenesis, Gottlieb, 1992, 1998). She 
captures this idea nicely with the following analogy: 
An old rhyme goes, "For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of 
the horse the rider was lost. ... " Loss of a particular rider could even lead to losing an entire battle. To know 
whether that nail makes the difference between losing and winning the battle, shouldn't we know what kind 
of battle it is, on what terrain it is being joined, what the command structure is, and who the opponent is? 
Even if it could be shown that the loss of a battle were traceable to a lost nail, this would not make the nail 
an adequate causal explanation for the entire complex of events that constituted the battle. Indeed, it is the 
entire complex that defines the nail's role. (Oyama, 1989, p. 28, italics added) 
Such claims do not obviate the need to understand how genetic structures contribute to 
phenotypic outcomes. Rather, they focus our attention on the necessity of understanding 
the complex dynamics of an entire developing system as well as making it clear that 
representational thinking (assigning phenotypic content to particular genetic structures) is 
at best a coarse approximation of the actual workings of the phenotype-building system. 
Griffiths and Gray (1997) argue, after Johnston (1987), that "[t]he idea that developmental 
information resides in the genes is a shorthand for the idea that if all other elements of the 
developmental matrix are held constant, changes in the genes are reflected in changes in 
the phenotype." (p. 471). However, they go on to note that "it is equally true that if 
everything including the genes is held constant, changes in other elements of the matrix are 
reflected in changes in the phenotype." (p. 472). Thus, it would be wrong to privileg~ 
'genetic information' over any other kind of developmental information in a theory of 
phenotypic construction. Developmental systems theorists such as Griffiths, Gray, Oyama, 
Johnston, and Gottlieb argue that we should understand the development of the phenotype 
as an outcome of the self-organising properties of a system made up of multiple resources 
such as "[g]enes, methylation patterns, membrane templates, cytoplasmic gradients, 
centrioles, nests, parental care, habitats and cultures ... " (Griffiths & Gray, 1997, p. 471). 
The point of this biological interlude is to argue, as Keijzer (1997, chap. 5, 1998a) does, 
that this very same pattern of thinking is relevant to our understanding of the role of 
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agent's inner components in the production of behavioural activity. Interactionists argue 
that, just as it is a gross explanatory oversimplification to map genes onto phenotypic traits, 
so it is with inner components (e.g., neural assemblies) and behavioural patterns. Keijzer 
(1997, 1998a) argues that inner components of animals that promote long-range 
anticipative behaviour should be understood as internal control parameters (ICPs) in the 
same way that modem developmental biology understands the role of genes in the 
construction of phenotypes. ICPs are not representations in the classic sense because 
macroscopic order (behaviour) is not somehow pre-encoded in them. Rather, ICPs playa 
central role in regulatory networks that give rise to ordered patterns of behaviour over a 
variety of time scales. In dynamical systems terminology, a control parameter is an aspect 
of a system that can be altered and that kicks the system into different states or patterns of 
activity as its magnitude is varied (see chapter 5 for more details). Keijzer proposes that 
this is just what ICP neural circuits do; they are local (within the body) regulatory 
networks that make small-scale changes to larger self-organising systems (e.g., the 
behaving body, social groups, environmental systems of various kinds) so that large-scale, 
and often temporally extended, order occurs in these larger systems. In other words, neural 
circuits provide 'simple' magnitude changes to parameters oflarger scale systems such that 
their behaviour changes. Natural selection has seen to it that such magnitude changes 
reliably produce 'adaptive order' in these large-scale systems (provided they are of a 
similar makeup to those systems that existed when the small-scale regulatory networks 
were originally selected). From this dynamical point of view, then, the entire explanatory 
point of assigning (behavioural) content to inner components vanishes85. Inner components 
'trigger' rather than 'instruct' behaviour. And this triggering capacity is itself modulated by 
the dynamics of other systems. For the interactionist enthusiast work must proceed along a 
different path to that of their cognitivist colleague. 
Mutual Definitions 
There are two important methodological consequences of embracing the previous 
collection of interactionist themes. The first is that we must systematically explore agents' 
behaviours in order to discover what it is that makes up their worlds (Chemero, 1998, p. 
181). We cannot assume that the furniture of our commonsense ontology or even the 
ontology of physics provide the 'input' for cognition. Instead we must contend with, what 
Clancey (1989) calls, the frame of reference problem, the problem of working out what an 
85 Keijzer notes that although it may not be impossible to redefme representations in a manner consistent 
with the nature of Ieps, this further distances the notion of representation from its original explanatory role 
as an inner isomorphism (of a state of the world or a behavioural plan). It is better, he argues, to admit that 
we are now talking about quite different entities, that work in quite different ways, and that must be studied 
using new empirical methods. A new vocabulary will help to signal these quite fundamental changes. 
I." 
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agent is sensitive to. This approach "must combine ethology, neuroscience, evolutionary 
biology, with elements of more traditional cognitive science to discover the nature of the 
Umwelten of non-human animals and artificially evolved robots." (Chemero, 1998, p.181). 
The second important implication of thinking in terms of mutual definitions is that we 
must be very careful how we think about the functions of agent's inner components in the 
overall behavioural system. To think of these components as part of a representational or 
information-processing system is to buy into the idea that, at a subpersona1 and physical 
level, agents take in something from, or of, the environment and manipulate it in order to 
produce behaviour. But if we are true to a naturalist and materialist philosophy we need to 
realise that it is no easy task to assign informational content to some privileged parts of the 
agent-environment system but not to others. We are better served, say interactionists, by 
thinking that all relevant structures help to 'inform' behaviour production and to avoid 
freezing pre-specified content into any part of the behaviour generating system. 
Explaining Wild Cognition 
An ESD approach that takes to heart the previously described themes requires a collection 
of explanatory tools that can do justice to the vision of cognition as consisting of a 
complex interplay of internal and external resources. As we have seen, traditional 
computational representationalism takes the task of cognitive science to be the 
investigation of the role of internal mental complexity in making sense of meaningless 
inputs and using them to produce plans or instructions for rational behaviour. Information 
theory and its modem extensions (e.g., Dretske, 1988; Markman & Dietrich, 1998) and 
computational theory thus form a suitable backdrop for tracking the flow and 
transformation of information through a physical system. On this view the cognitive 
project is entirely concerned with what goes on between the sensory surfaces and the motor 
surfaces; behaviour, environmental activity and structure are of (distant) secondary 
importance. 
The concerns of interactionism go beyond those of cognitivism and are not easily 
assimilated into an information-processing or computational-representational framework 
(see, e.g., Keijzer, 1997, pp. 126-141 86). It is not impossible to view some external 
resources (e.g., books, pictures, recordings) in representational and computational terms (as 
e.g., Hutchins, 1995a and Perkins, 1993 do), at least in a loose or metaphorical sense, but 
such attempts at extending the cognitivist framework face several significant problems: the 
86 Keijzer (1997, p. 126) summarises this idea "To put it bluntly, [cognitivism's] core idea is that behavior is 
the result of internal instructions, while the interactionist core idea is that behavior is not the result of internal 
instructions. " 
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problem of cognitivism's intrinsic internalism; the problem of turning all external 
resources into some form of representation; and the problem of defining representation. 
Cognitivism 's Intrinsic Internalism 
The cognitivist explanatory framework is an intrinsically internalist one. It focuses upon 
the role of the cognizer's innards in producing cognitive activity. The basic premise of 
cognitivism is that behaviour is caused via an internal interpretation of the outside world 
rather than through a basic kind of coupling with that world. Any cognitivist attempt to 
think of external resources as equal partners in the production of cognitive activity must 
face the charge that it ignores the fact that those same external resources must be re-
presented on the inside in order to impact on behaviour production. Put simply, 
cognitivism is essentially an inside-focused framework and, by adding on a few 'situated 
enhancements', it renders problematic its central premise. Cognitivism posits explanations 
of both low-level and high-level cognitive activity by declaring that "a set of 
representations has to be manipulated until they provide a set of instructions that specify 
what a behaving system should do to accomplish a goal." (Keijzer, 1997, p. 127). 
Interactionism does not make such assumptions. Consequently Keijzer (1997) IS 
pessimistic about the prospects of merging interactionist insights with cognitivism. 
[Cognitivism] states that the structure present in behavior results from previously stored instructions. The 
embodied approach states that the structure present in behavior results from the ever ongoing interaction 
between organism and environment. It is hard to see how the latter can be given a place within [cognitivism], 
or how they could be otherwise combined. The only plausible way for [cognitivism] to accommodate 
interactionism is by turning itself into a different conceptual framework. This move strikes me as a sensible 
thing to do, but the result will not be [cognitivism] any more. We should keep our terminology crisp here and 
not call this a way to salvage the existing conceptual framework. (pp. 127-128) 
'Representationalizing' External Resources 
The main thrust of extended cognitivist analyses such as those of Perkins (1993) and, in 
some respects, Hutchins (1995a, 1995b) is to continue to think ofthe cognitive system as a 
representational-computational system that is, however, distributed over elements that lie 
beyond the skull and the skin. However, such analyses tend only to easily incorporate some 
significant external resources within a modified cognitivist framework. Other parts of the 
environment, that interactionists appeal to as genuine parts of an agent-environment 
behaviour generation system, are not so easily assimilated. For instance, it is easy to think 
of the elements of the external world as part of an extended computational system when the 
objects of research are mainly instances of everyday computation such as in Hutchins' 
studies of position fixing in military navigation (Hutchins, 1995a) and the calculation of 
airspeed in commercial airliners (Hutchins, 1995b). In these cases the external resources 
really are representations (of the everyday variety) of various parameters and variables 
. central to what are basically arithmetic tasks. Such strategies become less useful when 
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considering less 'computational' kinds of activity such as doing a jigsaw puzzle (Kirsch, 
1995), learning how to ski by using a manual (Costall & Leudar, 1996), or learning how to 
eat correctly in a middle-class American household (Val siner, 1997). In these cases it 
stretches the representational metaphor to think of, for example 'walls that robots bang in 
to' or 'the layout of jigsaw pieces on a table', as items that contain or transform 
information about aspects of the world. These things are the world (or parts of it) and thus 
do not need representing at all. They do not contain information even though agents can be 
informed by attending to them. Clearly then, the computational approach does not easily 
incorporate all of those environmental resources that interactionists are willing to consider 
part of behavioural systems. 
Defining Representation 
Finally, it must be remembered that cognitivists generally believe that the power of 
external representation derives from the fact that people and other animals possess 
evolutionarily more basic internal representations. Thus, any adequate theory that explains 
the cognitive significance of external representation depends upon an adequate theory of 
internal representation (this is another consequence of cognitivism's intrinsic internalism). 
However, as noted in earlier chapters, there currently exists no widely agreed upon or even 
roughly complete theory of content for internal or mental representations. Thus, the status 
of any extended cognitivist approach rests upon the internal representational project being 
successfully completed. We have the right to be sceptical of 'extended cognitivism' until 
that time. 
An Interactionist Alternative? 
ESD-related research and the assumptions and claims shared by the different fields that 
contribute to ESD thinking provide us with a hodge-podge of thought provoking 
challenges to many of the common ideas in cognitivism. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether these challenges will result in a fundamental paradigm shift within cognitive 
science or will merely form the basis of a more sophisticated cognitivism. It is notable that 
a number of the claims made above have been resisted by traditionalists, usually by 
arguing that ESD advocates have overstated their case. Examples of such rejoinders 
include the following: 
1. We may be able to get by without representations in many cases but we still need them 
for much high-level cognitive activity (e.g., Clark & Toribio, 1994; Kirsh, 1991). 
2. There are possible, even likely, explanations of activity that do not require the use of 
either traditional symbolic representations or connectionist subsymbolic 
representations, but these alternatives nonetheless imply some kind of representation 
(e.g., Bechtel, 1998; Chemero, 1998; Clark, 1997; Markman & Dietrich, 1998). 
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3. A good deal of cognitive activity requires external resources but this does not mean 
that internal resources are not of primary importance and are not, in a fundamental 
sense, independent ofthe environment (e.g., Fodor, 1987). 
4. Decentralised and reactive architectures may be smarter than we had thought but there 
is no evidence that they can be scaled up so that they might account for complex 
intelligence (e.g., Kirsh, 1991). 
At times in this chapter I have addressed some of these criticisms directly, but I have done 
little more than suggest that some ESD ideas seem more attractive than the cognitivist 
alternatives. A stronger case for interactionism must rest upon an argument as to why 
cognitive systems are better viewed from an interactionist perspective. If the 
representational-computational and information-processing accounts are unsuited to 
explaining the expanded view of cognitive activity, an interactionist approach is going to 
need some new set of explanatory tools to deal with issues such as equal partnership and 
the continuous, modulatory nature of brain-body-environment dynamics, the interactive 
emergence of activity patterns from the low-level activity of decentra1ised and reactive 
architectures situated in complex, real-world environments, and the relational nature of 
both internal component function ('meaning'), and the stimulating environment or Umwelt. 
If natural cognizers really do not fit the cognitivist vision of informavores, that is, of 
systems that pull out and use environmental information in an inner symbol manipulation 
theatre, what sort of vision of 'living organisation' should we adopt? If a brain is not 
computing over representations of environmental objects, then what is it doing? ESD-
interactionists, as opposed to their ESD-representationalist cousins, are currently in the 
process of formulating explanatory tools for answering these sorts of questions. At the 
moment the field, such as it is, is fairly turbulent with many different suggestions being 
pursued by different researchers. Generally speaking, most interactionists would agree with 
Clark's claim that they are all advocates of, what he calls, the Thesis of Radical Embodied 
Cognition. This is the view that "[ s ]tructured, symbolic, representational, and 
computational views of cognition are mistaken. Embodied cognition is best studied by 
means of noncomputationa1 and nonrepresentational ideas and explanatory schemes 
involving, e.g., the tools of Dynamical Systems theory." (Clark, 1997, p. 148). In the next 
three chapters I will map out what I believe to be a promising approach for putting some 
flesh on the bones of this basic idea. 
i" .. 
5. Explaining Wild Cognition with Dynamical 
Systems Theory 
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[TJhe mathematical theOlJl of dynamical systems is no more a theory of autonomous agents than is the 
formal theOlJl of computation. Rather, like computation, dynamical systems theory! is best seen as offering a 
conceptual framework for thinking about complex systems, and a framework that is velJl different from that 
offered by computation. Where a computational language suggests that complex but highly structured 
behavior arises from the step-by-step transformation of discrete symbols by identifiable functional modules, 
a dynamical language suggests that such behavior can arise as a global property of the continuous 
interaction of many distributed, cooperative processes. Our task as scientists is to use the language and 
mathematical tools offered by dynamical systems theory to develop theories of particular phenomena of 
interest. 
Randall Beer (l995b, p. 130). 
Introduction 
The previous chapter gathered together a cluster of phenomena and ideas that interactionist 
researchers encounter and use in their studies of cognitive activity. It is clear that the 
research agenda of these scientists differs substantially from the usual fare of mainstream 
cognitive psychologists and their cognitive science kin. In this chapter I want to suggest 
that this cluster of themes and findings demand a different set of tools and a different 
explanatory framework from the computational-representational approach of cognitivism; 
simply extending the current cognitivist orthodoxy will not suffice. The alternative 
framework has to somehow make better sense ofESD themes than cognitivism does. 
I want to suggest that the tools necessary for studying cognition from an interactionist 
perspective are already at hand, although they are, as yet, at an early stage of development. 
In this chapter I will argue that an embodied, situated, and distributed interactionist 
alternative will likely be grounded in an explanatory framework that uses dynamical 
systems theory to model cognizers as autonomous systems (discussed in chapter 6). This 
framework provides an understanding of cognitive activity in terms of the coupling of an 
organism and its environment, an understanding of the organism as a self-organising and 
self-producing system, and an understanding of nervous systems as regulatory and 
coordinative control systems rather than as internal world-modelling systems. Such a 
dynamical systems methodological and explanatory framework, although still far from 
rigorous and complete, provides a strong and cohesive scaffold for making further sense of 
the ESD themes mentioned in the previous chapter. 
The Promise of Dynamical Systems Theory 
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Dynamical Systems The01Y and Cognitive Science 
A number of claims have been made about the ways in which dynamical systems theory 
can be fruitfully incorporated into cognitive science. The most general claim is that 
dynamical systems theory is useful for studying cognition because it is the explanatory 
framework of choice for understanding physical systems that change over time. And since 
cognitive agents are physical systems that change over time, they should be amenable to a 
dynamical system interpretation. Because dynamical systems theory is the most general 
framework applicable to the study of cognition, it carries with it the least number of 
theoretical preconceptions about the structure and dynamics of cognitive systems, unlike 
the more restrictive representational-computational approach. Therefore the dynamical 
approach should be preferred for being more 'open-minded' about the way cognitive 
systems are built (Beer, 1995a, 1995b; Husbands et aI., 1995). Importantly, those who 
make this point also take the dynamical systems approach to cognition to be quite general 
in nature and to encompass both digital computational and connectionist systems within 
the broad class of dynamical systems. 
Van Gelder (1995, 1998) argues that this equation of dynamical systems with all state-
determined systems that evolve over time obscures the distinctive claims that a non-
cognitivist dynamical approach might make about the cognition. Thus, less generally, van 
Gelder (1998) advances the dynamical hypothesis - the claim that, at the highest relevant 
level of analysis, agents are dynamical systems and not digital computers (as is claimed by 
the computational hypothesis central to cognitivism) and thus dynamical analyses and not 
digital computational ones are appropriate for cognitive science. By this van Gelder seems 
to mean that the characteristics of cognizers cannot be accurately captured as algorithmic 
transformations of discrete symbolic states even at the highest, most abstract level of 
description. This stands in contrast to the claims of Fodor, Newell, and Dennett who claim 
that such physical symbol systems may be merely implemented by dynamical or 
connectionist architectures87. According to van Gelder and Port (1995) cognition is better 
captured by a dynamical approach because of the basic facts 
that cognitive processes always unfold in real time; that their behaviors are pervaded by both continuities and 
discreteness; that they are composed of multiple subsystems which are simultaneously active and interacting; 
that their distinctive kinds of structure and complexity are not present from the very first moment, but 
emerge over time; that cognitive processes operate over many time scales, and events at different time scales 
interact; and that they are embedded in a real body and environment. The dynamical approach provides a 
natural framework for the description and explanation of phenomena with these broad properties. The 
87 It is important to note that Fodor (1975, 1987), Dennett (1978, 1991, 1996) and Newell (1990) each hold 
quite different views about how such an explanatory feat is possible. 
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computational approach, by contrast, either ignores them entirely or handles them only in clumsy, ad hoc 
ways. (van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 18) 
It is important to realise, however, that Van Gelder's dynamical hypothesis suggests a 
much less circumscribed approach to studying and understanding cognition than does the 
framework of ESD interactionism. Indeed, dynamical notions have been embraced by 
theorists who continue to endorse the use of representations, albeit in modified form, and 
continue to focus upon mostly in-the-head issues (e.g., Elman, 1995) as well as those who 
lean in a more interactionist direction. However, this is not to say that dynamical concepts 
do not support an interactionist approach to cognition or facilitate interpreting cognitive 
activity in an interactionist manner. On the contrary, there are several aspects of dynamical 
analyses which provide powerful ways of reinterpreting cognitive phenomena that are 
consistent with the themes mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Thus, Keijzer (1997) and others (e.g., Beer, 1995a, 1995b, 2000) focus on dynamical 
systems theory's facility for explaining the interaction of subsystems (bodily, neural, 
environmental) using the non-information-theoretic notion of dynamical coupling. On this 
reading dynamical systems theory should be preferred because it avoids the difficulties, 
such as the symbol grounding problem, associated with a 'message passing and message 
transforming' approach to the understanding of cognitive interactions. Keijzer (1997) 
ultimately challenges this reason for adopting dynamical systems theory on the grounds 
that the notion of dynamical coupling does not and cannot provide a unique understanding 
of what makes a system cognitive. Instead he argues, along with a number of other writers 
(Beer, 1995b; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Keijzer et aI., 1998), that dynamical systems theory 
itself cannot provide an adequate alternative framework for making sense of cognitive 
phenomena. Rather dynamical systems theory provides tools that seem, at this stage, to 
support and encourage an interactionist approach, rather than providing a complete 
alternative explanatory framework in itself. The principles of ESD interactionism, rather 
than those dynamical systems theory, provide the theoretical meat for a challenger to the 
hegemony of cognitivism. 
Dynamical Systems Theory: A Numerical Modelling Strategy 
At its most basic, DST can be used to explain cognitive phenomena by thinking of agents 
as systems that are describable as collections of variables that can take on numerical values 
that change value over time according to some rule of evolution - an equation known as a 
dynamic. More specifically, one can follow van Gelder (1998) and think of a real world 
entity (e.g., a person, a tree or a planet) as a concrete object. A system, by contrast is 
simply a set of variables that change interdependently. A concrete object can instantiate a 
number of concrete systems. For instance, a person can be understood as a reasoning 
system when we study this particular phenomenon or a kinetic system when we study how 
bodies fall. The mathematical descriptions (or models) of concrete systems are abstract 
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systems. Van Gelder talks of concrete systems realising abstract systems. Thus dynamical 
analyses of particular phenomena involve the construction of abstract dynamical system 
models. 
A dynamical systems model begins by conceiving of the behaviour of a system at a point 
in time as a set of values for a collection of state variables and any relevant parameters. 
Although variables and parameters appear to play a similar role in these geometric 
descriptions, they differ in an important way. The changing value of a state variable is 
dependent upon the values of other variables and parameters. However, while parameters 
can influence the values of variables they can not be influenced by them and thus 
parameters usually have a fixed value (gravity is a good example of a parameter that 
influences many physical systems). Thus variables are interdependent and parameters are 
not (see van Gelder, 1998)88. 
This collection of variable and parameter values constitutes a state of the system. Thus, the 
entire behaviour of the system at anyone point in time can be represented as a single point 
in a n-dimensional hyperspace where each dimension corresponds to one of the state 
variables. The mathematical rule (typically expressed in terms of a differential or 
difference equation89) that determines the way that the state of a system evolves over time90 
is known as the dynamic. As the behaviour of the system changes over time a path (called a 
solution trajectory) is traced out in the space. A space that represents all of the possible 
states of the system is known as the system's phase space91 • A phase space diagram that 
contains the set of all (or many) of the possible trajectories that the system can traverse (the 
88 Because a system is technically a set of variables changing interdependently, parameters are not actually 
part of a dynamical system (van Gelder, 1998). 
89 Differential equations are used to fmd the instantaneous rate of change of a variable (the derivative) at a 
particular value (e.g., we may use a differential equation to calculate the speed of an object at a particular 
time given information about the object's changing distance over a period of time) (see, e.g., Capra, 1998, 
pp. 114-118 for a simple exposition; Norton, 1995 for a more mathematical introduction). Importantly 
differential equations are not always solvable (especially in complex and irregularly behaving systems). 
Indeed it was this lack of solvability that led to Poincare developing the ideas that later became central to 
modem dynamical systems theory (Capra, 1998, pp. 119-126; Norton, 1995, pp. 45-47). When differential 
equations cannot be solved difference equations are often used instead. These are simply equations that, 
when iterated many times, trace out the behavioural trajectory of a system. Such equations effectively 
provide rules for working out the value of x at t+ 1 based on knowledge of the value of x at t (for more detail 
on the difference between differential and difference equations see Norton, 1995). 
90 The time set used may be discrete or continuous (Beer, 2000, p. 21). 
91 Writers often use the terms phase space and state space interchangeably. van Gelder and Port (1995, p. 7-
9) argue that the phase space is the numerical and mathematical counterpart of the system's real world state 
space or state set. 
162 
flow), when starting from different initial conditions, is called a phase portrait. A diagram 
that shows these trajectories in terms of the instantaneous direction and magnitude of 
change at each point92 is known as a vector field. 
Describing the Features of Phase Space 
A system's phase portrait represents that possible dynamics (behavioural trajectories) of 
the system and often exhibits interesting behavioural patterns that can be mathematically 
and qualitatively described. Of particular interest are regions of phase space toward which 
many trajectories converge. These are known as attractors. The space of all initial points 
which lead to an attractor is known as a basin of attraction. Attractors come in different 
varieties: a point (or fixed) attractor is simply a point at which a group of trajectories 
converge; a cyclic (or periodic) attractor is a regular series of points which trajectories 
move toward and then traverse in an ongoing cycle of activity; and a strange (or chaotic) 
attractor is a series of points that trajectories traverse that exhibit a non-repeating but rule-
governed (i.e., non-random) kind of pattern (see, e.g., Elman et aI., 1996, pp. 211-218 for 
some simple mathematical examples). The stability of an attractor (that is, the likelihood 
that a system will seek out and stay in the behavioural regime related to the attractor) is 
indicated by the size of the attractor's basin of attraction and the attractor's local relaxation 
time. The local relaxation time corresponds to the time it takes for a system to return to a 
stable state when the system is perturbed by its own intrinsic noise or an outside influence 
(see Thelen and Smith, 1994, pp. 65-66). In contrast to attractors, areas of phase space that 
trajectories avoid and flow away from are known as repellors. Areas of phase space that 
attract some trajectories and repel others are known as saddles. 
Changes to the System Dynamic 
The field of synergetics (an off-shoot of dynamical systems theory) pioneered by the laser 
physicist Hermann Haken (e.g., Haken, 1987; see Capra, 1998, pp. 89-92; Thelen & Smith, 
1994, pp. 54-56 for brief overviews) makes use of two kinds of parameter for discussing 
the ways in which systems made up of a number of component entities come to exhibit this 
kind of global order (examples include, laser light being made up of the light waves 
emitted by many atoms, the ordered rolling of heated water made up of a multitude of 
water molecules, the flow of a crowd through a football stadium). 
An order parameter (or collective variable) describes the modes of behaviour that the 
collection of components exhibits93 . For instance, in the finger waggling experiment 
92 Differential equations provide this kind of information. Thus vector fields are the natural geometric plot 
describing these equations. 
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discussed in the previous chapter, Kelso and his colleagues (see Kelso, 1995) tracked the 
behaviour of the finger waggling system in terms of a single order parameter that signified 
the relative phase of the two fingers rather than using a number of variables that describe 
the independent motions and angles of the two fingers and their joints. 
A control parameter (this really is a parameter in the sense of an 'outside influence' on the 
system) describes a particular aspect of the world that can be altered so that it 
systematically affects the system's phase portrait. Recall that a phase portrait depicts a 
system's behavioural landscape showing how any initial state will evolve over time. 
Attractors (and other kinds of limit sets such as repellors and saddles) correspond to 
regular kinds of behaviour that a system is often drawn toward or pushed away from. 
However, even this behavioural landscape of attractors and repellors can change when the 
system is perturbed by forces that lie outside of the system. As noted earlier, these outside 
forces, that are constant within a particular phase portrait, are known as parameters. When 
a parameter changes it produces changes in the behavioural landscape. Often such changes 
are only subtle, linear, and continuous changes to the trajectories and attractors (and other 
limit sets) in the phase portrait. The portrait remains qualitatively similar (or topologically 
equivalent or homeomorphic) to the old one (Beer, 1995a). Such subtle change is known as 
parametric change (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 63). However, within nonlinear systems94 a 
small continuous change in a parameter can lead to a dramatic discontinuous, qualitative 
change in a system's dynamics (behavioural landscape). Such phase shifts (or phase 
93 It may appear that an order parameter is not a parameter at all as it seems to describe emergent patterns 
rather than an outside influence of the system. The use of the synonym collective variable seems to further 
muddy the waters. However there are rather complex reasons for thinking of an order parameter as a 
parameter or 'outside influence' (see Kelso, 1995 for an introduction). Roughly speaking, an order parameter 
represents the collective 'force' of coordinated parts of the system. "An order parameter is created by the 
coordination between the parts, but in tum influences the behavior of the parts." (Kelso, 1995, p. 16). Clark 
(1997) calls this effect continuous reciprocal causation and illustrates it in terms of crowd behaviour where 
"the actions of individuals in a crowd combine to initiate a rush in one direction, and ... that activity then 
sucks and molds the activity of undecided individuals and maintains and reinforces the direction of collective 
motion." (pp. 107-108). This kind of phenomenon occurs in all nonequilibrium systems made up of many 
interacting components such as lasers, heated liquids, and living things. The next chapter examines the 
concept of a self-organising system in more detail. 
94 Capra (1998, pp. 121-122) and Stewart (1997) note that nonlinearity is extremely common in nature and 
that the sense that this may not be the case derives from the fact that many nonlinear phenomena have been 
'linearised' in the physical sciences in the past in an attempt to make them more tractable. Most nonlinear 
differential equations are analytically unsolvable (Port & van Gelder, 1995, p. 575) and this difficulty is one 
the primary reasons why Poincare and others embarked upon the qualitative study of nonlinear systems (van 
Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 14); that is, the "study of long-term general features of a dynamical system without 
attempting to derive or predict specific numerical values of the variables." (Port & van Gelder, 1995, p. 576) 
164 
transitions or bifurcations) can radically alter the dynamics of a system by 1) the creation 
or annihilation of an attractor or other limit set (a catastrophic bifurcation), 2) the 
transformation of one kind of attractor into another (a subtle bifurcation), or 3) suddenly 
changing the magnitude of an attractor (an explosive bifurcation) (see Abraham, Abraham, 
& Shaw, 1991, pp. II-86 - II-97). Thus, within nonlinear dynamical systems, small changes 
in a parameter can lead to discontinuous change. This is the sort of change that is often 
taken to be an indication that a new causal variable (e.g., a matured neural system or a new 
environmental agent) has begun to influence the system. Dynamical systems theory 
provides the tools to understand how a change in a parameter can cause a system to 
radically re-organise as opposed to being 'instructed' to behave in a certain way by a new 
causal agent. 
The term control parameter is typically used to describe a parameter that can be 'twiddled' 
by an outside agent to control the behavioural landscape of the system. Technically any 
parameter can serve as a control parameter. However, only a very few control parameters 
may lead to a behaviourally significant way of controlling the system's behaviour. Such a 
sufficiently useful control parameter could be used to push the system through a series of 
appropriate (useful or adaptive) behavioural regimes. For instance, when an animal is faced 
with a threat from a small sized opponent (reflected in terms of a low control parameter 
value) one kind of behavioural approach (e.g., aggressive display) is appropriate (signified 
by the phase portrait given for that value of the parameter). However, when the size of the 
opponent (control parameter value) passes a certain critical point, a new behavioural 
regime (e.g., a phase portrait that describes fleeing behaviour) appears. 
According to Abraham et al. (1991) a system that can control a control parameter that 
impacts upon itself through some kind of feedback loop is known as a self-organising 
system. Note that technically any aspect of a system that is modulated by the system itself 
is a state variable not a parameter. Thus, strictly speaking, a system cannot systematically 
control one of its own control parameters95 . However there does exist an interesting sense 
in which a control parameter can be understood as being reciprocally connected to a 
system. Dynamical systems theorists understand this phenomenon in terms of the coupling 
of two dynamical systems. 
Interacting systems 
Two or more systems are coupled when the state variable of one system plays the role of a 
parameter in the other and vice versa. This mathematical formalism nicely captures the 
95 In synergetics only systems that are made up of a large number of non-linearly interacting components, 
and are far-from thermal equilibrium, can be self-organising systems (e.g., Kelso, 1995). I present these 
ideas in more detail in the next chapter. 
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idea that two or more systems may modulate each other's behaviours. Because dynamical 
systems theory theorises the activity of a system in terms of the evolution of continuous 
numerical values, coupling differs from the traditional cognitivist notion of 'discrete cycles 
of input and output'. Instead of understanding the relation of two systems in a ping-pong 
manner, dynamicists speak of mutual direct dependence (van Gelder, 1998). This captures 
the idea that there is an ongoing and instantaneous modulatory relationship between two 
systems rather than a series of 'message passing' events between two arenas. 
The notion of coupling also illustrates, what van Gelder (1998) calls, the semi-arbitrariness 
of systems. This arises because any group of coupled systems (e.g., systems A and E) can 
also be understood as single larger system (e.g., system U) (Beer, 1995b; Wheeler, 1996). 
In a larger system such as U parameters in the coupled systems such as A and E are 
effectively converted into state variables. 
Dynamical Analyses and Psychological Phenomena 
DST describes and explains cognitive systems in numerical terms; the variables can 
correspond to any kind of entity thought to be relevant by the theorist, be they neuronal 
activation levels, bodily positions and angles, attitude levels, or mood states. The 
numerical value of a variable at any point in time thus corresponds to the strength, 
position, or quality of an entity. Such a notion should not be alien to most psychologists 
who have traditionally tried to provide some systematic numerical analysis of 
psychological phenomena using chronometrics, scale ratings, and various other methods of 
measurement. 
However, often the variables used in dynamical analyses are of a rather abstract nature 
representing higher-order invariants, emergent properties, relations between components 
and so on. Saltzman (1995), for instance, uses abstract constriction types as variables in his 
dynamical analyses of speech production rather than more physical variables such as lip 
aperture and lip protrusion. This is partly because DST equations quickly become difficult 
to visualise and analyse when they include more than a few variables, although, as Beer 
(2000) notes, it is not impossible and this problem can be circumvented by the judicious 
analysis of highly influential variables. But the use of abstract variables also occurs 
because they often provide the most economical and accurate description of multi-
component systems with relatively few degrees of freedom. Thus, the quantitative 
interpretations of psychological phenomena psychologists typically make may not be well-
suited to dynamical analyses96. 
96 An additional problem with the quantitative analysis of most modem psychology is that they are simply 
do not address psychological phenomena dynamically. Often psychological measurements are atemporal or 
only very vaguely temporal, such as pre- and post-treatment measures. 
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DST is thus an explanatory framework with a minimal commitment to any particular 
theoretical framework for understanding psychological phenomena compared to symbolic 
and even connectionist accounts. Symbolic accounts, as we have seen, consider cognitively 
meaningful units (e.g., concepts) to be encoded in a unique physical structure which is 
manipulated and transformed purely according to its physical shape and structure. 
Encoding is digital and change is discrete. While connectionist accounts admit a degree of 
fuzziness with regards to the structure-content relationship, and view change in terms of 
the systematic varying of numerical values, they commit the theorist to understanding 
cognitive activity in terms of interactions among multiple homogenous components (see 
van Gelder, 1995, pp. 365-374 for an analysis of the differences between the three 
frameworks). DST is much less prescriptive than either of these frameworks. This feature 
of DST accounts has been heralded both as its primary strength and its major weakness 
(often, ironically, by the same author). Beer (1995a, 2000) argues that DST is a less 
restrictive framework than that of symbolism or connectionism and should be preferred for 
just this reason. We are not obliged to make too many a priori theoretical commitments 
using a framework that can admit any kind or number of variables (even if, in practice, this 
may prove difficult or intractable) as long as: 1) they have numerical values (whether 
discrete or continuous), 2) they change over time (whether discretely or continuously), and 
3) they always possess a value (even ifit is zero). 
At the same time a whole raft of theorists (e.g., Bechtel, 1998; Clark, 1997; Eliasmith, 
1996; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Keijzer, 1997) argue that it is precisely this lack of 
theoretical commitment that rules out DST as a stand-alone explanatory theory of 
cognition. DST, argue these critics, provides a covering-law explanation rather than a 
causal-mechanistic explanation of phenomena (Bechtel, 1998, see below). Without this 
latter kind of explanatory enterprise we cannot build or model cognitive systems (see 
Clark, 1997) or utilise useful explanatory rules of thumb such as the decomposition and 
localisation heuristics (Bechtel, 1998). I will discuss these arguments later on in this 
chapter. For now, however, I want to focus on the ways in which dynamical systems 
notions reinforce the principles central to the kind of ESD interactionist thinking canvassed 
in the previous chapter.. In particular DST ideas seem to provide efficient tools for making 
sense of the ESD claims that: 
1. Non-neural (bodily and environmental) resources should figure prominently III 
descriptions of cognition; 
2. Boundary crossings between these different arenas cannot be adequately understood 
within a traditional information-processing framework; 
3. The distinct 'shape' of behaviour emerges from the coupling of neural, bodily, and 
environmental systems, and cannot be usefully understood as being primarily 
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controlled by one particular arena (see discussion of Damasio's work in the next 
chapter). 
Attractive Features of Dynamical Analyses for ESD Interactionism 
The dynamical systems framework does not provide a ready-made palliative to all of the 
ailments of current cognitive theorising. Indeed the application of dynamical systems 
theory ideas to the extremely complicated problems of cognitive activity may require the 
use of new and more advanced dynamical tools than currently exist (see, e.g., Ro, 1993; 
Jaeger, 1998; Swenson & Turvey, 1991). But even at the qualitative and metaphorical 
levels (see Van Gelder & Port, 1995) dynamical systems theory, if used judiciously, can 
provide some profound insights into ways of understanding the complex phenomena 
associated with cognition. 
It is not difficult to see that dynamical systems ideas dovetail quite nicely with the 
principles that have arisen from our analysis of ESD research. In this section I will briefly 
point out what I believe are the significant points of contact. 
A Common Calculus for Agent-Environment System Components 
The dynamical systems framework provides a common calculus for describing systems 
both within and outside of the agent (van Gelder, 1998; Clark, 1997). Environmental 
features, bodily structures, and neural architectures can all be understood in terms of 
numerical variables that are related to other variables by rules of evolution (i.e., the system 
dynamic). This stands in contrast to the cognitivist framework which cannot easily extend 
its representational and computational vocabulary to non-mindlbrain systems (see 
discussion at the end of the previous chapter). This feature of the dynamical view of 
cognition makes it easy to think of agent-environment systems as important units of 
analysis and of brain, body, and world as equal partners in the production of cognitive 
activity. Although a broad dynamical approach to cognition does not require theorists to 
take into account the embeddedness of the brain in bodily and environmental systems, Beer 
(1995b) argues (after Ashby, 1960) that we should use the following coupled equations 
representing coupled, nonautonomous, continuous-time, dynamical systems as our basic 
template for describing cognitive activity. 
XA = A(xA;S(xE)) 
XE = E(xE;M(xA)) 
In these equations XA is the change in state of the agent and XE is the change in state of 
the environment. A is the function of the agent's influence on 'input' to the agent system 
and E performs the same role for the environment system. The variables XA and XE are the 
current state of the agent and the environment respectively. S(XE) represents the effects of 
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the environment on the agent via sensory systems and M(XA) the effects of the agent on the 
environment via motor systems. Beer notes that environment terms can correspond to the 
actual environment or the body depending on what aspect of activity is being examined. If 
one follows Keijzer's (1997) basic interactionist schema A could be understood as a system 
that is itself made up of two coupled dynamical subsystems representing the nervous 
system (N) and the body (B). 
It should be noted that, even though DST makes it easy to represent agent and environment 
properties using the same calculus, it does not supply the theorist with any guidance as to 
the particular metrics that should be used to measure aspects of agent and environment 
dynamics. In a slightly different context Flach (2000) refers to this task as the common 
currency problem. He argues that mainstream cognitive psychology does not provide us 
with a common framework for describing the furniture of the environment, the tasks and 
goals facing the agent, and the control systems that intervene between them. For instance, 
because of the disciplinary differences between physics, aeronautical engineering, and 
aviation psychology an understanding of a pilot's task of turning a plane so that it is 
comfortable for passengers would typically be described in terms of gravity, acceleration, 
air pressure, wind speed, kinetic energy, work and so on (the environment as described by 
physics), flap angle, pitch, roll, elevation (in terms of the planes control systems as 
described in engineering terms), and in terms of mental representations of goals and values 
of the pilot (the province of psychology). Although all of these terms could be described in 
a numerical manner (and thus modelled in terms of coupled dynamical systems) no 
systematic agent-tool-environment dynamics may become apparent. Instead Flach 
advocates measuring the dynamics of all ofthe subsystems in terms of an objective, agent-
environment vocabulary. The aerial environment could be measured in terms of its 
contribution to smooth flying. The control systems of the aircraft could also represent 
banking in terms of 'objective comfort levels' of the passengers as could the task goals. 
This can be done relatively easily by building measurement systems and control systems 
that register higher-order invariants or emergent properties. For instance, a 'comfortable 
tum' may be measurable using some composite property that depends on the aircraft's 
acceleration, banking angle, and the characteristics of passengers sitting in cabin seats. 
This higher-order property would then reflect the amount of and suddenness of swaying 
felt by passengers. Not only would such a measurement system provide a more easily 
graspable and analysable description of the agent-environment system, it would also 
provide a natural set of parameters for designing relevant and ergonomic control systems. 
If a pilot can directly read off and control the 'comfort level' of a manoeuvre from the 
cockpit instruments the amount of in-the-head calculating and on-the-fly experimenting 
will be reduced. 
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Boundary Crossings as Coupling, not Message-Passing 
DST provides a framework for understanding the 'boundary crossings' between body and 
brain, agent and environment, and indeed different neural systems, that avoids the use of 
the often problematic metaphors of communication and information transfer and the 
associated concepts of input, information-processing, storage, and output. Van Gelder and 
Port (1995) argue that these traditional information-processing terms do not adequately 
capture the nature of the relationships between body and world or of the processes that go 
on in these domains. 
The cognitive system does not interact with the body and the external world by means of periodic symbolic 
inputs and outputs; rather, inner and outer processes are coupled, so that both sets of processes are 
continually influencing each other. Cognitive processing is not cyclic and sequential, for all aspects of the 
cognitive system are undergoing change all the time. (p. 13) 
[A]ny fully adequate approach to the study of cognitive systems must be one that can handle multiple, 
simultaneous interactive activity. Yet doing this is the essence of dynamics. Dynamical systems are just 
the simultaneous, mutually influencing activity of multiple parts or aspects. (van Gelder & Port, 1995, p. 24, 
bold emphasis added) 
So DST provides us with an appropriate concept for making sense of the frequent 
boundary crossings discussed in the previous chapter. Perception-action cycles can be 
understood in terms of the coupling of agents and environments rather than in terms of 
message passing (see Kugler & Turvey, 1987). 
The Coupling of Reactive, Decentralised Architectures and the Environment Leads to 
Interactive Emergence 
Dynamical systems explanations do not rely on any particular component of a system 
'carrying information or content' about other aspects of the system or other systems that 
interact with the system. Rather, ordered behaviours are viewed as arising from the 
dynamic interactions between components of systems. In short, order is emergent in 
coupled dynamical systems (a product of interacting aspects) rather than enforced by a 
controlling device within the system. Hendriks-Jansen (1996) notes that: 
Dynamical systems theory has made it possible to conceive of complex behavior as arising interactively from 
the structure of the environment in conjunction with the creature's internal dynamics. We no longer need 
hierarchically organized planning systems to explain intricate temporal structure. A natural creature's 
behavior does not need to be prep1anned. It does not have to exist as an abstract internal representation in the 
creature's head before it is "executed." The complex structure can emerge as and when it happens from the 
dynamic coupling between organism and its environment. ... [D]ynamica1 systems theory by itself cannot 
provide the natural kinds for an explanation, but it lays to rest the idea that complex behavior requires a 
computational explanation involving internal representations of the creature's activity that need to be 
prepared before they are "executed." (pp. 325-326) 
The tools of dynamical systems theory provide a framework that can help us to understand 
how ordered activity can occur without a central orderer or controller. Order can simply 
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and reliably emerge from the interactions (often non-linear in nature) between multiple 
components. Beer (1995b) shows how the notion of coupling can be used to clarify the 
interactionist idea that behaviour is not pre-coded within the agent or the environment: 
Since properties of the coupled system cannot in general be attributed to either subsystem individually, an 
agent's behavior properly resides only in the dynamics of A or E alone. This suggests that we must learn to 
think of an agent as necessarily containing only a latent potential to engage in appropriate patterns of 
interaction. It is only when coupled with a suitable environment that this potential is actually expressed 
through the agent's behavior in that environment. (p. 132) 
In chemistry, for instance, ordered patterns (systems with much reduced degrees of 
freedom), like the wave patterns in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky chemical reaction (see the 
next chapter), can emerge from a system that could potentially have many more degrees of 
freedom. In the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction there exist many millions of molecules of 
different chemicals that, under equilibrium conditions, would thoroughly intermix into a 
random, homogenous looking mixture. The chances that the chemicals in such a system 
would group like-molecules together, so that patterns would be apparent at the 
macroscopic level, are astronomically small (i.e., close to impossible). Yet, under non-
equilibrium conditions (e.g., when heat is pumped into the system), such order always 
emerges (see Thelen & Smith, 1994). 
If one were following a traditional cognitivist strategy for explaining the emergence of 
order in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, one might suppose that a qualitatively new set 
of instructions telling the molecules where to group (a new causal agent) had been 
introduced to the chemical system. Instead, what one finds is that the change from a 
disordered to an ordered regime is merely triggered by a steady change in a particular 
control parameter (e.g., temperature). "What is remarkable ... ", argue Thelen and Smith 
(1994, p. 62) " ... is that the parameter change ... [is] entirely nonspecific to q [the control 
parameter]. The temperature [has] no information whatsoever prescribing the nature of the 
chemical reaction ... . The pattern emerged strictly as a function of N, the nonlinear 
dynamics of the system." 97 (see also Kelso, 1995). Within an ESD framework similar 
analyses . can be made of, for instance, the behaviour of situated robots. Instead of 
attempting to understand behaviour in terms of either the environment instructing the 
robot, or the robot containing instructions for action, a dynamical analysis can make 
97 In this example Thelen and Smith are using the variables in Haken's (1978) general dynamical equation to 
show how phase shifts due to a parameter change differ from 'instructional' commands by new causal 
agents: 
q=N (q, parameters, noise) 
(where q is the behaviour of the system and N is the nonlinear function governing the elements of the 
system). 
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perfect mathematical sense of the idea that behaviour emerges from the interplay of 
environmental and agent-side resources. 
Making Sense of Many Kinds of Change 
Non-linear dynamical systems, as noted above, also have the natural facility for making· 
sense of systems that change continuously (linearly, monotonically) within certain 
conditions and discretely (nonlinearly, non-monotonically) within others (see Elman et al. 
[1996] for a thorough analysis of different kinds of change). Often slight changes in a 
control parameter cause only slight changes in the phase portrait of a dynamical system -
what you would expect from a simple linear system. But even simple nonlinear equations98 
that describe systems consisting of only a few variables and parameters related by simple 
rules of evolution can exhibit radical changes in the system's phase portrait. These phase 
transitions have all the appearance of events caused by new causal variables when in fact 
such events can occur as a natural consequence of the non-linear dynamics of the system. 
Within cognitive science this is a very important feature because computational stories of 
the structure and function of underlying mechanisms are largely driven by fonnal analyses 
of surface behaviour (including observed neurobiological and physiological patterns of 
activity). The computational theorist is thus vulnerable to introducing redundant 
complexity into their description of the underlying substrate. Sophisticated dynamical 
analyses are more likely to bring such possibilities to light. 
Complex Causal Networks Rather than Simple Effective Causation 
Perhaps most significantly dynamical analyses, especially analyses of non-linear, self-
organising systems, show how it is possible to challenge the idea that the behaviour of 
agents is mechanically detennined in a relatively simplistic manner by either external or 
internal forces (see, e.g., Juarrero, 1999). Even quite complex computational accounts of 
activity portray behavioural responses as the outcome of long, linear cause-and-effect 
chains. Yet relatively simple looking systems can exhibit self-organisation - that is, 
ordered transitions between global patterns in response to changes in environmental 
parameters. Such systems can be understood to have a kind of natural and spontaneous 
98 One of the most commonly cited nonlinear systems is known as the logistic mapping: 
f(x) = rx(l- x) 
By changing the control parameter r one can observe the behaviour of the system change from having a 
single limit cycle attractor (when r is less than 3) to having 2, 4, and 8 such attractors (at various values of r 
up to 3.54409). At 1=3.569945 the system enters a chaotic regime returning briefly to having several limit 
cycle attractors occasionally at higher values ofr (see Elman et al., 1996, pp. 214-219). 
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activity (they 'keep changing themselves') even in the absence of 'input'99. When such 
systems couple with other systems (including other self-organising systems) the coupling 
relationship is best understood as one in which the 'input' from the other system serves to 
perturb the dynamics of the system rather than to direct it how to act. Such systems do not 
always respond the same way to identical 'inputs' because the current internal state of the 
system affects how an input will be responded to. Thus complex systems are better thought 
of as compensating for perturbations and deformations than responding to commands. 
[E]ach of these two dynamical systems is continuously defonning the flow of the other (perhaps drastically if 
any coupling parameters cross bifurcation points in the receiving system's parameter space) and, therefore 
influencing its subsequent trajectory. Any agent that is going to reliably accomplish its goals in the face of 
such environmental perturbations must be organized in such a way that its dynamics can compensate for or 
even actively exploit the structure of such perturbations. (Beer, 1995b, p. 131) 
Dynamical analyses of complex systems are perhaps more likely to provide us with 
scientifically satisfying explanations of the apparent autonomy of organisms than the 
traditional computational approach by maintaining basic scientific beliefs in determinism 
and causation. 
Applying Dynamical Systems Theory to the Study of Cognition: Two 
Illustrative Examples 
I will now illustrate the ways in which DST has been used to make sense of cognitive 
activity using two examples from the literature. Importantly, neither example involves an 
attempt to model real human or animal cognitive activity and this should serve as a 
cautionary warning to the reader (see Beer [2000] for a summary of some dynamical 
analyses of real-life examples of cognition). Both examples have been chosen because of 
the way in which they illuminate key DST principles at a fairly fundamental mechanistic 
level of analysis. Because of the structural complexities of real agents and real 
environments, current DST models of human and animal cognitive activity (e.g., Thelen & 
Smith, 1994) often do not exhibit a level of precision and fineness of detail necessary to 
convincingly demonstrate the important features of a dynamical approach. Thus, the 
following examples are simplified, artificial, and indeed, not even fully cognitive in nature. 
99 Importantly, complex, self-organising systems are, however, usually open systems - that is, systems which 
require a continuous supply of energy to maintain their integrity (which is a consequence of their far-from 
equilibrium nature). This sort of openness is not what I mean by 'input' which, here is taken to be of a more 
'instructive' nature such as an introduction of a new chemical or the approach of a predator (see Thelen & 
Smith, 1994, pp. 54-56). In the next chapter I discuss Maturana and Varela's (1980, 1988) claim that certain 
kinds of complex system (an autopoietic system) are structurally open but operationally closed. This 
distinction maps on to my present distinction between 'receiving input' and being an open, self-organising 
system. 
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Hopefully, however, they should serve as adequate 'intuition pumps' for illustrating the 
promise of the DST approach to cognition. 
Van Gelder's Analysis o/the Watt Governor 
Tim van Gelder (1995) provides one of the best known (and most widely criticised) 
examples of the ways in which a dynamical analysis of a quasi-cognitive problem differs 
from the traditional formal-task analysis approach of cognitivism (see chapter 2)100. He 
asks us to think of an 18th century technological problem - the governing problem - as 
being akin to a basic cognitive information-processing subtask such as recognition by 
matching or memory retrieval. Van Gelder asks us to imagine how a computationally-
oriented researcher might try to solve the governing problem faced by engineers during the 
industrial revolution. During this period steam engines promised to provide a powerful and 
efficient workhorse for many industries including the cotton industry where spinning and 
weaving could potentially be automated and mechanised. However the speed of a steam 
engine's flywheel was known to fluctuate with changes in steam pressure and the workload 
being placed upon the engine. This lack of uniform engine speed meant that high quality 
spinning and weaving would be impossible under steam power. What was needed was 
some way of regulating the steam input into the piston (via the throttle valve) so that a 
consistent speed was maintained. Ultimately this problem was solved when James Watt 
invented the centrifugal governor. 
Thus, the problem space set up by van Gelder's historical analysis was of the need for a 
quasi-intelligent physical device to adjust an engine throttle so that it would let enough 
steam into the piston to maintain a consistent flywheel speed. Think of the governor as a 
'little person' behaving in the environment of the steam engine whose job it is to smoothly 
coordinate engine power output with workload. 
As was noted in chapter 2, van Gelder suggests that the computationally-oriented engineer 
would resort to using a formal task analysis to understand the system. Recall that this 
involves breaking the overall problem task into smaller components in order to produce an 
algorithm that specifies the distinct 'information processing' steps carried out by the 
computational governor. This formal task analysis would look something like this: 
1. Measure the speed of the flywheel. 
2. Compare the actual speed against the desired speed. 
3. If there is no discrepancy, return to step 1. Otherwise, 
a. measure the current steam pressure; 
b. calculate the desired alteration in steam pressure; 
c. calculate the necessary throttle valve adjustment. 
100 The governor example was used in chapter 2 to illustrate the use formal task description in cognitivism. 
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4. Make the throttle valve adjustment. 
5. Return to step 1 (Van Gelder, 1995, p. 348). 
The fonnal task analysis then demands that the computational governor that implements 
these steps should possess a collection of physical components for carrying out the various 
subtasks. These components would likely include "a tachometer (for measuring the speed 
of the wheel; a device for calculating speed discrepancy; a steam pressure meter; a device 
for calculating the throttle valve adjustment; a throttle valve adjuster; and some kind of 
central executive to handle sequencing operations." (p. 348). 
What is of significance here is that the computational governor seems to face many of the 
problems that cognitivists claim humans and other animals face. These problems include 
perceiving and constructing representations of the environment, comparing these states of 
the world with desired (internal, knowledge) states, computing the differences between 
these represented states (presumably in some common fonn of computational calculus, 
e.g., a language of thought), working out what to do given these differences and then 
actually executing these 'motor programs'. 
Watt's Solution to the Governing Problem 
What is interesting, as van Gelder points out, is Watt's actual solution to the governing 
problem was nothing at all like that of our cognitivist engineer. Indeed, according to van 
Gelder, Watt's solution contained nothing that could effectively be understood as involving 
representations or computations and is better understood in tenns of dynamical 
explanation. The implication that van Gelder and I wish to take from this is that perhaps a 
dynamical explanation is a better one for all cognitive activity and that the computational-
representational model is at best a very rough approximation of some aspects of cognition 
and is at worst completely unhelpful. 
Watt's solution to the governing problem consisted of building a device (a governor) that is 
attached to engine's main flywheel and to the throttle valve that regulates how much steam 
flows into the engine. The governor simply transfonns the behaviour of the flywheel so 
that it adjusts the throttle valve in an appropriate manner. Van Gelder (1995) describes the 
structure of the governor in the following way: 
It consisted of a vertical spindle geared into the main flywheel so that it rotated at a speed directly dependent 
upon that of the flywheel itself .... Attached to the spindle by hinges were two arms, and on the end of each 
arm was a metal ball. As the spindle turned, centrifugal force drove the balls outward and hence upward. By . 
a clever arrangement, this arm motion was linked directly to the throttle valve. The result was that as the 
speed of the main wheel increased, the arms raised, closing the valve and restricting the flow of steam; as the 
speed decreased, the arms fell, opening the valve and allowing more steam to flow. The engine adopted a 
constant speed, maintained with extraordinary swiftness and smoothness in the presence of large fluctuations 
in pressure and load. (p. 349) 
!--:.. 
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So the governor's activity makes sense in terms of the physical mediation it performs 
between the flywheel and the steam inflow. It stretches the imagination to view such a 
process as a 'modelling' of the engine environment, a calculation of an appropriate 
response, and an execution of those calculated responses as classic cognitivist 'agent 
theory' would do. Now, as van Gelder notes, most people, engineers and non-engineers 
alike, gain a fairly intuitive mechanical understanding of how the governor accomplishes 
its task just by looking at how it operates as a piece of machinery. Moreover people never 
seem to try and understand the process in terms of parcels of information being sent from 
the flywheel to the governor where a representation of the engine speed, or current 
workload, is created in the structure of the governor (e.g., in the arm angles) which is 
transformed in order to produce a motor program for instructing the valve to open and 
close. Dynamical systems theory provides a_ precise mathematical way of formalising the 
intuitive mechanical understanding. With the arms attached to the flywheel, but not to the 
valve, the governor's dynamics can be described by the following differential equation: 
d2e ( )2 e' e g. e de 
-2 = llco cos sm --sm -r-
dt 1 dt 
The parameters represented in this equation are current engine speed (ill), the gearing 
constant (11), the gravity constant (g), length of the governor's arms (1), and a friction 
constant (r). The only varying quantities are time (t) and the state variable of arm angle 
(8). The equation thus tells us how the 'change in arm angle' changes (the instantaneous 
acceleration) depending on the current arm angle, the current arm angle change, and the 
engine speed. To find out, for instance, the angle of the arm at time t one would have to 
find a solution (i.e., another equation) to this general equation. 
The dynamics becomes more complicated when the governor is hooked up so that it 
regulates the engine speed, as we require another equation representing the dynamics of the 
steam engine. Van Gelder uses the following differential equation to describe the dynamics 
of a steam engine that might be hooked up to a governor. 
d ll co 
-n- = F(co, ... ,"C , ... ,) 
dt 
In this equation"C is the parameter for the current state of the throttle valve (which depends 
directly upon the governor's arm angle 8) and ill represents engine speed. This equation 
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tells us how changelOI in engine speed changes as a function of engine speed, throttle valve 
state, and whatever other relevant variables one might need to take account of in an 
equation describing the dynamics of a steam engine. When coupled with the governor 
equation (i.e., when the values for 0) and't [in terms of 8] are shared), the entire dynamics 
of the overall governor-steam engine system is described. 
In an important sense the mathematical equations are not of primary importance here. They 
merely serve to show that a formal non-representational calculus does exist for making 
sense of the coupled activity. The key difference between the computational governor and 
the Watt governor is in the contrast between thinking of the behaviour of the system in 
mechanical terms rather than computational and representational ones. However, the 
dynamical analysis does accentuate the following aspects of the governor-steam engine 
system: 
1. The governor and the steam engine each have their own intrinsic, ongoing and 
quantitative, dynamics. This does not necessarily mean that the two subsystems can 
operate independently of each other. In this case the steam engine can obviously 
function without a governor, but the governor will not spin without energetic input from 
the engine. Nonetheless the governor's structure specifies a space of possible 
behaviours (i.e., a phase portrait) independent of any particular 'input'. 
2. When coupled, the governor and the engine exhibit simultaneous, quantitative, 
modulatory activity. One does not simply impel the other to work. They are not static 
entities that require the other to send them information in order to act. They each have 
their own intrinsic dynamics (represented by a phase portrait) which is perturbed or 
parameterised by the other. 
[A]ny change in engine speed, no matter how small, changes not the state of the governor directly, but 
rather the way the state of the governor changes, and any change in arm angle changes the way the state 
of the engine changes. (van Gelder, 1995, p. 357) 
VanGelder's examples provide two lessons. The first lesson is that the traditional strategy 
of formal task analysis sets us off in a direction where we build (in the case of simulation 
- a synthesis problem) or model (in the case of cognitive analysis - an analysis problem) 
componential systems (or homuncular systems) where the overall activity of a system is 
accomplished by the aggregation of the activities of its subcomponents (see Clark, 1996, 
1997). Van Gelder implies that a DST approach does not constrain our thinking in this way 
and indeed may, by the mere fact that the framework is so un constraining, alert us to the 
101 This equation is a rather vague and general one and meant only as a sketch. Van Gelder's (1995) use of 
the index n indicates that he is only concerned with discussing some kind of derivative of engine speed. Thus 
my use of the term change here is used in a similarly vague sense. 
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fact the there may exist non-componential solutions to our analysis and synthesis 
problems. One has to be cautious here, however, and note that something more than 'lack 
of constraint' is necessary to get at non-componential (i.e., emergent and dynamical) 
systems including possibly the use of behaviour languages (Brooks, 1997), artificial 
evolution (Beer, 1995a, 1995b; Harvey et al., 1993), and ethological investigation 
(Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). 
The second of van Gelder's lessons is that cognitive systems are better understood as 
dynamical systems than as traditional representational-computational ones. This claim is 
just a statement of the dynamical hypothesis. He argues that "the deepest reason for 
supposing that the centrifugal governor is not representational is that, when we fully 
understand the relationship between engine speed and arm angle, we see that the notion of 
representation is just the wrong sort of conceptual tool to apply." (van Gelder, 1995, p. 
353). For van Gelder the operation of the governor is just too subtle and complex for the 
traditional notions of representation and computation to handle. Digital computation is 
essentially sequential and cyclic in nature and implies the existence of discrete, identifiable 
steps in the process. Yet the coupling of the governor and the engine is a smooth, 
continuous, quantitative, and simultaneous process. DST incorporates tools that can 
capture these subtleties and complexities. 
While van Gelder's arguments have been influential in the first case, a number of authors 
have questioned his second claim. In particular these authors have been at pains to argue 
that some interesting sense of representation can still be gleaned in the governor example. 
Van Gelder argues that the angle of the governor's arms cannot be understood as a 
representation of the current speed of the engine (pp. 352-353)102. Bechtel (1998), 
Chemero (1998a, 1999), and Markman and Dietrich (1998) argue that it can. 
Problems with Computational Readings o/Watt's Governor 
As often happens with attempted non-computational explanations of cognitive activity, 
unorthodox theorists need to be wary of orthodox theorists claiming that the unorthodox 
alternative is just a particular implementation of a computational-representational system. 
Within modem cognitive science, classical symbolicists contend that connectionist 
102 Interestingly van Gelder has been widely misinterpreted as arguing that all dynamical systems theoretic 
approaches to cognition must be anti-representationalist in nature. However, he clearly states that DST is 
probably compatible with thinking of representations as, perhaps, attractors, parameter settings, trajectories, 
or system states in some systems (see van Gelder, 1995, p. 376; van Gelder, 1998, p. 622; van Gelder & Port, 
1995, pp. 11-12). He does explicitly argue that the centrifugal governor example is non-representational in 
nature and this has worried a number of representationalists. Perhaps this is because they see similarities 
between the governor example and cognitive phenomena that they are used to thinking of as 
representational. 
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networks are just a particular kind of symbolic system. The same fate seems to await the 
excited dynamicist (Markman & Dietrich, 1998; Bechtel, 1998; Chemero, 1998, 1999). 
Van Gelder is alert to this possibility and points out that there are several significant 
aspects of the Watt governor that simply do not fit the cognitivist's story. 
At first glance it may appear that the angle of the arm on the governor represents (in the 
sense that the arm's position reflects or covaries with) the speed ofthe engine. Van Gelder 
(1995, pp. 352-353) argues that this is not the case because: 1) the mere fact of covariance 
does not make something a representation (see my critical discussion of covariance 
theories of content determination in chapter 3); 2) that in any event the arm angle hardly 
ever correlates with engine speed because the governor reacts much more slowly to extra 
loading on the machine than the engine does - that is, at times when the whole system has 
reached a stable equilibrium point, the arm angle follows one kind of 'correlational 
scheme' while at other times (when the workload on the engine changes or the engine's 
pressure drops) it follows another; and 3) a representational analysis of the role of the 
governor's arms is simply wrongheaded. The point of the arms, as part of the entire 
governor assembly, is to enable a balanced output of power not to signal to the valve 
mechanisms what the current state of the engine is. Rather, both subsystems - the governor 
and the engine - modulate each other's activity in a complex codeterministic manner. It is 
in fact important that the arms do not correlate with engine speed directly or even with a 
particular temporal delay because to do so would jeopardise the proper functioning of the 
engine-governor system 103. 
Bechtel (1998, pp. 301-306) argues against van Gelder's dismissal of the governor's arm 
angles as representations of engine speed. Bechtel takes something to be a representation in 
the sense that I outlined it in chapter 2. That is, a representation is an object or event that 
carries information (a bearer) about another object or event (a referent) that is used by a 
system (a user) in order to coordinate its behaviour with the referent. So Bechtel, following 
Haugeland (1991), takes something to be a representation if it stands in for the object it 
represents within the operations of a cognitive system. 
Against van Gelder's first point, he argues that the governor possesses all of the criteria 
necessary for counting the arm angle as a representation of engine speed. That is the arm 
103 Smithers (1994 cited in Clark, 1997, pp. 95-96) notes that the second generation of governors were 
designed to react more quickly to engine speed changes due to factors such as extra workload by using better 
machining techniques that cut down on friction between parts, but that their increased sensitivity led them to 
malfunction by continually 'hunting' (oscillating between slowing down and speeding up). In order to 
overcome this problem the new governors had to incorporate components to avoid hunting. Thus we see that 
the perfect correlation beloved of causal theorists of representation (e.g., Dretske, 1995) actually proves to be 
a liability in this case! 
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angle is designed so that the 'infonnation' in the ann angle can be used to modulate engine 
speed - it has a user, a bearer, and a referent. This, so Bechtel argues, effectively answers 
van Gelder's 'mere correlation argument' . 
Bechtel deals with van Gelder's second objection by suggesting that the time-lag between 
the state of the engine and the 'relevant' ann angle does not necessarily preclude the ann 
angle being a representation. He supports this claim in two ways. First he marshals 
Millikan's biological function argument (see chapter 2) that x may represent y even if the 
two never correlate. Second he argues that an effect (in this case the state of the 
representation bearer) is always going to lag behind its cause (in this case the referent) 
making the two always temporally 'out of sync' . 
Finally Bechtel takes on van Gelder's claim that the representational relation is the wrong 
sort of way of understanding the mutual modulation of governor and engine dynamics. He 
argues that just because the governor and the engine are related in a subtle, complex,. and 
mutually detennining way, "it is not clear why it is too subtle and complex to satisfy the 
stand-in aspect of representation. Something can stand in for something else by being 
coupled in a dynamical manner, and by being so coupled figure in detennining a response 
that alters the very thing being represented." (p. 304). 
I believe that Bechtel's points largely miss the mark even though they raise some 
interesting points about a possible way of 'dynamicising' representational approaches. First 
of all, it is not clear that Bechtel fully appreciates the nature of the non-correlation between 
arm angle and engine speed. This lack of correlation involves not just a simple temporal 
delay but in fact a distinct lack of overall covariance. So it is not clear how representational 
content could be recovered from this more complex relationship between ann angle and 
engine speed. It is also not clear how Millikan's (1984, 1993) teleological approach would 
make much sense of what is going on. Chemero (1998, pp. 102-104) attempts to do just 
this, but the analysis is much less illuminating than that provided by the dynamical 
perspective (see the following section on a dynamical analysis of a Sussex robot for 
Chemero's re-analysis of the second example to get a feel for what a teleological account 
gives us). In an important sense Bechtel's efforts are primarily aimed at saving, not a 
representational account of agent-environment systems, but a mechanistic account (I 
discuss this issue in more detail in the final section of this chapter). His main concern is 
with DST's ability to give us an account of the target system that will illuminate the 
important causal relations that hold between its components. It is not clear to me why a 
representational analysis falls out as a natural consequence of holding the belief that a 
componential analysis is required to supplement the insights of a dynamical analysis. But 
this seems to be what Bechtel (and Clark, 1996, 1997) argue. There are a number of 
possible reasons why this representational assumption is regularly made. Here are two: 
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1. The first is that the notion of internal representation continues to evolve. With the 
advent of the notions of action-oriented representations and their kin (see the previous 
chapter and Clark, 1997; Chemero, 1998a), it has become permissible to think of 
structures that simultaneously 1) deform systematically in the face of specific 
environmental structure and 2) control/modulate motor activity, as representations, 
although it remains to be seen how content is handled in these cases. So the fact that 
the governor's arms may signify both the speed of the engine and the change in the 
valve opening makes perfect action-oriented representational sense. Although the 
notion of representation is becoming increasingly refined by exposure to ESD 
interactionist research, it is also becoming increasingly removed from its roots as an 
off-line model or simulation of absent objects, properties, or events (Keijzer, 1997). 
Just because examples such as van Gelder's can be reworked to accommodate some 
kind of stripped down, modified notion of representation, it does not follow that 
representational accounts provide the best or most useful accounts of cognitive activity 
for analysing, understanding, and modelling the behaviour of cognitive systems. 
2. The second reason for the ongoing debates between representationalists and non-
representationalists is that it is probably the case that the governor example is just too 
simple and too un-cognitive to ram the DST point home. Many mechanical systems 
succumb to componential/representational analyses quite easily because they have been 
constructed according to componential principles (Clark, 1996; Hendriks-Jansen, 
1996). Although the real centrifugal governor is not built like van Gelder's fictitious 
computational governor, it has still been designed as a component for modulating the 
activity of another machine. So perhaps it should not be surprising that some sort of 
representational gloss can be given. 
The second example provides a more complex, more 'natural' (because it features a less 
explicitly 'designed' agent), and more distinctively cognitive example of the ways in which 
a dynamical systems explanation can be deployed in the study of agent-environment 
systems. Once more I will use an example from the situated robotics literature, this time 
from the work of the evolutionary robotics team of Inman Harvey, Phil Husbands, and 
Dave Cliff (HHC hereafter) at the University of Sussex (Cliff et aI., 1993; Harvey et aI., 
1993, 1994; Husbands et aI., 1995). 
A Dynamical Analysis of a Sussex Robot 
As noted in previous chapters, HHC have designed and built a number of artificially 
evolved mobotic systems. Genetic algorithms are used to select connectionist architectures 
that produce simple adaptive behaviours such as target following and centering the robot's 
position in a room. HHC have provided dynamical, rather than representational analyses of 
these robots. Wheeler (1996) argues that the resulting connectionist architectures push our 
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attempts at giving a representational gloss to these behaviour-producing systems to the 
very limit. 
Husbands et al. (1995) argue that the operation ofthese robots in their environments is best 
understood from a dynamical systems perspective. They adopt a similar position to Beer 
(1995a, 1995b) in arguing that computers (computational systems) make up only a small 
proportion of all possible dynamical systems104 and that "the all-too-common assumption 
that cognition is some form of computation is ... a stultifying restriction on possible 
models for a robot control system, as well as the rest of AI." (p. 85). 
HHC understand the activity of their evolved robots in terms of the coupling of an agent 
system and an environment system in the same sort of way that van Gelder does with the 
governor-stearn engine example. For the agent-side part of the dynamical equation 
Husbands et al. (1995, pp. 91-93) describe the robot's internal control system using 
equations that represent the connectivity and connection weights within the robot's neural 
network105 as well as mathematical descriptions that describe the characteristics of the 
robot's visual sensors (two low bandwidth photoreceptors that register brightness). 
The robots studied by HHC are 'evolved' in a simple environment consisting of a 
cylindrical 'room' with walls of varying heights. This environment side of the dynamical 
equation is described by Husbands et al. (1995, pp. 93-95) in terms of the kind of 'input' 
the robot receives from at various regions in this environment. The input is described in a 
104 HHC use a quite general characterisation of a dynamical systems as "". any system that can be 
characterised by a fmite number of state variables, and a dynamical law that specifies how these state 
variables change with time." (Husbands et al., 1995, p. 85). This is a much looser and more inclusive 
defmitiori than that used by van Gelder (1998). He argues (pp. 617-619) that dynamical systems are 
quantitative systems - that is, systems whose behaviour exhibits quantitative distances between states. 
However, in digital computational systems, such as Turing machines, states are merely ordered. This 
distinction makes the dynamical hypothesis a non-trivial claim (see Wheeler's, 1998 commentary on van 
Gelder for more detail). 
105 Husbands et al. (1995, pp. 87-89) utilise recurrent dynamic real-time networks. These networks are more 
complex than traditional three-layer, feedforward networks. Each network consists of a set of preset 'input' 
nodes and a set of preset motor controlling nodes as well as a set of internal nodes. The artificial 
evolutionary process can connect nodes in any marmer (forward, backward, direct feedback to self, or 
unconnected). Moreover, any number of internal nodes can evolve - that is, some robots may produce 5 
internal nodes, some more, some less - although there are only fixed numbers of input and output nodes. 
Interestingly, several of the evolved designs 'cannibalised' unused input nodes and used them as internal 
nodes and some output nodes were not used (i.e., remain unconnected). So, even this fixed input and output 
architecture was effectively plastic. Finally, the connections between nodes incorporated time-delays (unlike 
traditional networks where all nodes are updated simultaneously) and an element of random noise. This led 
to a number of units forming noisy feedback loops - essentially ongoing self-organizing activity. This 
activity was perturbed but hot caused by input. 
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robot-relative manner in terms of a space consisting of two parameters: r being the point on 
a radius that passes through the centre of robot and that originates from the centre of the 
cylindrical environment, and ¢ being the clockwise angle between the radius and the 'front' 
of the robot. Motion (moving in straight lines, turning left and right etc.) is described in 
terms of transformations in this relativistic coordinate system. So rand ¢ evolve according 
to dynamics of the robot's movements. 
The overall activity of the robot is described in terms of the coupling of these two systems. 
Simply put, the agent subsystem consists of a set of variables (activation levels of units, 
connection weights, etc.) that evolve according to a certain dynamic (the linear threshold 
function that 'sums' inputs into units). The parameters consist of two environmental 
'input' values (Er and El) corresponding to the input registered by the robot's 
photoreceptors. These parameters are variables within the environment (or stimulus array) 
subsystem which 'evolves' according to transformations produced through the movement 
of the robot. HHC summarise this overall activity in terms of the vector field (phase 
portrait) of the entire system U (see Husbands et aI., 1995, pp. 97-102 for this global 
analysis). 
Wheeler (1996, pp. 218-225) argues that HHC's dynamical analyses provide us with a 
better explanatory and predictive tool of the robot's activity than a representational-
computational approach can because a dynamical account can better address the ways in 
which activity emerges from the interplay of the robot's network and sensors and the 
layout of the environment (i.e., evolved animate vision in action). He focuses on the facts 
that 1) the robot manages to carry out relatively sophisticated navigational tasks using very 
simple sensors, and 2) classical information-processing models do not encourage us to 
think that such things are possible. 
Minimal monocular vision is no basis for building models of the world, which then could be used to make 
decisions about how to proceed. The robot succeeds in its task by exploiting its own movements to create 
variations in light inputs. Thus the ways in which the sensory-motor mechanisms are coupled to the world 
enable the robot to complete the task, given its ongoing activity as a whole agent. (p. 224) 
He goes on to claim that the Cartesian view, as he calls it, guides theorists to think of 
solutions to cognitive problems purely in terms of what is inside the agent, whereas a 
dynamical coupling approach facilitates understanding how activity can interactively 
emerge from the interplay of a moving agent and its surroundings. 
The visuomotor phase portraits, which were constructed to understand the behaviour of the room-centring 
robot in different environments, could be thought of as an attempt to capture how the robot moves through 
its visuomotor world. The dynamical structure of that world (the phase portrait) changes when the robot's 
'physical' environment (to which it is coupled) changes, although the structure of the control system itself 
does not change. (p. 225) 
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Wheeler's conclusion is akin to the claims of van Gelder's (1998) knowledge hypothesis 
that cognitive activity is best understood using the tools of DST rather than necessarily 
reflecting the actual mechanisms underlying the robot's behaviour (the nature hypothesis). 
However, Chemero (1999) disagrees with Wheeler's analysis, arguing that it is possible to 
formulate an illuminating representational analysis ofHHC's robots. He analyses the roles 
of the various nodes within the network of one of HHC's evolved target-following robots 
(Harvey et al., 1994) and provides a representational analysis based upon his favoured 
teleological theory of representation. The robot's final network structure consisted of 12 
nodes106 connected by a variety of feedforward and feedback (recurrent) excitatory and 
inhibitory connections. Two nodes (0, 1) served as input nodes from two visual detectors 
(vI ~d v2). Three other nodes (13, 14, 15) served as output nodes that controlled the motor 
and steering capacities of the robot (13 increased voltage to the left wheel motor, 14 
decreased voltage to the left motor, and 15 increased voltage to the right motor). The other 
seven nodes served as intermediaries between input and output with the exception of node 
5 which excited other input and output nodes but received no input itself. 
Chemero uses Harvey et aI's (1994) analysis to make his representational claim. The latter 
found that the robot exhibited three kinds of behaviour each of which was controlled by a 
subnetwork of units (akin to the behaviour layers in Brooks' mobots): 
1. When the signals to both vI and v2 were weak (i.e., when the light coloured target was 
not 'in view') little or no activation was propagated to the input units. This resulted in 
the noisy node (unit 5) have primary influence over the network's activity which in 
tum caused the robot to tum on the spot in an irregular, noisy fashion. This provided 
the robot with the opportunity to 'wander about' until a strong input was detected in 
either vI or v2 thereby setting off a different kind of behaviour. 
2. When vI received a weak signal and v2 a very strong one,unit 1 self-inhibited and 
triggered a pattern of activation that led to the same kind of noisy turning as in the 
previous condition. However, when v2's signal was "medium high" (Harvey et al., 
1994, p. 399) a pattern was set up that caused unit 14 to excite itself so that the left 
motor slowed. This caused the robot to rotate in a medium radius circle until a strong 
signal was detected in vI and the following conditional behaviour occurred107. 
106 The artificial evolutionary process led to a number of other nodes being effectively unconnected to the 
network. The 12 nodes mentioned here correspond only to those that played a role in the robot's behaviour 
production. 
107 Chemero (1999, pp. 11-12) seems not to distinguish between the different behaviours caused when v2 
receives strong input and when it receives medium high input. It appears that he bases his analysis on the 
medium high input condition. Although this does not weaken his basic argument, it provides an impression 
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3. When v1 received strong input, regardless of the strength of the input to v2, unit 0 
triggered a pattern of activation which led to both motors being activated. This caused 
the robot to move straight ahead. 
Together these behaviour layers resulted in the strategy of rotating until the target was 
detected in v 1 and then of moving toward the target in a straight line. If the target was ever 
lost or obscured the robot would again rotate until it was acquired by v 1. 
Chemero argues that this set-up is enough to warrant branding the system as 
representational according to his teleological theory. The input nodes correspond to 
representation producers, the output nodes are representation consumers, and the patterns 
of activation across the intermediate nodes are representations. Under a teleological 
analysis the contents of the representations within the robot correspond to the way the 
world would need to be for the behaviour caused by the representation consumer to be 
adaptive. So in condition 1 the pattern of activation of the intermediate units have the 
content of, roughly speaking, target out of sight. In condition 2 they have the content 
target in sight (but not straight ahead?), and in condition 3 the content corresponds to 
target ahead. 
Yet despite successfully producing a representational gloss for the operation of the Sussex 
robot, Chemero argues that representationalists have little to celebrate. He gives several 
reasons why we should prefer the dynamical explanation over a representational one 
(Chemero, 1999, pp. 14-15). 
First of all Chemero notes that his construction of the representational story depended upon 
the prior existence of the dynamical account (p. 14). In a sense he used the dynamical 
account to run through the architectural (network) implications of placing the robot in 
different positions in the environment. This gave him the information necessary to assign 
'roles' or 'content' to different network node activation patterns. This makes the 
representational account an a posteriori one. Moreover, since Chemero focuses on only 
one of the robots evolved by HHC, we do not get a chance to see the advantages of the 
dynamical account in dealing with a collection of different but related control systems -
including 1) systems with different architectures evolved to deal with the same task and 2) 
systems evolved to deal with different tasks in similar environments. Whereas a 
representational analysis will require the theorist to treat each variation pretty much as a 
completely new problem to be analysed, a dynamical account may only require the 
relatively simple re-valuing of a couple of parameters. For instance, a variant network 
architecture can be dealt with by the dynamical analysis by 'simply' plugging in the new 
that the robot's workings are simpler than they actually are and thus it is possible that this simplification 
works in favour of his representational argument. 
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network dynamics into the relevant parts of the coupled equations, provided the basic kind 
of network is not very different from the original. Provided one has the software available 
to plot the new phase portrait or vector field, and this is pretty much a pre-requisite for any 
dynamical analysis, the new description of the robot's behaviour is instantly available. In 
non-linear dynamical equations, such as those that exist in most interesting neural nets, 
small changes to an architecture or a task often result in the new robot exhibiting quite 
different behaviours from its predecessors. But these large changes can be instantly had by 
twiddling the relevant equations in a dynamical analysis. 
By contrast, in a representational account these large changes in behavioural strategy 
would form the basis for the analysis. Representational accounts, of course, usually rely 
upon the researcher observing the behaviour of an agent, working out what stimuli it is 
reacting to, and then postulating how the agent is 'processing' and using that information. 
Because content assignment, the essence of any representational approach, relies on 
matching internal activity with behavioural and environmental kinds, representational 
analyses must exhibit a linear relationship between the behavioural complexity of the agent 
and theoretical complexity of the analysis of its behaviour. Of course, representational 
analyses may possibly be automated in simple cases, but this does not change the fact that 
a representational analysis is a much more labour intensive activity. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Chemero argues that the representational account 
adds nothing to the existing dynamical analysis (van Gelder [1995] makes a similar point 
about the possible accounts of the operation of Watt's governor). With the mapping ofthe 
system's phase portrait we can successfully predict the consequences for the entire system 
given any set of initial conditions. I would even go so far as to say that the dynamical 
account is more useful than the representational one. Representational explanations 
typically do not give us the predictive power of a complete dynamical account. For 
instance, Chemero's vague reference to patterns of activation belies the complexity of the 
robots' networks and the numerous parameters (e.g., connectivity, noise, weights) that 
must be calibrated in order to produce the appropriate behaviours. Certainly one could not 
build or model in detail the inner workings of these robots using the representational 
analysis provided by Chemero. 
Of course, HHC's robot system is relatively simple and we are unlikely to be able to 
produce anything like as precise a story for the behaviour of real agents in complex 
environments. We must guard against overextending our explanatory enthusiasm. 
However, it is important to note that HHC's robots are not all that simple and that it is hard 
to see that a traditional representational analysis of this system would have anything like 
the predictive power of the dynamical account. Yet demonstrations such as these do not 
convince the determined representationalist who argues that a representational explanation 
gives us something more than a dynamical one. It is to these issues that I tum next. 
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Does the Dynamical Approach Provide a Genuine Explanatory 
Framework? 
There are two basic kinds of objection to the dynamical hypothesis: 1) that the application 
of dynamical systems tools to cognitive activity is unworkable, and 2) that dynamical 
analyses do not provide us with an explanation that is fertile enough for understanding 
cognitive mechanisms at a level adequate for a sophisticated cognitive science. I will 
examine each of these objections in tum. 
Dynamical Systems TheOlY is Probably Unworkable in the Context of Cognition 
A number of writers have observed that the tools of dynamical systems theory work best 
when the researcher is only dealing with a few variables (e.g., Clark, 1997; Eliasmith, 
1996). It has been claimed that, beyond perhaps five to ten variables, the complexity of a 
dynamical system begins to threaten our "intuitive geometric understanding" (Clark, 1997, 
p. 101) and problems become intractable. Eliasmith (1996) argues that solving dynamical 
equations with the number of variables that, say a middle-sized connectionist network 
possesses, will prove to be impossible108• Such objections are probably a little premature. 
Husbands et aL (1995) happily construct dynamical descriptions of their quite complex 
neural network-controlled robots. Beer (1995a) points out that a savvy theorist can analyse 
high-variable systems by carefully picking and choosing which variables to analyse. 
Moreover these sort of objections do not challenge the contention that cognitive agents 
may well be dynamical systems (the nature hypothesis) in the sense of systems made up of 
quantitative variables (Van Gelder, 1998). 
Dynamical Systems Theory needs to be Complemented with a Mechanistic Emphasis 
A number of critics have remarked that dynamical systems· explanations seem to leave out 
important aspects of the full explanatory project of cognitive science. In this section I want 
to take a quick look at some of these objections and pull out what I think are the most 
important points. 
A common objection to, or at least misgiving about, the use of a dynamical systems 
framework in the explanation of cognitive activity is that it merely provides an abstract 
108 It is not clear in Eliasmith (1996) whether he fully appreciates what it means to solve a differential 
equation. This is an entirely separate task from the relatively simple task of specifying an evolution equation 
for a set of variables. Even some very low variable problems (such as the famous three body problem) are 
computationally intractable (unsolvable analytically) while the behaviour of many systems possessing a large 
number of variables can easily be modelled, that is, have their evolution equations described. The number of 
variables in a system is not the only measure of complexity. There exist a number of modem, often 
computer-intensive, methods for accurately approximating solutions for many analytically intractable 
problems including using difference equations (see Stewart, 1997). 
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mathematical description of agents' behaviours and that a complete theoretical explanation 
will also require a description of the underlying causal mechanisms, such as neural circuits 
or mental modules, which give rise to the surface behaviour described by dynamical 
equations. As I have noted at the beginning of the chapter, this claim is often, but not 
always, taken to be identical to the argument that a full explanatory theory of cognition 
must include reference to representations and computation. Van Gelder (1998, p. 625) is 
dismissive of such objections. He argues that other scientific endeavours, such as celestial 
mechanics, accept DST explanations as sufficient for all scientific purposes and that 
cognitive scientists should follow suit109• He suggests that cognitive scientists have 
traditionally adopted a relatively peculiar explanatory approach in utilising functional 
analyses of the components of 'cognitive systems', and that they have "become so 
accustomed to such explanations that anything else seems inadequate." (p. 625). 
In contrast to van Gelder, both Bechtel (1998) and Clark (1997) argue that dynamical 
systems theory has its place is a modem cognitive science, but that its use does not 
preclude the need for traditional mechanistic and computational-representational 
explanations. Bechtel suggests that dynamical systems explanations are a fonn of covering 
law explanation popular in the logical positivist philosophy of science pioneered by the 
likes of Camap, Nagel, and Hempel (Bechtel, 1998, pp. 306-307). According to Bechtel, 
. covering law explanations take a phenomenon to be explained "when a statement 
describing it was derived from statements specifying one or more laws and relevant initial 
conditions." (p. 306). He argues that such explanations are better suited to the physical 
sciences (and some would argue that they are not even appropriate there) and are rarely 
found within the life or cognitive sciences. By contrast cognitive science, amongst other 
sciences, makes use of what he calls mechanistic explanation, or what Clark (1996, 1997) 
calls componential or homuncular explanation. Such explanations analyse the system in 
question in tenns of the roles played by its components. The behaviour of a system is best 
109 Clark (1997, p. 117) points out that DSTdoes supply an explanation rather than a mere description 
insofar as it provides a framework for understanding counterfactuals - the idea that a dynamical systems 
equation will systematically tell us how the behaviour of the system would be different if some variable of 
the system was changed. An inductive generalisation by contrast will not tell us anything about 
counterfactuals. In a similar manner Chemero (1999) makes an interesting case for not thinking of DST 
explanations as being purely superficial descriptions of surface activity and thus being a weak guide to 
discovery - a claim made against the phenomenalist physics of Mach by atomists such as Boltzman. Those 
physicists that posited hidden causal mechanisms (e.g., atoms) were able to make novel (and ultimately 
fruitful) empirical predictions about various physical phenomena. Chemero points out that it is possible that 
DST explorations of cognition may result in the discovery of dynamical equations that generalise to many 
kinds of behaviour. He gives as an example Kaipainen and Port's extension of the Haken-Kelso-Bunz model 
of rhythmic behaviour to a possible general theory of meter '- a model that can be used to model any kind of 
rhythmic human behaviour (e.g., arm swinging, walking, and even speech actions). 
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understood by 1) thinking of the overall behaviour of the system as the outcome of many 
sub-behaviours (or the 'execution of component tasks' as Bechtel puts it), and 2) by 
assuming that each of these subtasks is accomplished by a separate (physical or functional) 
component of the system. Bechtel (1998, see also Bechtel & Richardson, 1993) refers to 
these two assumptions as the decomposition heuristic and the localisation heuristic 
respectively. Such a style of explanation focuses upon the internal structure of the 
'behaving system'. Machines, such as washing machines, computers, and so on, succumb 
to this kind of functional analysis quite easily for the simple reason that many modem 
machines are designed using the 'reverse application' of the decomposition and localisation 
heuristics (see Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). 
Thus, Clark (1997) does not believe that a dynamical systems approach is enough for 
cognitive science. He follows Dretske (1994, cited in Clark, 1997) in arguing that a 
complete explanation will give us the capacity to build the system being analysed; at least 
in principle. In order to do this one needs a full causal-mechanistic analysis of the system. 
And, since dynamical analyses often use relatively few state variables that correspond to 
quite abstract states of affairs, dynamical explanations do not provide the theorist with the 
knowledge needed to understand the causal-mechanistic links that hold between the 
components of the system. Clark (1997) claims that: 
[T]hese "pure" models do not speak directly to the interests of the engineer. The engineer wants to know 
how to build systems that would exhibit mind-like properties, and, in particular, how the overall dynamics so 
nicely displayed by the pure-accounts actually arise as a result of the micro dynamics of various components 
and subsystems .... What is really being suggested is not that in fact that we should be able to build systems 
that exhibit the desired features ... but that we should understand something of how the larger-scale 
properties are rooted in the interactions of the parts. (pp. 120-121) 
Keijzer (1997, pp. 195-198; see also Keijzer et aI., 1998; Keijzer and Bem, 1996) makes a 
similar claim. Unlike Clark, who argues that a mechanistic explanation adds some 
explanatory power by telling us how the parts of the target system interact, Keijzer's 
interest in constructing a mechanistic level of analysis is in finding out how to apply the 
dynamical analyses in the first place. Without having what Keijzer calls a theOlY of the 
implementing substrate, one cannot even specify the relevant parameters and variables 
which would feature in our dynamical equations (Thelen & Smith [1994] make a similar 
claim). Keijzer argues that a developed interactionist theory of behaviour can and should 
be constructed relatively independently of any dynamical modelling. What we cognitive 
scientists want to know first is what sort of organisation underpins a system that is capable 
of adaptive behaviour. We need to be able to say, at a mechanical level of description, what 
separates the cognitive from the non-cognitive. Dynamical systems theory can not do this 
by itself. I believe that Keijzer is entirely correct in his analysis but that it may potentially 
threaten the radical insights that a dynamical approach can provide because it is sometimes 
assumed that the insufficiency of DST as a theory of cognition means that we must 
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embrace a representational-computational framework to fill in the explanatory holes. For 
instance, both Clark (1996, p. 264, 1997) and Bechtel (1998) argue that a system that is 
successfully understood in a mechanistic and componential manner lends itself to a 
representational interpretation because "what must be done in such accounts is to explain 
how information is carried through the system and made available to other parts of the 
system that use it." (Bechtel, 1998, p. 313). In other words, a representational analysis is 
thought to be pretty much identical to a componential mechanical analysis. Any system 
where we can think of components signalling other components is (somehow) 
automatically representational in nature. 
Hooker (1997), however, argues that representational analyses typical in cognitive science 
do not usually tell us anything particularly interesting about the mechanical structure of a 
system. Ironically, the representational approach is actually more at risk of providing 
abstract redescriptions of surface behaviour than the dynamical account according to 
Hooker. Indeed, in an important sense,' it is one of the dynamical approach's strengths that 
it requires a description of components in a different vocabulary to the one that describes 
the high level activity patterns of the system. Hooker (1997) claims that 
[S]tructuralist theories specify structures in the same cognitive terms as the cognitive behaviours they wish to 
explain - if that is an explanatory weakness, it has the advantage of not requiring explanations in sub-
conceptual terms. By contrast, precisely because the dynamical systems approach wishes to explain the 
formation of global order by underlying interaction processes among more local components, its description 
of those components cannot be at the same conceptual level as the global order to be explained. (p. 107) 
Thus, Hooker effectively turns the argument of Clark and Bechtel on its head. The 
cognitive architectures that cognitivists derive from formal task analyses are often abstract 
algorithmic redescriptions of the surface behaviour being examined (see also Hendriks-
Jansen, 1996)110. Representational (structuralist) analyses are more like 'mere 
redescriptions' than DST accounts because the latter demands a complementary 
mechanistic analysis, whereas the former only seems to provide one. 
I think that many of these criticisms of dynamical analyses of cognition raise valid points. 
A full explanatory account of a cognitive activity will require some causal-mechanical 
understanding of the ways in which a cognitive system (whatever that might be) is put 
together. And one cannot get this merely by using the tools of dynamical systems theory. It 
is important to point out, however, that the dynamical analyses of the likes of Thelen and 
Smith (1994; Thelen, 1995) and Saltzman (1995) utilise empirical analyses of behaviour, 
110 It is possible that the strategy of using formal task descriptions could be wedded to a set of precautionary 
principles that offset the straightforward equation of organisation of cognitive mechanisms with behavioural 
redescriptions. I suspect that development of the subsumption architecture concept (Brooks, 1991a) is partly 
the result of this kind of cautionary use of 'functional analysis'. 
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as well as physiological and neurobiological data, in hunting out the variables and 
parameters that feature in their dynamical accounts. Interestingly, many of these theorists 
do not use the language of computation and representation to make sense of these causal-
mechanistic phenomena, contrary to the claims of Clark and Bechtel that such an analysis 
is a concomitant of an information-processing vocabulary. It is this aspect of many of the 
cognitivist arguments against DST that I think is unnecessary. It is important to be clear 
what I am objecting to here in these arguments. It is not the idea that components can be 
understood as signalling each other per se. I have no particular problem with the idea that 
one may want to try and understand the operation of, say, a washing machine, in terms of 
the way different components signal each other to operate. After all this sort of thing is 
exactly what is going on inside Brooks' (1991a) mobots all of the time. Rather, what I 
believe is problematic and ultimately unnecessary is the more specific claim in the study of 
cognition that these component-to-component signallings contain content about the things 
in the world outside of the system 111. And this after all is the core notion of cognitivism: 
that at a subpersonallevel mindlbrains model the world in some important sense. The task 
for the ESD interactionist is to sketch out a broad causal-mechanistic perspective that could 
underpin a non-representational interactionist approach to cognition. That is task I tackle in 
the next chapter. For now, however, it is important to summarise the moderate 
interactionist attitude to DST that has been developed in this chapter. 
What does Dynamical Systems Theory do for us? 
Dynamical systems theory gives us the tools for describing how the mechanisms 
underlying cognition relate to, and modulate, each other. Although dynamical models are 
often very abstract (do not map directly on to physical mechanisms) they should be 
linkable to these mechanisms in one way or another. More specifically, it should be 
possible to make sense of collective variables in terms of the operation of mechanical 
components. Thus Bechtel's (1998) claim that dynamical explanations only provide 
covering law explanations, in contrast to mechanistic explanations, misses the mark to 
some extent. I do not doubt Bechtel's claims that the heuristics of decomposition and 
localisation have been central to scientific breakthroughs in a variety of disciplines. I do, 
however, take issue with the implied claim that a mechanistic approach pushes us to think 
of the components of systems as representations that are computationally transformed. 
111 More specifically, we do not need to somehow provide a lawful relationship between some a priori 
objectively identified state of affairs in the world and a neural-bodily component state in order to make use 
of the idea that components may signal, influence, or modulate each other in ways that ultimately result in 
the production of adaptive behaviour. In other words we do not need to do all of the things that are usually 
thought to be necessary for constructing a theory of content. 
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The notions of representation, computation (when its formulation rests on the notion of 
representation), and even information are all fairly troublesome concepts as the earlier 
survey of theories of content pointed out. Dynamical analyses, by contrast, do not suffer 
from the sort of problems encountered by representational concepts, primarily because 
dynamical systems theory carries with it little in the way of theoretical baggage. As Beer 
(1995b, p. 129) notes: "[t]o say that something is a dynamical system is to say only that its 
future behavior depends upon its current state in some principled way, with no additional 
requirement that this state be interpretable as a representation or that the evolution of this 
state be interpretable as a computation." To argue that a system is representational, 
however, we need to assume that the states of elements of the system in question 
correspond to aspects of the world and that this correspondence is used to build 
subpersonal models and plans of action. As should be evident from the discussion in 
previous chapters, it is not clear how such a system might work. Indeed it is not even clear 
what a representation (or computation) is let alone whether people and other cognitive 
agents possess them. By contrast, the notions of, state variable, parameter, and dynamic 
(rules of system state evolution) do not have such troublesome foundations. They are well 
understood mathematical tools. This is not to say that it is easy, or even necessarily 
possible, to use these tools to construct adequate models of cognitive activity. But ifuseful 
and reasonably accurate explanations of cognitive activity can be produced without 
recourse to representational or computational terminology, then there should be no 
principled objection to their use. 
'. ~ --- ----- -
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6. What Kind of Dynamical System is a Cognizer? 
Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is valid 
for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. 
HumbertoMaturana & Francisco Varela (1980,p. 13). 
Introduction 
One has to squint quite hard to see anything particularly cognitive in Watt's centrifugal 
governor. Even Harvey, Husbands, and Cliffs evolved robots exhibit far simpler 
behaviour than creatures such as flies, cockroaches, and ants. So the dynamical analyses 
offered thus far will not convince the determined cognitivist to swap sides. Yet the point of 
rehearsing these dynamical examples is not to argue that dynamical systems theory (DST) 
has already provided a non-computational explanatory framework for cognitive activity 
but, rather, to suggest that it is worthwhile trying to find out whether dynamical concepts 
might provide a fertile medium for constructing an alternative explanatory approach. After 
all, as Beer (1995b) and others have argued, by itself dynamical systems theory is no more 
a theory of cognition than digital computational theory. Despite the fact that there do exist 
some helpful resonances between DST and the emerging interactionist programme, it is 
important that a dynamical approach is supplemented by a solid theory of the 
implementing substrate. The danger for the interactionist is that the lack of mechanical 
specification in DST will give the appearance that interactionism is a vaguely conceived 
explanatory approach. Therefore, in this chapter I want to bolster the interactionist themes 
hinted at by dynamical analyses and develop the outline of a non-cognitivist mechanistic 
underpinning for explaining interactionism. By mechanistic I simply mean a theory of the 
implementing substrate that can ultimately specify the sorts of parameters and variables 
that should be used in a full dynamical analysis. 
First of all, I want to develop the idea that cognizer's are special kinds of physical 
dynamical systems that interact with their environments in adaptive - that is to say, 
system-preserving - ways. I will refer to such systems as autonomous (or autopoietic) 
systems. This view stands in contrast to the cognitivist point of departure which is to 
conceive of cognizers as information-processing systems (e.g., Vera & Simon, 1993; see 
Smithers, 1995 for a critical analysis). These two perspectives are, of course, not 
necessarily mutually exclusive - its perfectly possible to think of natural information-
processing systems as deeply concerned with survival and bodily maintenance. However, I 
will argue that the differing primary foci of the two approaches steers the researcher in 
different directions both in terms of the kind of research focused on and the ways in which 
results of that research are understood. 
.· .. ·.;i, 
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This basic autonomy approach, then, serves to reorient one's understanding ofthe nervous 
system, the primary control structure of many cognizers. It seems that the autonomy focus 
supports a view of nervous system as a bodily coordinator and regulator rather than as a 
computer that processes information about the environment. In this view the nervous 
system is primarily in the business of modulating bodily processes and maintaining an 
adaptive structural coupling between the environment and the body. 
This view of the nervous system can be captured in simulations and models that use 
connectionist neural networks. Although these systems have been traditionally used to 
model a parallel and distributed version of the 'in-the-head information-processor', recent 
research has showed how the strengths and weaknesses of connectionism are well-suited to 
the creation of embodied control structures for embedded agents. Embodied connectionism 
(Bechtel, 1997), artificia11ife neural networks (Parisi, 1997), and the Distributed Adaptive 
Control framework (Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b) reinforce the regulation and 
coordination view of the nervous system. Despite these promising demonstrations, it is still 
widely argued that connectionist architectures are poor for making sense of logical and 
context-independent cognitive activities. They are, in short, excellent for modelling basic 
cognition but not so good at making sense of advanced cognition. Yet connectionism's 
weaknesses are illuminating, because they are also commonly human weaknesses. The 
question is whether connectionism can be supplemented so that, at least weak, human 
advanced cognitive abilities can be simulated. 
Autonomous Systems and the Dynamics of Being Alive 
In the last chapter it was argued that dynamical systems theory provides us with some 
powerful and illuminating tools for grappling with new themes that fall out from ESD-
related research, yet it is widely argued that dynamical systems theory does not provide us 
with concepts for distinguishing the truly cognitive from the non-cognitive. Some 
cognitivist-oriented researchers have used the tools of dynamical systems theory to make 
sense of several concepts central to traditional cognitive science. For instance, the notion of 
representation survives, albeit in a mutant form, within several dynamical analyses of 
cognitive activity (see, e.g., Elman, 1995). Thus it appears that it may be possible to 
supplement dynamical analyses with a cognitivist theory of the implementing substrate. 
Such a possibility will have major repercussions for an interactionist theory of cognition. If 
we are to avoid assimilating ESD-themes within a modified cognitivist framework, as 
interactionists believe we must do, then dynamical analyses need to be underpinned by a 
different understanding of the nature of cognizers than that existing in cognitivism. There 
exist several tantalising hints as to what this alternative underpinning might be like and, 
probably not coincidentally, these alternatives often make use of dynamical concepts. Here 
I make the broad claim that the alternative foundation we should utilise is what might be 
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called an autonomy (or autopoietic) analysis of cognition (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in 
press; Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1988). 
Briefly stated, an autonomous system is a special kind of physical system, a physical 
system that is delicate but cohesive. Its cohesion is essentially active and dynamic 
(nonstationary) consisting of a collection of ongoing and interdependent chemical reactions 
(the system's metabolism). The integrity of an autonomous system relies on the 
maintenance of these reaction dependencies. You cannot simply break a piece off an 
autonomous system and get two smaller autonomous systems. Instead one gets either one 
damaged, but still semi-functional system, and one dead system, or two dead systems. So 
autonomous systems are also holistic entities. Autonomous systems require raw energy 
(food) from beyond their boundaries in order to fuel their network of chemical reactions. 
They achieve this by actively seeking out raw materials and transforming them into the 
molecules required for metabolism. Autonomous systems are thus, of necessity, directive 
and interactive systems; systems that manage their relationships with their surroundings in 
order to get the needed resources for maintaining their own organisational integrity. 
Because most, if not all, natural environments are changeable and unpredictable, 
autonomous systems also need to be flexible in order to maintain their integrity. Flexibility 
can occur because autonomous systems exist on the boundary between stability and 
instability (thus their delicate nature) and can inhabit multiple ordered states in response to 
low energy interactions with their surroundings. 
Roughly speaking, this autonomy approach holds that cognition should be understood 
within the context of the organisation of living, self-producing, cohesive, thermodynamic 
systems with directive organisations that channel needed resources into their structures. 
This view shifts the focus of our basic cognitive approach from a discontinuity approach 
where cognizers are viewed as simple physical systems (bodies) controlled by complex 
physical systems (neural information-processing computers) to a continuity approach 
which takes cognizers (body, nervous system and all) to be complex physical systems that 
can maintain their identities by shaping the interaction dynamics of the organism-
environment system. Or, to put it more simply, the autonomy approach holds that 
cognition is strongly bound up with the job of being and staying alive, whereas the 
computational information-processing viewpoint focuses primarily upon internal 
transformations of symbols or representations (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, pp. 27-31)112. 
112 These two perspectives are, of course, not mutually exclusive. I do not want to suggest that cognitivism's 
internal modeller/planner assumptions are not compatible with the idea that cognizer's architectures are 
primarily concerned with 'survival', only that they do not begin with these questions in mind. Evolutionary 
and adaptive questions are not central to most cognitivist research. Rather, these questions have been used by 
some to modify and elaborate already existing explanatory concepts and strategies. 
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The cognitivist perspective focuses our attention on the actual cogitative processes thought 
to be necessary for recognising objects, recalling past events, solving problems, and so on. 
The interactionist perspective, on the other hand, focuses our attention on how a particular 
subset of physical systems (animals) manage their interactions with their surroundings. 
Cognitive Systems as Living Systems, Living Systems as Autonomous 
Systems 
The Chilean neuroscientists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980, 1988) are 
(in)famous for claiming that the terms cognition and life refer to the same sort of thing. 
Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement is 
valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. (emphasis in original, Maturana & Varela, 1980, 
p.13) 
Under this characterisation all organisms, from paramecia and pine trees, to porpoises and 
people, are considered to be cognizersl13 . This idea may seem strange, but I believe that it 
nicely captures one of the fundamental features of cognitive creatures that cognitivism fails 
to highlight - that cognition is all about ensuring the survival of an organism114• Cognition 
is of a piece with life because organisms can only stay alive by responding appropriately to 
('understanding') the environment in an adaptive manner that takes account of the dangers 
and benefits of various kinds of external events and objects. Of course, there exist huge 
differences in terms of the flexibility and scope of environment-coping abilities across 
113 I think that Maturana and Varela's claim has much to recommend it. I, therefore, resist the temptation by 
the likes of Mingers (1995) and Christensen and Hooker (2000, in press) to discard Maturana and Varela's 
understanding of cognition as life and preserve a more traditional notion of cognition being a property of 
animals (with nervous systems) or, even more specifically, of 'complex animals' (with complex nervous 
systems). My advocacy ofthe Santiago theorists' claim should not be understood as a claim that there are not 
very important differences in the behavioural strategies and underlying mechanisms of different kinds of 
organism. Nothing much really rides on where one draws the 'cognition/non-cognition line' as long as one's 
characterisation of 'the cognitive' accurately reflects the abilities and processes that exist in the relevant 
, 
organisms. However, I think that Maturana and Varela's notion of cognition has the requisite 'shock value' 
to reinforce the important continuity in the adaptive mechanisms of all organisms from bacteria, to plants, 
insects, and higher animals. Cognitivism's information-processing approach has the unfortunate tendency to 
reinforce the view that psychologists and their other cognitive science colleagues can ignore or downplay the 
importance of understandmg basic life processes in their studies. 
114 Here survival is meant in an evolutionary sense as the maintenance of systemic integrity of an organism 
until it can reproduce, where this condition holds for at least for a critical number of members of a 
population. The latter qualification is necessary because, as Millikan (1993) and others point out, 
evolutionary concerns relate to the ongoing reproduction of populations, not individual lineages. For 
instance, a group of bullfrogs may survive as a population even if most tadpoles never manage to reach 
maturity and reproduce. In some cases survival must continue past the point of reproduction because, as in 
humans, the survival of off-spring is contingent upon the protection and guidance of the parent. 
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different species. However, the point ofthe 'cognition equals life' claim is not to argue that 
humans cope with the environment in the same way that plants do, only that environmental 
coping is a central factor in defining a particular class of physical systems. 
Living things are autonomous systems (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press; Varela et aI., 
1991). Autonomous systems are special kinds of physical systems that can maintain their 
systemic integrity (what we usually refer to as 'staying alive') over a wide range of 
enviromnental conditions. More specifically, autonomous systems are: 
• cohesive systems (where that cohesion is active, flexible, and holistic); 
• self-generating systems (they manufacture the components that make up their 
structure, rather than relying on their food to contain all of biochemicals necessary 
for metabolism); 
• directive systems (they require environmental resources to provide the raw 
materials for self-generation and possess an organisation that channels those 
resources into their body structure. They are not passive systems that can rely on 
resources being available in their immediate surroundings); 
• and interactive systems (they must modulate their structure in order to cope with 
environmental changes. They can move from dangerous situations to safe ones and 
change the local environment). 
These features may seem a little opaque at this point, so it is worth looking at each in more 
detail. I will deal with the concepts of cohesion and self-generation in separate sections and 
the concepts of directedness and interactivity in the section Interaction and the Use of the 
Environment. 
Cohesion 
Living things are cohesive in an active, flexible, and holistic manner (Christensen & 
Hooker, in press, p. 4). A cohesive system, according to Christensen and Hooker (in press), 
is "one in which there are dynamical bonds amongst the elements of the system which 
individuate the system from its environment." (p. 3). Unlike gases, that have no internal 
cohesion, or rocks that are cohesive because of their passive and rigid (high-energy) bonds, 
the cohesion of living things such as cells is achieved through chemical bonds with shallow 
energy well interactions. These bonds are characterised by "short time scales relative to the 
life of the cell and must be continually actively remade with the assistance of external 
energy fluxes." (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 4). In other words, living systems are 
dynamic, ever-changing, whirlpools of energy and matter, that continuously take in 
resources, transform them into useable molecules, and expel what is not needed. The 
'thing' that is the living system is not a static collection of material components but rather 
,. ,. 
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an ongoing process or organisation (Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1988; see also Christensen 
& Hooker, in press, pp. 7-8). 
Active Cohesion 
It may seem that continually active chemical reactions that can give rise to macroscopic 
order, rather than just random turbulence, occur only rarely, if at all, in the physical world. 
Intuitively it seems that continuous activity should correlated with disorder rather than 
order. But this is not the case. Despite the fact that many of the physical systems that we 
are familiar with (e.g., high school chemistry experiments) exhibit randomness and 
disorder when active, there exist many thermodynamic systems that become more ordered 
when energy is pumped into them. In these systems the molecular products of the reaction 
do not thoroughly intermix. Instead like-molecules congregate in particular regions and 
this gives rise to ordered macroscopic patterns. Such systems are known as self-organising 
systems. To be self-organising a system must: 1) consist of a large number of components 
(e.g., lots of molecules), 2) have non-linear interactions between those components, 3) be 
dissipative in nature, and 4) be far-from-thermal equilibrium (Kelso, 1995, p. 16). A 
dissipative system is one that takes in ordered energy and matter in order to maintain or 
expand its own order, and expels disordered matter and heat (see Prigogine & Stengers, 
1985). On the surface, these systems seem to defy the second law ofthermodynamics (the 
fact that all systems tend toward maximum disorder or entropy). However, it has been 
argued that, while such systems increase the amount of local order, they actually increase 
the rate of overall universal disorder (e.g., Swenson & Turvey, 1992). Self-organising 
systems are far-from equilibrium (or non-equilibrium) systems because their ordered 
nature (organisation) relies upon there being continued energetic input into them. When 
this energy is taken away the system breaks down. 
Perhaps the most famous example of such a system is the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction 
(see Prigogine & Stengers, 1985). When the chemicals in this reaction mix the system does 
not equilibrate into a uniform blend of molecules but instead self-organises itself into a 
brownish background with a foreground of moving blue concentric circles. The reaction 
exhibits two different kinds of ordered pattern: 1) a pattern of concentric circles that 
propagate outward, and 2) radially expanding pinwheels that cartwheel about a centre 
(Kauffman, 1995, pp. 53-53). This spontaneous order (describable in terms of a few basic 
collective variables) maintains itself for a while until the system begins to move to a low-
order regime. The ordered phase can be maintained, however, by carefully pumping in the 
reactants at appropriate rates. This maintains the non-equilibrium nature of the reaction. 
This is the sense in which autonomous systems have an active cohesion. That is, their 
systemic integrity (order) relies upon an ongoing collection of low-energy interactions and 
chemical transformations. 
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Flexible Cohesion 
Flexible cohesion amounts to the ability of a system to produce appropriate (coherent, 
ordered) activity over varying environmental conditions. Put simply, a flexibly cohesive 
system does not fall to bits when conditions change, but rather changes its structure to 
compensate for the changes. Non-equilibrium systems can exhibit this kind of flexibility 
because they can undergo phase transitions from one ordered state to another (or from one 
ordered state to a stochastic or random state) with changes in the values of control 
parameters (recall the discussion in the previous chapter). For instance, in the Belousov-
Zhabotinsky reaction merely shaking the petri dish (changing a control parameter value) 
can push the system from the spiral pattern to the pinwheel pattern (Kauffman, 1995, p. 
54). As noted in the discussion of dynamical systems theory, control parameters are often 
nonspecific in their contribution to order parameter dynamics. That is, "in no sense do they 
act as a code or a prescription for the emerging patterns" .[,r (Kelso, 1995, p. 16) "". 
patterns form or change spontaneously with no specific ordering influence from the outside 
(and no homuncular motor program inside)." (Kelso, 1995, p. 58). This ability to move 
between different ordered regimes in response to environmental changes is what makes the 
cohesion of autonomous systems flexible (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 4). Cohesive 
equilibrium systems, like rocks, however, are not flexible in that they cannot easily change 
states and, when they do, they typically change from a cohesive unit (a rock) to a state of 
'low cohesion' (a pile of dust or a pool of molten rock). 
Holistic Cohesion 
However equilibrium systems, like rocks, can be broken up without affecting cohesion 
properties of the rock115• In fact, the same is the case for simple self-organising systems 
such as the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction (one can empty half of the solution from a 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky experiment into another container and, provided reactants are 
pumped in appropriately, the same ordered patterns can be observed). However, this is not 
the case for autonomous systems because "the forces which binds [their] parts depend on 
globally organised interactions." (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 4) and serious 
disruption to one part of the system often results in the entire system failing. Thus, there 
must be more to autonomous systems than just the possession of self-organising properties. 
115 This is so because "[t]he bonds are localised in the sense that the strength of the forces which bind a 
molecule within the crystal lattice depend only on the connections with adjacent molecules. This localisation 
means that there are no essential constraints on where the boundaries of the rock must occur - if it is split the 
particularity of the rock's identity is disrupted, but the result is two smaller rocks with exactly the same type 
of cohesion properties as the original." (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 4). 
.. -;. 
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Self-Generation 
Autocatalysis and Metabolism 
Self-organisation is not a sufficient criterion for defining life. Living systems seem to have 
an additional quality to that of self-organisation: they are in an important sense, self-
sustaining systems or self-generating systems1l6. That is, living systems acquire food and 
tum it into the molecules needed for building and operating their bodies. Living things 
"must constantly seek out sources of ordered free energy with which to replenish dissipated 
cellular structures and sustain the capacity for the processes that acquire these resources 
(e.g. foodsearch) and repair damage (e.g. reconstituting damaged tissue) or avoid damage 
(e.g. escaping a predator)." (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, p. 9). They continuously rebuild 
themselves by creating useful chemicals from the raw materials that they acquire. This 
feature of organisms is at base what is meant by the term metabolism (see Boden [1996a] 
for a discussion of metabolism in this context). We humans, for instance, replace 98 per 
cent of the atoms in our bodies every year; we rebuild our stomach lining in five days, our 
skin in six weeks, and our liver in two months (Margulis & Sagan, 1995, p. 23). What is 
'conserved' over time is not some particular set of materials (what Maturana and Varela 
[1980, 1988] call structure) but rather a kind of dynamic process or organisation. 
Kauffman (1993, 1995) proposes that such self-sustaining systems are a rather predictable 
consequence of organic chemistry. He has shown theoretically that, given a large set of 
basic organic molecules (reactants and catalysts), and a set of simple relations between 
them, that it is almost inevitable that an autocatalytic network will emerge. Some reactions 
require certain reactants or catalysts to work and these reactants and catalysts are the 
products of other reactions that in tum rely upon other reactions for their existence. When 
the molecular components of every reaction are the product of some other reaction in the 
system, the circle of reactions closes and a network forms. Thus an autocatalytic network is 
simply a set of molecular reactions that work together in a cohesive, circularly organised, 
closed system 11 7. Such systems exhibit holistic cohesion because they cannot simply be 
broken up into smaller, but fully functional, units. The entire network needs to function 
appropriately in order for the system to cohere. Kauffman (1995) argues that autocatalytic 
systems underlie life itself. 
116 Maturana and Varela coined the tenn autopoiesis (literally: self-building) to capture this idea. 
117 Of course autocatalytic systems require 'food' in the fonn of a steady supply of basic molecules to stoke 
up the web of reactions in the network once the network has fonned. Importantly, however, these food 
molecules need only constitute a very small subset of those required for the many reactions in the network. 
They are the raw materials that are transfonned in the various reactions. 
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At its heart a living organism is a system of chemicals that has the capacity to catalyze its own reproduction. 
Catalysts such as enzymes speed up chemical reactions that might otherwise occur, but only extremely 
slowly. What I call a collectively autocatalytic system is one in which the molecules speed up the very 
reactions by which they themselves are formed: A makes B; B makes C; C makes A again .... Given a 
supply of food molecules, the network will be able to constantly re-create itself. Like the metabolic networks 
that inhabit every living cell, it will be alive. (pp. 49-50) 
Autopoiesis and Boundary Producing Reactions 
One problem with applying the theory of autocatalytic systems is that such systems, if they 
occur with real chemicals, would require that their component molecules be kept in 
relatively close contact with each other for the reactions to occur. Kauffman (1995, pp. 66-
69) suggests that compartmentalisation may be necessary in living autocatalytic systems to 
stop the dilution of a system's molecules with non-system molecules so that a sustained 
and adequate concentration of reactants is available to both start and maintain an 
autocatalytic system. Kauffman suggests that compartmentalisation may occur by: 1) 
confining reactions to a surface (e.g., clay, a bilipid membrane) rather than a three 
dimensional volume, 2) by dehydrating the system so cleavage of long polymers by water 
molecules is reduced, or 3) using energy from exergonic reactions to drive the synthesis of 
polymers from molecules with high-energy bonds (e.g., food). In all these cases there must 
exist some form of boundary or container that holds the system together in a localised 
regIOn. 
This is where the notion of autopoiesis comes into its own. Maturana and Varela (1980, 
1988) argue that an autopoietic system, like an autocatalytic system, is a self-producing 
and self-maintaining system. However their formulation differs in the claim that one kind 
of autocatalysing reaction within the system is a boundary producing process (set of 
reactions). Thus, autopoietic systems differ from autocatalytic ones in explicitly needing 
and producing their own boundaries. The prototypical example of a boundary producing 
process is the ongoing production of the cell wall by prokaryotic cells. Maturana and 
Varela thus defines an autopoietic system118 as a 
dynamic system that is defined as a composite unity as [sic] a network of productions of components that, 
a) through their interactions recursively regenerate the network of productions that produced them, and 
b) realize this network as a unity in the space in which they exist by constituting and specifying its 
boundaries as surfaces of cleavage from the background through their preferential interactions within the 
network .... (Maturana, 1980, p. 29 quoted in Mingers, 1995, p. 15) 
118 On autopoiesis see Maturana and Varela (1980, 1988), Capra (1998), Margulis and Sagan (1995), 
Mingers (1995), and Stewart (1995). 
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A living thing qua autopoietic system1l9 is rather like a self-contained factory that 
continually rebuilds itself as its components wear out or are used up. Maturana and Varela 
argue that because autopoietic systems create their own boundaries, for maintaining their 
closed autocatalytic network, that they can be understood as operationally or 
organisationally independent from their surroundings. At the same time it is obvious that 
autopoietic systems are complexly coordinated with their environments. Maturana and 
Varela capture these opposing ideas by arguing that autopoietic systems are operationally 
closed systems that are structurally coupled to their surroundings. 
Interaction and the Use of the Environment 
Christensen and Hooker (in press) criticise Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis on 
the grounds that it obscures the important interactionist fact that autonomous systems are 
not just coupled to their environments, but they are essentially environment-using systems. 
They argue that Maturana and Varela's emphasis on operational closure focuses our 
theoretical attention on purely internal organisational matters and ignores the many ways in 
which autonomy maintenance in organisms relies upon relations within the environment as 
well as within the organism120. They argue that "the principal issue for Maturana in respect 
of multicellular systems is whether they have the correct structure to manufacture all their 
own components within themselves, not how well they cope with their environment" and 
that this has led to a "pre-occupation with locating autopoietic closure [that] in itself 
contributes little or nothing to understanding the basic evolutionary processes driving the 
emergence of neurally complex, adaptable life forms." (Christensen & Hooker, in press, 
pp. 8-9). By contrast, in their autonomy framework "the paradigm is the system that 
actively, directively constructs and/or compensates for external dependencies and 
1 I 9 Although it is commonplace for writers to say that Maturana and Varela consider all living things to be 
autopoietic systems, Maturana and Varela are actually a little more coy. At times they seem to suggest that 
the cell is the only living entity that we can be sure is an autopoietic system and that the status of larger 
organisms is unknown. They suggest that it is possible that multicellular organisms may be second-order 
autopoietic systems (which is to say, 'operationally closed systems made up of a collection of structurally-
coupled first-order autopoietic systems (i.e., cells)') rather than autopoietic systems simpliciter. For the 
purposes of this work I will assume that all living systems are autopoietic. 
120 I am not convinced that Maturana and Varela's approach is inconsistent with Christensen and Hooker's 
autonomy approach, but the point that the former focuses our attention on internal matters is well taken. The 
notions of operational closure and structural coupling are, as Keijzer (1997) notes, primarily directed at 
constructing a naturalistic framework that makes sense of the nervous system in a non-Cartesian manner. 
Issues of how the organism's organisation makes use of the environment are addressed rather vaguely in 
terms of structural coupling. Yet if the relations that hold in the environment provide fundamental constraints 
on what internal mechanisms need to accomplish, as the interactionist position claims (e.g., Rowlands, 
1999), then the autopoietic framework will need to take on board the criticisms of Christensen and Hooker. 
202 
constantly changes itself as it manages its interactions to respond adaptively to its 
environment." (p. 8); or more simply, "the general problem for adaptive systems is to 
produce environmental feedback that supports autonomy." (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, 
p.14). 
To accommodate an increased focus on how autonomous systems use the environment to 
maintain their bodily integrity Christensen and Hooker introduce a number of useful terms 
and concepts. Christensen and Hooker claim that autonomous systems are physical systems 
that actively produce the conditions necessary for maintaining their own systemic integrity 
(autonomy). Self-organising systems such as the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction and 
Kauffinan's autocatalytic networks will automatically disintegrate if they are not located in 
a resource-rich situation. Moreover, self-organising reactions do not particularly 'care' if 
the environmental conditions become such that the integrity of the system is threatened. It 
is true that many self-organising systems are able to exhibit orderly patterning across a 
variety of environmental conditions, but there is no sense in which these chemical systems 
attempt to avoid environmental dangers. Christensen and Hooker argue that autonomous 
systems exhibit a special kind of order across changes in environmental conditions. Simply 
put, autonomous systems produce 'spontaneous patterns' that place the system 
appropriately in the environment so that the spontaneous pattern forming is maintained. 
Thus, organisms do not just sit about in the face of resource depletion or the introduction 
of dangerous environmental conditions. Instead they actively seek out needed resources 
and actively avoid threats. Christensen and Hooker (in press) claim that this capacity arises 
from autonomous systems' directive organisation. Systems with directive organisations 
use environmental resources and alter their position in the environment in order to maintain 
their autonomy. They do this, so Christensen and Hooker (in press) argue, by seeking out 
"energy gradients that can maintain their dissipative processes and also act to maintain, and 
sometimes modify and elaborate, the processes which enable the exploitation of such 
gradients." (p. 3). Energy gradients are useful relations that exist between environmental 
entities. Autonomous systems possess mechanisms that use these gradients to get to places 
that contain useful resources or are safe (among other things). So "[aJutonomous systems 
are interactively self-generating: they so interact with their environment and within 
themselves that they are able to acquire the needed resources and direct those resources 
into the reconstitution of themselves." (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 7, emphasis 
added). 
Christensen and Hooker (2000) propose that we understand directive organisation in terms 
of the interplay of three major features of autonomous systems: the system's norm matrix, 
its action generation processes, and the agent-environment interaction dynamics (or 
interaction process). They start by embracing the, by now familiar, interactionist idea that 
behaviour is a joint product of agent-side constraints and environment-side constraints. 
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Rather than the agent containing detailed, inner instructions for every tiny movement in a 
behavioural sequence, agent-side mechanisms are understood to perturb the intrinsic 
dynamics of the environment "rather like the way inserting a stick into a fast-flowing 
stream modifies the pattern of the water flow." (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, p. 11; see 
also Keijzer, 1997, 1998a). Christensen and Hooker refer to the overall agent-environment 
dynamic as the interaction dynamics or interaction process. The organism's actions (or 
action generation processes) modulate the interaction dynamics so that the organism's 
autonomy is maintained. Autonomy is understood here as the global constraint (or 'goal 
state') of staying alive by avoiding tissue damage, repairing damage that does occur, and 
by continuously reconstituting the dynamic, self-organising network of reactions that is the 
organism. 
Of course, this global goal involves coordinating many separate systemic requirements. An 
autonomous system, for instance, must balance its need for food with its needs to breathe, 
conserve energy, maintain body temperature, and avoid injury. Every organism has a set of 
idiosyncratic requirements that must be met in order for its autonomy to be maintained. 
Christensen and Hooker (in press) refer to these requirements as closure conditions or 
normative constraints. An organism's internal action-generation mechanisms must 
generate actions that perturb the environment so that these conditions are achieved. The 
organism knows whether or not, and often how well, closure conditions are being met 
because it possesses an evaluative norm matrix - a collection of explicit norm signals. 
These are internal signalling systems that monitor the state of each of the various 
autonomy closure conditions. For instance, the feeling of hunger is an explicit norm signal 
for nutritional needs. An explicit norm signal like hunger is best understood, not as an 
internally represented goal for an animal, but rather as a system whereby an organism's 
body sets up internal correlations between some internal events (e.g., low blood sugar 
levels) and other internal events (e.g., heightened neural and hormonal activity that support 
food acquisition behaviour). If closure conditions are not being met, or are close to not 
being met, the animal's bodily state will modify so that appropriate action generation 
processes are set in motion for modulating the interaction process in order to improve the 
chances of closure. For example, a cheetah that is getting hungry will begin to produce 
actions such as searching for prey, stalking, and hunting. 
Making sure that all closure conditions are met is no simple process, for the various 
explicit norm signals that make up a norm matrix often conflict with each other. For 
instance, a hungry cheetah may be 'motivated' to chase its prey immediately but have to 
put this aside in order to fulfil the goal of avoiding injury from a nearby adult male gazelle. 
Thus, overall autonomy must be met within the web of tensions set up by a norm matrix. 
Christensen and Hooker are aware that this broad picture of the organisation of 
autonomous systems must be supplemented by a set of concepts that enable us to 
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distinguish between simple adaptive behaviour and complex intelligent action. They do 
this by making a distinction between different kinds of adaptive management strategies. 
They wisely argue that there exist no hard and fast distinctions between the strategies 
utilised by different kinds of organisms. Rather organisms differ in the degree to which 
they are able to flexibly and anticipatively modulate the interaction dynamics according to 
the plasticity, generality, and complexity of their action generation processes and norm 
matrices. 
The general trend Christensen and Hooker perceive in the move from low level adaptive 
management strategies to high level ones is of an increasing capacity for self-directedness. 
Self-directedness, as distinguished from simple directed organisation, derives from an 
ability to modifY one's action generation processes to better modulate the interaction 
dynamics. Increasing self-directedness is important for animals that need resources that do 
not always have the same environmental signature. If that signature is relatively robust, 
then a simpler low order adaptive management strategy will do. 
For instance, female mosquitos must feed on blood to acquire the necessary protein for 
egg-laying (Klowden, 1995 cited in Christensen & Hooker, 2000). They find blood 
courtesy of a C02 gradient tracking mechanism. Blood can be found because in their 
species-typical environments higher C02 levels are lawfully related to the presence of 
blood hosts. The mosquito, however, has no mechanism for searching for blood as such -
that relationship is dealt with in terms of the external environmental regularity between the 
presence of C02 and blood hosts. If C02 gradients arose for reasons unrelated to animal 
respiration, or some animal managed to limit or hide its C02 production, female mosquitos 
would have no way of altering their behaviour for they have no control over their blood-
finding mechanisms. "Thus, the mosquito's adaptive management strategy is low order 
because the information it uses to modulate its actions concerns only a very narrow aspect 
of the interaction process; most of the relations on which it depends are implicit." 
(Christensen & Hooker, 2000, p. 12). 
Moreover, mosquitos cannot alter or tune their C02 gradient-tracking abilities in order to 
find blood more efficiently. However, even bumblebees exhibit an ability to learn to 
associate flower colours with relative quantities of nectar (Real, 1991), thereby 
systematically modifying their gradient-tracking abilities. Large-brained mammals, 
including humans, have even more sophisticated self-directed abilities. Increasingly 
complex self-directedness increases the management horizon of the organism. Christensen 
and Hooker use this term to refer to the proportion of the interaction dynamics that the 
animal can modulate with its actions. A mosquito only deals with a relatively small 
management horizon that is spatially, temporally, and functionally local in nature -
spatially local because its tracking mechanisms can: only respond to C02 concentration in 
the immediate vicinity of the mosquito, temporally local because the mosquito's behaviour 
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is only modulated by the current momentary C02 concentration and not past or likely 
future concentrations, and functionally local in that gradient-tracking only affects relatively 
quick, reactive changes to flight settings rather than providing information for modulating 
a broad range of behaviours. In more complex animals the management horizon is 
considerably broadened with increasing abilities to track complex kinds of gradients that 
incorporate non-local spatial, temporal, and functional parameters. For complex animals 
what is tracked is no longer a simple environmental gradient, like a C02 concentration gradient, but a 
combination of system interaction processes and environmental organization, as evaluated by system norms. 
Thus, cheetahs track something like "effective hunting", specified as a relationship between injury-free 
movement effort and prey character (kind, size, health, etc.), terrain style ecological location, as evaluated 
against injury risk, hunger, urgency, satiation, [and] potential ecological risk. (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, 
p.17) 
In an important sense, more complex animals can see and act more broadly (in terms of 
temporally-extended events), more deeply (they are potentially sensitive to more aspects of 
the interaction process121), and more flexibly (they can deploy a variety of responses, over 
longer periods, to detected environmental features) than creatures with lower order 
adaptive management strategies. These kinds of abilities are enabled, so Christensen and 
Hooker argue, by increased abilities to: 1) anticipate future events, 2) evaluate whether, 
and to what degree, their actions are successfully modulating the interaction dynamics, and 
3) to construct more efficient gradient-tracking mechanisms (Christensen & Hooker, 2000; 
in press). They refer to the collection of all of these abilities as self-directed anticipative 
learning. 
It is important to be clear that anticipation, evaluation, and tracking mechanism 
construction are not necessarily complex, conscious, effortful, or even 'representation-
hungry' capacities, although they can be in mature humans. Anticipation merely involves 
the ability to deploy an action somewhat in advance of the sensing of a particular event and 
can be accomplished by such basic capacities as 'feedforward action', distal perception, 
low-level motor emulation, and simple conditioning, as well as high-level imagination and 
inference (Christensen & Hooker, in press, p. 11). Evaluation of action success is 
accomplished by explicit norm signals and can range from simple action-specific signals, 
such as proprioceptive stretch and pressure sensors, to relatively non-specific ones such as 
pain and hunger. The latter, claim Christensen and Hooker (in press), are "important for 
understanding learning because non-specific signals allow the system to modify its 
behaviour to better satisfy its constraints." (p. 13), whereas the former are tightly connected 
121 For instance, a mosquito would possess a deeper strategy if it could not only sense and use C02 
concentrations, but also be able to sense the smell of blood. It could then perhaps coordinate its behaviour 
with respect to more aspects of the interaction process. 
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to particular actions. Constructive gradient tracking exists wherever an animal can improve 
its ability to access a resource via gradient tracking. This can occur via low-level tuning of 
neuromuscular systems (see Goldfield's, 1995, theory below) to high-powered reflective 
analysis that leads to pursuit of new cues and gradients (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, pp. 
17-21). 
Goldfield's Theory of the Ontogeny of Action Systems 
Christensen and Hooker, building on the insights of Maturana, Varela, and others, provide 
a view of autonomous systems (cognitive systems) which takes animals to be an interesting 
subset of dynamic physical systems - systems that are dynamically cohesive, that require a 
constant influx of environmental resources in order to exist, and that produce systemic 
activity that ensures that those environmental resources are directed into the system. The 
general idea of autonomous systems can be embellished with insights from Goldfield's 
(1995) theory ofthe ontogeny of action systems. 
Goldfield (1995) has constructed a theory of the production of action by animals that has 
many resonances with the autonomy theory outlined by Christensen and Hooker. Drawing 
on Kugler and Turvey's (1987) and Thelen and Smith's (1994) attempts to theorise 
cognition and action in dynamical systems terms, Reed's (1982, 1996) theory of action 
systems, and many other sources, Goldfield proposes that we should understand action 
development as depending on the way "in which perception-action cycles ... are used to 
assemble task-specific devices ... " (p. 165). He suggests that there are two major processes 
involved in action production: assembly and tuning. Assembly, as noted in earlier 
discussions of dynamical approaches to development, involves the self-organisation of 
different components of bodily subsystems into devices for accomplishing particular 
activities. These systems overlap anatomically, so that certain muscles or neural circuits 
may at one point in time contribute to a device for kicking and at another time a device for 
walking. These devices spontaneously appear as attractor patterns in a dynamical system 
whose variables and parameters derive from the constraints of various bodily subsystems 
as well as constraints of the structured surround and the demands of the task at hand. In 
other words, task-specific devices are like very complex versions of the different, 
macroscopic, low-dimensional states that arise in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction. They 
naturally arise from the network of tensions and constraints between interacting variables 
and parameters. These constraints vary across multiple time-scales, across ontogeny as 
bodies develop and mature, across phases of perceptual learning as skills are gradually 
learned, and at the finest scale of actual performance as forces and influences are subtly 
modulated in response to perceptual feedback. These kinds of modulation lie at the heart of 
the concept of tuning which involves the "active exploration of underlying dynamics in 
order to modify parameter settings given task demands." (p. 166). People and many other 
animals actively explore the effects of varying the values of control parameters by 
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tinkering with levels of force applied to movements, angles, speeds, periodicity times, and 
the structures of environmental objects and layouts. So, Goldfield's notion of tuning relates 
to Christensen and Hooker's (2000, in press) claims that intelligent action requires an 
ability to learn how to improve interaction process modulation (perturb the interaction 
dynamics using action) by evaluating perceptual feedback about action consequences in 
light of explicit norm signals that signify whether, and how well, particular autonomy 
closure conditions are being met. 
Summary of the Autonomy Perspective 
Do these observations and claims get us any closer to formulating a statement about the 
theory of the underlying substrate that we should use in constructing dynamical models of 
cognizers? Goldfield (1995) provides a number of concrete examples of dynamical models 
that contain parameters that correspond to things like the mass of an infant and the stiffness 
and damping characteristics of a bouncing infant's spring (pp. 177-181). These are clearly 
much more specific applications of dynamical systems theory than those that are needed 
for a general theory of cognition. Christensen and Hooker (2000) are agnostic about 
whether dynamical models will ever be the best way of expressing our theoretical 
understanding of the structure of cognitive creatures. However, the autonomy approach 
does provide us with a framework that makes the following sorts of claims about the kinds 
of things (variables, parameters, relationships) that are important in an interactionist vision 
of the cognizer. 
The central concept in this perspective is that of interaction dynamics. This involves a 
commitment to viewing behaviour as an interactively emergent property of coupled brain, 
body, and environment systems that distributes 'control' across all of the systems. 
Coupling is conceived of as the mutual perturbing or parameterisation of the intrinsic 
dynamics of systems by other systems. 
The body systems are conceived of as coherent self-organising systems. They 
spontaneously assemble low-dimensional, ordered whole-body movements (which we can 
call actions). Actions perturb the flow of the interaction dynamics. 
Organisms are theorised as autonomous systems. They have evolved because they have 
been able to maintain their autonomy (their dynamic systemic integrity) over variable 
environmental conditions that exist in their species-typical environments. Put another way, 
evolution has seen to it that the kinds of spontaneous activity patterns that are realised by 
organisms' bodies adaptively perturb the interaction dynamics. The maintenance of 
autonomy involves balancing a number of factors which can be understood as closure 
conditions or normative constraints. Thus, perception-action body systems are sensitive to 
environmental features. Indeed they should be conceived of as gradient tracking systems :.; ." 
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which are systems that use the lawful regularities between environmental entities to lead 
the organism toward resources needed to satisfy autonomy closure conditions. 
Perception-action body systems are understood to be softly assembled task-specific devices 
constructed from anatomically overlapping resources in neural, endocrine, immune, 
skeletal (link-segment), musculotendon, and circulatory subsystems. These task-specific 
devices can be tuned through experience. This requires mechanisms for evaluating whether 
and how well particular closure conditions are being met by the action-based modulation of 
the interaction dynamics. This function is realised by a network of internal perceptual 
devices known as explicit norm signal systems (the norm matrix being the collection of all 
ofthese systems). 
In many organisms, especially in mammals, birds, and similarly complex creatures, this 
tuning is of a very flexible kind. Self-directed anticipative learning involves an ability to 
gradually increase the temporal horizon of environmental gradients so that anticipation is 
possible. By utilising experiential feedback about the consequences of action these kinds of 
animals can use their sensitivities to large slices of the interaction process in order to learn 
about and use the various environmental regularities that underpin gradients. This gives 
these animals a high-level of flexibility with regard to their behaviours they can produce in 
order to maintain autonomy closure conditions. 
The autonomy approach then, focuses theorists' attention on the entire body of the 
cognizer as an environment modulation system rather than focusing just on the brain as the 
'locus of cognition' as cognitivism is wont to do. However, it is important to understand 
just how the nervous system fits into the broader autonomy perspective. This is the issue 
addressed in the next section. 
The Role of the Nervous System in Cognitive Activity 
The Regulation/Coordination/Integration View of the Nervous System 
The autonomy approach provides a backdrop for understanding the nervous' system that is 
quite distinct from the information-processing perspective. Organisms are understood as 
systems that strive to maintain their autonomy. Their internal mechanisms are organised in 
a manner that makes this possible. In many organisms these internal mechanisms include a 
nervous system122, a collection of specialised cells for setting up a distinctive kind of 
122 By 'nervous system' psychologists usually mean the central nervous system or, even more particularly, 
the brain. In what follows I will use 'nervous system' to denote the entire collection of neurons (that is, the 
autonomic nervous system and peripheral nervous system as well as the eNS) and their supporting cast of 
glia, astrocytes and so on. Recent research (e.g., Meller, Dykstra, Grzbycki, Murphey, & Gebhart, 1994 cited 
in Maier & Watkins, 1998) indicates that glial cells, which can outnumber neurons by a ratio of 10: 1 in some 
animals, perform much more than a mere supporting role in neural dynamics. The boundaries of the nervous 
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internal signalling system that assists in the coordination and regulation of other cells in 
distant tissues and organs. However, as Maturana and Varela (1980, 1988) note, there exist 
many multicellular organisms that do not possess nervous systems and accomplish these 
coordinative and regulatory functions in other ways. Consequently, they argue that nervous 
systems are not necessary for cognition. Of course this does not mean that the kind of 
cognition that, say, plants are capable of is the same as that of organisms with nervous 
systems such as chimpanzees or bumblebees. In particular, nervous systems enable a fast, 
target-specific, rapidly replenishing, and potentially long-range chemical secretion system 
for bodily regulation, coordination, and integration. Reed (1996) argues that organisms that 
need to move quickly and need to move different body parts in a relatively independent 
manner, in order to maintain their autonomy (i.e., most animals with the exception of 
sponges and such like), require just this sort of coordinative system (see also Maturana & 
Varela, 1988). However it is important to realise that, even in animals, the operation of 
synaptic signalling systems is deeply interwoven with the functioning of other regulatory 
systems including other chemical secretion signalling systems (the endocrine system, the 
paracrine system123), the immune system, direct plasma membrane-bound signalling 
molecules that influence cells that are in direct physical contact, and gap junctions that 
directly join cytoplasms of interacting cells so that cells can exchange small-sized 
molecules (Alberts, Bray, Lewis, Raff, Roberts, & Watson, 1989). These systems work in 
conjunction to modulate an organism's bodily dynamics124. Neurons, then, are not the only 
'smart cells' in the animal body. Indeed, although they have special features, neurons are 
more similar to other secretory cells than is often acknowledged (see Alberts et aI., 1989, 
chap. 19). The picture that emerges from a close analysis of the role ofthe nervous system 
within animal bodies is that of a specialised subsystem of a whole bodily regulation, 
coordination, and integration structure that includes interactions between many different 
cell, tissue, and organ types. In sum, the role of the nervous system is to rapidly regulate, 
system, especially as it is understood as the central 'body control system', are perhaps fuzzier than is 
commonly appreciated. 
123 In endocrine signalling specialised endocrine cells secrete hormones that flow through the bloodstream. 
In paracrine signalling local chemical mediators are secreted and affect the immediate environment of the 
cell (approximately 1mm) before being destroyed or taken up. Although the endocrine and paracrine systems 
are widely discussed, some sources cite as many as five different chemical signalling systems. For example, 
Wessells and Hopson (1988, chap. 37) include an exocrine mode (a hormonal system where substances are 
secreted into ducts and subsequently body cavities and surfaces rather than into the tissue space near the cell) 
and an autocrine mode (a sort of localized paracrine mode where substances actually only work on the cell 
itself). 
124 For instance, chemicals secreted from neurons can act in paracrine mode as well as synaptic mode 
(Alberts et aI., 1989, p. 683). 
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coordinate, and integrate the different body regions of those multicellular creatures that we 
call animals. Nervous systems do not control behaviour directly, but they form a vital and 
important part of the behaving body that is the animal. In other words, the body as a whole 
is the 'controller' of activity (activity that perturbs and modulates the interaction dynamic 
in order to support the animal's autonomy) and the nervous system forms one vital part of 
this whole (see also Damasio, 1999, chap. 5). 
Support for the Regulation, Coordination, Integration View 
Clark (1997, p. 130) argues that, within the neurosciences, there exist several modelling 
ideas that fit in well with an interactionist approach to cognition and, what I am calling 
here, a regulation, coordination, integration view of the nervous system. My version of 
Clark's list includes: 
1. An emphasis on the nervous system as a sensory-motor coordinator. This notion fits in 
well with Maturana and Varela's (1980, 1988) notion of the nervous system as a 
system for enabling complex internal correlations between activity in the sensory 
surfaces and activity in the motor surfaces. This stands in opposition to current trend 
within the cognitive neurosciences which seeks to map particular psychological 
functions on to the neuroanatomy. 
2. An emphasis on the idea that the nervous system supplies part of the structure 
necessary for enabling cognitive activity (the equal partner notion). The activity of the 
nervous system is understood to perturb (and be perturbed by) the dynamics of other 
bodily systems and, via the body, the agent-environment interaction dynamics. 
Behaviour arises from the coupling of these different dynamic systems. Behavioural 
control and production is distributed across body, brain, and world. 
3. An emphasis on the distributed and decentralised nature of the nervous system itself. 
Instead of viewing the organisation of the nervous system as a physical manifestation 
ofthe sense-model-plan-act schema, it is understood in a manner more in keeping with 
the behaviour layer sUbsumption architecture championed by Brooks (1991a, 1991b) 
and his colleagues. The brain is a mess of low bandwidth connections between sensory 
and action oriented mechanisms. 
Sensorimotor Nature of Nervous System Control 
Clark (1997) notes that "the biological mind is, first and foremost, an organ for controlling 
the biological body. Minds make motions, and they must make them fast - before the 
predator catches you, or before your prey gets away from you." (p. 1). Clark contrasts this 
view of the 'mind' (by which I presume he means the brain) with the popular vision of the 
mind as "a kind of logical reasoning device coupled with a store of explicit data - a kind of 
combination logic machine and filing cabinet." (p. 1). Whereas Clark's idea derives from 
-:',' 
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his analysis of research in philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence, a parallel 
argument has been advanced within the neurosciences by Elizabeth Whitcombe (1996). 
She notes that the dominant modem view of the brain (and more specifically the cortex) 
derives from a basic strategy of mapping higher psychological functions onto separate 
neuroanatomical regions. This strategy has a long history going back to Broca, Wernicke, 
and, in more recent times, Geschwind. In her paper The anatomical foundations of 
cognition: Suggestions for a reinterpretation she argues that this functional mapping 
approach is "a temporary expedient, a compilation of two sets of data: extrapolations from 
animal experiments, and the 'topographical pathology' of aphasia and associated disorders 
of higher cerebral function." (pp. 81-82). The assumptions that underpin this approach, she 
believes, are untenable, and the data are more consistent with a view of the brain/eNS as a 
system for coordinating various 'peripheral end-organs' so that behaviour is made possible. 
Whitcombe remarks that 
It may be useful to follow the lead given by the ftrst experimentalists in central motor function, Fritsch, 
Hitzig, Goltz and others. Rather than abstracting the cerebral hemispheres, or the cortex, from their context 
in the nervous system and the body it regulates, may we not restore them to continuity not only with the 
brainstem and cord but also with the peripheral end-organs which determine the speciftc character of sensory 
and motor modalities. . .. Function may be seen as the property not of some discrete focal area, or some 
fraction of connectivity in the cortex, brain or central nervous system; but rather as a property of anatomical 
systems, which consist of specialized peripheral end-organs, receptors and effectors, together with their 
corresponding neural organization, peripheral and central. (Whitcombe, 1996, pp. 84-85) 
In effect, Whitcombe argues that the nervous system coordinates our sensory and motor 
surfaces so that basic life functions are effected; functions such as posture and locomotion, 
breathing, feeding, excretion, reproduction, and sensing. One can think of these sensory-
motor circuits as equivalent to the basic behaviour layers in a Brooksian subsumption 
architecture. These basic functional subsystems are then modified and interconnected in 
various ways by evolutionary and maturational processes and through experience, training, 
and practice, so that they combine to realise what the famous neuroscientist Hughlings 
Jackson called, broad or cultivated sensory-motor activities such as ballet-dancing, bicycle 
riding, and, swimming. Whitcombe's main focus is to argue that our ability to speak 
likewise derives from a complex interconnection of basic human sensory-motor abilities 
for such things as respiration and feeding125. She contends that "[i]t could well be that 
125 This is likely to be viewed as a fairly controversial claim given the modem enthusiasm for modular and 
innatist theories oflanguage mechanisms (e.g., Pinker, 1994). But Whitcombe's knowledge of neurobiology 
and language are impressive and her argument convincing. She is certainly not claiming that parts of the 
brain have not evolved to support language or that language can be acquired via some general learning 
mechanism. Rather she argues that there is no self-contained central language module (or set of modules) in 
the brain (which do all the important 'information processing' related to parsing, lexical access, and so on) 
and that sends signals to motor systems to output in one way or another (spoken, signed, written). Instead she 
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speech and spoken language has developed from routines devised to exploit the vocal and 
the articulatory possibilities of breathing and feeding arrangements peculiar to the human 
species, rather than arising mysteriously as some 'faculty' with which the human brain is 
uniquely endowed." (Whitcombe,1996, p. 86). So, Whitcombe claims that broad abilities, 
such as speech, are the functional adaptations of narrower sensory-motor systems and that 
they are "devised to exploit their properties." (p. 85). There is more than a faint similarity 
between these ideas and Goldfield's (1995) idea, described above, that task-specific 
devices are softly assembled from anatomically overlapping components. 
A related claim is made by the neuroscientists Antonio and Hanna Damasio (Damasio, 
1989, 1994, 1999; Damasio & Damasio, 1994) in their statement oftheir convergence zone 
hypothesis . .The Damasio's argue that the brain is primarily a system for adaptively dealing 
with the environment's impact upon the body of the living animal. More specifically they 
argue that the world is 'interpreted' in terms of how it affects the body in a survival-
relevant fashion. Damasio (1994) puts it this way: 
If ensuring survival of the body proper is what the brain first evolved for then, when minded brains 
appeared, they began by minding the body. And to ensure body survival as effectively as possible, nature, I 
suggest stumbled on a highly effective solution: representing the outside world in terms of the modifications 
it causes in the body proper, that is, representing the environment by modifying the primordial 
representations of the body proper whenever an interaction between organism and environment takes place. 
(Damasio, 1994, p. 230) 
They arrive at this conclusion from considering a range of neurological disorders that 
suggest that the brain does not create detailed 'representations' of perceived or imagined 
entities, at higher-levels of the processing stream, from simple representational features 
that are registered in early processing mechanisms. Rather, like Whitcombe, they argue 
that the brain contains basic sensory and motor fragments in early cortices (that map 
'knowledge' of the world) and nonmapped procedures (what Clark, 1997 calls neural 
control structures) for coordinating these fragments in later cortices. 
The Convergence Zone Hypothesis: the SensolJl-Motor and Decentralised Nature of the 
Nervous System 
The impetus for the convergence zone hypothesis is the binding problem. This is the 
problem of how the 'content' of perceived and imagined objects, which is dealt with by 
anatomically separated cortices (of, for example, colour, shape, movement, and size), is 
bound together so that coherent activity can be coordinated. Conventional neuroscientific 
argues that language, which is at root speech, is fundamentally grounded in the dynamic arrangement of 
various sensory systems (e.g., auditory system) and motor systems (e.g., oral-laryngeal systems) and the 
physiological and biophysical processes that support them (e.g., respiration systems, postural systems, head 
and neck movement systems). 
i 
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wisdom has it that the binding problem is probably solved via the creation of more 
complete and integrated 'representations' of events in the more anterior multimodal 
cortices (Damasio, 1989, pp. 28-30). In other words, it is widely thought that early sensory 
cortices sort out the basic features of what is being sensed and then send on their 
conclusions to a higher theatre where the features are assembled into fuller pictures. One 
can see the influence of the sense-model-plan-act schema in such an assumption. However, 
such a 'processing cascade' model of the brain is at odds with the neuropsychological 
evidence. In particular, one implication of the processing cascade model is that damage to 
the later, integrative cortices should prevent a person from perceiving (or recalling) the 
various features of a perceived or recalled entity. Damasio (1989, pp. 30-31) notes that, 
under this traditional view, bilateral damage to these integrative cortices should: 1) 
"preclude the perception of reality as a coherent multimodal experience and reduce 
experience to disjointed, modality-specific tracks of sensory or motor processing", 2) 
"reduce the quality of even such modality-specific processing", and 3) "disable memory 
for any form of past integrated experience and interfere with all levels and types of 
memory". This, however, turns out not to be the case. Amongst other contrary findings 
Damasio and Damasio (1994) note that: 
1. Damage to early visual cortices compromises the retrieval of features (e.g., color); 
2. Damage to intermediately placed cortices leaves the retrieval of features intact, but may compromise the 
retrieval of knowledge pertaining to certain categories of concrete knowledge, that is, compromise 
retrieval of knowledge of some nonunique entities while sparing others; 
3. Damage to the anterior-most cortices compromises retrieval of knowledge regarding virtually any 
unique entity or event (scene) but leaves intact retrieval of features, entity components, and nonunique 
entities. (p. 67) 
For instance, a person with early cortical damage may not be able recognise or imagine the 
shape or colour of an acquaintance's face. They are effectively blind to one or more 
features of a viewed or imagined entity. Damage to intermediate cortices may lead to the 
inability to recognise or imagine the class or category of an entity even though they can 
easily describe its various features. Damage to more anterior cortices may reveal itself in 
the person's inability to recognise or imagine unique entities such as a particular person's 
face or a specific episode while preserving their ability to categorise the viewed entity and 
describe its features. 
In light of these findings the Damasios propose a more decentralised and distributed view 
ofthe brain's role in cognitive activity. They suggest that the neural substrate that underlies 
cognitive activity is composed ofthree sets of systems: a set of feature fragment systems, a 
set of convergence zone systems, and a set of attentional systems. 
The first set of systems, located in the early (primary and early association) sensory and 
motor cortices, serves as the basic 'knowledge base' for sensory and motoric knowledge. 
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Damasio (1999) refers to these systems as the brain's image space. This is the only place in 
the brain where explicit (mapped) content is found. In other words, all cognitive activity is 
represented neurally in terms of the neural features within this set of systems. Moreover, 
because of this, Damasio and Damasio claim that it is only activity within these systems 
that provides the content of consciousness (Damasio, 1989, p. 45). Recently Damasio 
(1999) has provided a much fuller analysis of the neuropsychological basis for 
consciousness. For Damasio core consciousness is enabled by second order mappings in 
the brain's dispositional space (see the next paragraph) that incorporate mappings of an 
object of perception (which may include the 'inner perception' of imagery and memory), 
the state of body (what Damasio calls the protoselj), and the way in which the body is 
changed in response to the object126. Damasio argues that these second order mappings can 
then be experienced as 'images' courtesy oftheir effects on the 'image space' that consists 
of the early sensory and motor cortices. 
The second set of systems that Damasio believes make up his decentralised view of the 
brain is found in the higher-order cortices (sensory and motor association cortices of 
different orders in the occipital, temporal, parietal, and frontal regions) as well as in some 
limbic structures (entorhinal cortex, hippocampus, amygdala, cingulate cortices) and the 
neostriatum/cerebellum. Damasio (1999) calls these systems the brain's dispositional 
space. Its role is to coordinate the time-locked activity in the image space made up of the 
explicitly mapped sensory and motor systems. That is, these systems consist of machinery 
that connects the various sensory and motor knowledge fragments in a coherent and 
adaptive manner, so that complex combinations of sensory information and motor activity 
can be coordinated127. These systems do not contain explicit 'representations' of 
knowledge but rather dispositional (nonmapped) neural patterns which coordinate and 
organise the feature fragment regions (Clark's neural control structures). Damasio and 
Damasio refer to these coordinative areas as convergence regions (of which there are 
hundreds) made up of smaller neural ensembles of convergence zones (of which there are 
thousands). Anatomically, convergence zones are neural groups "within which many 
feedforward/feedback loops make contact" (p. 71) that "direct the simultaneous activation 
126 Damasio (1999, chap. 8) suggests that these second order mappings may occur in various nuclei in the 
thalamus, the superior colliculi, and in the cingulate cortices. 
127 The 'fragment record' regions (the fIrst set of systems) also exhibit a limited binding capacity "capable 
of binding features into entities" but they cannot "map non-local contextual complexity at the event level ... " 
(Damasio, 1989, p. 34). In other words, the binding capacity of the early cortices is not enough to promote 
adequate organisation of feature fragments for the support of such cognitive operations as understanding the 
category membership of an entity, recognizing the specifIc or autobiographical nature of an entity, or fItting 
the entity into a temporal sequence or episode (see also Damasio and Damasio, 1994, pp. 67-68). 
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of anatomically separate regions whose conjunction defines an entity." (p. 65). 
Convergence zones are reciprocally connected with more anterior convergence zones as 
well as more posterior zones and ultimately explicitly mapped feature fragment regions. In 
essence, convergence zones associate different kinds of sensory, motor, and somatosensory 
activity, and develop epigenetically as the organism experiences different combinations of 
worldly events, actions, and bodily activities (Damasio, 1989, p. 48). The associations that 
different zones realise work 'in reverse' when imagination or remembering occurs. That is, 
higher-level activity is fed back into more posterior regions so that images (explicit, 
mapped activity) are reconstructed based upon the animal's previous experience of co-
occurring sensory, motor, and somatic activities. 
The third set of systems that the Damasio's postulate "ensure the attentional enhancement 
required for the concerted operation of the other systems," (p. 70). Damasio and Damasio 
(1994) do not go into any detail about these systems and I am not sure that even they are 
very clear about them128 . In any event, these systems seem to constitute another kind of 
neural control structure for coordinating mapped regions so that adaptive behaviour is 
produced. 
Although the Damasios continue to use the language of representation and information-
processing, their convergence zone framework is quite compatible with ESD ideas. 
Convergence zones can be conceived in non-representational terms as the schemas that 
coordinate perceptual instruments (Thomas, 1999) or the low bandwidth connections 
between augmented finite state machines in mobots (Brooks, 1991b). In both cases 
convergence zones can be understood as coordinating non-representational detection and 
action systems rather than world-modelling systems. Most importantly, their approach 
provides empirical and theoretical support for the idea that the CNS is primarily a 
coordinator of sensory and motor surfaces even in animals that possess complex 
behavioural and psychological abilities that cognitive scientists normally think of as far 
removed from sensory and motor concerns (both neuroanatomically and psychologically). 
128 Damasio (1989, p. 49; 1994, pp. 196-199) says a little more about this hypothesized set of 'attentional 
systems' but I am less than convinced that, as described, they add much to the basic framework. His basic 
premise is that an image-generating neural system will create numerous candidate images (solutions) for any 
reasoning problem and that basic attentional and working memory systems are required to make such 
activity tractable. A basic attention mechanism is required to single out a particular image to be utilised while 
a basic working memory system is needed, so he argues, in order to keep the image activated for a relatively 
long periods time. It seems to me that the whole notion is rather vague and impressionistic and conflates the 
experience of reasoning with what must be the case in the underlying substrate. In order to make more sense 
of this suggestion, it needs to be made clear why and how specific 'images' need to be singled out for 
attention and kept alive at a neural level of description. 
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The Partial Role played by the Nervous System 
We have already seen that there exist a good number of researchers that claim that the 
operation of the nervous system cannot be understood except in the context of the action 
loops that it participates in with environmental structures and body structures (e.g., Keijzer, 
1997). Indeed the brain, especially the mammal brain, seems to be specialised for using 
such loops. This may be why Kathleen Gibson (1996) suggests that "neuroanatomical 
plasticity in response to environmental input is so wide-spread and integral to the 
functioning of many mammalian brains that they could well be considered bio-
environmental of biosocial organs." (p. 36). In what follows I will discuss three important 
senses in which the nervous system should be seen as a partial, albeit important, 
contributor to behaviour generation: 1) the conservation of neural processes across 
different behavioural forms, 2) cortical plasticity supporting functional invariance across 
morphological changes, and 3) the somatic marker hypothesis which holds that the body 
proper plays an important role in internal 'information processing'. 
Sunfish, Salamanders, and Mobile Robots: The Conservation o/Neural Processes 
There exists considerable evidence that at least some neural structures and processes are 
conserved across related species and across ontogenetic changes but that these same 
processes contribute to different behaviours because non-neural bodily morphology differs. 
Specifically, there is evidence that neural motor patterns are sometimes conserved across 
morphological and behavioural changes in ontogeny and phylogeny. Lauder and his 
colleagues have discovered this sort of effect in different species of sunfish 
(Centrarchidae) and in salamanders (Lauder, 1992; Reed, 1996). In a study of the feeding 
behaviours of sunfish they found that the motor patterns, that is, the neural impulses that 
flow down the spine, are quite similar across twelve different species of sunfish despite the 
fact that feeding behaviour and jaw morphology vary enormously across the different 
species. The implication is that it is differences in morphology and other non-neural 
factors, rather than differences in neural activity, that underpin differences in behaviour. 
Lauder's research with tiger salamanders shows a similar phenomenon that occurs across 
ontogeny. Neural motor patterns are preserved across metamorphosis, but behaviour and 
bodily morphology exhibit marked changes. Interestingly, Smithers (1992) reports a 
similar conservation effect in his research with Lego situated robots. He has found that it is 
often easier to tune a robot's behavioural dynamics by altering the robot's body shape and 
structure rather than through reprogramming its control system. Indeed, he claims that 
body alterations are sometimes the only way to get the robot to behave appropriately. 
This conservation phenomenon is consistent with the idea that the modulatory effect 
contributed by an animal cannot be understood only in terms of the unique states of the 
nervous system. Rather, action results from the nonlinear coupling of body systems and 
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neural systems. And often it is easier, or more likely, that behavioural changes will occur 
when non-neural bodily systems change against the background of a constant neural 
dynamics. Thus neural action patterns, including so-called central pattern generators, do 
not uniquely specify a set motorlbehavioural pattern (Pearson, 1985 cited in Reed, 1996). 
Nervous systems are not mechanically specific systems (systems that specify a sequence of 
movements) but rather functionally specific systems (systems that balance bodily factors 
against environmental influences in order to produce an appropriate behavioural functional 
outcome) (Reed, 1996). And this stands to reason, for animals must produce relatively 
invariantfunctional behaviours (e.g., moving in a particular direction at a particular speed) 
in environments where terrain, windspeed, water currents and so on can vary enormously. 
Therefore, animals must evolve internal systems that can produce relatively constant 
effects across different environmental conditions. "[S]election will operate on a functional 
system that spans the central and peripheral nervous systems, and probably includes bodily 
morphology as well." (Reed, 1996, p. 72). In other words, the nervous system makes up 
part of a larger behaviour production system that is functionally specific in nature. Its role, 
as an inherently plastic system, is to regulate and coordinate the larger system so that 
bodily and environmental influences are adequately balanced and the appropriate 
interaction dynamics are realised. The nervous system's purpose is to "set up a kind of 
field of force that can be maintained as an invariant background against which further 
influences - perceptual, behavioral, biomechanical- play." (Reed, 1996, p. 73). 
Monkeys Fingers and Temporary Deafferentation: Cortical Plasticity 
The functionally-specific nature of the nervous system is nowhere better demonstrated than 
in experimental findings which demonstrate the plasticity of the cortex. The cortex changes 
rapidly in response to changes in what can be called task-relevant mOlphology. One can 
see this process at work in Merzenich and Kaas' famous research on the somatotopic 
cortical effects of altering the hand-finger morphology of adult owl monkeys (Allard, 
Clark, Jenkins, & Merzenich, 1991; Merzenich & Kaas, 1991; see also Thelen & Smith, 
1994, pp. 136-140). They observed the neural effects of changing proprioceptive input to 
the brain by 1) amputating one or two of the monkey's fingers, 2) surgically joining and 
later separately two adjacent fingers, and 3) training monkeys to use a device for getting 
food that stimulated only the tips of one or two fingers (thereby changing their normal 
'input' experiences). The boundaries of the relevant cortical maps corresponding to these 
morphological-functional systems were found to change over a fairly brief period. The 
maps associated with the amputated finger were colonised by the maps from adjacent intact 
fingers. The surgically joined fingers formed a single map from the maps of the previously 
unjoined fingers. Moreover, when the fingers were later surgically separated the 
independent finger maps reappeared. In the unusual stimulation experiment the monkeys 
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developed greatly enlarged maps for the fingers involved. Again these reduced in size 
when the training stopped. 
Kelso (1995) reports similar research that suggests that such cortical reorganisation can be 
even more rapid and more radical than suggested in Merzenich and Kaas' studies. For 
instance, the somatotopic maps of limbs in monkeys that have had their limbs deafferented 
(by severing the nerves in the dorsal roots of the spinal cord that carry sensation signals to 
the brain) are completely colonised by normally distant face maps (Pons et aI., 1991). 
Similarly, by using blood pressure cuffs to 'functionally deafferent' parts of the arm and 
hand of human participants experimenters can observe effects on cortical representations 
within 25 minutes. 
All of this research shows that the nervous system, and more specifically the cortex, 
flexiblyrecoordinates and reintegrates the dynamics of non-neural body systems to ensure 
that a consistent behavioural function is maintained. The cortex "does not represent either 
the periphery of the body or the external environment with which the periphery comes into 
contact; instead cortex is a vehicle for weaving behaviorally significant aspects of the 
environment into a system that has the capacity to preserve some varieties of behavioral 
units rather than others." (Reed, 1996, pp. 75-76, emphasis added). The cortex seems to 
serve as an important arena for establishing the task-relevant coordination of body part 
dynamics. It is something like a kind of massively complicated behavioural homeostat - a 
system for making sure that the right kinds of 'output' (behavioural functions) are 
produced by a system that is perturbed by changes to the body that may occur in a number 
of ways: through low-energy coupling with the environment (sensation and perception), 
high-energy coupling (injury, surgery, contact with environmental objects), and through 
natural changes to body (maturing systems, illness and disease, physiological changes, 
etc.). Clearly the notion of 'representational content' is not fully suited to a description of 
the nervous system depicted by these claims, for the CNS is portrayed as a balancer and 
modulator rather than a representer or information-storer129. 
Gut Feelings: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
Antonio Damasio (1994, 1999; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991) has been struck by the 
ways in which a number of neuropsychological disorders seem to relate to patients' 
inability to appropriately evaluate environmental events because of an inability to feel the 
appropriateness of certain evaluations or actions. Upon inspection of the evidence he 
129 This does not mean that detennined representationalists will not and cannot produce representational 
versions of the regulation, coordination, integration view of the nervous system, only that the dominant 
picture has shifted from one of taking in infonnation and transfonning it to one of adequately balancing the 
multiple influences on the system so that its cohesion is maintained. 
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suggests that these patients possess damage to neural circuits that monitor and use the 
dynamical changes in non-neural body systems and this prevents them from usmg 
important content about the nature of experienced or imagined events. As was noted 
earlier, Damasio (1999) refers to the overall neural-mapping of bodily activity as the 
protose1f. In his terminology non-neural body processes serve as somatic markers for the 
environmental interactions (in perception) and planning and reasoning (in imagination). 
Damasio combines these ideas with evolutionary considerations to claim that 
(1) The human brain and the rest of the body constitute an indissociable organism, integrated by means of 
mutually interactive biochemical and neural regulatory circuits (including endocrine, immune, and 
autonomic neural components); (2) The organism interacts with the environment as an ensemble: the 
interaction is neither of the body alone nor of the brain alone; (3) The physiological operations that we call 
mind are derived from the structural and functional ensemble rather than from the brain alone: mental 
phenomena can be fully understood only in the context of an organism's interacting in an environment. That 
the environment is, in part, a product of the organism's activity itself, merely underscores the complexity of 
interactions we must take into account. (Damasio, 1994, pp. xvi-xvii) 
So the perception (and imagination) of an event derives not just from the characteristics of 
the event-in-the-world, but also from the kinds of bodily processes (muscle states, heart 
rate, and so on) that are happening at the time. The nervous system is thus deeply 
embedded in the body proper - the body works with the nervous system to create a viable 
whole. On this view interactions with the environment occur via interaction with the body. 
In Damasio's (1994) words: 
Primordial representations of the body proper in action would offer a spatial and temporal framework, a 
metric on which other representations could be grounded. The representation of what we now construct as a 
space with three dimensions would be engendered in the brain, on the basis of the body's anatomy and 
patterns of movement in the environment. 
While there is an external reality, what we know of it would come through the agency of the body proper in 
action, via representations of its perturbations. We would never know how faithful our knowledge .is to 
"absolute" reality. (p. 235) 
Damasio argiles that all of our cognitive activities necessarily involve input from non-
neural body systems, that is, the internal milieu, the viscera, the vesitbular system, and the 
musculoskeletal system. The animal as a whole interacts with the environment. Events and 
situations encountered by an animal result in changes to the whole body state that includes 
neural patterns as well as changes in other organs, joints, muscles, tissues, and so on. 
Natural selection has seen to it that these bodily changes anticipate potential actions and 
bodily responses. So, for instance, the perception of a dangerous situation not only 
involves changes to our 'thoughts' and 'action plans', but also to changes in heart-rate 
(increased circulation of oxygen to facilitate flight or fight), perspiration (to facilitate 
traction), hormonal levels, and so on. These bodily changes are subsequently fedback to 
neural systems by the animal's internal perceptual apparatus and impart an important part 
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of the content or meaning of an environmental encounter130. Damasio argues that this 
bodily feedback provides the foundation for primary emotional feelings - innate feelings 
related to evolved survival-oriented evaluations such as the human snake-fear response. 
This bodily feedback monitoring can be understood to form part of the substrate underlying 
explicit norm signals for autonomy closure conditions (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in 
press) or value schemes (Edelman, 1987, 1992). Humans and, no doubt many other 
animals, also have the facility to associate unique, personal experiences with particular 
bodily states and subsequently come to acquire often subtle and complex feelings about 
objects, people, and events for which there is no (strong) innate response. Damasio calls 
such acquired body-brain response loops secondary emotional feelings 131 • Christensen and 
Hooker (2000, in press) talk of self-directed autonomous systems modifying their explicit 
norm signals in the light of experience to better deploy interaction processes aimed at 
fulfilling various closure conditions. Secondary emotions appear to perform a similar role. 
Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis builds upon this framework. He suggests that 
anticipative bodily responses to events provide a rapid means of evaluating a situation. 
These 'gut feelings' massively reduce the possible range of responses animals have to a 
situation. In humans, merely thinking about a possible course of action can engage a body-
brain loop which 
forces attention on the negative outcome to which a given action may lead, and functions as an automated 
alatm signal which says: Beware of danger ahead if you choose the option which leads to this outcome. The 
signal may lead you to reject, immediately, the negative course of action and thus make you choose among 
other alternatives. The automated signal protects you against future losses, without further ado, and then 
allows you to choosefrom among fewer alternatives. (Damasio, 1994, p. 173) 
Damasio and his colleagues (Damasio, 1994, chap. 9) have found that people with damage 
to their ventromedial frontal cortex display an inability to exhibit socially appropriate 
(secondary) emotional responses to disturbing events (Damasio et aI., 1991) and an 
inability to adequately evaluate and plan activities· (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & 
130 Damasio (1994, pp. 131-134) suggests that the neural-bodily pathway for primary emotions begins with 
activity in the limbic system (especially the anterior cingulate and amygdala). This activity triggers changes 
in the hypothalamus, muscles in the face and limbs, the autonomic nervous system, neurotransmitter nuclei, 
and other unspecified brain internal responses. The hypothalamus activity gives rise to endocrine and other 
chemical activity in the bloodstream. The brain then receives feedback signals from the viscera, muscles, and 
joints. 
131 Damasio hypothesizes that secondary emotional feelings include ventromedial prefrontal activity (the 
substrate of acquired 'dispositional representations') with the machinery of primary emotions. 
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Anderson, 1994)132. Such observations support Damasio's contention that body-state 
feedback loops are central to even high-level, rational cognitive activity. 
Damasio's (1999) most recent claim is that the activity of body-proper systems is also 
central to the phenomenon of consciousness. As noted earlier in the section discussing the 
convergence zone hypothesis, Damasio thinks of core consciousness as an outcome of 
second order mappings which incorporate neural maps of an object, the proto self (the state 
of one's body), and the effect of the object on the proto self. He speculates that emotions 
are bodywide, survival-relevant responses to an object or event and that feelings are first-
order mappings of those bodily responses (feelings, rather than emotions, are probably 
equivalent to Christensen and Hooker's explicit norm signals). Damasio (1999) argues that 
having feelings provides an advantage over just having emotions because "[t]he simple 
process of feeling begins to give the organism incentive to heed the results of emoting 
(suffering begins with feelings, although it is enhanced by knowing, and the same can be 
said for joy)." (p. 284). Core consciousness then builds on this feeling process by creating 
a high order "feeling of knowing that we have feelings." (p. 285). Damasio suggests that 
such knowing is important for complex behaviour and sensitivity to the environment. 
[K]nowing is the stepping stone for the process of planning specific and nonstereotyped responses which can 
either complement an emotion or guarantee that the immediate gains brought by emotion can be maintained 
over time or both. In other words, "feeling" feelings extends the reach of emotions by facilitating the 
planning of novel and customized forms of adaptive response. ... In looking for a good reason for the 
endurance of consciousness in evolution, one might do worse than say that consciousness endured because 
organisms so endowed could "feel" their feelings. I am suggesting that the mechanisms which permit 
consciousness may have prevailed because it was useful for organisms to know of their emotions. And as 
consciousness prevailed as a biological trait, it became applicable not just to the emotions but to the many 
stimuli which brought them into action. Eventually consciousness became applicable to the entire range of 
possible sensory events. (Damasio, 1999, p. 285). 
Thus, Damasio's understanding of the evolutionary function of consciousness seems to 
dovetail nicely with Christensen and Hooker's (2000, in press) idea that complex animals 
exhibit self-directed anticipative learning, which is, at its core, the ability to monitor one's 
own reactions to the environment and to use that monitoring constructively and creatively 
to adjust one's behaviour. 
Maier and Watkins (1998) propose theory from the field ofpsychoneuroimmunology that 
is similar in many respects to Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis. Like Damasio they 
argue that non-neural body systems play an important role in mental life. They present a 
wealth of evidence for the idea that "a variety of behavioral, affective, and cognitive 
132 Primary emotional responses remain intact. Patients with damage to the amygdala region, however, 
exhibit dulled primary (and secondary) emotional responding (Damasio, 1994, chap. 7). 
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phenomena are driven by events in the immune system." (p. 83). The immune system 
serves as a kind of diffuse internal sense organ for recognising foreign substances within 
the body. When the system detects a foreign substance within the body it initiates a series 
of adaptive behavioural and physiological changes that they refer to as sickness. These 
changes include fever, increased slow-wave sleep, alterations in plasma-ions, shifts in 
protein synthesis by the liver, increased circulation of white blood cells, reduction in food 
and water intake, increased responsiveness to pain, reductions in activity, exploration, 
social interaction, aggression, and sexual behaviour, depressed mood, loss of attention, and 
interference with certain types of memory. Maier and Watkins argue that this natural 
sickness response can come to be associated with stressful situations (e.g., public speaking, 
an impending athletic contest) so that it becomes activated in those situations. They note 
that "The theory being proposed is that events in the environment categorized as stressors 
activate the same circuitry as is activated by infectious agents, they just enter the loop at a 
different location." (Maier & Watkins, 1998, p. 93). They go so far as to argue that 
immunological responses are evolutionarily more basic than fight-or-flight responses in 
animals and that the latter is largely built upon the substrate of the former. This accords 
with the general idea that the nervous system has evolved in the context of simpler, non-
neural body systems and has become a specialised subsystem that works to modulate the 
non-neural systems rather than being a completely new and self-contained system for 
producing behaviour. 
In sum, Damasio and Maier and Watkins suggest that evaluations of surroundings are 
fundamentally dependent upon the nervous system's couplings with body proper systems. 
The brain does not so much form representations of what the body is doing (although 
Damasio sometimes writes as if this is the case); rather actual 'processing' occurs in non-
neural systems and the consequences of these non-neural dynamics serve as 
parameterisations of nervous system activity133. We can utilise Christensen and Hooker's 
133 Damasio hypothesises that it is possible that we do not always use bodily-feedback to inform our (high-
level) cognitive activity. With experience a person's brain can develop 'neural short-cuts' that bypass bodily 
input (he calls them emotional 'as-if' loops). We, in a sense, can use our emotional/evaluative skills without 
having to activate complete bodily feeling-related processes. However he doubts that the feelings that arise 
from as-if loops "feel the same as the feelings freshly minted in a real body state." (p. 156). This could be 
because there are chemical as well as neural aspects to the mechanisms that underlie 'real' (body state-based) 
emotional feelings" (pp. 157-158) and because "the brain is not likely to predict how all the commands -
neural and chemical, but especially the latter - will play-out and the resulting states depend on local 
biochemical contexts and on numerous variables within the body itself which are not fully represented 
neurally." (p. 158). Damasio, although still captured to some extent by aspects of the cognitivist vision, 
seems to want to argue that important adaptive1y significant processes occur in non-neural parts of the 
substrate underlying the production of behaviour. 
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(in press) distinction between low and high-order adaptive strategies to make deeper sense 
of this idea. In low order strategies, such as female mosquitos' C02 gradient tracking 
system, a large amount of the interaction dynamics occurs in the environment-side of the 
dynamic equation. For instance, the relationship between concentration of C02 and the 
presence of a bloodhost is entirely embedded in the structure of the environment. The 
internal gradient tracking mechanisms of the mosquito rely upon this relationship in order 
to contribute to the production of adaptive behaviour. The mosquito cannot modify its 
tracking mechanisms to deal with situations where the relationship is violated. Indeed, the 
mosquito has no way of 'knowing' about the importance of this relationship. The same 
idea can be applied to the interaction dynamics of the nervous system and systems in the 
body proper. Important relationships that exist purely within non-neural systems are not 
'discriminated' or controllable (and thus modifiable) by the nervous system. Thus the 
nervous system is not sufficient for producing 'commands' for behaviour. It does not 
contain all of the requisite 'content' needed for behaviour production. Rather behaviour 
emerges from the coupling of body and neural systems. 
A Distributed and Decentralised Locus of Cognition 
All of the previously discussed theories and their supporting research demonstrate how the 
adaptive production of modulation processes is widely distributed throughout the nervous 
system and the body proper. The regulation, coordination, integration view of the nervous 
system encourages us to resist employing the sense-model-plan-act schema as a template 
for describing the neurocognitive operations. The convergence zone hypothesis most 
obviously challenges the idea that the brain instantiates some kind of processing cascade 
where simpler representations are accumulated and coordinated into more complex 
representations at higher processing stages. Schechtman (1997) argues that much of the 
evidence and argument deployed in favour of the idea that the brain is the locus of 
cognition is also consistent with a distributed view of the role of the nervous system and 
that "[t]he standard conception of the brain as the locus of mind stems ... from the 
imposition of a Cartesian conception of self on a materialist ontology." (p. 149). 
Schechtman provides arguments in favour of the ideas that: 1) damage to the non-neural 
body affects cognition, 2) that phantom limb phenomena do not show that full perceptual 
experience can exist without possessing a limb, and 3) that Penfield's (1958) experiments 
in stimulating different sectors of the cortex to produce memory-like experiences do not 
show that normal cognition is possible without bodily influences. The continuing tendency 
to want to think of the brain as the locus of the mind comes from the fact that the standard 
view "meets the ontological requirements of materialism with very little impact on the 
traditional conception of the subject. Aside from the issue of immateriality (which is 
admittedly a large one), everything else that is generally presupposed about the subject 
within dualism can stay more or less the same." (p. 160). However, Schechtman argues 
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that "questions about the legitimacy of the traditional view of the subject must be raised if 
we are to take our materialism seriously." (p. 161). Schechtman believes that our current 
knowledge of neural phenomena is more consistent with some kind of distributed view of 
the contribution of nervous system to cognitive activity. 
An Interactionist View of the Nervous System 
So what does the nervous system do in an interactivist-constructivist framework? I have 
argued that the best way to think about the role of the nervous system is as a regulator and 
coordinator of the body (although, even non-nervous system systems must also perform 
these duties to some degree) rather than an internal world-modelling device. The nervous 
system cooperates with the body to produce bodily change that affects the interaction 
dynamics. At a very simple level the nervous system is simply a sensory surface-motor 
surface coordinator. It facilitates the many adaptive internal correlations between these 
surfaces. 'Poke' a sensory surface with an environmental event and a (hopefully) 
appropriate bodily postural response will result. Appropriate bodily responses are ones that 
preserve the system's autonomy. One need not think of the innards as implementing 
computations over representations of things in the world. Rather, the nervous system is a 
self-organising system that reorganises in response to changes in control parameters 
(changes in internal or external sensory surfaces). The reorganisation in tum alters the 
dynamics of the body as a whole (postural change and movement through the 
environment). 
Now, of course, this is too broad and vague a picture of the nervous system's function 
within the agent-environment dynamic to get us very far, but it serves as a guiding and 
focusing picture in much the same way as the Cartesian notion that 'inner pictures' of the 
world are created in the nervous system and used for thinking and the planning of action. 
In particular, the regulatory-coordinative picture helps us to think of the nervous system as 
providing important components for the assembly of perceptual instruments, the circuits 
that regulate the coordination of perceptual instruments, and systems for implementing 
performatory action. 
Recall that perceptual instruments are anatomically overlapping neuromuscular devices134 
for detecting and measuring specific changes in the external world and within the body 
134 Note that perceptual instruments are not just constituted by neural components but also from structures in 
the body proper. A 'hefter' cannot be used to test for weight without the existence of the muscles within the 
arm, hand, and shoulder which react and deform in particular ways to the presence of moving masses due to 
their spring-like qualities, and the hand-arm skeletal (link-joint) system which has its own dynamics courtesy 
of its physical features (mass, oscillatory behaviour, momentum and so on). In an important sense these non-
neural systems do not just enable the nervous system to interact with the world by providing a protective 
casing for the nervous system, they also modulate the nature of the 'input' to the nerves and provide a ready-
--. '.', 
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(Thomas, 1999; see also Goldfield, 1995, pp. 159-160). These instruments influence the 
activity of other instruments (i.e., they provide the substrate for epistemic action) and 
provide signals for initiating performatory motor activity (i.e., pragmatic action). Many 
perceptual instruments can be thought of as measuring aspects of things in the environment 
(such as the weight of a hefted object, or the relative location of a fixated object) or the 
effects of objects and events on 'environmental arrays' (e.g., the structure of the light, 
distributions of volatile chemicals in the air). Other instruments measure goings on in the 
body including the activities occurring in the sensory surfaces (e.g., muscles that move the 
eyes, the state of cochlear fluid in the auditory system [Dallos, 1992, 1997, cited in 
Thomas, 1999]). Christensen and Hooker's (1999, 2000) explicit norm signals can be 
fruitfully understood in terms of the testing of bodily states using inward-focused 
perceptual instruments. For instance, hunger (a norm signal relating to available energy 
levels) may be realised by a collection of instruments that test for blood sugar levels, 
distension of the stomach, and the like. 
Multiple perceptual instruments must be coordinated so that coherent agent activity can 
take place. Thus, the nervous system can also be understood to contribute a 'perceptual 
instrument coordination system'. Much of the nervous system may be given over to neural 
control structures. These are "any neural circuits, structures, or processes whose primary 
role is to modulate the activity of other neural circuits, structures, or processes - that is to 
say, any items or processes whose role is to control the inner economy rather than to track 
external states of affairs or to directly control bodily activity." (Clark, 1997, p. 136). 
Thomas (1999) seems to be talking about a similar, although more specific, kind of thing 
when he discusses the neural exploratory procedures or schemata that "determine the 
sequence in which the various perceptual instruments are brought into play." (p. 222). 
These neural control structures can be understood to assemble individual perceptual 
instruments and the coordinated behaviour of multiple perceptual instruments '(and 
performatory motor systems) in a task-relevant manner. In other words these neural control 
structures might perform the same sort of functions as the low bandwidth connections 
between the augmented finite state machines (AFSM) that make up behaviour layers and 
made dynamics for the 'output'. Indeed, the neural part of perceptual instruments must modulate the natural 
non-neural dynamics found in such systems (see also Schechtman, 1997). Burton (1993) provides a detailed 
examination of the role played by non-neural systems such as vibrissae (whiskers), horns, quills, teeth, and 
tools (such as sticks) in haptic perception. In each case the non:..neura1 system can be understood as 
'transducing' action on its surface so that the nervous system interacts with a transformed stimulus pattern. 
For instance, our outer skin is composed of relatively stiff plates of keratin (called corneocytes) and it exerts 
a shearing force on underlying innervated tissue when touching an object. To put it succinctly, non-neural 
parts of the body are part of (most?) sensory systems and not merely supportive of them. They provide 
behaviourally important signal transformations on afferent and efferent neural activity. 
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connect lower layers to higher layers in Brooks' situated robots. Recall, that these 
connections within mobots are best viewed in terms of simple suppress, interrupt, . and 
encouragement signals rather than as systems whereby detailed information is passed from 
AFSM to AFSM. It seems sensible to suggest that that neural control structures may also 
perform this low-bandwidth coordination role rather than a high-bandwidth representation 
building role. Within most of Brooks' robots these connections are hard-wired and thus not 
amenable to modification with experience. But real animal neural control structures are no 
doubt plastic in nature. Edelman (1987, 1992) has suggested a possible process for 
modifying connections between multiple 'categorisation systems' (e.g., neural maps that 
respond to specific qualities of a target such as colour, orientation, and movement). These 
maps develop via experiential selection135 and are reentrantly connected by massively 
parallel and reciprocal connections. These connections are strengthened when activity is 
correlated in two or more maps and weakened when it is not. 
Neural Control 
Structures 
Brain 
Object of 
perception " 
Performance 
Instruments 
Information bearing causal products 
of object of perception 
Figure 6.1 The Nervous System according to Perceptual Activity Theory 
(modified from Thomas, 1999, p. 220) 
135 In experiential selection neural groups, or rather the connections that exist between neural groups, that 
work well according to some value system are maintained at the expense of less successful groups. Edelman 
(1992) notes that "during behavior, synaptic connections in the anatomy are selectively strengthened or 
weakened by specific biochemical processes. This mechanism effectively "carves out" a variety of 
functioning circuits (with strengthened synapses) from the anatomical network by selection." (pp. 83-85). 
227 
Action generation processes or performance instruments are those neuromuscular 
subsystems that accomplish particular kinds of pragmatic action. This idea derives from a 
bringing together of Christensen and Hooker's (2000, in press) ideas and Thomas' notion 
of perceptual instruments, but focuses not so much on systems for detecting information 
but for those that get things done. 
As noted earlier, Goldfield (1995) discusses the idea that animals possess a performatory 
action system where various anatomical resources are softly assembled into task-specific 
devices136. For instance, the hand-arm system can playa role in devices such as a carrier, 
scooper, pusher, tapper, clapper, pounder, reacher, and grasper (pp. 260-261). Like 
perceptual instruments, performance instruments are made up of anatomically overlapping 
resources; not only overlapping with each other but, to a large degree, overlapping with the 
resources utilised by perceptual instruments. 
The Autonomous Systems View in Summary 
The hypotheses of the Damasios, Whitcombe, and Schechtman all point to a vision of the 
nervous system as primarily sensory-motor in nature. The brain is no longer viewed in a 
Cartesian materialist manner, as housing devices for carrying out different kinds of 
cognitive activity. Rather, the nervous system's function is viewed as the integration, 
coordination, and regulation of the body so that the changing world does not kill or 
seriously damage the animal. And frequently it accomplishes this in an anticipative manner 
by enabling the animal to be in the right place to get required resources or to avoid danger. 
The nervous system does not do all of this by itself however. It is essentially reliant on the 
states of other bodily systems and states. of the environment in order to maintain autonomy. 
The nervous system itself 'merely' provides a fast, focused, and flexible matrix of internal 
correlations for perturbing the intrinsic dynamics of body and environment so that an 
appropriate interaction dynamics is maintained. 
136 Goldfield derives his ideas from Reed's (e.g., Reed, 1996) taxonomy of action systems. Reed suggests 
that it is useful to think of animals as possessing a collection of action systems in addition to set of perceptual 
systems (in Gibson's, 1966, 1979/1986 sense). The taxonomy includes a basic orienting system for 
maintaining posture, a locomotor system, an appetitive system for getting nourishment, a performatory 
system for moving and manipulating objects (in Reed, 1996 he calls it the manipulatory system), and an 
expressive system for modulating social interaction (In Reed, 1996; the expressive system is one of the 
interaction systems which also include the sexual reproduction system, the nurture and grooming system, and 
the semantic system). He also suggests that there exists a combination of the perception and action systems 
that he calls the play system. These systems all clearly relate to evolutionarily significant kinds of activity. 
However, my use the notion of performance instruments aims at a lower level of function than do Reed's 
action systems. 
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This view of the nervous system seems to be a more appropriate one for an autonomous 
systems approach than that given by cognitivism's computational perspective. Instead of 
theorising the agent as a machine that generates models of the world in its head and uses 
those to plan behavioural responses, the autonomy view of cognition takes the agent to be a 
flexible, sensitive, and complex system that adaptive1y modulates its activity with respect 
to the changing environment often with the express 'purpose' of altering that environment 
so that it can maintain its own autonomy. This is a complex view and one that requires the 
theorist to make some rather vague sounding claims about concepts such as sensitivity and 
modulation. The distinction between these terms and the theoretical terms of cognitivism 
can be better distinguished with a deeper understanding of dynamical systems terminology 
and a detailed knowledge of animal anatomy and physiology amongst other pre-requisites. 
However, these are generally not within the grasp of the average psychologist (including 
the present writer) and it thus becomes tempting to write off the claims of the autonomy 
approach and the regulation, coordination, integration view of the nervous system as a case 
of putting old wine in new bottles. One promising way of trying to make more concrete the 
differences between these new ideas and traditional cognitivist ones is to examine the ways 
in which connectionist models have been used to simulate the role of nervous system 
within. an interactionist context. It is to these concerns that I tum in the next chapter. 
7. Connectionism as a Model of the Embodied 
Nervous System 
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Mind is a leaky organ, forever escaping its "natural" c01~fines and mingling shamelessly with body and with 
world. What land of brain needs such external support, and how should we characterize its environmental 
interactions? What emerges, as we shall see, is a vision of the brain as a land of associative engine, and of its 
environmental interactions as an iterated series of simple pattern-completing computations. 
Andy Clark (1997, p. 53). 
Introduction: Connectionism meets ESO Interactionism 
I have argued that the autonomy approach combined with the regulation, coordination, 
integration view of the nervous system provides the basic framework on which an 
interactionist theory of the agent must be built. The salient question is: Can we be any 
more specific about the functioning of the nervous system within an interactionist 
perspective? In this chapter I want to suggest that the field of connectionism provides us 
with one of our best opportunities for understanding how the nervous system might 
contribute to the production of cognitive activity in conjunction with other bodily and 
environmental processes and structures. However, two problems immediately face the 
interactionist who wants to use connectionism. 
The first is that, despite being a neurally inspired modelling approach, connectionism has 
been widely criticised for its biological implausibility. If connectionism does not reflect 
actual neural processes to some useful degree, its use within any theory of cognition opens 
that theory up to criticism (see Crick & Asanuma, 1986; Green, 1998; Reeke & Sporns, 
1990; Segalowitz & Bernstein, 1997). I will not address this issue in any detail here; it 
suffices to say that the approach I take is to argue that connectionism, and its various 
incarnations in biologically realistic networks (Globus, 1992) and synthetic neural 
modelling research (Almassy, Edelman, & Spoorns, 1998; Edelman, 1987, 1992; Reeke & 
Sporns, 1990), is currently our best low-level take on how multiple interacting units can 
map inputs, understood as patterns of activity on sensory surfaces, onto sensible, adaptive 
outputs, understood as activity patterns on motor surfaces. I follow Farmer's (1990) 
proposal that the term connectionism should be used to refer to the general mathematical 
approach to modelling the properties of all kinds of dynamical systems where interactions 
depend upon a finite set of connections and where the connections are fluid. Such a 
characterisation includes neural networks, autocatalytic networks, classifier systems, and 
immune nets. We know that neural circuits, and indeed any array of cells, are networks in 
this sense. Thus we are at least looking in the right direction when we suppose that 
connectionist networks provide approximate models of the workings of the nervous 
system. 
: . 
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The second problem is that connectionism has largely been associated with attempts to 
model cognition as a purely in-the-head affair. In fact, at times connectionists have gone to 
great lengths to get their networks to mimic at least some of the internal operations of 
classical architectures. We see this, for instance, in Smolensky's (1991, 1995) attempts to 
model compositional operations by using the tensor product technique. Of course, it should 
be clear by now that interactionists do not believe that the whole cognitive story can be 
told purely in terms of the internal dynamics of a mindlbrain regardless of whether it is 
modelled using a classical symbolic architecture or a connectionist one. 
Despite these problems, I think that connectionism provides a promising framework for 
modelling the sorts of physical processes that may well go on in the workings of the 
perceptual instruments, neural control structures, and performance instruments that 
plausibly constitute a regulatory, coordinative, and integrative nervous system. My 
discussion takes the following form. First, I will briefly sketch out what connectionism is 
and indicate why so many cognitive scientists find it an attractive approach. Second, I will 
examine some of the problems that have been identified by critics. The third section 
consists of a description of two connectionist simulations which show connectionism's 
promise within an embodied and situated perspective. Finally I will examine several of the 
illuminating weaknesses of the connectionist framework. 
The Connectionist Profile 
Connectionist networks, also known as artificial neural networks (ANNs), are nonlinear 
mapping systems that are loosely inspired by the structures and processes of the nervous 
systems of humans and animals. Standard connectionist models137 consist of several, 
usually three, layers of units, or 'neurons', that can map a coded input (coded in terms of 
the activation levels of the input nodes) into an appropriate coded output (again coded in 
terms of activation levels)138. A network is typically trained from an 'ignorant state', where 
the weight values between the various nodes are randomly assigned, by getting the network 
to construct outputs, based upon its current connection weight values, and giving it 
137 The 'white rat' of connectionism is the three layered, feedforward network that uses the backpropagation 
learning rule. 
138 There are certain limitations on these abilities. For instance, some pattern pairings require the existence 
of hidden layers between the input layers and output layers (e.g., the exclusive-or function, see Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 1991). As the complexity and variety of the input-output patterns increase, so too does the size 
of the network (number of units and connections). 
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feedback about the correctness of its attempts. This feedback is used to subtly adjust the 
network's weights using a learning rule such as the method known as backpropagation139. 
Varieties of Pattern Mapping 
The mappings performed by ANN s can realise associations, transformations, 
'recognitions', or completions depending on the kind of network used and the input-output 
pairings it is exposed to (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991; Rowlands, 1999). Pattern 
association is simply the ability of the system to learn how to map an arbitrary input 
pattern onto an arbitrary output pattern. A variety of ANN, known as a pattern associator, 
can learn to pair, for example, an arbitrary code signifying the visual qualities of a number 
of stimuli (e.g., rose, steak) with a code that stands for the olfactory qualities of each 
stimulus (Hinton, McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Some kinds of pattern associations can 
be thought of as pattern transformations - mappings that apply a particular operator to all 
inputs. For instance, Smolensky (1988) describes a network that can transform input data 
in accord with Ohm's Law. Many networks are also designed to categorise an input into a 
broader class. For instance, a network has been designed to map naval sonar returns (input) 
into one of two categories: mine present and mine absent (see Churchland, 1995). 
Connectionists refer to this kind of mapping as pattern recognition. Finally, connectionist 
networks called autoassociators can also engage in pattern completion. This is the ability 
to 'map' an incomplete input pattern onto a completed version of that pattern. In practice 
this involves activating a certain subset of units that represent a partial pattern and letting 
the network 'fill in the gaps'. In other words, networks can make good guesses about 
stimuli based upon incomplete information. 
Typically the patterns that are mapped by simple networks are patterns that are extended in 
space but not in time. For instance, a word or an image representing a snapshot of a scene 
is mapped onto an appropriate output. We can call this spatial pattern mapping or 
synchronic pattern mapping. This sort of system works well if each input pattern 
corresponds only to one particular output pattern. For instance, it is possible to install a 
spatial pattern mapper in a robot that can provide appropriate motor commands to sensor 
input into a complex reactive mechanism akin to Brooks' sUbsumption architecture (e.g., 
139 Backpropagation calculates the average difference between the actual output and desired output (the 
mean squared error or MSE) as a measure of the accuracy of the network and then, one weight at a time, 
checks to see if a slight change in the weight's value will reduce the MSE. Changes that result in a reduction 
of the MSE are implemented. This process is repeated many, usually thousands of, times and gradually the 
network (often) comes to 'learn' how to produce the appropriate outputs when given particular inputs (see 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). There exist a number of other methods for training networks including other 
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Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b). However, many cognitive activities involve 
responding differentially to an input depending on where it falls in a temporally extended 
pattern. For instance, a mobot may need to produce one kind of motor output in response to 
an object as it approaches it and a different kind of behaviour as it moves away from it, 
even though, for a fraction of a second (a single input 'snapshot'), it may be receiving 
identical sensory input in both cases. The robot obviously needs some way to take into 
account how the particular input is embedded within a larger temporal context140• We can 
call this ability to be sensitive to temporal dependencies temporal mapping or diachronic 
mapping. Luckily for the connectionist, a type of ANN known as a simple recurrent 
network can do just this (Elman, 1990, 1995; see also Churchland, 1995). Simple recurrent 
networks use an extra set of context units as a kind of temporary memory of a previous 
input to produce networks that can respond appropriately to patterns that occur over 
time141 • For instance, it is possible to train a simple recurrent network to recognise that a 
particular word (input pattern) may require a different output depending on the word's 
position within a sentence (e.g., whether the word is being used as a subject or an object). 
Temporal mapping enables a network to engage in a limited kind of time-space distancing 
- that is, sensitivity to 'stimuli' that are distant in time. This amounts to being able to enter 
an event at a particular stage and, in a sense, have a good guess at what has gone before 
and what is likely to happen, and to modulate one's activity (output) accordingly. This 
supervised training strategies, such as the delta rule (a close cousin of backpropagation), and unsupervised 
methods, such as Hebbian learning. 
140 In fact it is an entirely empirical question whether anything more than clever spatial pattern mapping is 
needed for this sort of robotic navigation. Pfeifer and Verschure's (1992a, 1992b) robot Lola, which is 
discussed below in more detail, makes do with a relatively simple ANN control structure. They note that 
"[ 0 ]riginally we had planned to get anticipatory behavior by introducing several network layers to keep some 
information about the recent past ... " but that "[t]his turned out not to be necessary." (Pfeifer & Verschure, 
1992b, footnote 4, p. 26) 
141 Sometimes theorists talk of context nodes as being a kind of memory, perhaps a type of working 
memory, that holds in mind what was being thought at a previous time. I do not believe that this is a 
particularly useful analogy, for it does not actually make contact with the basic ideas in the working memory 
literature. For one thing, working memory research is typically concerned with the ability to keep in mind a 
series of items by rehearsing them. The role of context nodes in an recurrent network is to modify the impact 
of current input in the production of activity across hidden layer and, ultimately, output layer nodes. 
Although a loose analogy with some kind of memorial crosstalk may be read into the dynamics of simple 
recurrent networks, there is no strong theoretical motivation for thinking that simple recurrent networks deal 
in any kind of 'information-processing level' memory processes. Rather, I think that simple recurrent 
networks might provide some insight in to the patterns of activity that may occur in recurrently connected 
neural circuits. Such feedback systems may play important roles in amplifying or suppressing particular 
neural signals without thinking of them as a kind of very low level memory system. 
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gives networks a capacity for simple looking forward and looking backward in time that 
does not involve having to posit a detailed inner model of events (e.g., classically-inspired 
scripts). 
Features of Connectionist Pattern Mapping 
The structures and processes that underpin the pattern mapping abilities of ANN s are 
interesting for two reasons. The first is that the network stores its 'knowledge' of input-
output associations across the entire network of units and connections, rather than being 
stored in a subcomponent of the system such as a register in a standard serial, von 
Neumann computer. So unlike traditional symbolic architectures, neural networks' 
'knowledge' (i.e., their ability to appropriately pair input and output) is distributed over the 
entire, or large parts of the, network in the form of the networks' pattern of weightings 
between nodes. This feature is frequently referred to as distributed representation (Hinton 
et aI., 1986). 
The second interesting characteristic of ANN s is that they can store multiple 
'representations' of input-output pairs within the network by using a single set of resources 
(connection weights). In other words, a single connection weight value can playa role in 
multiple input-output association representations. This feature of ANNs is known as 
superposition (Clark, 1993, pp. 17-23). Superposed representations have all sorts of 
fascinating properties that I will discuss in a moment. 
The major advantages of such systems as models of human psychological abilities have 
been well-rehearsed in the literature (see, e.g., Bechtel, 1993a; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
1991; Churchland, 1995; Clark, 1993; McClelland, Rumelhart, & The PDP Research 
Group, 1986). These unique selling points of artificial neural networks142 include speed, 
robustness and graceful degradation, content-addressable memory, automatic 
generalisation, and automatic prototype extraction. Briefly, ANNs are fast (or at least 
potentially so) because they involve parallel processing. Most ANN research actually 
involves simulations run on conventional serial machines. Thus, this advantage is not often 
appreciated. Of course conventional symbolic models can also be implemented with 
parallel processing architectures, so this virtue is not necessarily distinctive of 
connectionist networks. Graceful degradation refers to the ability of neural networks to 
continue to produce reasonable output in the face of damage to the network. ANNs are 
much less brittle than conventional physical symbol systems. They also perform quite well 
when presented with incomplete or noisy data. They are, in short, tolerant of all sorts of 
abuse. Content-addressable memory refers to the ability of ANNs to automatically access 
142 At least those networks with distributed representations and nonlinear weight summation procedures. 
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appropriate 'stored infonnation' without the need for a protracted serial search-and-match 
procedure. If one thinks of the output of a network as a retrieval of stored knowledge and 
the input as a cue or query for that knowledge, ANNs can be thought of as machines that 
can automatically 'look up' the appropriate memory without needing to search for it. 
ANNs can automatically generalise what they have learnt (the way specific input features 
and relations between those features relate to output features) to novel input. In a typical 
training and testing session a network is trained on a set of stimuli until it reaches a high-
level of appropriate pattern matching. The network's weights are then frozen and it is 
tested on stimuli that it has been previously exposed to as well as a set of related, but 
novel, stimuli. More often than not the network responds appropriately to these new 
stimuli. Finally, Clark (1993, pp. 20-23) argues that one of ANNs' strengths is their ability 
to automatically extract prototypes. As is well known in the fields of categorisation 
research, a prototype is the statistical average of a group of similar stimu1i143 , such as one's 
concept of the average dog that derives from one's experience of many types of dog (see, 
e.g., Medin, 1989; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; see also Churchland, 1995, pp. 49-53). 
Prototypes will not usually correspond to any actual member of a category. However many 
theorists argue that prototypes are used when we make typicality judgments and engage in 
other kinds of categorisation activities. Clark (1993) argues that ANNs automatically 
extract the statistical central tendency of feature complexes (prototypes of a set of inputs) 
because they incorporate mechanisms that strongly associate features via powerful 
mutually excitatory connections. The implication is that ANNs incorporate the human 
psychological ability for fuzzy categorising and typicality judgment 'for free'. 
Some Problems with Traditional Connectionism 
Despite traditional connectionism's intuitively attractive features, the framework has 
drawn criticism from a number of quarters. A number of cognitive scientists have argued 
that connectionism's holistic pattern mapping profile is inadequate for making sense of 
compositional cognitive abilities such as language, logical reasoning, complex problem-
solving, and language-like thought (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Many connectionists 
disagree. I will leave discussion of these issues until the end of the chapter on the grounds 
that we should at least give connectionism a chance as a modelling tool for non-
compositional cognitive abilities. If neural networks can be constructed to model such 
abilities this would be more than a minor success for the framework. However, even 
connectionism's ability to model these sorts of abilities has come into question and it is . 
these critiques, I believe, that are fundamentally related to the issue of incorporating 
143 The notion of similarity is especially problematic for researchers of concepts and categories (Medin, 
1989). 
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connectionism into an ESD interactionist framework. These critiques all derive from the 
problems of using connectionism within a conventional cognitivist information-processing 
framework. Traditional simple connectionism, to use Clancey's (1997) term, usually 
portrays ANNs as neural-like systems for implementing a version of cognitivism's mind as 
an in-the-head, world-modelling computer. Clancey (1997) argues, after Cliff (1991), that 
simple connectionism is severely restricted in its explanatory power when adopting the 
view of neural networks as pipeline processors that are isolated from real environments and 
thus require designed ontologies to make them work. 
Pipeline Processing 
Traditional connectionism follows the cognitivist assumption that the mind is an entirely 
in-the-head device. This is accomplished by thinking of neural networks as pipeline 
processors (Cliff, 1991, p. 32). Most current connectionist simulations use sequentially 
operating feedforward networks (even simple recurrent networks are basically feedforward 
systems) where the input layer is viewed as playing a sensing role, the hidden layer 
(usually there is only one) is thought of as modelling aspects of the world, and the output 
layer produces an 'action'. In other words, the dynamics of the networks are thought of in 
terms of a traditional information-processing sequence. Connectionist researchers often 
talk of the activity patterns of the hidden layer as realising internal representations stored in 
the network (although see Clark [1993] on the problematic nature of trying to understand 
networks in such a static and 'text-like' manner). In many ways this is quite an. odd way of 
thinking of representation because the input layer activity seems to be a much more likely 
locus for representations of external objects, properties, or events than the hidden layer 
which is, in effect, a midpoint in the mapping process from a stimulus to a response. The 
concept of hidden-layer representations no doubt arises from the fact that statistics such as 
hierarchical cluster analysis tum up interesting kinds of partitionings (patterns of hidden 
layer unit usage) related to categorical similarities and differences among different inputs 
and the outputs that they map on to. 
Sensory-Motor Isolation and Designed Ontologies 
The second feature of traditional connectionism that inclines theorists to· think of ANN s as 
incarnations of cognitivist in-the-head computers is its sensory-motor isolation (Cliff, 
1991). Simple ANNs are akin to the philosophers' 'brain in a vat' in that they sit in 
splendid, unmoving, isolation responding only to input selected by an outside 
experimenter. In traditional connectionism it is the experimenter who supplies the 
'perceived environment' (the input training set) and the consequences of acting in that 
environment (the set of correct mappings that are used to calculate output error which is 
used to change weight values). Clancey (1997) calls this experimenter-selected input a 
designed ontology. The neural network cannot choose its input by, for instance, moving its 
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sensory surfaces (input layers) using activity in its output layers in an independently 
structured environment. Thus, simple connectionism nullifies the possibility of perception-
action loops playing a role in cognition and focuses attention on the ANN's internal 
dynamics as the locus of cognition. These features of simple connectionism fit it nicely 
into the traditional cognitivist approach. 
The top-down approach to network training used in simple connectionism has been 
criticised as being derived from our folk-psychological and formal analytical assumptions 
about the appropriate kind of 'sense data' that is fed into cognitive systems (Hendriks-
Jansen, 1996, pp. 75-81). Cliff et al. (1993) argue that only by exposing agents to real, low-
level sensory input, as they do in their evolutionary robotic experiments, can we get an idea 
of how real agents utilise environmental information and, consequently, how real neural 
networks are structured (their connectivity and values of connection weights). Similarly, 
Hendriks-Jansen (1996, pp. 81-86) argues that we must carefully observe the behaviour 
patterns of animals, in the wild and experimentally, before we can make sensible 
suggestions about the kinds of stimuli to which they seem to be sensitive. Connectionist 
researchers, on the other hand, typically use highly artificial and abstract input sets (Clark, 
1997; Cliff, 1991). 
Cliff (1991) considers designed ontologies to be problematic because they provide an 
artificial scaffold for ANNs' supposedly powerful natural learning processes. This scaffold 
is thought to be problematic in the same way that toy worlds have been in AI research. The 
construction of toy worlds by researchers effectively pre-processes the input for the AI 
programs effectively doing much of the important and difficult work for the system. And 
because the pre-processing is carried out by the researcher, the question of whether such 
pre-processing could be accomplished by an extra subsystem bolted onto the central 
system is suppressed. (Often AI researchers have found that it is the pre-processing, 
typically perceptual and recognition, subsystems that are the hard ones to build, not the 
central systems that they concentrate on). This means that the internal processes of the 
'intelligent system' might not, and typically do not, work in real-world environments 
because it proves impossible to implement adequate sensory and motor systems for coping 
with noisy, dynamic environments filled with novel objects and events144 (see, e.g., 
Brooks, 1991a, 1991b). In effect this means that toy worlds can 'push' a particular vision 
ofthe workings of agents' internal systems (typically a cognitivist, information-processing 
view) at the expense of interesting, and possibly more workable, alternatives. 
144 In fact, the problems of how we can build adequate sensory and motor systems for traditional model-
based architectures are central to the frame problem and Keijzer's (1997) instruction problem. See the 
discussion of these problems in chapter 3. 
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Verschure (1992; see also Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a) has shown how this sort of problem 
occurs in Sejnowski and Rosenberg's (1987) NETtaik architecture. The purpose of 
NETtaik is to provide spoken (phonemic) output in response to written (graphemic) input 
strings. It turns out that the phonemic distinctions detected in the network's hidden layer 
activity occur because of the way the experimenters had constructed the input and output 
encoding systems and the set of correct letter-phoneme mappings in the training set. The 
units used to encode consonants differed almost entirely from those used to encode vowels. 
NETtaik then merely pulls out the patterns implicit in this encoding. The significance of 
the hidden layer partitions derives, not from the way the network uses its letter-phoneme 
correspondences (it does not use them at all), but from the constraints imposed top-down 
by the researchers. Clancey (1997) describes the problem this way: 
According to Verschure, the real work is in the creation of the 24-feature category system for pronunciation, 
plus the preparation of the 50,000 input-output pairs constituting correct behavior associations. In this 
respect, a parallel-distributed-processing (PDP) machine constitutes a clever hash-coding scheme: The 
person outside represents an item as a vector of features, which are numerically reconfigured for efficient 
storage. (p. 72, italics added) 
Why is this problematic? Because, argue Cliff (1991) and others, a really useful application 
of connectionism can only occur if ANNs are allowed to deal with environmental input on 
their own terms. Most traditional connectionist research merely presents networks with 
ungrounded classical cognitivist symbols, both as input and as desired output, and asks the 
network to plot a mapping between the former and the latter. Connectionism, according to 
Cliff (1991), "has acted merely as a palliative for several of the maladies of symbolism." 
(p. 34). Just as past AI researchers could not find out much about the likely inner workings 
of real agents from simulations that use artificial micro-worlds, connectionist researchers 
cannot be expected to unearth potentially realistic network structures and dynamics by 
having them react to pre-processed input in the form of folk psychology-based symbols. 
Hendriks-Jansen (1996, p. 86) concludes that, while connectionism continues to rely on 
experimenter-supplied symbols for input (and as desired outputs) it will not have moved on 
much further from classical symbolism. 
The Question of Representation 
Central to many discussions in contemporary cognitive science is the question of whether 
or not connectionist systems are symbolic or representational in any interesting sense. By 
and large the majority of modern connectionists seem to believe that non-linear, distributed 
neural nets (see Hanson & Burr, 1990) are systems that trade in a special kind of non-
symbolic representation (Smolensky, 1988). In classical symbol systems, symbols are 
tokens that stand for particular concepts. Typically they are thought of as being atomic 
entities that can be combined with other symbol tokens in a principled way according to 
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their "syntax" (roughly, their physical fonn) that maps directly on to their interpretation or 
semantics: Symbol tokens are thus thought to be context-independent; by this theorists 
mean that every use within a larger symbol structure (e.g., a proposition) of the concept, 
say, coffee uses the same token to represent coffee. Any contextual modification of the 
meaning of the proposition occurs in tenns of the external syntactic relations holding 
between the coffee token and other symbol tokens (e.g., the tokens for old or in a cup). 
Neural nets with superposed, distributed representations are, however, thought of as being 
context-sensitive (Clark, 1993). The idea here is that there does not exist any core physical 
token (say, an activation vector) that corresponds to a particular concept in all particular 
cases. Instead, there exist a number of related activation patterns that stand for such 
contextually-infected things as coffee-contacting-porcelain and coffee-in-a-can. There is 
no way, so the connectionists argue, of assigning particular meanings to individual units or 
unit groups that capture context-free features or microfeatures such that a single token can 
be found that underlies all uses of a certain concept. Instead, there exists a family similarity 
between activation vectors that deal with the same concept in different contexts. In other 
words, we can loosely speak of a variety of activation vectors as meaning a single concept, 
however their underlying differences will make a difference to further 'processing' within 
the network. So, for instance, my representation of coffee (in the can context) will quite 
possibly lead to different outputs compared to my coffee (in a cup context) representation. 
Some critics of connectionism argue that this reveals a fatal flaw in neural network models 
of cognitive activity because only real, atomic, context-independent symbols can be used 
to generate the much vaunted quality of compositionality (systematicity and productivity) 
which underlies such cognitive abilities as language production and comprehension, and 
logic and reasoning (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Macdonald & Macdonald, 1995). 
At any rate, most connectionists understand their networks as being representational in the 
sense that they store some kind of knowledge distributed throughout the network in the 
connection weights. However, there are an increasing number of researchers who do not 
think of neural networks as containing internal representations of environmental entities in 
the patterns of activity across hidden layers (e.g., Edelman, 1987, 1992; Hendriks-Jansen, 
1996; Munsat, 1990; Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b; Wheeler, 1996). 
There are a number of reasons for holding such a belief: 
First, it is possible to claim that a network knows how to, or can enable an agent to, map 
certain features onto certain other features without thinking of the system as an 
environment-modelling device. Many cognitivists are of the opinion that mere 'stimulus-
response' systems are not cognitive because they do not involve complex internal 
transfonnations (e.g., Fodor, 1986). Yet most connectionist networks are just complicated 
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varieties of stimulus-response machines. In fact neural nets are not good candidates for 
sense-model-plan-act systems despite the fact that connectionists often use three layer 
networks with an input layer, output layer, and a hidden. 'central processing layer'. ANNs 
can be fashioned with two layers, a single fully interconnected layer (e.g., Boltzman 
machines), or more than three layers. Recurrent networks, especially artificially evolved, 
continuous time networks (e.g., Beer, 1995a, 1995b; Wheeler, 1996) can become close to 
impossible to model in terms of 'processing stages'. 
The second reason for thinking of neural networks in non-representational terms comes 
from an appreciation of the methods connectionist researchers use to make representational 
statements about their models. The impression that ANNs' hidden layers contain 
representations has been reinforced through the use of a number of statistical techniques 
such as hierarchical cluster analysis, principal components analysis and contribution 
analysis (see Clark, 1993). These techniques summarise the ways in which the networks 
function when they are presented with a variety of test inputs. For instance, hierarchical 
cluster analysis gathers together pairs of similar hidden layer activation patterns; one can 
see from this which inputs are dealt with in similar ways. However, these analyses do not 
capture all of the subtle 'semantic nuances' of neural networks (Clark, 1993, p. 61). As a 
number of writers have claimed (e.g., Churchland, 1989; Smolensky, 1988), a complete 
understanding of how network patterns contribute to behaviour ('output') can only be had 
at the numerical level of weights and unit activation levels (Clark, 1993, p. 62). Clark 
(1993) argues that we need be careful not to think that the likes of cluster analysis provide 
a foolproof method for unearthing anything like traditional representations in the messy 
complexities of network dynamics. "The final call ... is for caution: Connectionism 
reconfigures content in dynamic ways which can often outstrip our attempts to capture it in 
a piece of static, text-like code." (Clark, 1993, p. 67). 
The final reason for being sceptical about representational claims within connectionism 
arises from attempts to use networks within real robots. When networks are embedded in 
robots that move about the world and select their own input, it becomes more important to 
study the covariance of neural dynamics and behaviour than that between the neural 
dynamics and the objective environment (Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992a, 1992b). If anything, 
such analyses can be used in retrospect to work out what a robot is 'seeing' within its 
Umwelt. That is, one can legitimately hypothesise that if a robot behaves in a similar 
fashion in a variety of contexts that it 'sees' those contexts as somehow similar in kind. 
This is a completely different task from working out how a system builds internal re-
presentations of worldly objects from sensory data. In these cases representational analyses 
are just not as useful as alternative analyses (e.g., dynamical ones). 
Embodying and Situating Connectionism 
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Not all connectionist simulations have been constructed as alternative, non-symbolic 
models of the cognitivist mindlbrain. Pfeifer and Verschure (1992a) even argue that 
connectionism is neutral with regard to the broader explanatory framework adopted by the 
theorist. Indeed, many of the successful simulations in the connectionist literature involve 
analyses of skilful, sensorimotor activities (basic cognition) rather than compositional, 
high-level ones (advanced cognition). Networks have been used to explore such basic sorts 
of skills as face recognition, handwriting recognition (signatures, addresses on mail), visual 
processing, and motor control (see Clark, 1997). Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991, chap. 5) 
and Rowlands (1999, chap. 7) argue that connectionism provides a fertile framework for 
understanding instances of, what Ryle (1949) referred to as knowing how. This is the kind 
of knowing involved in riding a bicycle, or playing tennis, or even carrying out 
experiments. It is skilful or procedural knowing145 as opposed to knowing that or 
declarative knowing. Bechtel (1997; see also Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991) has even 
argued that our ability to engage in formal logic is better understood as an instance of 
knowing how to use external rules and symbols. He has even constructed a simplified 
connectionist network that learns, succeeds, and fails in formal logic exercises in much the 
same way as his undergraduate students do. 
Yet, despite there being suggestive resonances III the literature, much connectionist 
research has failed to model cognitive activity in a realistic manner. Clark (1997) notes that 
connectionism's 
ability to illuminate biological cognition depends not just on using a processing style that is at least roughly 
reminiscent of real neural systems but also on deploying such resources in a biologically realistic manner. 
Highly artificial choices of input and output representations and poor choices of problem domains have, I 
believe, robbed the neural network revolution of some of its initial momentum. (p. 58) 
He argues that much connectionist research has "leaned too heavily on a rather classical 
conception of the nature of the problems ... " (p. 58) by concentrating efforts on modelling 
isolated cognitive abilities, such as producing the past tense of verbs, often using arbitrary 
artificial codings of the relevant stimuli. Clark suggests connectionism would be better 
145 I use the terms procedural knowledge and knowing how interchangeably. It should be noted, however, 
that both Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) and Rowlands (1999) state that the notion of procedural 
knowledge is traditionally used by theorists who model knowing how as being realised by condition-action 
rules (e.g., Anderson, 2000). This, then, situates knowing how in the traditional physical symbol system 
paradigm and thus stands in opposition to connectionism. I follow Bechtel, Abrahamsen, Rowlands, and, 
indeed, Ryle, in believing that this gets things the wrong way around; Imowing how is primary and Imowing 
that is derivative. Or, to put it less opaquely, our high-level cognitive abilities are grounded in our basic 
sensory-motor skills which are underpinned by dynamical/connectionist-like principles rather than 
! ... 
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served by embedding networks in realistic settings where real-world input is used in the 
production of realistic actions as, for example, Pfeifer & Verschure (1992a, 1992b) and 
Almassy et al. (1998) do. 
What an ESD version of connectionism, as a model of the regulatory, coordinative, and 
integrative nervous system, requires is, firstly, the use of real input in a realistic manner 
and, secondly, a coupling with a body and an environment so that it plays a partial role in 
the generation of behaviour. Fortunately, there exists some connectionist research which 
shows promise in dealing with these issues. I will illustrate connectionism's potential as a 
model of these factors by mentioning a couple of suggestive simulations. The first example 
comes from the work of Pfeifer and Verschure (1992a, 1992b) with their situated robot 
Lola. Lola learns how to 'visually' navigate its real-world environment in real time based 
on feedback from collisions. The second example, from the work of Beer and Gallagher 
(1992; Beer, 1995a, 1995b), shows how a connectionist 'nervous system' serves as a 
controller for the movement of parts of an agent's body without necessarily' containing' all 
of the knowledge necessary for enabling the movements. 
Real Input: Pfeifer and Verschure's Distributed Adaptive Control 
Approach 
The 'real input' criterion demands that: 
1. The neural net be able to deal with continuous real-time input from the environment 
rather than merely ordinal sequences of input. 
2. The input must originate from sensors that transduce changes in the gradients of some 
'environmental array' rather than being abstracted, symbolic descriptions created by an 
experimenter (i.e., this is essentially Cliffs [1991] designed ontology objection). 
3. Furthermore, this input needs to be a product of an agent's self-directed activity in its 
environment rather than a series of experimenter-controlled stimuli presentations. 
4. And, consequently, learning and behaviour-production must occur simultaneously 
rather than in two distinct phases. 
Pfeifer and Verschure (1992a, 1992b) have attempted to address these issues by 
constructing a mobile navigating robot that they call Lola. Lola is an example of an 
approach to using neural nets that they refer to as Distributed Adaptive Control. They 
argue that we will only produce useful behavioural models with neural networks if they are 
embodied (control some sort of 'body system') and operate in an environment where input 
symbolic/computational ones. Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), and Glenberg (1997) have begun to try and 
elucidate this sort of idea. 
242 
IS selected by the system itself (see also Parisi, 1997). More specifically, distributed 
adaptive control requires that the modeller use the following strategy (Pfeifer & Verschure, 
1992a, 1992b; see also Hendriks-Jansen, 1996): 
1. Characterise the robot's sensors and effectors and the nature of the environment in 
which it is going to operate (what objects inhabit it, how they are laid out, etc.). Lola 
possesses a collision detector, a target detector, a range finder, and a simple wheel-
based motor system146. It was designed to work in an office-like, enclosed environment 
containing walls and a number of objects and apertures. 
2. Define a value scheme for the robot. A value scheme is a set of basic hard-wired. 
('innate') sense-act reflexes that the robot possesses for achieving basic survival in its 
environment (rather like the most basic behaviour layer in Brooks' robots). Lola had 
three basic kinds of reflex in its value scheme: 'retract and turn in another direction 
after a collision', 'whenever a target is detected move toward it', and 'move straight 
ahead'. 
3. Define the network architecture and the learning mechanisms that can implement the 
value scheme and provide a basis for modifying behaviour. Lola consists of a sensory 
input layer (range-finder input), an avoidance layer (the collision detector inputs to this 
layer), an approach layer (the target detector inputs to this layer), and a motor output 
layer (whose activity is determined by input from the previous layers and controls the 
steering and speed of the robot's motors). The layers are interconnected such that a 
modified Hebbian learning mechanism147 can modify the weightings between the 
sensory layer and the approach and avoidance layers. This implements a kind of 
classical conditioning between the 'visual' readings of the rangefinder (conditioned 
stimuli) and the detection of collisions and targets (unconditioned stimuli) and the 
hard-wired unconditioned responses that constitute the value scheme. 
4. Let the robot interact with its environment and analyse the resulting behaviour. Pfeifer 
and Verschure have analysed Lola operating in environments with and without targets. 
In all cases the robot developed the ability to rapidly visually anticipate collisions so 
that it navigated its environment without bumping into things. That is, the robot did not 
146 Lola began life as a simulation in a modelled realistic-physics environment. Thus the sensors and 
effectors, although modelled realistically, did not correspond to any specific kind of machinery. Lola's 
neural network was subsequently successfully exported to a wheeled robot that used unreliable infrared 
sensors. Strictly speaking only the real robot is called Lola. 
147 This mechanism incorporates an active decay function that enables 'learning' to occur continuously, but 
that leads to equilibrium behaviour in a stable environment. Learning need never be turned off in such a 
system (Pfeifer & Verschure, 1992b, pp. 26-27). 
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just learn to associate a rangefinder state with a collision state, but rather learnt 
rangefinder states that correlated with collision avoidance. It also learnt to back out of 
comers without hitting anything and follow walls (in a similar manner to Mataric's 
[1991] robot Toto) while searching for a target that was placed behind a hole in a wall. 
The robot learnt behaviours that were dependent upon the kind of environments it was 
placed in (context-relative learning) and on the structure of its own particular 
movement patterns. This meant that network patterns were not simply a function of 
what was in the environment, but of what the robot did in that environment (which was 
a function of its body structure, sensor and effector characteristics, and value-scheme 
reactions) over the course of its learning history. 
In sum, with the distributed adaptive control approach, it is the robot itself (via its basic 
sensori-motor value scheme) that 'pairs up' input activations with output motor commands. 
The nature of the internal activation patterns cannot be anticipated by the researchers 
because they do not know how the robot will 'decide' to cope with its environment (or 
even if it will cope). Network activation spaces for such robots are personalised (relative to 
the machine's particular history of interactions - the robot in effect 'chooses' its input from 
one moment to the next), embodied (in the loose sense of being dependent on the nature of 
the sensors, actuators, and body structure of the mobot - a bigger robot will, for instance, 
have a larger 'personal space' than a smaller one and will thus need to react at different 
distances from objects to successfully avoid them), and situated (dependent on the kind of 
environment in which the robot learns). In fact, the weighting systems in even simple 
robots like Lola are likely to be idiosyncratic, that is, not 'decodable' in terms of their 
contribution to behaviour without a full understanding of the robot's history, body-
structure, and environment structure. The sorts of analyses that are used in simple 
feedforward and recurrent networks (e.g., hierarchical cluster analysis, principal 
components analysis, and contribution analysis) will probably be inadequate for 
partitioning the hidden layers so that claims about internal representations can be made. 
One can analyse network dynamics in terms of how they correlate with activity (although 
this will change as learning proceeds), but this is a far cry from capturing some kind of 
permanent database of knowledge representations within the system which is used for 
recognising objects and planning action. 
Thus . Pfeifer and V erschure' s distributed adaptive control simulations show how 
connectionist networks can be used to control an embodied and situated agent that utilises 
real input to produce adaptive behaviour. Their research also shows that the specific 
dynamics of a neural network, as a body regulator and coordinator, depend upon the nature 
ofthe robot's body (sensors, effectors, etc.). It, in effect, depends upon the 'processing' of 
environmental information given to it by the body-in-action. This observation is clearly 
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seen in the dynamical analyses perfonned by Beer and Gallagher on their connectionist leg 
controllers. 
Partial Structure: Beer and Gallagher's Leg Movement Controllers 
Although robot walking is probably not what most of us would think of as a cognitive 
activity, research into legged movement provides us with some nice examples of the ways 
bodies and environments cooperate with neural control systems to produce molar 
behaviour. Keijzer (1997, pp. 122-25) discusses work by the robotics researcher Raibert 
(1986, 1990; see also Hodgins & Raibert, 1991; Raibert & Hodgins, 1992, 1993 all cited in 
Keijzer, 1997) that gives a concrete illustration ofthese ideas. In particular he focuses on a 
one-legged robot (that, Keijzer calls 'Hop') that moves by hopping on a single 
compressible leg. Hop's leg is a bit like a shock-absorber in that it shortens when the robot 
impacts with the ground. This causes the air within the leg to compress and provide a 
means for propelling Hop upward in the next movement. The robot's control structure 
controls the direction in which the leg points when it hits the ground (via hydraulic 
actuators that control the position of the 'main body' with respect to the leg). This torso-
relative-to-leg movement is used to balance the robot so it does not fall over and to tip the 
whole machine so that it moves in a certain direction. However, the control system "excites 
and modulates the bouncing motion, but does not specify the details of the trajectory ... " 
(Keijzer, 1997, p. 124) as occurs in classically designed robots. "Hop's control mechanism 
uses the dynamic interaction between the springy mechanical system and the control to 
generate motion" (pp. 124-125). Keijzer argues that Hop, and Raibert's other robots, 
provide support for the idea that body systems and neural control systems work as equal 
partners in the production of behaviour: 
Instead of thinking about a nervous system or a control system as a center for commands to be executed by 
actuators, the body and the environment are taken as a system with its own dynamic characteristics~ The pre-
existing dynamics of the body and the environment are only modulated by the controlling system, not really 
controlled. Raibert and Hodgins state: "We believe that the mechanical system has a mind of its own, 
governed by the physical structure and the laws of physics. Rather than issuing commands, the nervous 
system can only make 'suggestions' which are reconciled with the physics of the system and the task" 
(Raibert & Hodgins, 1993, p. 350). (Keijzer, 1997, p. 125) 
It is just this sort of neural 'suggestion-making' can be seen at work in Beer and 
Gallagher's (1992; Beer, 1995a, 1995b) connectionist leg controllers. They have 
'designed' a number of artificial neural network controllers for a simulated hexapedal 
robot. The impetus for this work was the creation of controllers for robot's such as Brooks' 
Genghis, Hannibal and Attila (Brooks, 1991b). 
The robot body-design used by Beer and Gallagher consists of six rigid legs, each with a 
foot that can move up and down. Each leg is driven by three motor effectors, one ,- . 
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controlling clockwise torque, one anti-clockwise torque, and the other the state of the foot. 
When the foot is in the down position (presumably touching the ground) forces generated 
by the effectors move the robot (forward or backward depending on which way the leg is 
swinging). When the foot is up the motors swing the leg through the air (again forward or 
backward depending on which effector is active). Each leg is controlled by a small, fully-
interconnected (continuous time, recurrent), neural network of five units. Three units are 
dedicated to driving the three effectors. The other two 'interneuron' units have no pre-
assigned role. Each unit receives input from a sensor that measures the angle of the leg 
with respect to the robot's body. All six leg sub-networks are wired together to form a 
complete 30 unit movement network (see Beer, 1995a, pp. 186-189). 
The goal of the simulations was to evolve a robot that moved forward in a robust manner 
(had an average forward velocity of greater than zero). This was, in effect, the 'selection 
pressure' that acted on the evolved networks. The weights, biases, and constants of the 
networks were artificially evolved using genetic algorithms (see Beer, 1995a, pp. 189-192 
for more detail on the algorithms used and the gradual developments observed). 
Eleven successful networks were evolved under three different sensory-input conditions: 1) 
input always available, 2) input never available, and 3) input available half ofthe time (the 
unreliable input condition). All of the successful networks exhibited the tripod gait typical 
of real, fast walking, six legged insects148 . However the characteristics of the networks 
evolved in the different conditions differed in important ways. 
Beer (1995b) refers to the networks that evolved in the 'always available' condition as 
reflexive pattern generators because they rely upon the sensory input about the state of the 
leg (its angle) in order to drive the dynamics of the leg network. When sensory feedback 
about leg angle was cut from these networks the robot would cease moving. Interestingly, 
because these networks were sensitive to leg angle changes, the simulated robot could 
adaptively modulate its behaviour to changes in terrain and changes in the morphology of 
the leg (e.g., shortening or lengthening of the leg). Evolution under the 'never available' 
condition resulted in the production of central pattern generators - networks that produced 
a toy-like, stereotypical movement pattern that was insensitive to changes in terrain and 
changes in leg morphology. When input was intermittent (the '50% available' condition) 
the networks produced generated a compromise solution where stereotyped movement was 
produced in the absence of sensory feedback and more robust and situation-sensitive 
movement was produced when input was available. 
148 Only a tripod gait will adequately support an insect in a balanced state. The creature's centre of mass 
must lie within the polygon formed by the supporting feet (see Beer, 1995a, p. 187, fig. 4). 
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The cases of the reflexive and mixed pattern generators are interesting because they 
provide illustrations of the ways in which the body can be understood to contribute an 
essential component of the movement control system. In an important sense these neural 
networks do not provide the entire mechanism necessary for the production of robust 
forward movement. These networks are akin to the partial, internal control structures found 
in Hop noted above. Beer and Gallagher's reflexive pattern generators rely on a control 
loop that includes the leg to complete the movement control structure. This is most clearly 
seen when one views the neural net activity from a dynamical systems perspective. Beer 
(1995a, 1995b) plots the dynamics of a single leg control structure in a three dimensional 
phase space. The values of each dimension correspond to the activation levels of each of 
the motor output units. He shows how one of the reflexive networks exhibits six different 
attractor dynamics dependent on the position (and direction of movement) of the leg (the 
control parameter). In effect these are six different phase portraits. They differ because of 
the changing influence of the control parameter. In simple terms we can say that the 
network 'does not know what to do' unless the bodily dynamics to which it is coupled 
continuously changes in a particular orderly manner. Without influence from the body, the 
leg movement will arrest at a particular point (a point attractor in the phase portrait) rather 
than exhibit the desired periodic trajectory (a limit cycle in the portrait). 
The reflexive pattern generator examples are enlightening but it is likely, as Beer notes, 
that real animals (and robust robots) evolve in something like the noisy-sensor condition 
and thus possess something like the mixed pattern generators. This may seem like an 
opportunity to argue that, in real-life examples, the control system can be fruitfully thought 
of as at least partially unembodied and unsituated. On closer examination, however, it is 
clear that the significant behaviour produced by the network-leg system cannot be 
understood in this way. Recall that the mixed pattern generators work better when coupled 
with the body. One can think of this as the primary mode of operation - the 'no input' 
ability to produce stereotyped behaviour can be viewed as a kind of emergency backup (a 
bit like our ability to be able to briefly continue navigating through a room after the lights 
go out). Mixed pattern generators are, perhaps, simply failsafe reflexive pattern generators. 
In sum then, what the leg controller example illustrates is that: 
1. Body states can contribute 'input' to a control network such that when those body 
states become decoupled from the network the control system's performance degrades 
or even fails. 
2. Thus the body (particular bodily states) in effect becomes part of the overall control 
system. The networks do not 'contain' the entire behaviour-generating mechanism. 
One could argue that failure in such a decoupling scenario is simply due to lack of 
adequate input for the network. In a sense this is correct. But the traditional cognitivist 
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vision is that input simply provides values for a fixed set of variables in internal 
programs. The command and control structure is largely fixed in place in the head 
waiting to be 'stimulated' (or have its parameters set) as theorists such as Chomsky 
(e.g., 1980) are fond of pointing out. And, according to this story, clever researchers 
should be able to unpack these internal control programs such that they can give us a 
good idea of the structure of the behavioural activities that they control. 
The dynamical systems perspective, however, shows us that the 'input' that derives 
from bodily dynamics actually changes the whole nature and structure of the 'internal 
programs' and not just the values of variables (see Kelso [1995] on the idea that 
learning changes the dynamics of the entire learning system). On this reading it is 
probably going to be impossible to pin down an internal structure as the controller of 
the fine details of a behaviour149• 
3. It stands to reason, then, that evolution (in this case artificial evolution) selects for 
body-network couplings rather than independent, 'full-control' network architectures. 
Beer argues as much when he writes: 
In a dynamical approach to situated action, an agent's nervous system, its body and its environment are 
viewed as coupled dynamical systems. Given that bodies and nervous systems co-evolve with their 
environments, and only the behavior of complete animals is subjected to selection, the need for such a 
tightly coupled perspective is hardly surprising. Here the focus is on continuously engaging an 
environment with a body so as to stabilize appropriate coordinated patterns of behavior rather than the 
sequential sense-think-act processing cycle typical of computational approaches. (Beer, 2000, p. 11) 
Minimally Cognitive Behaviour and the Scope of Connectionism within an Interactionist 
Approach 
Examples of the use of connectionist networks within an embodied approach and in 
artificial life research (Parisi, 1997) are currently largely confined to modelling sensory-
motor control systems and skills. Recently Beer and his colleagues have extended these 
ideas to the simulation of, what they call, minimally cognitive behaviour (Beer, 2000; 
Slocum, Downey, & Beer, 2000). They have artificially evolved continuous time recurrent 
network controllers for simple agents that can perceive whether or not an aperture is large 
enough to fit through, discriminate between their own 'body parts' and objects in the 
environment, successfully 'catch' a horizontally or diagonally falling object when only 
seen for a brief period at the beginning of its trajectory, and attend selectively to objects in 
149 Here is a toy example: Assume there exists an 'inner program' for determining greetings. The program 
has a single variable NAME which is filled by the input corresponding to the person you are tallcing to. The 
program is SAY "Hello, how are you NAME?". In a dynamical systems approach the 'input' might change 
the whole program from one dealing with greetings to one dealing with requests. 
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their environment so that two objects falling at different speeds can both be caught. In all 
these cases the agents are simulated and their environments are less than realistic. 
Nonetheless, they provide us with a glimpse of the ways in which a regulatory/coordinative 
nervous system may couple with body morphology and environment structure in the 
generation of adaptive behaviour. Although it is far too early to expect to have evidence for 
such systems being capable of modelling advanced cognitive abilities such as formal 
reasoning, it is worth asking whether it is likely that high-level cognition can be achieved 
by building bigger, more complex embodied networks? And it appears that there are good 
reasons why this is probably not going to be the case. It is to these issues that we now tum. 
The Limits of Connectionism 
Artificial neural networks are ideally suited to simulating skilful sensorimotor processes 
where long periods of training lead to gradual increases in the ability to coordinate 
behaviours and perceived events (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991, chap. 5). This capability 
should not be underestimated, for it lies at the very foundation of many of the skills 
exhibited by most animals, including humans. ANN simulations nicely capture the fact that 
these basic cognitive skills, as I shall call them, are not just knee jerk type reflexes but 
subtly coordinated responses to aspects of the environment which are discriminatory 
(modulated by variations in the intensity andlor shape of the stimulus), learnt and 
modulated by experience (have a 'procedural memory' component), deployed relative to 
the animal's state (sickness, emotion, motivation, hunger, etc.), and potentially 
anticipative. 
Thus connectionist ideas seem to get us some basic time-space distancing without having 
to endorse a representational (or at least symbolic) approach to cognition. It seems that 
embodied ANNs enable us to make contact with the past (via implicit procedural memory 
embodied in the network's ability to 'learn from experience'), look some way into the 
future via anticipating future stimulus patterns, and reach into the perceivable present (via 
sensory systems), and the nonperceivable present (via synchronic pattern completion). In 
sum, ANNs seem to give us a mechanism for at least modelling situated, context-sensitive 
cognition. 
Moreover, the weaknesses of ANNs seem to incorporate features which are familiar to us 
when we learn procedural skills. Like us, ANNs are slow learners, requiring many practice 
trials to perfect our skills 150. And like us ANNs can suffer from 'crosstalk' where "similar 
150 Although it is arguable whether people and other animals need quite as many learning trials as the 
average neural network does. Of course, most ANNs typically start their training from a state of complete 
'ignorance' (randomly set initial weights) and have no internal guiding system (a value system or norm 
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encodings can interfere with one another (much as when we learn a new phone number 
similar to one we already know and immediately muddle them up, thus forgetting both)." 
(Clark, 1997, p. 60). The weaknesses of ANNs are also illuminating in at least one 
neurobiological way - they work best when they deal with small sets of domain-specific 
data. Too much variance in the kinds of input-output pairings limits ANNs' ability to learn. 
Instead ANNs seem to lend themselves to a kind of modular architecture where a collection 
of specialised systems are wired together by low-bandwidth connections (see Elman et a1., 
1996). And finally ANNs, like humans, seem to have real difficulty dealing with logical, 
compositional domains such as language (speech production and comprehension), off-line 
problem solving and reasoning, and 'displaced' creativity. Like humans, ANNs are good at 
frisbee but bad at logic (Clark, 1997). 
However, although humans may be better at frisbee than logic, at least they can do logic 
when adequately trained. Neural nets, it seems, are fundamentally hamstrung when it 
comes to decomposing what they know (what they are able to do) into different bits of 
knowledge so that they can be recombined, substituted, or modified. Because neural 
networks are essentially holistic pattern mappers, they have no access to components of 
their knowledge and thus cannot engage in any cognitive activity which is fundamentally 
compositional in nature. This fundamental limitation of connectionism is discussed in two 
different, but related, ways: 
The first problem with ANNs is that they do not seem to be able to embody an explicit 
syntax for ordering the knowledge components stored in the network. Because the 
knowledge stored in ANNs is context-sensitive rather than atomic in nature, they cannot 
distinguish the order or layout of stored knowledge components in such a way that they can 
be reordered or recombined in a logical manner that can support inference, systematicity, 
or productivity. Even simplified localised networks that have knowledge components 
mapped on to individual units face this problem, because the networks do not possess any 
principled (syntactic) method for ordering the knowledge components. Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (1991) give an example based on the sorts of criticisms offered by Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988): 
[1]f A&B and A are two nodes in a network, the weight of the connection from A&B to A can be set such 
that activating A&B results in (causes) the activation of A. This could be viewed as a kind of inference, but 
the representation of A is not in any way part of the representation of A&B. Any two nodes could be wired to 
have the same pattern of influence, for example, A&B might excite node Z. Clearly, then, the connection is 
not compositional in nature, and the inference does not go through in virtue of the syntactic relation between 
the nodes. (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991, p. 212) 
matrix). Pfeifer and Verschure's (1992a, 1992b) show that by having a hard-wired value system learning can 
occur relatively quickly. 
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Efforts to augment ANNs by including a set of 'relation units' that assign roles to the 
different knowledge component structures do not seem to provide a satisfactory solution to 
the problem (for a connectionist at any rate), because ultimately such measures result in the 
connectionist constructing a neural network implementation of a classical symbol system 
(see Pinker's [1997, pp. 118-122] discussion of Hinton's [1981] proposition network). 
Thus, those who argue that language and/or thought require a compositional (systematic 
and generative) architecture (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988) have 
reason to believe that connectionism will not suffice as a description of the substrate of 
cognition. I shall not address these problems directly here, but instead direct the reader to 
Bechtel (1993b, 1996), Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), and Rowlands (1999) for 
thoughts on how neural networks may be able to model linguistic skill without succumbing 
to the charge of merely implementing a classical symbolic model. 
The second problem derives from the implicit nature of the knowledge that is 'stored' 
within neural networks. Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) argue that current 'first-order 
connectionist systems' are nice candidates for explaining the basic implicit levels of 
cognitive functioning found in humans, but they cannot account for the sorts of higher 
cognitive activity exhibited by people who seem to use more explicit 'representations' of 
knowledge - that is, knowledge that can be prised out of the internal milieu and to some 
extent examined by the neural net/person and used in different ways. Among the various 
skills endowed by being able to extract 'knowledge components' Clark and Karmiloff-
Smith include: 1) example-independent knowledge of rules, 2) coping with systematic 
changes to the structure of the rules governing a domain, 3) intelligent self-debugging 
without full scale retraining, and 4) integration of activities with those of other subsystems 
operating on data included in different formats. Let's look at each of these skills in tum. 
Example-independent Knowledge of Rules 
Neural networks cannot, and do not, construct an activity pattern that actually represents a 
generalisation or rule. Rather, such 'rules' emerge from the total dynamics of the network. 
There exists no way to extract such a rule so that it can be explicitly used. That is, unlike 
neural networks, in people "[t]he generalisation, insofar as it would constitute information 
for the system, constitutes a piece of knowledge over and above the ability to judge each 
individual case correctly." (Chlrk & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, p. 494). 
Coping with Systematic Changes to the Structure of the Rules Governing a Domain 
Thus, we cannot isolate part of a rule system realised by a neural net and replace it with a 
new component so that a new rule is implemented. For instance, a neural network that 
produces pattern transformations that respect Ohm's law (V=CxR) cannot simply replace 
part of its knowledge so that it can implement V=C+R (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993, 
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pp. 491-492). Only a complete retraining of the net from scratch can bring about such a 
change. 
Intelligent Self-debugging without Full Scale Retraining 
Similarly, a network cannot improve its performance by isolating a problematic knowledge 
component so that it can be retrained in isolation from the rest of the adequately 
functioning network. Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) illustrate the ability to self-debug 
with a golfing example: "a golfer whose game suddenly deteriorates may isolate the cause 
of the trouble as the wrist component of the swing. This enables her to take focused action; 
instead ofleaming the whole swing anew, she can keep most of it intact and concentrate on 
the source of the trouble. Such a focus is not possible for a first-order connectionist system 
in which all its knowledge is inextricably intertwined and no control structures exist of 
capable of un picking parts of the web while preserving others." (Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 
1993, p. 492). 
Integration of Activities with those of Other Subsystems Operating on Data Included in 
Different Formats 
The intuition Clark and Karmiloff-Smith express here is that one cannot transfer 
'knowledge' that is distributed throughout an entire, perhaps idiosyncratic, network to 
another network (as may be the case for knowledge transfer between modules or people). 
What is needed is a symbolic summary of the knowledge that can be transmitted and that 
can then be used to reformat the receiving network so that it can intemalise that 
knowledge. 
They thus conclude that because currently existing connectionist systems are 1) example 
driven (they exhibit no rule-based or 'insightful' knowledge changes), 2) possess purely 
emergent knowledge (rules do not depend upon symbolic expressions that stand for 
elements of the rule), and 3) they have no self-generated means of analysing their own 
activity, that they are too inflexible to account for genuine thought. As they say, "[n]o 
system in which rules are always merely implicit and emergent can, in our view, exhibit 
the kinds of higher-order flexibility and creativity found in humans. Only explicit rules 
have the genuine, systematically manipulable components that make radical flexibility 
possible." (p. 504) 
They put this claim to the test by rehearsing findings from Karmiloff-Smith's 
developmental research (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, 1994). Karmiloff-Smith and her 
colleagues have conducted a good deal of research that analyses trends in the development 
of a wide range of cognitive abilities including aspects of language and drawing. She 
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perceIves a common pattern in these developmental sequences151 . Early on children's 
cognitive skills are 'data-driven' by the external environment and realised by holistic 
procedural knowledge. They appear to have an implicit understanding of the task and 
cannot rearrange or utilise components of their knowledge. Such an inability mirrors the 
limitations of first-order connectionist systems. As children (but significantly, not other 
animals [Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, p. 694]) achieve a high level of competence at this 
implicit level (Level I), they begin to transcend their knowledge-use limitations152. 
Karmiloff-Smith argues that there has been a reorganisation of the cognitive system and 
the implicit representations of knowledge have been redescribed in a more explicit format 
(Level E1). Karmiloff-Smith suggests that there exists a variety of levels of explicitness of 
representational redescription. Level E 1 is revealed in the componential nature of the 
behaviour itself though the child is not aware of, or able to, express the ability. In her 
words: 
The redescriptions are abstractions and, unlike level-I representations, they are not bracketed (that is, the 
component parts are now open to potential intradomain and interdomain representational links). The E1 
representations are reduced descriptions that lose many of the details of the procedurally encoded 
information. ... Once knowledge previously embedded in procedures is explicitly defmed, the potential 
relationships between procedural components can then be marked and represented internally. Moreover, 
once redescription has taken place and explicit representations become manipulable, children can introduce 
violations to their data-driven, veridical descriptions of the world - violations which allow, for instance, for 
pretend play, false belief, and the use of counterfactuals. (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994, pp. 700-701) 
Beyond E1 children's knowledge becomes more explicit and thus more flexible and 
manipulable. At level E2 children are supposed to have conscious, but not verbal, access to 
knowledge components. At level E3 knowledge elements become verbally explicit as well 
as enabling children to pass their knowledge components to each other. Karmiloff-Smith 
(1994, p. 701) admits that she generally treats levels E2 and E3 together because at that 
time she had not yet researched the distinction. A couple of concrete examples help to see 
what Karmiloff-Smith has in mind in laying out her representational redescription theory. 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) suggest that one example of representational 
redescription can be seen in children's understanding ofthe term word. Under their reading 
151 As Karmiloff-Smith forcefully points out, the pattern is repeated in all of these developing skills. 
However the pattern unfolds independently for each particular domain often at quite different ages. Thus, 
Karmiloff-Smith's domain specific approach is formulated in opposition to the domain-general framework of 
Piagetian theory. See Nelson (1996) for a moderate domain-general critique ofKarmiloff-Smith. 
152 Karmiloff-Smith (1992, 1994) points out that the increasing explicitness of children's knowledge is not 
driven by the failure or lack of success of implicit strategies, but rather by achieving a behavioural mastery 
at the implicit level. 
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children initially have an implicit understanding of what a word is and this is evidenced by 
the fact that they can produce and comprehend words in a compositional manner. As they 
grow older this implicit understanding is representationally redescribed so that they can 
come to express this knowledge153 • Karmiloff-Smith and her colleagues asked children 
between 3 and 7 years of age to engage in two different tasks. All of the children could 
produce multi-word sentences containing open- (roughly nouns, verbs, adjectives) and 
closed-classed (prepositions, articles, etc.) words. In the first task the experimenter read a 
story and occasionally paused mid sentence, whereupon the child was asked to repeat the 
last word that had been uttered. In the second task a number of open- and closed-class 
words were orally presented to the children and they were asked to say whether they were 
words or not. Three to 4.5 year olds could not do either task. Four and a half to 5 year olds 
could do the first task but not the second task. Usually children who failed the second task 
did not identify closed-class words as being words. Five to 7 year olds could do both tasks. 
Karmiloff-Smith takes these results to be supportive of the idea that at 4.5 to 5 years and 5 
to 7 years the implicit knowledge (level I) about wordhood is representationally 
redescribed. That is, word knowledge is made more accessible and useable by the child for 
other kinds of activities besides the ones in which the distinctions were originally acquired. 
So the 4.5 to 5 year olds had redescribed their knowledge of what constitutes a word to an 
E1 level (that is they could extract information signalling whether a structure is a word 
within a partially on-line task) and that 5 to 7 year olds' cognitive systems had 
representationally redescribed their knowledge at a higher, more explicit, level (E2 or 
higher) where they can be directly questioned about the wordhood of different symbolic 
structures. 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) has shown similar increases in children's ability to explicitly 
decompose and reuse originally implicit knowledge in other domains. In one study she 
asked children to draw make-believe people and houses. She found that as children grew 
older they gained more explicit control over the elements in their drawings, being able to 
construct make-believe drawings from separate elements in normal drawings (e.g., putting 
aeroplane wings on a person). Younger children, on the other hand, produced rather 
stereotyped whole-drawings whose make-believe elements involved changes in size or 
153 Olson (1996) argues that people understand word boundaries explicitly only when they become literate. 
He presents several pieces of relevant research to support his claim. I am inclined to think that Olson's claim 
is more likely to be the case than Kanniloff-Smith's purely endogenous representational redescription 
approach. Nonetheless Karmiloff-Smith's experiment nicely illustrates what she means by representational 
redescription. It is also possible that one may want to argue a modified version of the representational 
redescription framework that explicitly includes exogenous factors such as an education within a literate 
culture. 
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shape rather than the juxtaposition of what are usually unrelated elements. In other words, 
younger children seemed to have great difficulty decomposing and reusing elements from 
their more holistic,· interwoven, implicit procedural knowledge. 
Karmiloff-Smith's interpretations of developing behaviours in terms of her 
representational-redescription model have been criticised by some for reading more 
explicit knowledge use into the data/phenomena than is warranted and of focusing too 
much on internal rather than external mechanisms (Bechtel, 1993b; Hendriks-Jansen, 
1996). However, the general claim that Clark and Karmiloff-Smith make still stands. 
ANNs, as currently conceived, do not suffice as mechanisms that can enable advanced 
cognition. The ability to disembed knowledge from the structures that allow our ongoing 
cognitive activity is absolutely crucial to our ability to decouple from the immediate 
environment and think about things 'off-line' (cf. Grush, 1997). Yet there is nothing within 
the basic connectionist architecture itself that seems to endow cognizers with the ability to 
'think off-line', because ANNs are implicit, environmentally embedded, devices rather 
than decoupled self-sufficient simulators. 
Augmenting First-Order Connectionist Networks 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993) suggest a number of ways that ANNs could be 
augmented in order to gain this sort of ability. The first is to give up on connectionism and 
embrace traditional symbolism. Of course, connectionists would be loathe to do this, given 
the acknowledged strengths of the approach. The interactionist is also unlikely to want to 
endorse the classical view, given its problems and anti-interactionist implications. The 
second is to embrace some sort of connectionist/symbolist compromise. Clark and 
Karmiloff-Smith discuss a number of existing hybrid architectures. However, this is no 
good for the ESD interactionist because it gives up the fight for an alternative explanation 
of cognition and also leaves unresolved the problems of cognitivism. The third alternative 
is to adopt some kind of 'second-order' connectionist solution. Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 
discuss Chalmers' (1990) use ofthe RAAM architecture (Pollack, 1990) which compresses 
activity patterns and passes it on to a second neural network that transforms the 
compressed data, according to some rule expressed in the dynamics of the second ANN, 
and then decompresses it as a new activity pattern (see also Bechtel, 1996). However, such 
a system still deals in emergent, implicit rules (in the transformation network) which 
cannot be transported or manipulated. Thus, no kind of second-order solution seems to 
currently exist. 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith clearly hope that some sort of second-order connectionist 
network can be created that fulfils all of their flexibility, transportability, and 
manipulability criteria but acknowledge that nothing of the sort currently exists. However, 
even if such a network did exist, what would be achieved is a thoroughly in-the-head 
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system for implementing just the kind of physical symbol system that Fodor, Pylyshyn, and 
other classicists argue must be the case. 
The Appeal to External Symbol Systems 
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith discuss another possible alternative that involves the use of 
external symbol structures (i.e., language and other symbol systems) as an environmental 
scaffold for enabling the advanced cognitive abilities that they seek to explain. However, 
they quickly dismiss this explanatory strategy on the grounds that children seem to exhibit 
explicit representational redescription abilities (level E1) without being able to 
linguistically express, manipulate, and use that knowledge (level E3). A number of 
commentators argue that such a dismissal may be premature (e.g., Bechtel, 1993b; Dennett, 
1993; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). Bechtel (1993b) argues that Karmiloff-Smith's examples do 
not unambiguously demonstrate that representational redescription is actually going on at 
the E1 level. He cleverly recasts each of the developmental changes noted by Karmiloff-
Smith in terms of the "changing interactions between a cognitive system and external 
representations [e.g., utterances of words, drawings] rather than positing a process of 
internal representational redescription and operation upon that." (Bechtel, 1993b, p. 537). 
In each case the puzzle of how a network-like system could cope with the increasing 
'explicitation' of knowledge is accounted for by off-loading the problem onto 
environmental structures which can be inspected by a first-order type system. Bechtel 
(1993b) goes on to say that 
I am concerned that in explaining the behavioral changes Clark and Kanniloff-Smith are constructing an 
excessively mentalistic story which will require a powerful cognitive homunculus that perfonns 
computations upon representations. I agree with them that more than first-order connectionist networks are 
required to explain human cognition, but I am concerned about the nature of what more is posited .... I am 
suspicious of positing within the system the capacity to 'analyze' its own activity, for that seems to introduce 
an analyzer. Once a system has learned to generate and respond to external symbols such as those of natural 
language, then it does not seem problematic to talk of a system constructing an analysis of itself (perhaps 
only in private speech) and responding to it. (pp. 537-538) 
I believe that Bechtel is on the right track here. Embodied and situated neural networks 
should remain as implicit, embedded-in-the-present, pattern mapping systems with the 
ability to pull off the kinds of modest time-space distancing mentioned earlier. After all, 
neural networks (that are implanted in a body, that provide the substrate for a subsumption-
like architecture of behaviour layers, and that realise perceptual instruments, action 
generation processes, and neural control structures) seem to be able to, at least potentially, 
model nearly all of the basic cognitive activity exhibited by non-human animals as well as 
a large and significant amount of human cognition. This is no small accomplishment. 
Human advanced cognitive abilities obviously demand another implementational story. 
Instead of trying to push ANNs to some kind of second-order level that risks reincarnating 
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the problematic classical symbolic vision, it seems sensible to pay close attention to the 
structure of the complex social and symbolic environments in which advanced cognizers 
live. Surely this 'special input' may well playa significant role in supplementing basic 
cognitive abilities so that more radical kinds of time-space distancing are possible -
distancing that involves forays into imagined and hypothetical environments as well as 
altering the way agents relate to the present, future, and the past. It is to these issues that 
we tum in the next chapter. 
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8. From Basic to Advanced Cognition 
The doorway into this virtual world was opened to us alone by the evolution of language, because language 
is not merely a mode of communication, it is also the outward expression of an unusual mode of thought -
symbolic representation. Without symbolization the entire virtual world ... is out of reach: inconceivable 
Terence Deacon (1997, p. 22). 
Introduction 
The autonomous systems framework sketched in the last chapter accounts for, what I have 
called, basic cognitive time-space distancing abilities. Animals are not merely stimulus-
response engines that are driven entirely by the 'projectable properties' in the local 
environment. Most animals are more closely tied to the nuances of their local environments 
than human beings. The objective of this chapter is to say something about what underpins 
this difference. Moreover, my goal is to argue that an interactionist approach can account 
for this difference without succumbing to the need to postulate a subpersonal 
representational explanation. Indeed, I believe that by comparison to the usual cognitivist 
story, interactionism's explanatory conservativism encourages a more sophisticated (and 
unfortunately much more complicated) understanding of how human symbolic cognition 
arises. The interactionist story is necessarily social, cultural, developmental, and 
evolutionary in nature. This radically expands the range of phenomena that need to be 
understood before a deeper understanding of human cognition can be had. 
The Representation Hungry Problem 
Here is the problem. As we have seen, it looks increasingly likely that within a 
sophisticated interactionist framework, we can show how an autonomous system, such as 
an animal or a mobile robot, can act intelligently with respect to things in its local 
environment. Workers in situated robotics have created subsumption architecture-based 
mobile robots that can make their way in real-world environments in a robust, timely, 
adaptive, useful, and intelligent-looking manner, all without the need to construct models 
of the environment or access explicitly laid down goals or plans (Clark & Toribio, 1994; 
Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). These situated mobots work in a distinctly un-cognitivist manner. 
They are sensitive to their surroundings (they 'perceive'), can demonstrate adaptive 
movements in a wide variety of circumstances (they can 'behave rationally'), and can come 
to anticipate events and streamline their actions (they can 'learn from experience'). In sum 
these critters are simple versions of insects like earwigs and other relatively context-bound 
creatures (Kirsh, 1991/1996). 
However we know that many animals, especially many mammals and birds, are capable of 
coordinating their behaviour with elements of the surroundings with which they are not in 
, 
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direct causal contact. I take it as uncontroversial that animals of all kinds are capable of 
incredible time-space distancing (TSD) abilities that deserve to be thought of as cognitive 
abilities. These abilities include the navigational and communicative skills of honey bees, 
the capacious memory abilities of birds like Clark's nutcracker, the complex alliance-
tracking skills of monkeys, and the incredible migration capacity of animals like the arctic 
knot. Animals, it seems, are not merely reactive and situation-bound in a strict sense. In 
light of this fact Kirsh (1991/1996) has argued at length that the possession of non-
representational, situated, subsumption-like architectures may be able to explain the 
behaviour of simple creatures like earwigs but not that of more sophisticated animals such 
as mammals and birds. Kirsh lists a number of phenomena that he believes require a 
conceptual/representational explanation. These include unifying perceptions into 
equivalence classes, making predictions, dealing with things out of perceptual contact, 
understanding things objectively, inference and predication, problem-solving, and 
engaging in creative endeavours. Similarly, as noted in Chapter 1, Clark and Toribio 
(1994) argue that without representation we cannot deal in cognitive abilities where the 
"problem involves reasoning about absent, non-existent, or counterfactual states of affairs" 
or the agent needs "to be selectively sensitive to parameters whose ambient physical 
manifestations are complex and unruly (for example, open endedly disjunctive)." (p. 419). 
More specifically Clark and Toribio argue that we require a representational explanation 
for dealing with: 
1. Situations where there is an obvious absence of an environmental signal necessary for 
'reasoning' about places, events, or individuals that are hidden, spatially distant, or that 
exist only in the past, or in the future. This is essence of what I have called time-space 
distancing. 
2. Situations where behaviour seems to be coordinated with respect to non-existent or 
counter-factual states of affairs. Phenomena such as imagination, misrepresentation, and 
deception fall into this category. 
3. Situations where animals seem to compress or dilate perceivable stimuli in ways which 
do not depend upon perceptual similarity and difference. This is what is usually meant 
by the term conceptual equivalence. 
One could argue that there is no evidence that any non-human animals possess any of these 
capacities in the sense that humans do. For instance, on reviewing the evidence Donald 
(1991, 1998, 1999) argues that even apes - animals that are surely amongst the most 
cognitively sophisticated in the world - inhabit a purely episodic culture which is 
characterised as primarily unreflective, concrete, and situation-bound in nature (see also 
Heyes, 1998; Lock & Colombo, 1996; Nelson, 1996). According to Donald modem apes 
possess a complex event perception ability and an episodic memory that is reliant on 
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situational triggers. Such abilities are evident when, for instance, chimpanzees 'recognise' 
specific individuals, places, events, and actions and can modulate their behaviour 
accordingly. In this sense episodic ability is a powerful kind of procedural skill (Nelson, 
1996) and is thus, at least conceivably, achievable by some kind of advanced, embodied, 
first-order connectionist network. In a discussion of Norman and Shallice's (1986) theory 
of the supervisory attention system Dennett (1998) also points out that non-humans rarely 
exercise the advanced cognitive skills that are supposed to flow from high-powered central 
cognitive mechanisms - skills such as planning, troubleshooting, dealing with novelty, 
dealing with danger, and overcoming habits. Dennett (1998) argues that these skills are not 
reliably available to animals without language even though "[t]here are plenty of familiar 
anecdotes proclaiming that birds and mammals - at least - exhibit these talents on 
occasion." (p. 294). He makes the point that we should be impressed by the fact that 
examples of these skills in animals "recount remarkable and impressive cases" and that 
"[i]n addition to the anecdotes of glory, there is evidence, both experimental and anecdotal, 
oftheir widespread failure to rise to challenges of this sort." (p. 294). 
Despite these observations many animals do seem to be able to adaptively modulate their 
behaviour with regard to aspects of the world with which they do not have causal contact. 
There is an important sense in which many animals strive for 'goals' which involve distant 
places or objects and events (not currently available). These cases of anticipatory 
behaviour (Keijzer, 1997, 1998a) seem to require the postulation of in-the-head 
representations of these non-local entities (models) and plans for obtaining them (what 
Keijzer [1997, 1998a] calls representations that specify what to do). The challenge for a 
non-representational interactionist framework is to account for these kinds of basic time-
space distancing without requiring a subpersonal representational explanation. 
Explaining Basic Cognitive Capacities in Non-humans 
I think that there are at least two ways in which basic long-distance, time-space distancing 
skills can be accounted for in a non-representational interactionist framework. The first 
way is, as was suggested in the previous chapter, to exploit the temporal pattern matching 
powers of recurrent networks (Elman, 1990). If animals incorporate something like the 
kind of neural organisation seen in recurrent networks, that is, a set of context nodes that 
feed activation values from a previous time-step into the current network dynamics, and, if 
it makes sense to think of neural networks as non-representational systems, as I think it 
does, then it is quite possible that we can think of such abilities within a sophisticated basic 
cognitive interactionist framework. 
Secondly, it may well be possible that non-recurrent systems might exhibit temporally-
sensitive behaviour by simply learning about, or evolving mechanisms to deal with, the 
causal contingencies that exist between different parts of relevant environmental events. 
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For instance, as noted in the last chapter, Pfeifer and Verschure's (1992a, 1992b) robot 
Lola, manages to do things that the builders imagined would require memory (i.e., taking 
account of things that are currently not the case), with simple feedforward neural networks. 
In a sense Lola 'sees' the past in the present. 
Keijzer (1997, 1998a) has attempted to make explicit the substance of these ideas in 
arguing that anticipatory behaviour can be explained within an extended interactionist 
framework where large-scale dynamics can be modulated via the control of small-scale 
local dynamics. Keijzer's idea is a complex one and requires an appreciation of dynamical 
systems theoretic concepts. As noted in chapter 4, he argues that organisms capable of 
anticipatory behaviour should be thought of as possessing neurally-realised internal 
control parameters (ICPs) that adaptively perturb behavioural patterns at higher levels of 
organisation. The idea is that the ICP need not contain a detailed context-independent 
content that specifies what an animal should do (i.e., an ICP is not a plan-like 
representation). Rather an ICP is simply a 'trigger' for initiating a reorganisation of 
behavioural dynamics at multiple scales of organisation. 
The neural system modulates short term organism-environment interactions. These short-term interactions in 
tum modulate happenings in the environment on a longer time-scale, and so on. Large-scale order results 
from intrinsic self-organizing tendencies at that scale. This order is manipulated by changing control 
parameters within the microscopy. It is not specified beforehand within the microscopy .... The microscopy 
'uses' the intrinsic order at larger scales to generate the trajectory. (Keijzer, 1997, p. 231). 
The mosquito's blood-finding behaviour provides a simple example. The internal 
mechanisms (ICPs) of the mosquito act only with respect to the local environment (the 
presence of C02) but the 'natural dynamics' of C02 is related to other events on a larger-
scale (i.e., respiration events in animals). By modulating behaviour with respect to local 
events, the mosquito also modulates its behaviour with respect to larger-scale (temporally 
and spatially larger) events. However, there is nothing in the internal mechanism that needs 
to possess a contentful structure that relates to anything about the larger-scale events. That 
is dealt with entirely by the lawful relations that hold between differently scaled 
environmental phenomena. The 'content', if it is anywhere, is distributed across the agent-
environment system154. So Keijzer suggests that animals have evolved regulatory ICP 
networks (neurallbodily subsystems) that enable behavioural modulation over large scales 
by creating local changes which have adaptive long distance consequences: 
154 And, as has been noted in earlier chapters, the notion of content does not really fit such a view. Content 
implies a content holder separate from the thing that the content is about. In the distributed interactionist 
view there is no 'information in the head' just an adaptive capacity for sensitive coordination. 
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[A)nticipatory behavior occurs when a behavioral system is capable of generating regular trajectories, which 
lead to a sufficient macroscopic order. Given a capacity for self-organized behavioral regularities at a short 
time-scale, a regulatory network which modulates a set of control parameters will be able to guide this 
process over longer time-scales in a way that makes it relatively independent of the immediate environment. 
It will enable the system to achieve long-term goals. An extended interactionist account of adaptive behavior 
can thus deal with problems which formerly necessitated representational specifications. (Keijzer, 1997, p. 
234) 
In an important sense Keijzer here challenges the idea that the term situated is synonymous 
with the term stimulus-bound. The latter term implies that behaviour can only be 
coordinated with respect to something with which the agent is currently in direct causal 
contact. Situatedness, on the other hand, refers to being sensitive to (i.e., being able to 
modulate behaviour with respect to) some aspect of the environment and this may be 
possible via the causal consequences of the distant environmental state on more proximal 
parts of the world. So any behaviour that can be cashed out in terms of modulation with 
respect to a sequence of environmental 'clues' and relations (a trackable gradient as 
suggested by Christensen & Hooker [2000, in press]) constitutes a basic cognitive activity. 
Language, Symbolic Skill, and Humans' Radical Time-Space Distancing Ability 
Despite the fact that Keijzer's ICP hypothesis seems a promising way to extend the 
interactionist approach to account for anticipatory behaviours such as long-distance 
migration, temporally extended food searches, and abilities to relocate particular places in 
the environment, it does not tell us the whole story about the powerful time-space 
distancing abilities of human beings. Keijzer happily admits that he has deliberately 
restricted his focus to behaviour (roughly what I have been calling basic cognitive activity) 
rather than high-level cognition. So the ICP hypothesis does not directly tackle the kinds of 
phenomena that cognitive psychologists commonly address - things like reasoning, 
problem-solving, and explicit memory. And it is just these kinds of advanced cognitive 
abilities that seem to cry out for representational explanation. We can get a better grip on 
the contrast between basic and advanced cognitive abilities by briefly examining cognitive 
developmental phenomena. 
Human Cognitive Development 
Many, perhaps most, theories of cognitive development can be understood as portraying 
the child moving through a series of three basic phases of cognitive functioning. The child 
begins as a situated basic cognizer, albeit one embedded in a complex sociocultural 
environment, and then moves through a transitional stage where nascent symbolic abilities 
develop until, about the age of 4 years, they begin to behave in a recognisably advanced 
manner. 
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Basic Cognitive Period 
During the first period of development the infant shows a developing ability to make sense 
of their immediate environment. They develop the kinds of abilities that all animals 
possess for survival in the world. These include the ability to perceive the affordances of 
the surroundings and to act adaptively with regard to what is perceived. Piaget (1970) 
famously characterised this period as a sensorimotor stage of development. He believed 
that the newborn needs to learn the most elementary of skills such as distinguishing self 
from non-self, and learning about the basic physical characteristics of objects, such as 
persistence and substance, by actively exploring themselves and their surroundings. 
However these ideas have not stood up to empirical scrutiny. It has become clear that even 
very young infants seem to be quite well equipped for making sense of the world as a 
three-dimensional place and themselves as actors in it. Other abilities develop quickly such 
as deferred imitation (Meltzoff, 1988; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), tracking objects and 
events through brief displacements (Baillargeon, 1986, 1993; Diamond, 1985, 1988), and 
distinguishing phenomena such as human speech sounds (see Bates, ThaI, & Janowsky, 
1992). Thus many modern developmental theorists have objected to the characterisation of 
the infant as a sensorimotor creature (e.g., Mandler, 1992; Meltzoff & Moore, 1998; 
Spelke, 1998) and claim that infants are actually quite complex innately conceptual agents. 
Infants rapidly develop the capacity to bridge-time (what I have called diachronic pattern 
mapping), to 'remember' from only one or a few experiences, and to recognise an object 
using different modalities (crossmodal integration). These findings have, for instance, led 
Suddendorf (1999) to the cognitivist conclusion that, up until 18 months of age, children 
must be in possession of a 'single updating model of the world' because they do not merely 
feed off the 'projectable properties' available in the local environment (see also Perner, 
1991). Instead they seem to be collecting stimuli into equivalence classes ('concepts') and 
using these in an off-line manner when they track objects and imitate the actions that they 
have seen others perform (Meltzoff & Moore, 1998). However others have argued that 
many of the claims of these, often strongly nativist, representationalist claims about young 
infants' cognitive abilities are not supported by current experimental findings, and that 
infants should be considered to be essentially situated, sensorimotor beings (Fisher & 
Biddell, 1991; Haith, 1998). Rutkowska (1994) has even explicitly argued that infants 
should be thought of as complex kinds of Brooksian mobots - organic machines whose 
behaviour derives from the interaction of three kinds of neural system (perceptual 
processes, behavioural/motor processes, and action programs) that softly assemble 
independent 'reflexes', and the embedding environment (see also Hendriks-Jansen, 1996). 
She believes that infant abilities, including those that exhibit anticipation and expectation, 
can be modelled without needing explicit goals or hierarchical control. For instance, she 
claims that anticipation of an occluded object's trajectory "develops from the 
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concatenation of two initially independent processes: novel attention to the object's kinetic 
occlusion; and turning (necessarily in the direction of its unseen movement) to (re)fixate 
the object." (Rutkowska, 1994, p. 184). 
So infants, among other basic cognizers, perceive patterns that stretch over (usually short) 
spans of space and periods of time. They can enter into a perceptual relationship with an 
event given only small 'cues'. That is, they can 'enter' a pattern at many points and can use 
their exploratory abilities to provide fuller information for more completely specifying the 
nature of the event. They can thus modulate their activity in terms of what they perceive. 
There is no need to postulate internal inferential mechanisms that make use of mental 
representations. What often looks to an observer to be complex, canny, and adaptive 
behaviour that results from a detailed understanding of the layout of the environment (a 
mental model) operated on by a planning system, actually derives from the interaction of 
simple behavioural layers with the structure of the local environment. My claim here is that 
all of the behaviour of nonhumans and of human infants can be explained in terms of such 
non-representational basic cognitive mechanisms, processes, and skills (with the possible 
exception of enculturated apes). 
The Transitional Period 
The second phase of cognitive development is a transitory phase between the first context-
bound phase and the third symbolic and representational phase. Around the age of two 
years children seem to acquire, what Piaget (1951, 1970) referred to as the symbolic 
function (see also Russell, 1996). About this time children begin to develop a number of 
simple abilities which involve an ability to "decouple action from its immediate pragmatic 
function ... " (Nelson, 1996, p. 102). Suddendorf (1999) suggests that this ability for 
"mental detachment from the immediate present" (p. 227) derives from an ability to 
entertain additional models ('interpretations') of the environment to the 'single updating 
model' that they possess from birth (see also Leslie, 1987). This reveals itself in a wide 
variety of new abilities that seem to involve an ability to juxtapose an alternative 
'decoupled' view of a situation (e.g., a desired future state, an expected state, a 
remembered state, etc.) with one's immediate perception of the situation. Thus children of 
this age exhibit 'insight' and planning (juxtaposing a desired goal state with the current 
state of the environment), Piaget's stage 6 object permanence (the capacity to remember 
that an object exists after it is hidden), pretence (the ability to simultaneously 'hold in 
mind' the actual nature of an object, such as a toy, and a representation of what one is 
pretending it to be), the awareness of another's perspective of a situation, and complex 
imitation (the ability for the precise practicing and rehearsal of actions [see also Donald, 
':, ;'--... 
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1998, 1999])155. Although the 'holding in mind two models of the world' account of these 
abilities is popular (e.g., Leslie, 1987; Olson, 1989, 1993; Perner, 1991; Suddendorf, 
1991), it is by no means the only way of understanding these developments. Nelson (1996) 
argues that the ability to decouple does not so much arise from the development of a more 
complex 'neurocognitive architecture', but from learning about the way certain events 
unfold in the child's social world. She speculates, for instance, that parents or older 
siblings jointly construct pretence with children by engaging in activities where familiar 
routines or events can be played out in an out-of-context manner. For example, a parent 
might pretend that stuffed toy animals are going to bite, kiss, or hug the child. From 
experiences like this the child gains the insight that some activities are pretend ones. In a 
sense Nelson argues that children come to understand how, and in what ways, they can 
generalise particular 'real world' activities like bathing, sleeping, and so on to other 
pretend actions (e.g., lying down and pretending to sleep) and objects (e.g., using a doll as 
a prop for a familiar activity). In other words, children learn to 'stretch' the conditions 
under which they will deploy their basic situated activity skills. 
Despite possessing these early off-line skills, children of these ages are still unable to 
engage in adult-like off-line cognizing. Children of between about one and a half and four 
years largely rely upon caregivers to scaffold their skills (Nelson, 1996). Without this help 
these children remain unable to exercise much of an ability to transcend the here-and-now. 
Children younger than four do not have adult-like explicit memories. Memories of past 
episodes do not easily come to mind and the memorial narratives that they produce are 
often fragmentary in nature. They are also often confused about the source of their 
memories. In fact children of this age do not possess a long-lasting narrative-based 
autobiographical memory at all (Fivush & Schwarzmueller, 1998; Nelson, 1993, 1996)156. 
In other words, they do not exhibit the ability to voluntarily and independently 'retrieve' 
even relatively recent life events and episodes. They cannot control their memories in an 
155 Russell (1996) feels that it is important to distinguish the precise and complex ability to imitate that 
emerges at about age two from the more basic deferred imitation exhibited by infants (Meltzoff, 1988; 
Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). He suggests that early deferred imitation might be "described more 
parsimoniously as 'remembering what actions a novel object will afford' ... " and that the more complex 
imitation skills that Piaget (1951) had in mind "were often of the child's imitation of how another person 
behaved (rather than what was done with an object) - such as the imitation of a playmate throwing a temper 
tantrum the previous day. If we mean this by 'deferred imitation' then there are no strong impediments to 
saying it arrives some time in the middle of the second year." (p. 160). 
156 Interestingly the time of onset of autobiographical memory corresponds to the ending of childhood 
amnesia - the inability for adults to remember events that occurred before 3.5 to 4 years of age (Fivush & 
Schwarzmueller, 1998; Howe, 1998; Howe & Courage, 1993, 1997; Meltzoff, 1995; Nelson, 1993, 1996). 
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adult-like fashion157. Similarly these children's categorisation skills are mostly 
perceptually-based rather than hierarchically and logically-based. They do not seem to 
possess the strong compression and dilation skills that Clark and Toribio (1994) argue 
require a representational explanation. 'Transitory children' do not fully appreciate adult 
cultural temporal concepts . (such as before, first, and yesterday). Although many children 
of this age can count, they do not understand what counting is for. Despite having just 
counted all of their toys the pre-four-year-old will not then know how to answer the 
question "How many toys do you have?" (Deheane, 1998; Wynn, 1992). And, perhaps 
most famously, pre-four-year-olds regularly failfalse belief tasks, where the child needs to 
appreciate that another's beliefs (or even their own past beliefs) may differ from their own 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and appearance-reality tasks, where the child does not seem to 
be able to acknowledge that an object can look like one thing but actually be another (e.g., 
a sponge painted to look like a rock) (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986). In all of these cases 
two to four year old children show that they cannot quite fully transcend their basic 
cognitive situation-embeddedness. They do not possess the independent ability to easily 
and voluntarily think off-line, when it comes to dealing with distant and imaginary 
environments, although they show signs of applying their basic cognitive skills to 
situations in new and unusual ways. 
The Early Advanced Cognition Period 
The third phase of development signals the beginning of advanced cognitive activity. 
Somewhere between the ages of three and a half and five years children develop the ability 
to think about the past, the future, the out-of-context, and the imaginary in a reasonably 
adult-like form. This is evidenced in a variety of domains. Children of this age begin to 
develop a long lasting narrative-based autobiographical memory, they can construct fluent 
personal episodic accounts and create short made-up stories. They begin to show evidence 
of using logically-based categories instead of perceptually based ones. They come to 
appreciate cultural and technological notions of time and temporality. They develop a 
sense of self as different from others and a new understanding of the intentional states of 
others emerges. They are able to formulate plans and long term goals for future action, 
recollect specific events in a coherent and explicit manner, make accurate predictions of 
people's behaviour based on what is known about their beliefs, engage in lying and 
157 The Flavells and their co-workers have shown that those I have been calling 'transitory children' 
generally show little in the way of metacognitive sldll. That is, they do not show an awareness of, much less 
a control of, the what adults refer to as the flow of consciousness, inner speech, or imagery. In addition, they 
exhibit little in the way of metamemory skill - the use of deliberate strategies for organising and controlling 
266 
deception, effectively restrain themselves from immediate impulsive action, make sense of 
complex narratives, amongst a variety of skills that require an ability to set a virtual 
situation apart from a real one (Nelson, 1996; Suddendorf, 1999). To be sure these skills 
reach higher levels of sophistication until the age of 10 and beyond, but children of about 
four are recognisably advanced in their cognizing158 . Lying behind all of these skills seems 
to be the basic ability to bracket beliefs and points-of-view from what is or what seems to 
be the case. Children at this stage of development appreciate the power of language as a 
'virtual environment builder' and use this understanding when they comprehend and 
produce utterances. Suddendorf (1999) argues that these abilities derive from an ability to 
metarepresent; to understand representations as representations and to appreciate how 
representations relate to reality: 
With metarepresentation, then, representational relations can be tagged with predicates (e.g. your view; my 
memory), and the individual can now simultaneously entertain several distinct representations of the same 
object or event in reality without running into paradoxical conflicts. '" With metamind the child can 
appreciate representations as representations and can entertain various conflicting representations of the 
same object or event. ... Metamind enables the individual to entertain various ways of looking at the same 
thing - representing what it is, looks like, was, could be, should be, and so on. . .. At times, metamind can 
'wander off, as it were, and entertain a variety of propositions. It is the stage for complex reasoning, 
considering 'what ifl', theorizing, reconstructing the past, and planning the future. Metamind enables the 
cognitive apparatus to function off-line. (Suddendorf, 1999, p. 235, emphasis added) 
Ultimately advanced cognition comes down to the ability to create 'virtual environments' 
that enable a peculiar kind of flexibility - an ability to 'make oneself do things out of 
context' rather than merely be sensitive to the environment (local or distant). One must be 
careful here, however, as it may be the case that behaviours generated by these two 
different 'cognitive systems' may not be empirically distinguishable from each other. 
When simply observing behaviour in an isolated context it is difficult to tell whether the 
activity is being coordinated through the tracking of environmental gradients or via an off-
line use of virtual environments. 
Advanced Cognition and Imagery 
memory such as rehearsal of lists (Flavell, Green, and Flavell, 1993, 1995, 1996; Flavell, Green, Flavell, & 
Grossman, 1997). 
158 Developmental theories often include a later stage of development where formal, theoretic, and logical 
cognition is understood to emerge somewhere around the age of 11 or 12. Piaget (1970) called this phase of 
development the formal operational stage. For a detailed neo-Piagetian theory of the cognitive developments 
in middle childhood see Case (1985). K. Gibson (1996) also provides a summary of neo-Piagetian thinking. 
Both Scheerer (1996) and Olson (1994, 1996) argue that complex human cognition may require literacy. 
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The Recruitment Hypothesis 
I propose th&t we understand advanced cognitive abilities as grounded in a capacity to use 
our basic, situated cognitive abilities in an 'off-line manner'. This is achieved by being 
able to, in a sense, create a kind of virtual environment into which we can plug our basic 
cognitive mechanisms. Moreover, I want to claim that this recruitment ability rests, not on 
a built-in neural emulation machine, but on the way complex social and linguistic 
environments affect our basic cognitive architecture. This does not mean that our brains are 
not well-designed to facilitate the emergence of advanced cognizing. Rather, I want to 
suggest, in true interactionist fashion, that the structure that enforces and enables advanced 
cognitive abilities is situated in the human environment, especially in its social and 
linguistic structures. I will develop my, admittedly speculative, ideas in the following way: 
Humans and other animals are complex basic cognition machines designed to negotiate 
and use local environments often in the service of long distance goals (anticipatory 
behaviour). As I have argued in the previous chapters, the fundamental unit of basic 
cognition is the perception-action cycle and the agent-side component of the cycle is 
largely realised by a regulative, coordinative, and integrative nervous system. I call this the 
basic cognition package. 
Advanced cognition involves the ability to recruit the mechanisms and reuse the abilities of 
the basic cognition package. We see this phenomenon most clearly in mental (visual, 
auditory, and motor) imagery. We already know from imagery research that human beings 
use their basic perception-action abilities, and recruit the neural mechanisms that underpin 
those abilities, in the production of off-line imaging. Imaging can be thought of as an 
ability to entertain realities and possibilities beyond the immediate here and now, or as the 
ability to generate a virtual environment with respect to which we can modulate our 
actions. So it possible to think of advanced cognition as imagery use in a broad sense. 
People are not born with the ability to image in a controlled fashion. Instead we come to 
learn to control and reuse our basic cognitive package through an immersion and education 
within a human social and communicative environment. At the root of learning to reuse 
imagery is our ability to use natural language and other public symbol systems. 
The next section, Imagery as the Reuse of Basic Perception-Action Systems, examines 
whether imagery can be understood as a kind of decoupled version of perception and 
action. The subsequent section, Learning to Control Imagery, speculates about the ways in 
which immersion in a social and linguistic environment may enable this decoupling. 
Imagery as the Reuse of Basic Perception-Action Systems 
An interactionist theory of cognition is committed to a position that eschews the need for 
representations that serve as inner models of the world or inner plans for action. This 
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means that if we want to develop an interactionist explanation of advanced cognition we 
need to avoid postulating the existence of neurocognitive modules ~r circuits that 
specifically enable advanced cognitive abilities. That is, we need to explain advanced 
cognition in terms of some redeployment or reuse of the skills and mechanisms that 
underpin basic cognition. This does not mean that the brains of advanced cognizers will be 
identical in structure and function to those of basic cognizers, only that advanced cognition 
does not require an evolved, neurally-realised, inner modelling device. This, I believe, is 
more or less what Vygotskians have in mind in claiming that "[i]f one decomposes a higher 
mental function into its constituent parts, one finds nothing but the natural, lower skills." 
(Kozulin, 1986, p. xxv). Fortunately there is good evidence to suggest that at least some 
off-line cognitive activities make use of basic, on-line neural resources. 
Evidence for Recruitment in Imagery 
Many of the observations made in imagery research support the view that the neural 
mechanisms underlying perception and action are used when people imagine particular 
objects, events, and actions. Mental imagery research has primarily focused upon its 
perceptual aspect. For many of us experiences of visual and auditory images have a very 
similar feeling to our perceptual experiences. They are different enough however for most 
of us to know that they are not identical. Experimental research also provides a good deal 
of support for the idea that imagery involves activity in perceptual mechanisms. For 
instance, it has been widely shown that imagery of one modality can interfere with 
perceptual tasks in that same modality (and vice versa) (e.g., Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 
1987; Craver-Lemley, Arterberry, & Reeves, 1997; Smith, Reisberg, & Wilson, 1992). 
These findings have been taken to imply that the many of the same neural and bodily 
resources are required for carrying out both kinds of activity. Neuroscientific research has 
further supported this idea by showing that, in normal, non-brain damaged individuals, 
many of the regions in the brain that are active during perceptual activities are also active 
in imagery activities that parallel the perceptual tasks (on visual imagery see Farah, 1989; 
on motor imagery see Jeannerod, 1995; on auditory imagery see Mcguire, Silbersweig, 
Murray, David, Frackowiak, & Frith, 1996; Zatorre, Halpern, Perry, Meyer, & Evans, 
1996). There is even evidence to suggest that people who suffer deficits in perception due 
to neural damage suffer parallel deficits in imagery. These parallels include colour-
blindness, what-where dissociations, face agnosia, and visual neglect (Farah, 1989). 
However, the evidence is not entirely unambiguous. Goldenberg, Miillbacher, and Nowak 
(1995) describe a patient who is completely cortically blind (near complete damage to the 
primary visual cortex) but was capable of providing appropriate answers to questions that 
are usually thought to require visual imaging. Similarly Thomas (1999) reports that Roland 
and Gulyas (1994) and Mellet et al. (1996) claim to have shown that no activity occurs in 
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the retinotopically mapped regions of the visual cortex when visually imaging and that 
such activity is more consistently associated with neural activity in non-retinotopically 
organised areas (see also Deposito, Detre, Aguirre, Stallcup, Alsop, Tippet, & Farah, 1997; 
these findings have been contested by Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, & Alpert, 1995)159. This 
of course may not mean that there is no recruitment of perception structures in visual 
imagery, but this research should make us sceptical of claims that the entire neural circuitry 
of vision is utilised. Indeed most researchers believe that recruitment does occur, perhaps 
primarily in non-primary cortices such as the visual association cortex (Deposito et aI., 
1997). 
Although mental imagery, especially visual imagery, is often taken to be a sort of out-of-
context, off-line partner of perception, there is also plenty of evidence that imaging 
involves motor components (Annett, 1995; Kosslyn, Behrmann, & Jeannerod, 1995; 
Jeannerod, 1995). This is not only the case when one is imagining carrying out a physical 
activity such as reaching for an object (Georgopoulos, Lurito, Petrides, Schwartz, & 
Massey, 1989) or tying ones laces (Annett, 1995), but also when one is engaged in visual 
image transformations such as rotating an imagined object (Deutsch, Bourbon, 
Papanicolaou, & Eisenberg, 1988; Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz, 1998). Annett (1995) 
presents research that shows that muscular activity occurs when people imagine how to 
perform a motor task and Jeannerod (1995) reviews a number of studies that show that 
imagining a limb moving increases the preparedness of the limb's reflex capacity in the 
same way that real movement does (but to a slightly lesser extent). Similar phenomena 
have been observed in tasks involving inner speech, which is widely taken to be a form of 
auditory imagery (Sokolov, 1968/1972; MacKay, 1992; Reisberg, 1992). Although 
evidence is against muscular activity being neceSSa7Y for imagery160 it is a common 
accompaniment in non-brain damaged individuals. Glenberg (1997) describes how bodily 
activity is associated with a wide variety of imaging activities: 
[I]magining a fearful situation evokes sweating, imagining a positive situation results in measurable activity 
in muscles associated with smiling, and imagining negative situations results in muscles associated with 
furrowing of the brow. There are analogous effects for imagery related to otherperceptuaVaction systems. 
159 Part of the problem here must be due to the widespread use of the subtraction technique in PET, fMRI, 
and ERP research. The 'activations' that cognitive neuroscientists observe are made relative to one or more 
comparison conditions. This means that any observed activation is dependent upon the degree to which the 
tasks in the comparison conditions involve similar neural resources. 
160 The classic demonstration of this is Smith, Brown, Tolman, and Goodman's (1947) study where the 
unfortunate Smith had his entire musculature paralysed using D-tubocurarine and was kept breathing using 
artificial means. While paralysed Smith could observe, comprehend speech, retrieve memories, and think 
normally (see also Damasio, 1999, pp.292-294). 
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Thus, in imaging a pendular motion, discharges in the eye muscles follow the appropriate frequency, in 
imaging bicep curls there are discharges in the biceps, and in imagining the taste of a favorite food there is 
an increase in saliva flow. (p. 5) 
These findings suggest that imagery involves a kind of retro-activation of mechanisms that 
underpin motor activity as well as perception. In other words, imagery probably involves 
the 'priming' of the entire body to react as if it was really perceiving the imagined event or 
object. 
In sum, then there exists considerable evidence in support of the view that basic cognitive 
structures used for making do in the local environment are redeployed when we entertain 
things 'off-line'. It is not a big leap to suggest that it may be our imagery abilities such as 
visualisation, mental practice, and inner speech that enable us to accomplish advanced 
cognitive tasks. Indeed much research shows that imagery can play an important role in 
laying down memories, recall, concrete and abstract reasoning, language comprehension, 
and the learning of new skills (Kosslyn et aI., 1995). Within the framework I am 
developing here one can think of imagery primarily in terms of the ability to control and 
evoke basic cognitive abilities in out-of-context situations. In fact, perhaps ironically, this 
view of imagery plays down the experiential and conscious aspect of imagery and focuses 
upon the idea that imagery involves an ability to 'context hop' (Lock, 1999) or 'suppress' 
(Glenberg, 1997) - to get ourselves to do things that are not responses to natural immediate 
environmental goings on by putting ourselves in a 'virtual context'. Psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience have provided us with some fascinating facts about the 
relationships between imagery, perception and action, but it is important to think about 
how we might explain how basic perception-action structures may be recruited in the 
service of advanced cognitive abilities. 
How Might Imagery Account for Advanced Cognition? 
Cognitivist theorists generally explain imagery as the product of plugging a descriptive 
mental representation into the 'back end' of our normal perception-action apparatus to 
produce a surrogate for normal perceptual information (the image) (Kosslyn, 1994). This, 
as was briefly noted in chapter 2, is the approach that Grush (1997; see also Clark & 
Grush, 1997161) takes with regard to mental representation. He suggests that basic 
161 Clark (1997) provides a friendly critique of this notion that denies the need for the 'brain state' (that 
constitutes the representation) to be used 'off-line'. Clark's tinkering effectively reduces the power of this 
theory of representation by requiring it to make use of the vague idea that a representation is a representation 
if it has been designed (e.g., by natural selection) to transmit a particular kind of information to other parts of 
the 'cognitive system' (see also Chemero, 1998a, 1998b for a critique of the notion of representations as 
'stand ins'). 
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perceptual engagement with the local environment does not require a representational 
mechanism (but see Clark & Grush, 1997). Instead he claims that the neural activity 
associated with the energetic stimulation of the sensory surfaces by something in the 
environment constitl+tes a presentation. Presentations do not fulfil all of the criteria 
generally thought to exist for representations and are something like Dretske's (1988) 
indicators or type II representations. The issue of representation only arises, argues Grush, 
when something in the brain has to do the job of something in the world when in fact that 
thing is not currently in the environment and being sensed by the agent. That is, a 
representation is part of a system that emulates the perceptual input of an absent 
environmental object. A representation must be an internal content-preserving structure 
that is decouple-able from the real world and that can be plugged into the behaviour 
producing apparatus in the nervous system (see also Clark, 1997; Haugeland, 1991)162. In 
support of this claim Grush (1997) argues, and supplies some supporting evidence, that 
some activities (e.g., rapidly reaching for an object) require a motor emulator because 
neural feedback of proprioceptive information about the position of the arm is too slow to 
effectively modulate the trajectory of the moving arm. The emulator architecture can 
overcome this problem by presenting the bodily action systems with a representation of 
'the way the world will be in a few moments', thereby allowing the agent to act earlier than 
would be possible if they were relying upon perceptual feedback to direct action. 
For various reasons I believe that Grush's reaching examples do not provide convincing 
evidence for low-level emulation. Firstly, Grush (1997) admits that existing empirical 
evidence regarding motor activity, such as reaching, may be consistent with a feedback 
model. Secondly, even if it turns out that a feedback model is insufficient to account for 
rapid reaching, it is possible, I believe, for such a system to be implemented within the 
basic sort of pattern-mapping system I outlined above, for, as Chemero (1998a) notes 
"[ d]espite the fact that the emulator is not hooked-up to incoming proprioceptive signals 
for a few milliseconds, the arm and the action it is undertaking is in no way absent." (p. 
34). It seems plausible that a pattern-mapping system might be able to implement this kind 
of moderate anticipative activity. Finally, the motor emulator notion does not actually fulfil 
all of the criteria Grush (1997) requires of an emulator theory, particularly the need to be 
162 Within psychology a similar claim has been made by Leslie (1987; see also Olson, 1989, 1993; Russell, 
1996; Suddendorf, 1999) to account for phenomena in developmental psychology relating to theory of mind 
research. Specifically Leslie hypothesises that children can only pretend when they can juxtapose a 
representation of an actual object (e.g., a banana) with, what Leslie calls, a metarepresentation of the thing 
that the object is taken to be (e.g., a telephone). To manage such a feat children must possess a decoupler - a 
device for removing a representation from its normal causal input-output functions and inserting it into an 
appropriate place in the information-processing sequence. 
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able to identify subcomponents within the representation bearer. Grush thus provides no 
compelling evidence for the idea that there exists an emulator as a subpersonal imagery 
mechanism in real animals. But if such a system does not exist, how do we explain how 
mental imagery works? 
The Perceptual Activity Theory of Imagery 
Thomas (1999) develops a theory of imagery that avoids a commitment to, what he calls, 
the computational mentalism of the quasi-pictorial theory of imagery (e.g., Kosslyn, 1994) 
and the description or propositional theory of imagery (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1991). He calls his 
approach a perceptual activity theory and which draws upon insights in active vision 
research (see chapter 3). In this view "perceptual learning is not viewed as a matter of 
storing descriptions (or pictures) of perceived scenes or objects, but as the continual 
updating and refining of procedures (or "schemata," see Neisser, 1976) that specify how to 
direct our attention most effectively in particular situations: how to efficiently examine and 
explore, and thus interpret, a scene or object of a certain type." (Thomas, 1999, p. 218). 
Imagery occurs when the perceptual instruments are retro-activated via the activation of 
neural structures controlling the coordination of the instruments (schemata): 
In this theory imagery is experienced when a schema that is not directly relevant to the exploration of the 
current environment is allowed at least partial control of the exploratory apparatus. We imagine, say, a cat by 
going through (some of) the motions of examining something and fmding that it is a cat, even though there is 
no cat (and perhaps nothing relevant at all) there to be examined. Imagining a cat is seeing nothing-in-
particular as a cat. (Thomas, 1999, p. 218, emphasis added) 
When we view a cat in the environment our perceptual instruments are deployed to 
measure and test elements of relevant information about the cat. When we visually imagine 
a cat we activate those instruments to work in the same manner in the absence of any 
relevant environmental stimulation. Because we have previous experience of deploying our 
perceptual instruments iJ} the perception of cats (and cat pictures, sculptures, cartoons, etc.) 
our brains have developed the dynamic neural connections that reflect the synchronic and 
diachronic activity of our perceptual instruments for many kinds of events, objects, and 
properties. Perhaps something like Edelman's (1989, 1992) re-entrant signalling is at work 
here in the generation of association patterns between instruments. Notice how this picture 
differs from Kosslyn's approach (1994) where modality-free representations in long term 
memory are translated into a perceptual medium in imagery. First of all, the 'schemata' in 
our neural control structures are 'instructions' (connections and weightings) for formatting 
instruments in particular conditions, not representations of things in the world. They are 
neural circuits that set off a self-organising pattern of neuromuscular activity that organises 
or primes the body into a activity pattern similar to that which occurs when perceiving an 
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environmental object or eventl63 . Secondly, the perceptual activity view holds that "no 
end-product of perception, no inner picture or description is ever created. No thing in the 
brain is the percept or image." (Thomas, 1999, p. 218). Rather, imaging involves 'priming' 
the agent's body to act as if it was perceiving somethingl64 . The problem for Thomas' 
(1999) approach is in specifying how it is that "a schema that is not directly relevant to the 
exploration of the current environment is allowed at least partial control of the exploratory 
apparatus." (p. 218, emphasis added). Why, in other words, do we 'see' (or hear or feel) an 
object and event that is not the one in front of us? How is it that we can initiate activity that 
is not our 'natural' (situated, basic) response to a situation? 
Learning to Control Imagery 
The problem we face is the identification of a mechanism for enabling people to use their 
perception-action resources in an off-line manner. In other words, we are trying to explain 
how 'imaging' might be possible within an interactionist framework that eschews the need 
to postulate an internal representational trigger for the recruitment of perception-action 
structures. What mechanism can enable the off-line assembly of our perception-action 
resources? I want to argue that a command of language and other symbol systems can 
facilitate this possibility. But how can we develop this idea? After all, the dominant 
(Chomskian, generative grammatical) view of language within cognitive science merely 
treats language as an adjunct to thought - a kind of external expression and comprehension 
system bolted on to an independent central conceptual system (e.g., Chomsky, 1995; 
Pinker, 1994). Carruthers and Boucher (1998) refer to this as the communicative view of 
the relation between language and thought, a view in which language does not affect 
thought at all. Indeed in an important sense thought 'comes before' language. So, in this 
view, our advanced cognitive ability must be a feature of 'pure thought'. The answer, I 
believe, rests on combining what Bechtel (1993a, 1996) has called a distributed view of 
language or an external symbol approach with a roughly Vygotskian view of the 
regulatory powers of language (e.g., Berk, 1994; Diaz & Berk, 1992). In Carruthers and 
Boucher's (1998a) terminology this is a kind of cognitive conception of language "which 
sees language as crucially implicated in human thinking." (p. 1). 
The basic idea is a simple one: language (speech) is a tool for making information 
available to others that they may use to regulate their activities (Reed, 1996). In particular, 
163 These neural circuits may be a kind of internal control parameter in Keijzer's (1997, 1998) sense. 
164 It may be possible to incorporate Damasio's (1994, 1999) notion of bodily 'as if loops' into such a 
perspective (see my discussion in chapter 6). Certainly Damasio is one of the foremost advocates of the idea 
that imagery is the internally initiated use of perceptual and motor structures. 
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language "can be used to make people aware of prior or upcoming environmental 
situations ... [that enables] ... a kind of modified and collectivised prospective control" 
and it enables us to "select, modify and transform ecological information to serve our own 
purposes and make a new form of information that is not dependent on the immediate 
environment. Thus language is often used to make others aware of possible, hypothetical, 
and even fictitious states of affairs". (Reed, 1996, p.156). By utilising particular utterances 
(spoken symbol structures) a speaker can provide a listener with information about things 
that they cannot perceive. So a simple kind of time-space distancing can occur by 'passing 
on a signal' in the place of (perceivable) environmental information. The next step in the 
argument is to suggest that, with experience with this social symbolic regulation of 
activity, we can come to use language privately and individually to regulate our own 
actions in an out-of-context fashion. Finally we can argue that the regular use of activity 
patterns in out-of-context situations can lead to these patterns becoming engaged 
automatically and habitually in their new environments. Complex advanced cognitive 
skills that required a symbolic scaffolding to learn and perfect can later be used without the 
benefit of private speaking or visualising if they are exercised regularly. Some skills 
however always require jumping out of context, constructing novel combinations of 
activity patterns, and re-presenting a 'natural interpretation' in non-natural ways. It is these 
kinds of skills, which might include planning, troubleshooting, dealing with novelty, 
overcoming habits, complex reasoning, causal analysis, problem-solving, that will always 
require symbolic mediation (whether silent and private, or out-loud, or in dialogue with 
others) (Dennett, 1998). 
Although this basic idea seems plausible enough, there are thorny problems ahead for 
anyone who attempts to flesh it out in more detail. 
Problems for an External Symbol View 
The first problem, that Wozniak (1976) calls the language and thought paradox, is that it is 
hard to see how it is that you can tell yourself something that you do not already know. 
What more can one get from saying something to oneself (especially silently) that cannot 
be got from simply thinking it? Numerous suggestions have been made here: Dennett 
(1991) suggests that speech may supply a vital connection between two (or more) neural 
circuits that are neurobiologically unconnected. Language can serve as a 'cognitive 
auto stimulant , that follows an external pathway. Carruthers (1996, 1998) has developed a 
similar but more detailed theory along these lines. In essence he argues that our linguistic 
systems are the neurocognitive Grand Central Station of the brain and that the coordination 
of other modular activities is carried out using the lingua franca of natural language. 
Language, that is, provides the vehicle for thought that requires the coordination of many 
evolutionarily basic modular systems (see also Clark, 1997, 1998b). 
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But for the dedicated anti-representational interactionist there exists a deeper problem 
because, unlike the previous authors, the non-representationalist suggests that there is no 
prelinguistic thought of a self-directed and context-independent nature available to initiate 
'off-line' action (Carruthers, for instance, has no problem with off-line cognizing if it can 
be plausibly thought to be available in a domain specific way within particular modules). 
The recruitment hypothesis that I am arguing for here requires that, in advanced cognition, 
'language comes first' and 'language provides us with the resources for context-
independence'. The only kind of presymbolic 'thought' available for the recruitment 
hypothesis is that occasioned by direct perception and action within the local 
environment165 . So my problem is this: how can symbol use occur without advanced 
thought being already in place? More specifically: 
1. How can a self-regulating symbol-user initiate an out-of-context 'train of thought', 
composed of complex efforts at creating virtual environments, that can be used to 
produce non-situationally-detennined action? That is, how can a situationally-
detennined basic cognizer suddenly acquire the ability to autocue, self-remind, or 
voluntarily access action patterns, as Donald (1991, 1998, 1999) puts it? 
2. Secondly, how can a 'system' with no explicit, declarative memory (an implicit, 
procedural, and basic cognitive system) use symbols if it cannot somehow 'store' and 
'access' that symbolic knowledge from somewhere inside its head? That is, how can 
public, external representations do their thing without them being outer expressions of 
more fundamental internal representations? 
I have no fully worked out answer to the first question, but my basic intuition is that what 
we call autocuing or voluntary recall is still a kind of situationally-detennined cognitive 
activity166; that is, 'voluntary' access to action patterns via a symbolic network is 
ultimately initiated by things happening in the real environment. Our ability to rely upon 
symbolic 'virtual environments' provides the opportunity to be detennined by a larger 
environment than that 'lived in' by basic cognitive creatures, but we remain detennined 
nonetheless. This 'real environment autonomy' may at least make advanced cognizers 
165 And perhaps the fact that the bodily mechanisms that enable this basic cognition may occasionally 
operate spontaneously in the absence of the sort of enviromnental situation they are 'fitted' to, as, for 
instance, may happen in dreaming. 
166 Despite Donald's (1991, 1998, 1999) argument that the advent of mimetic culture requires the evolution 
of auto cuing or voluntary recall, he nowhere advances an argument about how his theory avoids 
determinism. Cognitivism is equally susceptible to these 'free-will versus determinism' problems (see 
Copeland, 1993, chap. 7; Juarrero, 1999). 
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seem to be more flexible and 'voluntary' than their basic cousins. Deacon (1997) has a 
similar suspicion that he expresses this way: 
Symbolic analysis is the basis for a remarkable new level of self-determination that human beings alone have 
stumbled upon. The ability to use virtual reference to build up elaborate internal models of possible futures, 
and to hold these complex visions in mind with the force of the mnemonic glue of symbolic inference and 
descriptive shorthands, gives us unprecedented capacity to generate independent adaptive behaviors. . .. 
[S]ymbolically mediated compulsions to act are far more chaotic [than nonsymbolic indexical compulsions], 
in the technical sense of that word, far more susceptible to the influence of tiny initial differences in starting 
assumptions or ways of dividing up experiences and qualities symbolically. . .. It is not so much that our 
actions arise from a totally unconstrained and compulsion-free center of intentions, but that the potential 
starting point, the intended purpose we have modeled, can be drawn from such a vast variety of alternatives 
with little initial difference in motive power. (p. 434) 
Adult human 'free will' is an important issue for any theory of cognition and it should not 
be ignored. However, to date there do not exist any convincing explanations of how free 
will can be reconciled with a theory of cognition that is consistent with what is known in 
the natural sciences. 
The second question, of how symbols can extend our cognitive reach beyond the here and 
now without the symbolic information being explicitly 'encoded' inside the agent, is, I 
believe, more readily explainable than the first. Such an explanation needs to embrace, 
what Bechtel (1996) calls, an external symbol approach or a distributed understanding of 
language. 
A Distributed View of Language 
A number of interactionist thinkers have been attracted to the idea that language and other 
symbol systems might be fruitfully thought of as external structures that mediate our basic, 
pattern mapping, cognitive abilities (e.g., Bechtel, 1993a, 1996, 1997; Clark, 1997, 1998b; 
Dennett, 1991, 1996; Rowlands, 1999). The general idea is that external structures such as 
utterances, gestures, diagrams, instruction lists, and plans can be thought of as 
environmental transformations (effected by our motor skills) that can be responded to with 
our basic, situated perception-action abilities. One popular example comes from the work 
of the connectionist researchers Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986). 
They suggest that symbol-use requires three things: 1) an external arena where physical 
symbols are instantiated, 2) a capacity to comprehend and use those symbols (pattern 
recognition and association), and 3) a capacity to produce new symbol structures (pattern 
completion). They illustrate their idea by imagining how a connectionist system could be 
built to multiply large numbers. Because of the limitations of reasonably sized neural 
networks, it would probably be impossible to train one to multiply any two large numbers 
together, but it may be possible to build a pair of interacting networks that can deal with 
the problem in a human-like fashion. People generally multiply large numbers using place-
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value multiplication with a pen and paper (unless they have a calculator handy)167. These 
external scaffolds do not just make the task more efficient or reliable; they actually 
completely transform the nature of the problem by turning it'into a sequence of repeated 
situated actions. The process starts by giving the problem a physical form by writing it 
down. We then apply a pattern recognition strategy to locate the first single digit problem. 
We solve the problem (pattern completion) and then write down the solution to it in the 
appropriate place in the environment. This transforms our perceived environment and we 
loop back to our first strategy of search for patterns (the next single digit problem). This 
problem is solved via pattern completion, and so on. So such a system could be 
implemented using two connectionist networks (one a pattern recogniser, the other a 
pattern completer) and a system for manipulating structures in the environment (some kind 
of 'writer') (Rowlands, 1999, pp. 163-164). 
The key lesson of this thought experiment IS that it illustrates how a complex 
compositional problem can be decomposed into the deployment of a series of skilful 
pattern-mapping procedures (know-how) that are hooked into a modifiable environment. 
Rumelhart et al. (1986) describe the benefits of this kind of process in the following way: 
Each cycle of this operation involves first creating a representation through manipulation of the environment, 
then a processing of the (actual physical) representation by means of our well-tuned perceptual apparatus 
leading to further modification of this representation. By doing this we reduce a very abstract conceptual 
problem to a series of operations that are very concrete and at which we can become very good. Now this 
applies not only to solving multiplication problems. It applies as well to solving problems in logic (e.g., 
syllogisms), problems in science, engineering, etc. These dual skills of manipulating the environment and 
processing the environment we have created allow us to reduce very complex problems to a series of very 
simple ones. This ability allows us to deal with problems that are otherwise impossible. This is real symbol 
processing and, we are beginning to think, the primary symbol processing that we are able to do. Indeed, on 
this view, the external environment becomes an extension to our mind. (pp. 45-46) 
The agent-environment system as a whole knows how to multiply large numbers, but the 
entire task does not go on 'in the head'. Rather it consists of the interplay of internal and 
external structures. People, and the imaginary connectionist system, use paper and pen to 
'store' the results of each operation and ultimately produce an answer which we can then 
read off of the external environmental scaffold. The answer never appears fully in the 
dynamics of the network, as it were. There is no need to postulate an internal system that 
deals in mathematical symbols and their transformations. Rather the environment and the 
'agent-system' modulate each other's activity until the answer appears inscribed on the 
167 At least modern Western people seem to multiply this way. People from different cultural groups use 
different mathematical methods, such as using an abacus. Moreover, it seems that when people solve 
mathematical problems mentally they make use of internalised versions of these methods (Hatano, 1982). 
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environmental surface. Some may object that such a suggestion does not explain our ability 
to, at least sometimes, do large number multiplication 'in our heads'. But Rumelhart et al. 
(1986) have a distinctly Vygotskian response to this objection:· 
There is one more piece to the story. This is the tricky part and, we think, the part that fools us. Not only can 
we manipulate the physical environment and then process it, we can also learn to internalize the 
representations we create, "imagine" them, and then process these imagined representations - just as if they 
were external (p. 46) 
Bechtel (1993a, 1993b, 1996, 1997; Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991) and Rowlands (1999) 
have attempted to generalise Rumelhart et al.' s idea to the much more complex domain of 
human language. There are three main tasks that face a theorist interested in developing a 
distributed view of language. First, language needs to be portrayed as having a strong 
external and environmental flavour. This is not an intuitively obvious way of thinking of 
language since traditional cognitivist (e.g., Chomskian) views of language take it to be 
largely an in-the-head affair. Under the distributed view however linguistic symbols are 
understood to be environmental entities that can be perceived and that are compositional in 
nature. Words take on a variety of physical forms as sound patterns, manual signs, or 
written characters. These physical forms can be used compositionally because they can be 
produced in a large variety of syntactic combinations that express composite meanings. 
Spoken words and manual gestures can be strung together in temporal sequences and 
written words can be concatenated spatially. Physical symbol tokens are both generative or 
productive (they can be combined with, juxtaposed with, and slotted into, other symbol 
structures to create an unlimited variety of meaningful sequences) and exhibit systematicity 
or generality (roughly, by rearranging tokens one can represent different semantic 
relationships between the same symbolised concepts). Compositionality is understood as 
embedded in the languages themselves rather than being viewed, as the Chomskian's 
would have it, as a set of internal neurobiological constraints. So humans have the capacity 
to understand and use this compositional feature of Jinguistic external structures rather 
than these structures being systems that cause language to be compositional because of 
their compositional internal structurel68 • Bechtel (1993a) notes that "[t]he key to the 
external symbol approach is to move formal symbols, which adhere to syntactic rules, out 
of the head and locate them in the environment of the system." (p. 130). Similarly, 
168 See Deacon (1997, chap. 3) for a discussion of how we can think of languages as semi-autonomous 
external systems that co-evolve with human neural structures and cognitive capacities rather than as simple 
behavioural expressions of the functioning an internal biological subsystem (such as that envisioned by 
Chomsky, 1980, 1995). Hutchins and Hazlehurst (1991, 1995; Hazlehurst & Hutchins, 1998) have shown 
that a simple kind of grammar emerges within a simulated community of interacting connectionist 'agents'. 
Steels (1998) has attempted a similar demonstration with real robots. 
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Rowlands (1999) argues that rather than postulating "an internal linguistic or quasi-
linguistic system" where language is understood to be plugged into the individual's brain, 
"we plug the organism into a linguistically structured environment, and we give it the 
capacity to use, to utilize, this environment." (Rowlands, 1999, pp. 179-180). 
The second aspect of a distributed approach to language involves taking the enforcement of 
grammatical principles to be something that is primarily carried out by the language 
community. "Ultimately, what determines the grammatical correctness or otherwise of 
combining one symbol with another in a particular way is the pattern of grammatical usage 
exhibited by the linguistic community." (Rowlands, 1999, p. 178). This stands in 
opposition to traditional symbolic accounts that argue that the well-formedness of 
linguistic productions occurs because the internal symbolic system's structure does not 
allow badly formed language strings. So on the distributed reading, grammatical 
acceptability is in some sense learntl69 • This means that the underlying neural system need 
not instantiate a linguistically (compositionally) structured system but, rather, it need only 
be capable of coming to learn to respect those grammatical relationships that exist in the 
communicative environment. In other words, language comprehension is understood as an 
ability to use the connectionist-like skills of pattern-mapping (recognition, association, and 
completion) to manipulate and use external environmental entities (words, sentences, 
propositions). Such an internal system is not usefully understood as building an internal 
model of the linguistic propositions one hears or reads, but of having the procedural 
resources for skilfully perceiving and using environmental entities. As Bechtel (1993a) 
notes "[ w ]hat exists inside the cognitive system is not an internal representation of these 
external symbols, but an ability to extract information from them and to produce symbol 
strings which adhere to the syntactical rules that characterize properly formed strings ... " 
(p. 130) and that "[t]he network knows how to extract information from grammatically 
structured sentences, but in order to do this it does not have to have an internal 
representation of the sentence upon which computations can be performed." (p. 138). So 
connectionist systems might be able to emulate such feats even though they do not possess 
compositional architectures. Rowlands (1999) argues that "connectionist systems might be 
169 This does not mean that simple induction from examples of speech in the environment will do the job. As 
Chomsky (1959) has famously argued, a simple general learning system could not possibly lead to the kind 
of grammatical sophistication that humans, even young children, display. Evidence shows that children tend 
to make a large number of correct guesses when it comes to learning grammar (see Deacon, 1997, chap. 3). 
However, this does not mean that some sort of learning system (perhaps with built-in learning biases of some 
kind) cannot learn how to use and generate grammatically correct symbol structures without the benefit of 
negative examples and explicit feedback about correctness (see, e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 1999; 
Christiansen, Chater, & Seidenberg, 1999; Deacon, 1997; Redington & Chater, 1998; Seidenberg, 1997). 
I, 
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capable of exhibiting such features as generativity, systematicity, and inferential 
coherence, not because they themselves are structured in such a way as to exhibit those 
features, but, rather, because, in virtue of the structure they do have, they are capable of 
using or employing an external linguistic system which exhibits these features." (p. 181). 
The third key aspect of a distributed approach to language is that we need to think of the 
production, as well as the comprehension, of language as involving pattern-mapping 
processes and environmental manipulation. That is, speech production should be viewed 
primarily as a motor activity - a bodily skill for creating the appropriate sound patterns, 
manual gestures, or inscriptions, for getting ideas across, naming things, indicating, issuing 
orders, regulating the behaviour of others, and so on. Our ability to do this no doubt arises 
from some perhaps 'innate' abilities for producing sounds such as babbling and cooing (see 
Pinker, 1994) and innate abilities to chew and swallow (MacNeill age, 1998; Whitcombe, 
1996) (what we might call the intrinsic dynamics of our oral-vocal-respiratory systems in 
Goldfield's [1995] and Saltzman's [1995] terms). These abilities are tuned and modulated 
by practice and environmental and social feedback (the most important being whether 
appropriate responses to specific communicatory intentions can be extracted from other 
people and whether one's own sound production sounds right to one's own ear). 
This picture of language use as emerging from the interaction of a pair of procedural, 
pattern-mapping systems (a 'comprehender' and a 'producer') and a highly structured 
sociolinguistic environment may seem a little too vague for many cognitive scientists' 
likings. However, there does exist some interesting simulation research that shows that a 
collection of non-compositional 'neurocognitive innards' may well be able to exhibit 
compositional skills when trained in an appropriately structured 'linguistic' environment. 
Implementing a Distributed Language System 
Both Bechtel (1993a, 1996) and Rowlands (1999) examme some recent connectionist 
efforts for getting networks to treat language-like strings in a compositional manner 
without a compositionally structured computational architecture (e.g., Elman, 1990, 1993, 
1995; St. John & McClelland, 1990). These simulations use recurrent architectures and the 
sentences to be analysed are fed into the input layer one word at a time. The results of these 
simulations are intriguing and indicate that a distributed view of language is quite 
plausible. Specifically, these networks can, to a limited degree, extract ('recognise') the 
syntactic and semantic/thematic roles that words have in sentences and can produce output 
that respects such 'interpretations' "given nothing more than a corpus of positive examples 
of allowable texts - exactly what the UG [universal grammar] theorists had said was 
impossible" (Deacon, 1997, p. 134). For instance, in Elman's (1993) simulation the 
network's task was to 'guess' the next word in a sentence that was presented to the network 
one word at a time. The trained network was quite successful at picking the correct kind of 
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word (i.e., whether it was syntactically appropriate) for sentences that it had already been 
exposed to in training and also for novel sentences. The network could even cope with 
embedded clauses and structural transformations. Significantly such success did not occur 
when the network was trained using full, complex sentences right from the outset. In this 
condition the network rapidly converged on suboptimal solutions that exposure to 
subsequent learning trials could not overcome. By exposing the network to complex cases 
from the outset, it was faced with "a very large area oflogical space to search for a solution 
and, therefore, caused it to search wildly for solutions to problems where these solutions, in 
fact, depended upon solutions to more simple problems." (Rowlands, 1999, p. 185; see also 
Deacon, 1997, pp. 132-135). In simple terms, artificial neural networks work best when 
they deal with a training set that contains a large number of relatively similar items. The 
learning process quickly finds the appropriate approximate input-output mappings and then 
gradually refines them so that narrower distinctions can be made. However, when faced 
with a set of quite varied training items, the network cannot quickly find an approximately 
correct mapping solution because the diverse training mappings possess a variety of quite 
different solutions. The result of combining a complex training set with an incremental 
learning strategy, such as backpropagation of error, is that the network rapidly fixes on a 
suboptimal ('in-between') solution from which it cannot escape. 
Elman (1993) found that there were two solutions to this problem. The first solution was to 
phase the training. Basically this boils down to training the network with simple sentences 
first and, once it had learnt to provide appropriate output for these sentences, to advance to 
more complex sentences. Rowlands (1999) argues that there is an important sense in which 
training is phased when children learn language. He suggests that children are gradually 
exposed to different kinds of language as they mature. At about six months of age infants 
seem to elicit infant-directed speech, a syntactically, semantically, and lexically simplified 
form of language, from their caregivers. Prior to this point it is not used. Throughout early 
development adults seem to modulate their language to suit the capacities of the child. 
However, this in itself is unlikely to be enough, as the real world of linguistic stimulation 
is no doubt messy, with the child being exposed to complex adult language as well as 
tailored simple language. So the infant also needs some ability to . focus only on the 
appropriate 'training examples'. Elman's (1993) second method for training his 'language 
comprehension network' provides an insight into how this might be possible. The second 
strategy was to phase the memory. This basically involved exposing the network to fully 
complex sentences and depriving it of the feedback it would have normally gained from 
the context units for later words in each training sentence. Roughly speaking Elman made 
the network 'ignore' input after it had processed three or four words of a sentence. Over the 
training session Elman gradually increased the number of words that the network would 
'pay attention to' until feedback from the previous input was supplied for all of the words 
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in each sentence. Rowlands (1999) thinks that such a finding may tell us something about 
the way a child might need to function in order to learn language: 
Elman's employment of a phased-memory strategy seems to indicate that limitations on certain types of 
memory might, in fact, be a crucial and positive factor in determining the ability of statistical inference 
engines to penetrate theoretical domains that are hierarchically ordered in the sense of being formed by way 
of recursive combinatory rules. (Rowlands, 1999, p. 189) 
Deacon (1997) argues that children's language learning seems to ride on just these sorts of 
'limitations'. In fact he goes so far as to argue that languages are entities that have evolved 
to fit the cognitive profile of the developing child: 
Being unable to remember the details of specific word associations, being slow to map words to objects that 
tend to co-occur in the same context, remembering only the most global structure-function relationships of 
utterances, and finding it difficult to hold more than a few words of an utterance in short-term memory at a 
time may all be advantages for language learning. (p. 135) 
In sum, then, several recent connectionist simulations provide some intriguing 
demonstrations that language-like tasks may be implementable using non-compositional 
systems that are plugged into highly structured linguistic environments. Moreover, their 
limitations, and the solutions used to overcome them, seem to map roughly onto aspects of 
the language learning situation. 
From Indexical Pattern Mapping to Symbolic Pattern Mapping 
All of this talk of connectionist networks exists in the somewhat rarefied atmosphere of 
computer simulations. Bechtel (1996) suggests that the strategy used by Elman and others 
may not be the best one for making sense of a distributed account of language. In 
particular, he argues that these models fall prey to many of the criticisms of 'disembodied 
connectionist simulations' that were mentioned in the previous chapter. In fact Bechtel 
(1996) expresses some very 'interactionist' concerns: 
I am not even convinced that that they represent the most fruitful way of exploring linguistic ability within a 
connectionist or nonsymbolic framework. They approach the task of language processing in isolation from 
other cognitive activities and the needs of the organism to control its body in its enviromnent. Thus, there is 
no real semantics for such models. A far more realistic approach might begin with a model of a system 
functioning in an enviromnent, that is, a system with sensory capacities to absorb information from its 
enviromnent and motor capacities to change its enviromnent. (pp. 74-75) 
Deacon's (1996, 1997) theory of language evolution focuses closely on semantic issues 
and provides some ideas for extending the connectionist-inspired notion of a distributed 
language system. Deacon suggests that pattern associating connectionist networks can be 
understood to be indexical systems - systems that can learn to associate a token (or, to use 
the terminology of classical conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus) with a referent (or 
conditioned stimulus). Thus, something like a pattern-associating ability may underpin the 
ability of many animals to learn how to modulate their behaviour (their response) when 
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exposed to the token. Deacon argues that all non-human animal communication involves 
an ability to deal with indexical reference. That is, animals modulate the behaviour of 
others by producing calls, gestures, and displays that are associated with particular 
referents. Vervet monkeys, for instance, learn that 'barking' is associated with the presence 
of a predator such as a leopard that requires running up a tree, that 'coughing' is associated 
with eagles and safety can be found by hiding in shrubs, and that 'chuttering' is associated 
with the presence of a snake and getting together into a group to crowd about it in a 
threatening manner170 (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990). In other words, pattern-associative 
learning enables the modulation of behaviour with respect to distant environments when a 
conspecific produces a sign (call, gesture, etc. )171. In sophisticated animals (many 
mammals, birds such as parrots) it may even possible to use an index (say a word spoken 
by a human trainer) in a variety of contexts via stimulus generalisation arid the transfer of 
learning sets (see Deacon, 1997, pp. 80-81). This may give the appearance of a kind of 
symbolic competence because it appears that the animal appreciates the meaning of the 
index rather than just knowing what goes with what. 
However, Deacon argues that indexical, pattern-associating abilities differ from symbolic 
abilities in two important ways. First, indexical reference requires an animal to observe a 
correlation between the index and its referent. Moreover, if the experience of correlation 
ceases the index will eventually cease to 'mean' the referent. This phenomenon can be 
observed in the extinction phases of operant conditioning experiments. Symbols, on the 
other hand, still mean their referent, even if we hardly ever, or never, observe a correlation 
between the presence of the symbol token and its referent (after we have learnt what the 
symbol refers to). Somehow, once symbolic reference is created, it is 'maintained' without 
the benefit of an indexical relationship to a referent. 
The second difference between symbols and indices IS that learning an indexical 
relationship does not affect other known indexical associations. By contrast, when we learn 
a new symbol (e.g., a new word) it becomes importantly associated with other words 
(symbolic referential relationships) that we also know. Deacon argues that the former 
difference is explained by the latter: 
We do not lose the indexical associations of words, despite a lack of correlation with physical referents, 
because the possibility of this link is maintained implicitly in the stable associations between words. It is by 
170 Actually, it is not at all clear whether the referents of the vervets' calls are particular animals, kinds of 
animals, or signals for behaving in a certain way (see Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Noble & Davidson, 1996). 
171 This is roughly what Christensen and Hooker (2000, in press) mean by constructive (i.e., modifiable, 
learnable) gradient tracking. 
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virtue of this sort of dual reference, to objects and to other words ... , that a word conveys the infonnation 
necessary to pick out objects of reference .... 
This referential relationship between the words - words systematically indicating other words - fonns a 
system of higher-order relationships that allows words to be about indexical relationships, and not just 
indices in themselves. But this is also why words need to be in context with other words, in phrases and 
sentences, in order to have any detenninate reference. Their indexical power is distributed, so to speak, in the 
relationships between words. Symbolic reference derives from combinatorial possibilities and 
impossibilities, and we therefore depend on combinations both to discover it (during learning) and to make 
use of it (during communication). (Deacon, 1997, pp. 82-83) 
In essence Deacon argues that in learning to 'deal with' (produce and comprehend) 
symbolic reference, people come to grasp the relations that exist among the symbol tokens 
themselves and not just. those that hold between the tokens and objects. Tokens have all 
kinds of semantic and syntactic relationships with each other. Syntactically some token 
combinations are allowed and some are not. Semantically we might learn that the tokens 
cat and dog are quite closely associated compared to, say, cat and bus. This means that 
humans have the capacity to detect and use combinatorial patterns - that is, patterns made 
up of rule-based combinations of stimuli (symbol tokens), and not just holistic patterns. 
Deacon expresses this idea by saying that people come to make sense of the high-order 
regularities that hold among tokens. He argues that this is a hard problem for nonhumans 
because it involves moving from the indexical referential strategy of associating objects 
and tokens to the symbolic referential strategy that downplays object-token association in 
favour of token-token association. However, due to our oversized prefrontal cortex, 
Deacon believes that we humans are well predisposed to this kind of learning in a way that 
other animals are not. 
The prefrontal cortex helps us inhibit the tendency to act on simple correlative stimulus relationships and 
guides our sampling of alternative higher-order sequential or hierarchic associations. Its role in language and 
symbol learning in particular is not, however, merely to increase something we might call prefrontal 
intelligence. Rather I suspect the importance of the size change can be thought of in displacement tenns, in 
patterns of cognition as in patterns of brain development. Prefrontal computations out-compete other 
cognitive computations and tend to dominate learning in us as in no other species. In simple tenns, we have 
become predisposed to use this one cognitive tool whenever an opportunity presents itself, because an 
inordinate amount of control of the other processes in the brain has become vested in our prefrontal cortex. 
The way the parietal cortex handles tactile and movement infonnation, the way the auditory cortex handles 
sound infonnation, the way the visual cortex handles visual infonnation are all now much more constrained 
by prefrontal activity than in other species. (Deacon, 1997, p. 265) 
In other words, Deacon argues that human beings have brains that are well-suited to 
learning about symbolic relationships as well as indexical relationships. Mature human 
brains 'contain' symbolic pattern mappers. This does not mean that humans have anything 
like a subpersonal physical symbol system in their heads. Rather it meansJhat humans are 
specially sensitive to networks of token-token relationships as well as to token-referent 
, <,. 
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relationships. In an environment that contains symbolic systems - systems of tokens 
(spoken words, manual gestures, text) that are internally (grammatically) organised as well 
as externally (referentially) organised - humans are capable of grounding reference 
courtesy of an ability to detect token-token patterns. Whereas the kind of time-space 
distancing enabled by indexical pattern mapping is limited to observed covarying 
relationships, an ability to appreciate symbolic patterns enables an agent to introduce new 
tokens by relating them to tokens that already exist in the network. This means that 
reference can be 'grounded' without having to observe token-referent relationships. 
Moreover, it also enables one to create or use tokens that have no real-world referents but 
that gain their meanings purely from their relationships with other symbol tokens. 
Specifically, 
[b ]ecause of our symbolic abilities, we humans have access to a novel higher-order representation system 
that not only recodes experiences and guides the formation of skills and habits, but also provides a means of 
representing features of the world that no other creature experiences, the world of the abstract. We do not 
just live our lives in the physical world and our immediate social group, but also in a world of rules of 
conduct, beliefs about our histories, and hopes and fears about imagined futures. (Deacon, 1997, p. 423) 
Deacon (1997) goes on to suggest that such abilities derive from the reuse of basic 
cognitive mechanisms. 
This world [the world of the abstract] is governed by principles different from any that have selected for 
neural circuit design in the past eons. We possess no brain regions specially adapted for handling the 
immense flood of experiences from this world, only those adapted for life in a concrete world of percepts 
and actions. (p. 423) 
These ideas tie in nicely with the earlier discussion of advanced cognition as an ability to 
image - that is, the ability to use our basic situated perception-action skills in an off-line 
manner. 
Symbols and Concepts in a Sociocultural Milieu 
So far I have been rather vague about the nature of the relations that are supposed to hold 
between tokens in a symbolic system and what the consequences of these relationships are 
for symbol users. Fortunately there exists a long tradition within sociolinguistics, social 
theory, and some parts of psychology that examines the interactions that hold between 
symbol systems, social structure, and cognition. For instance, Lock and Symes (1996) 
argue that the evidence from sociolinguistic, psychological, and anthropological research 
... broadly supports a view of communicative symbol systems as the providers of 'cognitive technologies or 
'tool-kits' that variously afford analytic, context-independent thought. This is not to claim that language 
determines thought, but that conceptual systems can make some universal mental operations more or less 
difficult to carry out. As an example of what we mean by this, we draw an analogy with the differences 
between the Roman and Arabic number systems. The mental operations of multiplication and division are 
available to users of both systems, but the symbolic 'tool-kits' affect the ease with which these operations 
286 
can be perfonned: it is easier to divide 63 by 9 to get 7 than LXIII by IX to get VII. Similarly, it is easier to 
think about, and even perceive, the structure of society and how communication systems operate within it if 
one possesses a symbol system which symbolizes these things. (p. 230) 
So symbol systems, especially languages, are not just concept-neutral tools for expressing 
ideas, as the communicative theorists would have it, but they are also things that re-present 
the world in a particular way. They are, in essence, cultural conceptual systems, so in 
learning to use these symbol systems, people learn about these conceptual systems. 
Concepts, in this sense, are cultural entities that correspond to a collection of skills that 
'belong together' in a particular community's activities. Hendriks-Jansen (1996), 
borrowing extensively from Clark (1993), puts it this way: 
Concepts do not correspond to specific internal states or structures. They must be equated with the ability to 
exercise a particular skill: the skill of deploying the concept in all relevant situations that do not lead to 
category mistakes. Internally, such a skill may be sustained by a variety of disjunct computational states that 
need to have nothing in common from the point of view of physics, neuroscience, or even computational 
psychology. They are held together purely by the fact that, together, they enable an agent to "negotiate some 
macro-level domain which interests us in virtue of our daily human life." (p. 284) 
Thus, to use an analogy from Clark (1993), being able to use a symbol, that stands for a 
concept like dog, is like being a skilled golfer. The skills that hang together as golf skills, 
such as hitting balls over long distances, then over smaller distances into little holes, and so 
on, are culturally, not neurobiologically or computationally related. Similarly 
being good at thinking about dogs and acting appropriately with respect to dogs (which is what having the 
concept of "dog" amounts to) does not mean being good at manipulating some internal symbol that can be 
identified with the word "dog" or the various properties of dogs. The different skills involved in having 
thoughts about dogs do not share a common causal factor that may be found within the person who has 
mastered the concept. These skills are only about the concept because they converge on the public linguistic 
and cultural entity "dog," in the same way as the rearing skills of the mother duck are about her duckling 
only because they converged on the duckling "in the real world." (Hendrilcs-Jansen, 1996, p. 284) 
This perspective shows how concepts, as external public entities, can be understood ~s a 
collection of linked situated, on-line skills. In learning to grasp communal concepts one is 
effectively learning how a variety of perception-action skills 'go together'. Some may be 
skills that are directly relevant to the immediate situation and thus are the kind of skills that 
a fully basic cognizer might use. But many others may normally (for a basic cognizer) 
relate to 'distant environmental situations'. In the symbolic/conceptual framework of the 
agent's community these skills are considered to be relevant to the current situation. It is 
through the use of symbol systems (primarily language) that agents gain access to these 
relationships. 
It is entirely possible that the neurallbodily mechanisms that enable the diverse skills that 
underpin a concept become neurally 'connected', perhaps via reentrant signalling or some 
other kind of constructive neurobiological process. But this should not be viewed as 
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evidence in favour of the cognitivist strategy of trying to explain cognitive activity purely 
in tenns of neurobiological phenomena. This would be a bit like trying to understand body 
building purely in tenns of muscle physiology while ignoring key factors such as the 
biomechanical effects of using weight resistance and the properties of training 
programmes. The 'glue' that holds together the situated perception-action skills exists 
initially only in the set of semantic relationships that exist within communal 
symbolic/conceptual networks (i.e., languages and 'discourses'). 
Is there any evidence that learning to use language enables an ability to cognize in an 
advanced fashion - to be able to 'think' in an abstract and off-line manner? I believe that a 
good number of the findings in early cognitive developmental psychology are consistent 
with this hypothesis. 
The Guided Reinvention of Advanced Cognition 
Mature human beings do not simply live in their immediate environments. Perceived 
objects and events remind us of other things and, in off-line cogitating, we can consider 
things which seem to have nothing at all to do with our current environmental situation. 
How is it that humans become able to do such things? By and large the evidence suggests 
that we do not begin life with such an ability. As newborns we enter the world as basic, 
situated cognizers for whom the immediate environment is fairly much all there is to life. 
Many theories of cognitive development propose, sometimes only implicitly, that, over the 
first few years of life, we develop some kind of internal time-space distancing mechanism. 
But, from an interactionist perspective, such a move does not seem to be workable. A 
promising alternative, as I have been suggesting in this chapter, is to argue that immersion 
in a human social environment enables children to grasp ways in which the here-and-now 
may relate to distant environments (e.g., Lock, 1980, 1991). It is worth investigating 
whether the dynamics of a human environment can help construct a child's developing 
time-space distancing abilities. Within some of the child development literature there is 
suggestive evidence that communicative interactions between infants and others provides 
the requisite social scaffolding for eliciting time-space stretching skills. 
For instance, Nelson (1996) points out that around the middle of the child's first year 
Parents tend to institute signals, explicit and implicit, that provide guidance to the child's anticipation and 
participation. For example, a mother may routinely ask, "Do you want lunch now?" before heading to the 
kitchen, or, "How about a bath?" as the accustomed hour draws near. Babies toward the end of the fIrst year 
respond to these verbal, and nonverbal, signs, typically following or even preceding the parent in the 
expected direction. (p. 97) 
Parents seem to be providing symbolic links between events in the here and now with 
'distant' events. Lock (1991; Lock et al., 1989) refers to this phenomenon whereby an 
adult (or older peer or sibling) makes explicit the 'distant' implications of things in the 
288 
here-and-now, as context hopping. In context hopping situations the child is encouraged to 
expand what they 'see' when they perceive events and objects. Language is being used by 
the senior partner to attach objects and events from distant environments to things in the 
local environment. Lock (1991) gives the following examples from observations he and his 
colleagues (Lock, Service, Brito, & Chandler, 1989) have made of an 18 month old 
interacting with his mother. 
Example 1. "It's like the clock at home." Here she is showing the child a clockwork toy, and focusing his 
attention on the key that winds it up. 
Example 2. "It's a snake. Remember the one you had at the fairground once?" Now she is showing him a 
different toy, but still relating what he sees to another temporally displaced context. 
Example 3. "He's got boots on, hasn't he? They look like Daddy's shoes." At this point they are looking at a 
picture book, and again she betrays her presupposition that her infant understands a lot of what she is saying, 
that her words serve to bring to his mind, as the picture does in hers, a remembered event. 
Example 4. Still looking at the book, she says: "Ooh, it's a red car, isn't it, like the one we saw in the garage 
when we got petrol this morning." (p. 289) 
Lock (1991) describes what he believes are the effects of these sorts of interactions on the 
child in the following way: 
Unless asked to remember, [the infant] might not: He might stay context bound. In all the aforementioned 
examples, left to his own devices, the infant might not be motivated to exercise what we call "his memory," 
to see (literally) this event in front of him as having any connection to an event that can be accessed only 
through the directive and depictive content of his mother's words (and, later, it is claimed that the mother's 
strategy not only is acting in a constitutive manner with respect to her child's memory skills, but is changing, 
inter alia, his experience of objects and events as he perceives them). (p. 289) 
During this period, between about 15 and 24 months, children begin to engage in, what 
Lock (1993) calls, symbolic referential communication. Prior to the second half of the 
second year children use words in a holistic manner that is usually strongly tied to the 
immediate context "such that when a child says "down," for example, as it puts an object 
down, it means all of <I am putting that object down>, and is not coding just one item of 
meaning." (Lock, 1993, p. 284). However towards the end of the second year children 
seem to come to grasp the insight that individual objects have names. At this point a 
'naming explosion' or 'vocabulary burst' occurs where there is a sudden increase in the 
vocabulary learning rate. What seems to be happening here is that the child is moving from 
learning words in, what Deacon (1996, 1997) refers to as, an indexical manner (the kind of 
learning accomplished by association of a sound or gesture and an object or event) to 
learning words in a symbolic manner where there exists a "generalizable "understanding" 
of the relation between sounds and objects, a relation that holds over differing objects and 
contexts." (Lock, 1993, p. 283). Thus children come to use words to refer to elements of a 
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situation and not the entire situationl72 . They have moved from using words holistically to 
using them predicatively: 
The separate components coded in the adult language [begin to be] constructed: actions, in English, need to 
be constructed as separate from agents and patients: where "kick" might originally mean <I am kicking the 
ball>, it has come to just represent the act of kicking; similarly for "ball" uttered in the same circumstances. 
Once these differentiations are made, then the child is moving itself beyond the realm of reference to that of 
predication; not just identifying something as a ball, but identifying a ball and saying something about it. 
(Lock,1993,p.284) 
A number of authors have suggested that the advent of an ability to predicate signals the 
beginning of an ability to think beyond the current context using symbolic tools because 
the predicate can refer to an out-of-context (unperceivable) feature of the subject (e.g., 
Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; Lock, 1993; Reed, 1996; Russell, 1996). At this stage words are 
beginning to be lifted out of their embedded context and have become at least slightly 
'decontextualised'173. Words are not just used to accompany or move along events as they 
have been up until this point. However, this is still the primary function of language at this 
age (Nelson, 1996). Once the child has mastered an ability to comment, they have the 
potential to explicitly link something in the immediate environment with something 
beyond the current context. Typically this pre-grammatical predication is not enough for 
making any complex statements about things beyond the immediate context. Yet pre-
grammatical predication does provide a communicative environment where adults and 
older siblings and peers can help young children extract the implications of their speech 
and make more explicit the meanings of the words they use. And it is in this environment 
that we see children and caregivers engaging in context-hopping 'dialogues'. Nelson 
(1996) and others have argued that it is these sorts of social interactions which provide the 
necessary scaffolding for coming to grips with more powerful grammatically-based symbol 
structures. 
Between the ages of about two and four years children enter an opening to language phase 
where they can actively incorporate what is said to them into their understanding of the 
world (Nelson, 1996). At this time children acquire much of the grammar of their 
community's language(s) (Lock, 1993). In grammatically sophisticated language many of 
the aspects of communicated information are explicitly marked by words, inflections, 
172 Lock et al. (1989) have observed that at around this age many parents direct their child's attention to 
objects, parts, and relations that hold between them when, for instance, looking at picture books. They 
suggest that this might provide an opportunity for coming to grips with the idea that words map onto 
elements of a scene. 
173 In terms of Karmiloff-Smith's (1992, 1994) approach, discussed in the previous chapter, children are 
making their knowledge more explicit. 
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word-order and so on. So at this stage of development, children have learnt that symbols 
can be combined to produce very specific meanings that do not depend upon there being a 
shared context between the speaker and the listener (Lock, 1999; Lock & Symes, 1996). 
They have, in the terms of Deacon's theory, learnt how to ground reference by appreciating 
a large number of token-token relationships (both syntactic and semantic). This radically 
expands the child's ability to use symbols to go beyond the here and now. When one can 
string together a complex symbol structure all kinds of relationships to distant, abstract, 
and imaginary objects and events can be made with some element of the local 
environment. However, between two and four years this ability is still far from adult-like. 
Children of this age can both understand another person's utterances and can use it to 
modify their own world knowledge, yet, as noted in the previous section on cognitive 
development, they cannot easily appreciate that what they are told may constitute a 
different point of view from their own. Nelson (1996) claims that these children cannot 
"maintain two simultaneous mental representations of the same situation ... " (p. 129). 
Linguistic information, it seems, cannot be held apart as representing someone's point of 
view as distinct from one's own. It either feeds in to one's own view of the world or it is 
ignored. 
At about four or five years of age children overcome this limitation. Nelson (1996) calls 
this the language-modelling phase. In this phase another's discourse can be used by the 
individual to construct an independent alternative point of view that can be juxtaposed with 
one's own point of view. It is quite possible that specific sophisticated grammatical 
developments enable this sort of ability. For instance, de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) 
have shown that children's ability to appropriately understand complements (e.g., She 
thought/said/claimed that the cake was in the cupboard) predicts success at false belief 
tasks (but not vice versa). To understand a complement a listener must be able appreciate 
that a proposition can be true even though part of it may be false (e.g., 'Tom thinks that the 
world is flat' may be true even though 'the world is flat' is false). That is, de Villiers and 
de Villiers' research suggests that it is developments in particular linguistic skills which 
underpin success in cognitive tasks that involve appreciating virtual environments and not 
the other way around. 
It appears that about the age of four, most children have developed a near-adult ability to 
comprehend and produce symbolic patterns that weld together aspects of the immediate 
context with distant, and even abstract, objects and events. Moreover, they can consider 
these symbolic relations independently of their own personal understanding of the world. 
This is truly an ability to imagine in the sense that most adults mean it. 
Conclusion 
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How does a distributed view of language help us to understand advanced cognizing from 
an interactionist perspective? Crudely speaking, the idea pursued here is that external 
public symbols can serve as 'stimuli' for triggering an appropriate activity pattern in the 
same way that the symbol's referent might. "There's a mugger around the comer" can 
initiate mugger-avoiding behaviour in the same sort of way as the sight of someone lurking 
suspiciously nearby. A cognitivist might argue that advanced cognitive power of language 
and other symbol systems is parasitic on the deeper pre-existing cognitive power of 
thought which is understood as a computational process involving subpersonal 
representations. By contrast, the distributed view of language suggests that it is the external 
symbol system itself, which is concretely realised by actual language usage within a 
community, that can 'connect' things in the current environment with things that are 
temporally or spatially distant or are abstract in nature. Language-users begin life as 
possessors of a basic cognitive package of situated perception-action skills that enable 
them to learn to use the symbol system to, in a sense, access the world beyond the concrete 
here-and-now. No subpersonal internal representation system is required in this scenario 
only an ability to respect and use the relationships that hold between the symbols that make 
up an external symbol system. 
In language production a person perceives something in their local environment and knows 
how to produce an appropriate linguistic response. In language comprehension a person 
perceives an external symbol structure and knows how to produce an appropriate 
behavioural response which itself may be the production of another external symbol 
structure. In both cases knowing how call arise from some kind of pattern-mapping device 
that does not need to possess a compositional architecture. Some sort of sophisticated 
connectionist system may do the job. In skilled self-directed speech, where the same agent 
plays the role of both producer and comprehender, these same coupled pattern-mapping 
processes can go on with a minimal amount of 'efferent leakage'. This may look as if some 
kind of subpersonal internal symbolic computing is going on, but it is in fact a case of 
internalization or the private appropriation of personal-level social skills. This echoes 
Vygotsky's (1930-1935/1978) claim that "[e]ach function in the child's cultural 
development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, 
between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological)." (p. 
57). 
This interactionist view of advanced cognition may seem to be a little too behaviourist for 
many cognitive scientists' tastes. For many, such a position might seem to be an attempt to 
resurrect Skinner's (1957) approach to language that Chomsky (1959) so successfully 
demolished. However the interactionist position must be much more sophisticated than 
Skinner's. It will require a detailed theory of the 'cognizer's innards' that, perhaps, builds 
l; . 
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on research with embodied neural networks. It will also require a much more complex 
understanding of the environment than can be formulated in terms of operants, reinforcers, 
and punishers. And, perhaps most importantly, it will require a sophisticated understanding 
of the interaction dynamics that exist in the development, learning, and practicing of 
symbolic skills. Such a theory will be something like a sociolinguistic extension of 
Christensen and Hooker's (2000, in press) notion of gradient tracking. From this 
perspective symbol structures form a special kind of environmental gradient; environment 
regularities that can be used to expand one's interactive horizon. Moreover, symbol 
structures are gradients that humans can produce in almost any situation and that are 
constantly skilfully modified. Christensen and Hooker argue that intelligent behaviour 
occurs in systems that are capable of self-directed anticipative learning. These are, roughly, 
systems that can tune and even construct new gradient tracking processes. Learning to use 
language can be usefully understood in these terms. In production we are constantly 
learning how to best use language to provide a 'gradient' that effectively regulates the 
behaviour of others (or oneself in the case of self-directed speech). In comprehension we 
are constantly modifying our gradient tracking skills in trying to make the best use of the 
symbol structures produced by othersl74. 
In an important sense, the view I have developed here does not quite mesh with the simple 
claim that I started with. Initially I suggested that advanced cognition involves the 
'activation' of situated activity patterns by external symbols. Perhaps a better way to 
understand the influence of external symbol systems on cognition is in terms of their 
ability to expand an agent's Umwelt or cognitive horizon (e.g., Lock, 1999). This 
broadening of the cognitive horizon is much larger and more varied than one that can be 
had by an 'indexical' cognizer because symbol systems enable an agent to both 'associate' 
objects and events that they have never seen together, and associate objects and events with 
imaginary, hypothetical, and abstract entities. An indexical cognizer could perhaps 
associate a token for referent! with referent2 but the result would not be an association of 
referentl and referent2. Rather the token would either become associated with both referents 
(i.e., it would have a disjunctive content) or, given time, the association with referentl 
would be extinguished. A symbol-user, on the other hand, might, for example, come to 
associate a place with death or happiness simply because they had been told about such an 
association. Experience with a symbolic environment enables one to 'see' much more in 
the local environment than one would from a basic cognitive point of view. One can, 
sometimes slowly and deliberately, spin out a 'symbolic gradient' that can help modulate 
174 This does not just include a pure semantic appreciation, but also more importantly includes skill in 
detecting pragmatic and paralinguistic subtleties such as irony, lying, and honesty. 
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one's behaviour with respect not just to simple causal regularities, but also with respect to 
possibilities, likelihood's, desired goals, and fears. A skill with symbols fundamentally 
transforms the way the world looks and feels. 
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9. Where is Cognition? 
Like Humpty Dumpty, brain, body, and world are going to take a whole lot of putting back together again. 
Andy Clark (1997, p. 222). 
The traditional way of replying to inquiries about the whereabouts of cognition is to point to a 
location in the head, specifically to the brain. This, I believe, is the primary commitment of 
cognitivism. The representational and computational hypotheses central to modem cognitivist 
theory derive from an attempt to understand how time-space distancing can be achieved by 
systems that 'cognize in their heads'. The mental representation system provides the critical 
subpersonal mechanism for 'stretching' the influence of the environment over space and time. 
Many cognitivists argue that creative, compositional, representational systems, such as those 
possessed by humans, enable the even more spectacular cognitive skill of modulating behaviour 
with regard to possible, hypothetical, counterfactual, and imaginary states of affairs. 
The intrinsic intemalism apparent in these cognitivist assumptions can be understood as the 
result of a long scientific and philosophical history of attempts to locate the mechanism 
necessary for the spontaneity, animacy, and sentience of living things, especially of 
animals and even more especially of human beings, within part of the body. Descartes has 
often been criticised by modem theorists for a lack of mechanistic zeal - for preserving the 
truly human in some mysterious non-materialistic esprit. Yet he also clearly articulated the 
position that most animals are mere machines explainable by natural philosophy. 
Cognitivism reveals its ties to Descartes in two important ways. First, it has attempted to 
scientifically validate Descartes' idea that there is a single locus of cognition within the 
body - the brain has become the instructor, the controller, and the thinker, for the entire 
person. Second, cognitivism has relegated bodily (non-brain) processes, reflexes, and 
sensorimotor activity to the realm of the 'merely mechanical'; the important stuff goes on 
in the central neural circuits. 
Forces within the sciences have been struggling with this Cartesian and Newtonian picture 
of the merely mechanical for the entire twentieth century. In recent decades, with the 
advent of fields such as non-linear thermodynamics, it has become obvious that the world 
of matter does not just consist of linear, passive, equilibrium, reversible reactions 
(Prigogine & Stengers, 1985; Swenson & Turvey, 1991). The picture of the billiard-ball 
universe has been shattered. Scientists are beginning to appreciate how complex, 
environmentally sensitive, dynamic order can arise quite naturally in even relatively simple 
physical systems. A growing number of scientists argue that these natural dynamic 
processes may also be at work in living systems. These ideas are beginning to filter into 
explanations of animal and human behaviour in psychology and the cognitive sciences. 
Incorporating these influences into psychology is no small task. Even simple animals such 
'~ - .", - - ,," -
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as insects are much more complicated than self-organising physical systems like the 
Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction. It is more than likely that the current tools used for 
analysing these relatively simple physical dynamical systems will be woefully inadequate 
for understanding people and other cognizers. Despite this probability, current dynamical 
systems strategies and methods already provide an opportunity for challenging many of the 
assumptions of the cognitivist computational approach to cognition. 
Embodied, situated, and distributed interactionism has arisen within this intellectual 
climate where explanations of complex order ride on an appreciation of issues such as 
decentralisation, emergence, complex cooperativity, and constraint satisfaction (Resnick, 
1994). In this thesis I have attempted to tie together some of the insights of researchers 
who are open-minded about the prospects of moving beyond the current representational-
computational framework by understanding behaviours, including human behaviours, in 
distributed interactionist terms. This final chapter summarises the framework sketched thus 
far and offers some comments about the ways in which interactionist theoretical and 
empirical work might be developed and encouraged. 
The Lessons of Interactionism 
Agent-Environment Systems and Autonomy 
In chapter 4 I enumerated several themes that recur in many of the embodied, situated, and 
distributed interactionist fields of research that were examined in chapter 3. Perhaps the 
key theme is that cognition should be understood as something that occurs within an agent-
environment system. On the surface this may seem to be a rather trite claim, but it in fact 
signals the biggest difference between interactionism and cognitivism. Of course, 
cognitivism has always allowed the environment a role in cognition. In that tradition the 
environment provides input and a place for motor output. However, the concept of the 
agent-environment system goes, or should go, much further than this. What this system 
concept implies is that there is no such place as the mind. Rather, there exists minded 
activity which involves a complex interaction between neural, bodily, and environment 
events. In this view the world does not need to be understood as getting into people's heads 
so that thoughtful behaviour can be produced. In interactionism environmental entities stay 
in the environment and the agent modulates their behaviour by detecting and manipulating 
those entities. People, and other cognizers, are viewed as complex systems who are 
sensitive to the environment and who use the environment in their day-to-day projects 
which, at root, involve maintaining their autonomy. In making reference to the notion of 
autonomy, interactionism commits itself to a vision ofthe cognizer as inherently concerned 
with staying alive by making sure that they act appropriately in the environment. 
Autonomy implies that cognizers are, at base, systems that possess biological norms for 
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maintaining their systemic integrity. Cognizers are fundamentally systems that sense, 
coordinate with, modulate, and manipulate the world. 
Interactionist Innards 
Our understanding of the role of the cognizer's neural and bodily mechanisms changes 
when we conceive of the cognizer as primarily designed to detect and manipulate 
environmental entities. In cognitivism the mindlbrain is viewed as an infonnation 
assembler and user - a small biological factory for building interpretations, ideas, and 
plans. An interactionist detect-and-manipulate architecture, on the other hand, is best 
understood in tenns of a regulatory, coordinative, and integrative nervous system coupled 
with a complex body. Functionally speaking, this system consists of perceptual instruments 
andperfonnance instruments that are wired together by a complex of neural control 
structures. These instruments are, perhaps, wired together in a kind of subsumption 
architecture made up of semi-autonomous, behaviour-layers that have high-bandwidth 
connectivity within a layer and low-bandwidth external connectivity among the layers. 
These are essentially complex sensorimotor control systems. On this view, behaviour is not 
understood as existing prefonned in some kind of neurally realised plan or template. 
Rather, behavioural activity is understood to emerge from subtle, homeostatic couplings 
between the topography of the local environment and the supple dynamic activity of 
sensory systems and action systems. Imagine a water-filled balloon being balanced on a 
single finger. The balloon constantly wobbles as its centre of gravity changes and the 
finger-hand-ann system continuously feels for and compensates for these wobbles by way 
of a continuous sequence of tiny motor movements. These movements then alter the 
dynamics of the balloon and the centre of gravity changes again requiring more finger-
hand-arm movements. Think of the balloon as the environment and of the finger system as 
the agent. This is the interactionist's guiding image. 
Complex, cultivated activity, to use Hughlings Jackson's tenn (Whitcombe, 1996), 
emerges from the fact that these behaviour systems can be modified by learning. Many 
animals are capable of tuning and assembling their basic sensorimotor control systems in 
the light of experience, practice, and play (Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press). From an 
internal, subpersonal perspective, control parameters are explored and associative 
connections are forged or modified. From a whole-animal perspective new and improved 
skills for exploratory and perfonnatory action are learned. 
Basic Cognitive Abilities 
In may seem puzzling as to how these situated, sensorimotor systems manage to modulate 
their behaviour when the sensed environmental entities do not make contact with the 
agent's body. Most theorists claim that this is not a problem because distal perception 
I.,': . 
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ensures that the agent and the relevant environmental entity can remain in contact. Often 
this relationship is theorised in terms of some kind of information transfer between the 
environment and the agent's sensory surfaces. This relationship is analogous to the way a 
message is passed down a phone line by a caller to a receiver. This image is no doubt at 
work in the use of communication science's information theory by psychologists and other 
cognitive scientists. This image is probably responsible for the idea that the cognizer must 
actively (computationally) mine the sparse raw data given in the message from the 
environment for an 'intended' or original message (see Knapp, 1986). These ideas lie at the 
heart of the cognitivist understanding of perception and force on us a representational 
understanding of even quite basic cognitive relationships between animals and their 
environments. 
However, distal perception can be understood in another way in terms of contact with the 
'causal consequences' of the environmental entity on the local environment (e.g., Thomas, 
1999). In this essentially Gibsonian view, the local environmental arrays can be understood 
to be composed of potentially trackable gradients that the organism can follow or avoid 
(Christensen & Hooker, 2000, in press). In Gibson's (197911986) terminology gradients 
specify the existence of particular environmental object and events. Animals possess 
sensory systems that are sensitive to these gradients. An animal's Umwelt is constituted by 
these specifications of 'distant' objects and events. However, animals do not just wait 
about or randomly chance upon these gradients. Instead, they actively and skilfully explore 
and interrogate their surroundings in search of them. Animals manipulate their 
environments in two ways (Rowlands, 1999): they carry out exploratory, or epistemic, 
actions for getting environmental information and performatory, or pragmatic actions in 
order to serve their material needs. 
Thus, a distal-perceptual gradient tracking explanation promises to keep the interactionist 
image intact in the face of the problem of coordination with distant, but still causally 
potent, environmental entities. The water-filled balloon analogy suggested earlier can be 
modified by thinking of the water-filled balloon as being balanced on a stick that is grasped 
by the hand-arm system. This is a more complex coupled system but it remains a detect-
and-manipulate system. No message is transmitted from balloon to hand, yet agent and 
environment remain coupled. 
Advanced Cognitive Abilities 
The interactionist vision can potentially explain a good number of the time-space 
distancing abilities of humans and other animals. I have argued that a basic, situated 
cognitive creature realised by an autonomous system with a regulatory, coordinative, and 
integrative nervous system can modulate its behaviour with regard to current distal 
environmental entities, future states of the environment that are specified in the current 
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local environmental structure (anticipation), and past states of the environment (basic, 
recognition-type memory and pattern-mapping learning). But what about the, perhaps 
uniquely human, abilities for thinking about things that are truly out of context, in the 
sense that there exists nothing at all in the local environment that can be used as an index 
of their presence? These are genuinely representation hungry situations. Surely here the 
notion of a mental representation must come into its own (Clark, 1997; Clark & Toribio, 
1994). Representation hungry situations are a deep problem for the determined 
interactionist. The subtle detect-and-manipulate powers of situated robots built with 
subsumption architectures or controlled by embodied neural networks seem far from 
capable of exercising such advanced cognitive powers. 
The suggestion I have made is that a shared external symbol system might be able to 
transform the situated cognizer into a representation-savvy creature without us needing to 
postulate the existence of an internal mental modelling subsystem. Many animals 
coordinate their behaviour with respect to things in the environment that they cannot 
directly sense via the communicatory efforts of others of their kind. These social animals 
produce calls or displays that can inform others of the presence of particular environmental 
objects or events. This kind of indexical ability to use calls and displays as referential signs 
(Deacon, 1996, 1997) can be understood as a kind of social/communal gradient-tracking 
phenomenon where the communicatory behaviour of conspecifics serve as gradients. 
Humans have developed very sophisticated varieties of these social-communicatory 
gradient systems. We call them languages. 
Languages instantiate shared conceptual systems and they exist concretely in terms of 
interlocking systems of narratives and discourses. Roughly speaking, these are publicly 
shared systems that specify the relations that hold between environmental entities and the 
kinds of behaviours that are considered appropriate responses to those entities. Because 
languages specify relationships that hold between in-context entities and out-of-context 
entities they can be used to access those out-of-context entities. Once the agent has access 
to such entities, they can serve as 'stimuli' for the modulation of behaviour. Thus, in this 
view, language constitutes a kind of portable environmental gradient production (and 
comprehension) system for flexibly regulating behaviour. People learn to use languages 
but their compositional syntactic and semantic structure is not realised in the organisation 
of their neural architecture. Rather, various neurallbodily systems provide the pattern-
mapping mechanisms necessary for skilfully producing and comprehending utterances in 
appropriate circumstances (Bechtel, 1993a, 1996; Rowlands, 1999). 
This is admittedly an incomplete theory of advanced cognition, but it is one that I believe 
is worth pursuing. In order to elaborate this framework, it will be necessary to study 
language and its cognitive consequences in social and ecological settings and to pay close 
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attention to the ways in which syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of language-use 
work together to realise language's powerful regulatory and modulatory properties. Such 
research is already being carried out in the fields of artificial life (Hutchins & Hazlehurst, 
1991, 1995; Parisi, 1997) and situated robotics (Steels, 1998). This research complements 
existing traditions in psychology and other social and cognitive sciences that seek to 
understand the role of language and narrative in the 'social construction' of human 
cognitive skills (e.g., Harre & Gillett, 1994; Lock, 1980, 1999; Lock & Symes, 1996; 
Nelson, 1996). The theoretical positions of these different researchers may not always be in 
agreement, but I believe that they are sufficiently similar in their aims for there to be some 
fertile exchanges of ideas that could develop and bolster the interactionist vision of 
advanced cognition that I have described in this thesis. 
Studying Cognition Interactionist Style 
Little of what I have discussed in the previous chapters makes direct contact with the 
phenomena examined, and terminology utilised, within traditional cognitive psychology. 
Thus, there is a risk that interactionism will evolve into an obscure side discipline 
"specializing in slime molds and six-legged insects ... " (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996, p. 1) that 
is ignored by cognitive psychologists and their cognitive science kin. Unfortunately, there 
is no simple way to provide alternative interactionist explanations of such things as 
attention, explicit memory, working memory, and problem-solving. Such tasks are 
formidable ones that will require a lot of time and much empirical research and theoretical 
analysis. However, what can be done at this stage is to outline the kind of strategies that an 
interactionist might employ for making sense of the various cognitive phenomena that 
feature centrally in modem cognitive psychological research. 
A reasonable number of the research findings I have described have been discovered using 
traditional experimental techniques in laboratory settings. But a good deal of interactionist-
inspired research has arisen because researchers have embraced a variety of non-traditional 
(at least within psychology) procedures and strategies for studying cognitive activity. In 
order to investigate issues such as perception-action cycles, environmental manipulation, 
and interactive emergence researchers will need to alter or supplement existing methods of 
research. Broadly speaking, there seem to be three kinds of strategy that will assist the 
interactionist: an emphasis on detailed observation, an experimental methodology that 
preserves important agent-environment relations, and an experimental rather than purely 
analytic approach to modelling. 
Detailed Observation 
Much of the interactionist-oriented empirical research that I have discussed in the previous 
chapters involves giving close attention to the fine detail of the actual activity that people 
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and other cognizers engage in. For instance, Ballard et al.'s (1995, 1997) research involved 
the careful monitoring of eye and hand movements, and Hutchins (1995a, 1995b) spent 
many days observing and recording the activities of people at work in various natural 
environments. Hendriks-Jansen (1996) notes that two of the key orienting attitudes of 
ethology are "start all analysis from a secure base of description" and "view behavior in the 
context of the environment to which it has been adapted." (p. 205). He argues that 
cognition researchers should also embrace these methodological assumptions. Detailed 
descriptive research is facilitated when researchers can easily access instruments, such as 
video cameras, for the careful recording of micro genetic interactions. Hendriks-Jansen 
observes that the explosion in micro genetic infant developmental research began when 
such instruments became available in the mid 1970s. Detailed observation of cognitive 
activity in natural environments makes it possible to grasp the kinds of small-scale 
temporally-extended interactions that occur between agents and their environments (which 
may include other agents). The ability to gather such information is obviously important 
for interactionist research. It also enables theorists to understand cognitive activity in 
dynamical systems terms because such research can throw up thickly described time series 
data sequences. Perhaps the most important reason for spending a good deal of time 
engaged in such exploratory research is that the true complexity of real-world cognitive 
activity can be appreciated with such a strategy. 
Experiments that Preserve Interaction 
Once a researcher has a good understanding of how cognIzers act in their natural 
environments, they can explore the ways in which varying environmental conditions affect 
the production of cognitive activity in more controlled, experimental conditions. 
Experiments, broadly understood, involve the systematic and controlled manipulation of 
the experimental situation. This enables the researcher to elicit information about the 
powers and limitations of cognizers that cannot be gleaned from simple observation. From 
an interactionist perspective, it is important that many of the essential features of real-
world cognitive activity are preserved in experimental research. For instance, ecological 
psychologists often vary the environmental conditions in their experiments in a similar way 
to most traditional psychological researchers. However, unlike many of their colleagues, 
ecological experimenters often arrange their experiments so that participants can actively 
control and manipulate their environments. The ecological psychologist's interest is in 
seeing how people modulate their exploratory and performatory actions in response to 
various kinds of environmental information. Such research manages to preserve the 
perception-action cyclic nature of cognition within the experimental situation. This stands 
in contrast to many traditional experiments where what the participant perceives is 
completely controlled by the experimenter and the actions of the participant cannot 
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influence the environmental dynamics. The coupling relationship between perception and 
action is effectively severed. Thus, well-designed experimental research built upon a solid 
descriptive base can illuminate an interactionist understanding of cognition. 
Experimental Modelling 
The third useful strategy for engaging in interactionist research is the building of simulated 
cognizing systems such as mobile robots. This use of simulation need not have the goal of 
building artificial cognizers. Rather, it should be understood as a computer-assisted attempt 
at constructing theoretical models of cognitive activity. Traditionally scientists have either 
formulated models in some natural or mathematical language or have built physical models 
of their target phenomena. Modem computers radically expand the scope and power of 
modelling possibilities by enabling theorists to construct complex, dynamic, and rigorous 
simulations of their target phenomena. Within behavioural research robotics offers a 
method of combining these powerful computational simulations with physical models. Of 
course, classical cognitivist researchers also build 'cognitive simulations' but the approach 
taken differs from that used by situated robotics and artificial life researchers. In classical 
simulation work much of the designing is planned prior to the building of the system by 
using formal task descriptions to map out relevant computational-level algorithms. By 
contrast, situated roboticists and artificial life researchers utilise a 'situated action strategy' 
where a simple system is constructed and then tried out in an environment to see how it 
copes. Information gleaned from such investigation is used to debug and tweak the design 
in order to make it function more effectively. The process continues by adding new 
components to the system or by altering its environment to see how such changes affect its 
activity. Gradually, through an ongoing process of trial and error a useful, functional model 
can be developed. This sort of simulation research is more like perfecting a recipe for 
baking a cake than the classical approach, which is akin to the drawing up of a building 
blueprint by an architect. The advantage of such experimental modelling is that it explicitly 
incorporates a 'reality-testing procedure' where real-world constraints, such as noise and 
slippage, bring to light important and useful lessons about engineering the internal 
dynamics of the simulated agent. For instance, Horswill (1992) notes that what I have 
called the experimental modelling approach can lead to fortuitous discoveries such as 
learning that a pair of crude sensor systems can compensate for each other's inadequacies, 
or, that a subsystem designed to enable one kind of activity actually solves an unrelated 
problem. 
These kinds of research strategies promise to focus the light of scientific inquiry more 
strongly upon those often overlooked aspects of human and animal activity that 
interactionist's believe are deeply implicated in the production of adaptive and intelligent 
behaviour. Interactionism is, at its core, a position that takes the study of cognition to be a 
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fundamentally multidisciplinary task that moves beyond the study of what goes on in 
people's heads. Modem cognitive science has achieved a lot through its interdisciplinary 
alliances, but its focus has remained the investigation of the individual and their brain. 
Interactionism's emphasis on the importance of the non-neural body, the topography ofthe 
physical environment, and social and cultural factors in cognitive activity, suggests that 
many other disciplines could be fruitfully incorporated into this cooperative enterprise. 
Currently cognitive science has very little to say about the ways in which people and 
animals use and relate to their surroundings, but environmental psychologists, geographers, 
ecologists, ergonomics and human factors researchers, and landscape researchers have 
tackled these issues from a variety of perspectives. Medical researchers, kinestheologists, 
and biologists of many stripes have detailed appreciations of the way bodies work. 
Sociologists, ethnographers, cultural anthropologists, and sociolinguists can tell us a good 
deal about the nature of social groups and cultures. If cognition is all about how animals, 
partiCUlarly we human animals, 'know how to do things', and cognitive science involves 
trying to understand this knowing, surely we should tap into the deep reservoirs of 
knowledge and expertise embodied in and distributed among all of these research 
traditions. 
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